Civil war white movement white guard path. white guard
white movement saved the honor of Russia in a revolutionary catastrophe. The feat of the Russian volunteers will forever remain proof that the Russian people did not "choose" the Bolshevik government, but resisted it to the last opportunity.
However, respecting the courage and sacrifice of our grandfathers *, it is useful to understand why they did not win. The reasons for the defeat, of course, are many and they are analyzed by different authors. In this article, we will touch upon the least studied question: what role did their allies of the Entente countries play in the fate of the Russian White armies. (To avoid accusations of bias, we will rely on a wide range of sources.)
Here is what Lenin wrote about this: “In the course of three years, the British, French, and Japanese armies were on the territory of Russia. There is no doubt that the most insignificant tension of these forces of these three powers would be quite enough to defeat us in a few months, if not a few weeks”; but this did not happen, since the Bolsheviks managed to "decompose" the enemy troops.
It was, of course, not a matter of the “decomposition” of the interventionists. And the fact that the notorious "intervention of 14 states against the Soviet republic" - was not. Foreign troops were sent to Russian territory with other goals - not to overthrow the power of the Bolsheviks. This "intervention" is divided into two different periods before the end of the First World War (November 1918) and after.
During the war, the Germans occupied the Baltic states and southern Russia to replenish depleted reserves - according to the Brest Treaty with the Bolsheviks. So the Germans did not fight against the Bolsheviks, but supported them in every possible way. It was important for the Germans to control the new government in Russia so that the eastern front would not be restored against them - and they hoped to exercise this control, on the one hand, with money and instructors for the Red Army that was being created, on the other hand, by agitation in neutral countries for the diplomatic recognition of the Bolsheviks ( especially after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which gave Germany huge Russian territories).
Instead of helping the White armies, the Entente by the beginning of 1919 decided to fence itself off from chaos in Russia with a cordon from the states bordering it - Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland. In January 1919, the Entente made an offer to the Whites that outraged them: to start negotiations with the Bolsheviks on the Princes' Islands ... Cases of "intervention" by the Entente countries on the territory of the former Russian Empire after November 1918 were aimed not overthrowing the power of the Bolsheviks, but ensuring their influence in the newly formed states.
Thus, the British were interested in Baku oil; by November 1919 they occupied Baku and railway to the port of Batumi. As one of the white figures recalled: “With the light hand of the British, the Georgians took a definitely hostile position towards the Russians in general and the Volunteer Army in particular. Russians in Tiflis were subjected to real persecution. The Russian Church suffered especially…”; even "asked the British to clarify whether we are dealing with allies or with enemies?" . Small British units also appeared in another coveted area of British interest - in the Transcaspian region, controlling the Krasnovodsk-Ashkhabad railway.
Even earlier, the British appeared in the Baltic states, in December 1918, after the Germans left from there - to support independence Baltic States. In August 1919, an English emissary, according to a pre-compiled list, appointed the North-Western Government under Gen. Yudenich, demanding that all members sign a sheet on which was “written in illiterate Russian ... recognition of Estonian independence,” otherwise the Entente would have stopped aid, recalled M Margulies (who participated in the compilation of this “government”).
However, the promised help from the Entente still did not follow even during the days of Yudenich’s offensive. Independent Estonians, in response to his request for help, said, “it would be unforgivable stupidity on the part of the Estonian people if he did this.” people”, at the request of Trotsky, disarmed the White Army and imprisoned him behind barbed wire in the winter. Thousands of white warriors and members of their families then died from diseases and Estonian repressions. For this, the Estonians received from the Bolsheviks about 1000 square meters. km of Russian lands under a peace treaty of February 2, 1920, and the Bolsheviks got the opportunity to export gold (masking its Russian origin) to other countries through the port of Tallinn.
France at the beginning of 1919 also staked out its sphere of influence in Odessa and Sevastopol, sending troops to replace the retreating Germans: two French and one and a half Greek divisions. Their command concluded an alliance for help with the government of the independent Ukrainian Directory, unable to control the situation; the French occupied Kherson, Nikolaev and advanced 100 km north of Odessa, forbidding the Volunteer Army from attacking the Petliurists.
But already in March-April, at the first threat from the Bolsheviks, although having a threefold superiority over them, the French hastily evacuated, taking Russian military vessels and the valuables of the State Bank from the White Army. Contrary to promises, the French did not hand over to the whites the richest front-line reserves of the tsarist army, which were left to the Bolsheviks during the flight ...
Don Ataman Krasnov, the French presented the following conditions of their "assistance": compensation to French entrepreneurs for all losses that occurred "due to the lack of order in the country, no matter what they expressed, in damage to machines and devices, in the absence of labor, ... must compensate those who lost ability to work, as well as to the families of those killed as a result of the riots, and to pay in full the average profitability of enterprises, adding to it a 5% surcharge for the entire time when these enterprises for some reason did not work, starting from 1914. "From the allies, contrary to established opinion, we did not receive a penny," wrote Gen. Krasnov on the situation on the Don. In this second period, often the only source of ammunition for the white units was to get them in battle from the reds (who used the central warehouses of the tsarist army). If the Entente countries provided some kind of material supply to the White armies, then on a strictly commercial basis. In the summer of 1919, Churchill explained to his Parliament that the equipment supplied by the Whites, being in excess for England, brought commercial benefits. In addition, the little that was supplied, as a rule, was trophy surplus (often from the captured Russian warehouses of the tsarist army) - and payment was taken for this exported Russian raw materials, grain, gold, as well as Russian funds in Western banks. On the whole, the allies and Japan then removed much more funds from Russia than they supplied weapons. For example, about 150 tons of gold was sent by Kolchak to Japan and the United States in payment for what was ordered, but not received equipment, one can also recall part of the Russian gold reserves and many other valuables taken by the Czechs from the Far East.
It should also be noted that supplies to Kolchak were promised only if he recognized the entire state debt of Russia. At the same time, the lion's share of supplies was intended for the Czechs. And when the need for a war against Germany disappeared, the Czechs refused to fight and, together with the allies, contributed to the uprising of the “Siberian democracy” (Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks) against Kolchak, who was treacherously extradited for reprisal French general Janen...
In the final period of the civil war, the British also evacuated their few contingents and in April 1920 even presented General Denikin (and his successor Wrangel) with a demand to stop fighting the Bolsheviks (for "Lenin guaranteed an amnesty to the Whites" ...).
The French, as Millerand later admitted, then provided short-term support to the Crimea for one single reason: to save the link of the above-mentioned "cordon" - Poland, where like-minded people came to power. Wrangel's army, hitting the rear of the Bolsheviks in Northern Tavria, diverted part of their forces from the Polish front. It was then (8/10/1920) that the de facto recognition of the Wrangel government by the French followed: so that he could use pre-revolutionary Russian funds stored abroad for the purchase of equipment, and at the same time undertake to pay the former debt to Russia. When did Poland, with the help of the Entente and Wrangel withstood the onslaught of the Reds - neither the Poles nor the French even thought to help the white Crimea. “But what is the point of us helping you? Let Russia still rot (he said so!) for 50 years under the Bolsheviks, and we will get on our feet and get stronger!.. ”- this was Pilsudski's answer to a request for help. In October, a Polish-Soviet treaty was signed in Riga, and Trotsky threw the liberated troops against Wrangel ... The end is known.
We also note that the Wrangel administration perceived French loans as “simply usurious”, and the conditions for the supply of equipment, according to P.B. Struve, were "extremely burdensome." France promised to deliver only its surpluses and trophies - in exchange for bread, coal, and wool so much needed in the Crimea itself. “In essence, French assistance was reduced, financially, to a tactical move that would allow France to receive from Wrangel the payment of the debts of his predecessor and sell him in installments someone else’s property that she did not need” . Of the actual French supplies, only one steamer managed to arrive with stocks of "things useless for war, worth about 8 million francs, according to an agreement concluded by General Denikin - and that's all." True, the French helped with the evacuation, but to pay for the "expenses" they took the Russian merchant and navy along with the cargo and even confiscated the personal accounts of people from the environment of the gene. Wrangel ... In Constantinople, not wanting to feed the Russian army (hoping for a resumption of the struggle!), the French sought to disperse it, persuaded them to return to the Crimea (where the promised "amnesty" turned into a terror of Kun and Zemlyachka), there was an attempt to assassinate the stubborn Wrangel ( someone's ship rammed his yacht in Constantinople)...
It is clear that the white emigration perceived this policy of the Entente countries as a betrayal (it was this that soon became the most important reason for the “Smenovekhovism” since the Russian cause in the West has no allies, then the emigration has no choice but to reconcile with the Bolsheviks and restore Russia from the inside ...) .But these are all well-known facts. Let's move on from the facts of betrayal to the analysis of its causes.
Examples of the divisive anti-Russian policy of the Entente are partly given above using the examples of the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Transcaucasia. There is also an official document top level: in May 1919, in a note by Clemenceau, also signed by Wilson and Lloyd George, a demand was put forward for the Supreme Ruler of Russia, Kolchak, to recognize the actual independence of all newly formed states. (Again, we note that almost everywhere, with the support of the Entente, they were headed by Freemasons. Thus, in addition to the Czechoslovak leaders T. Masaryk and E. Benes, Masonic sources mention: in Poland Pilsudski, in Georgia, Prime Minister Gegechkori and Minister of Foreign Affairs Chkhenkeli; in Ukraine, the chairman of the Central Rada M. Grushevsky, then the chairman of the Petliura Directory, there were many Freemasons among the Baltic politicians, for example, the Prime Minister of Lithuania M. Slezhavichus and the future president of Latvia Zemgal). Denikin then bitterly reproached the allies that, having not officially recognized any of the Russian White governments (with the exception of the “de facto” recognition of Wrangel for the sake of saving Poland), they willingly and hastily recognized all the new states that had arisen on the outskirts of Russia (These “independent states "obsequiously fawned over the Entente, refusing to help the White movement. Then, when communism came to their land in the form of historical retribution, all of them - Czechs, Poles, Caucasians, Estonians and even the heirs of the famous Latvian shooters - blamed only the Russians for this ... ) And in relation to the Russians themselves, for example, the British policy in the North of Russia “was a colonial policy, i.e. the one that they use against non-ferrous peoples”: the soldiers and officers “are so rude towards our peasant that the Russian person even hated to look at it,” wrote Gen. Marushevsky (according to democrat S. Melgunov - "one of the most objective observers"). “Cut off from almost the whole world by the difficulties of communications and the constraints of, let’s just say, the English ‘dictatorship’, we were positively politically blind. The slightest desire to penetrate this veil caused a certain opposition from the British command. Communication with Tchaikovsky in Paris was weak and consisted of letters that reached with rare couriers, other information was random and passed through English censorship. The humiliating dependence on foreigners led to the fact that even in purely Russian white territories, as in the Northern Region, “undoubted misunderstanding and even enmity between the authorities and the population” accumulated. One can imagine what a moral problem all this was for many white leaders, realizing their impotence and gritting their teeth, to compromise for the sake of at least some possibility of struggle ... It seems that Russia then could (theoretically) be saved by one thing: if in 1918 both the white generals and the Germans miraculously saw the light, concluding a conservative anti-Bolshevik alliance between themselves. The prerequisites for it are noted by many memoirists. Savich (deputy of the State Duma, participant in the Iasi meeting, then an employee of the governments and Wrangel) writes that even in Kadet circles at the beginning of the civil war, not everyone hoped for the Entente; many (even Milyukov) believed that “only the Germans can give us real help if we can prove that Russia, restored with their help, will be deeply grateful to them, will be their constant ally and friend. The latter point of view was apparently shared by the majority of those present” at the meeting described by Savic. To him, however, "it seemed incredible that the Germans would decide to expel their forced allies and obedient Bolshevik vassals during the still ongoing struggle in the West." At that time, a short-sighted, selfish bet on the dismemberment of Russia prevailed in German politics: the rejection of Ukraine and the Baltic states from it (and again, as in the Entente countries, this happened contrary to the opinion of many German military men who were ready to help the White movement ...). As bitterness accumulated from the betrayals of the Entente, Germanophile sentiments spread even in Siberia, surrounded by Kolchak - but it was too late: defeated Germany left the game and the Entente did not allow her to ally with the Russian Whites (otherwise the most famous attempt of such an alliance, the army of P. M. Avalov-Bermondt, could take more serious forms). However, the fact that soon Germany, seeking to change the results of the Treaty of Versailles, led a secret twenty-year cooperation with Bolshevik Russia indicates that the potential for a natural Russo-German alliance was there. And if there were more worthy governments in both countries, the fate of Europe could have turned out differently ... Denikin, we recall, at the beginning of the civil war, believed the promises of the allies in the Entente and remained faithful to them so much that he even acted to his own detriment. “We Russians did not conclude peace with the Germans,” General Denikin liked to say. And when in 1918 the Germans offered their help to the Volunteer Army, he categorically rejected it [however, agreeing to receive German ammunition through a formal intermediary, Gen. Krasnova - M.N.]. And when, in July 1918, the German cavalry, striving for the Kuban, occupied by the Volunteer Army, began to cross the Yeya River through the Kushchevsky railway bridge, the last one on the orders of Gen. Denikin was blown up, despite the fact that the White Army cut off its connection with the North ... ", recalled Denikin's ally, Colonel P.V. Koltyshev ... At the same time, Denikin refused to share with the gene. Krasnov to march on the Volga to reunite with the eastern anti-Bolshevik front, which promised an important strategic success; he preferred to occupy the Kuban and wait there for the arrival of the "allies" ... The inertia of the war against Germany and loyalty to the "allies", their false promises of help, together with Masonic solidarity behind the backs of the military - all this led to the fact that the tragedy of Russia had to end according to the scenario that had begun: the orientation of volunteers towards the Entente continued, which was not going to overthrow Bolsheviks. The monarchists in the White movement, under democratic pressure, were confused and were forced to roll up their banners, believing that the completed proclamation of the monarchical principle and the name of the February coup inevitably following from this by its real name would be tantamount to a refusal to assist the Entente, without which the success of the struggle against Bolshevism was considered unattainable.
Characteristic in this regard is the unsuccessful attempt by Tchaikovsky and Savinkov to convince their revolutionary "brother" Pilsudski, who already in the autumn of 1919 saved the Bolsheviks by concluding the first truce with them at the most critical moment - and even then consciously, in secret contact with Lenin ( through Yu. Markhlevsky) in order to give the Reds the opportunity to crack down on the Volunteer Army: "Cooperation with Denikin in his fight against the Bolsheviks does not meet the Polish interests." Negotiations between the Russian "brothers" and Pilsudski (January 1920) only led to Tchaikovsky and Savinkov promising the "complete democratization" of Denikin's government, which was to be headed by Tchaikovsky himself; Denikin had to agree (the Novorossiysk evacuation prevented the implementation of this plan). Moreover, from Savinkov's letter it is clear that one of the reasons for the conclusion of peace by the Poles with the Bolsheviks and with the Ukrainian independentists was "the persistent advice of Lloyd George" ...
That is, the Entente then used the Russian Freemasons as pawns in its geopolitical game: to overthrow and prevent the restoration of the monarchy in Russia, to dismember it, to create a "cordon sanitaire" (instead of liberating Russia from the Bolsheviks) - and then deceived their expectations. In exile, Russian Freemasons were not admitted either to the Peace Conference, or even to Western lodges for roles corresponding to theirs. Russian degrees dedications... They were suitable in the West, perhaps even for control over the Russian conservative abroad; conspiratorial emigrant organizations, headed by Masons, were tolerated by the Entente countries and the limitrophes controlled by it, not least because of intelligence services (Savinkov's organization is an example of this) ...
True, as has already been said, in exile many of the Februaryists began to realize what had happened. The same Tchaikovsky wrote already in 1920: “So, the governments of the great powers recognized the notorious criminals and traitors of the allied interests in the world war for legitimate power and not only entered into negotiations with it, but were also ready to conclude with it formal and deliberately inflated international contracts. Moreover, they not only did it themselves, but encouraged (if not forced) to do the same a whole number of weak ones who arose again at the expense of Russia with their own assistance, state formations... This is the whole horror of the modern world scandal! Sooner or later, all those guilty of this moral insanity, of course, will be called to account…” In another article, Tchaikovsky even reached such a true feeling: “There is something strange, unconscious and superstitious in this fear before the coming reaction in Russia. “Kolchak and Denikin are tsarists, and they are surrounded by well-known reactionaries and Black Hundreds!”...” (highlighted in the original).
At the Paris Foreign Congress in 1926, right-wing sentiments already prevailed among a considerable part of the Februaryists. Earlier, already in 1921, the monarchist congress in Reichenhall and the First All-Diaspora Council of the Russian Church Abroad in Sremski Karlovtsy, as well as the Far Eastern Zemsky Sobor in 1922, restored the tradition of monarchist legal awareness on the right flank of the Russian diaspora. Emigration straightened even more in the 1930s; at the same time, many Russian Masons left the lodges and returned to the Orthodox Church...
The consequence of the betrayal of Russia by the democracies in the First World War was that much fewer Russian emigrants fought on their side in World War II (most of all in the French army: about 3,000 young conscripts) than in alliance with the Germans. The vast majority of the white military emigration (members of the ROVS, NTSNP, RNSUV, etc.), remembering the lesson learned during the civil war, tried to fight for the creation of the Russian Liberation Army on the German side - both together with the former Soviet military personnel (ROA General Vlasov), and independently: the Cossack units of Krasnov, Shkuro, Turkula, the Russian Corps created in Yugoslavia, the 1st Russian national army B.A. Holmston-Smyslovsky. And in these difficult years for Russia, both old and new "allies" again demonstrated that Russia has no friends...
Since my Second world war the Western democracies were all with the same ideology, they again preferred an alliance with the Bolsheviks, and not with the people of Russia, and not only traded with our "cannibals", but also fought with them, and after the war they gave them millions of their opponents - deceitful way, with cruel reprisals in Judenburg, Plattling, Lienz ... Former "allies" handed over thousands of white emigrants for execution - Krasnov, Shkuro and other officers ...
The author of the book “Victims of Yalta” N. Tolstoy recalls that those Western figures whose past was connected with the White movement also participated in their extraditions: “Lord Killirn, the ambassador in Egypt, which became a transit point for many Russians repatriated in 1943-1945 High Commissioner in Siberia under Admiral Kolchak; Lieutenant General Burrows, head of the military mission in Moscow since March 1944, and Major General Colin Gubbins, head of the MTR [Services special operations by issuance. - M.N.], in 1919 they were in Arkhangelsk with General Ironside, and Field Marshal Alexander, to whom ... the Cossacks surrendered, fought against the Bolsheviks along with the Baltic Landswehr "and was awarded the Yudenich Order of St. Anna of the 3rd degree". Many of these military men again turned out to be powerless against the order that came from the already familiar political spheres: they always acted according to the law of some other morality, another force that crushed human feelings and ethical norms ...
All this is informative not only from a historical point of view. The present time is not much different from the described era: there are plenty of leading neo-Feburalists in Russia, and the goals of the “help” of the West are the same, first he helped Gorbachev’s “perestroika”, then the independence of the “peoples oppressed by Russia”, now he helps “building democracy” .. .
Against this background, the words of the First Hierarch of the Russian Church Abroad, Metropolitan Vitaly, do not seem at all an exaggeration: “All forces, billions of gold, will be thrown, just to extinguish the flame of the Russian Renaissance. This is what Russia is facing now. This is cleaner than Napoleon and Hitler.
Behind these words is the 75-year experience of the Russian white emigration.
1991 - 1993
The article was published in the newspapers "North-East" (Novosibirsk. 1993. No. 2-3), "Our Country" (Buenos Aires. 1993. No. 2251-2259), as well as in the magazines "Kuban" (Krasnodar. 1993 . No. 9-10) and "Moscow Bulletin" (1994. No. 2).
It is reproduced here in a slightly modified form: separate paragraphs are added in the form of additional illustrations and the topics reflected in other articles of this collection are shortened.
Mikhail Nazarov, "Mystery of Russia"
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Lenin V. PSS. M. 5th ed. T. 42. S. 22-23. |
White guard, your path is high: Black doula-chest and temple. God's yes white is your business: Your white body is in the sand. It's not a flock of swans in the sky: The White Guard's holy army With a white vision melts, melts ... The last dream of the old world: Youth-Valour-Vendee-Don. Marina Tsvetaeva
The White movement is a Russian national patriotic movement that originated in the spring of 1917 solely to save the collapsing statehood and army, which, according to the theorist of the Russian counter-revolution, General of the General Staff N. N. Golovin, was the positive idea of the movement. After the usurpation of power in the country by the Bolsheviks, the White Movement unites disparate and often hostile political groups and already acts as a force striving to overthrow Bolshevism.
For white movement was characteristic of its state purpose. It was interpreted as a necessary and obligatory restoration of law and order in the name of preserving national sovereignty and maintaining the international authority of Russia. In addition to fighting the Reds, the White movement also opposed the Greens and separatists during civil war in Russia 1917-1923. In this regard, the White struggle was differentiated into the all-Russian (the struggle of Russians among themselves) and regional (the struggle of White Russia, which was gathering forces on the lands of non-Russian peoples, both against Red Russia and against the separatism of peoples trying to secede from Russia). The origin of the term "White Army" is associated with the traditional symbolism of white as the color of supporters of law and order and the sovereign idea, as opposed to the destructive "red". White color symbolized the purity and nobility of aspirations. It is also noteworthy that often in Soviet journalism any representatives of the counter-revolution in general were called "whites", regardless of their party and ideological affiliation. The basis of the White movement is the officers of the old Russian army. The vast majority of junior officers, as well as junkers, came from the peasantry. The very first persons of the White Movement - Generals Alekseev, Kornilov, Denikin and others - also had a peasant origin.
Ideology A significant part of the Russian emigration of the 20-30s of the XX century, headed by the famous classic of Russian political philosophy I. A. Ilyin, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Army, Lieutenant General Baron P. N. Wrangel and Prince P. D. Dolgorukov, put an equal sign between the concepts " White Idea" and "State Idea". Zimin emphasizes in his work: For him, the White Idea is the idea of religiosity and at the same time the struggle for the "cause of God on earth." Without this idea of an “honest patriot” and “Russian national unity”, according to the Russian philosopher, the “White” struggle would have been an ordinary Civil War. armed forces in the South of Russia of the General Staff, Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin - "the natural desire of the people's organism for self-preservation, for statehood." Denikin very often emphasized that white leaders and soldiers died "not for the triumph of this or that regime ... but for the salvation of Russia", and A. A. von Lampe - the general of his army - believed that the White movement was one of the stages of a great patriotic movement.
Goals The goals of the White movement at its stage after the seizure of power in Russia by the Bolsheviks were: the liberation of Russia from the Bolshevik dictatorship, the unity and territorial integrity of Russia, the convening of a new Constituent Assembly to determine the state structure of the country. Contrary to popular belief, monarchists were only a few most The White movement and the right to a decisive vote were not used at all. The White movement, in general, gravitated towards the cadet social and political values, and it was the interaction of the cadets with the officer environment that determined both the strategic and tactical guidelines of the White movement. The White movement was made up of forces heterogeneous in their own way. political composition, but united in the idea of rejection of Bolshevism. Such was, for example, the Samara government, "KOMUCH", in which the main role was played by representatives of the left parties - the Socialist-Revolutionaries. According to the head of the defense of the Crimea from the Bolsheviks in the winter of 1920, General Ya.
Alexander Kolchak Place of birth Russian Empire, St. Petersburg province Place of death Irkutsk Affiliation Russian Empire White movement Type of troops Fleet Years of service 1886-1920 Rank admiral Commanded an artillery battery (flag captain); Baltic Fleet (assistant commander); Black Sea Fleet(commanding); White Army in Siberia (Supreme Commander)
Anton Denikin Place of birth Wloclawek, Russian Empire Place of death Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA Affiliation Russian Empire White movement Type of troops Infantry Years of service 1890-1920 Rank of the General Staff Lieutenant General Commanded the Western Front; southwestern front; Volunteer Army; V. S. Yu. R.
Nikolai Yudenich Place of birth Moscow Place of death France Affiliation Russia Years of service 1879 - 1919 Rank Infantry general Commanded the Northwestern Army
Vladimir Kappel Vladi Mir O skarovich Kappel (April 16 (28), 1883, St. Petersburg province - January 26, 1920, Utai junction, near Tulun station near Nizhneudinsk) - Russian military commander, General Staff Lieutenant Colonel (1916), General headquarters lieutenant general (1919). Member of the First World War and the Civil War. One of the leaders of the White movement in Siberia. Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Eastern Front. Cavalier of the Orders of St. George 3rd and 4th degrees, Order of St. Vladimir 4th degree, Orders of St. Anna 2nd, 3rd and 4th degrees, Orders of St. Stanislav 2nd and 3rd degrees. He created from a small detachment of volunteers one of the most reliable military units of the army of Admiral Kolchak - the legendary Volga ("Kappelevsky") Corps. In December 1919, having taken command of the dying Eastern Front, he saved the army from encirclement near Krasnoyarsk and led it to Baikal, albeit at the cost of his own life.
The death of a general On January 26, 1920, at the Utai junction, near the Tulun station near the city of Nizhneudinsk, Vladimir Oskarovich Kappel died of bilateral pneumonia. The last words of the general were: “Let the troops know that I was devoted to them, that I loved them and proved it with my death among them”
Conclusion As a result of a tough confrontation, the white movement suffered a crushing defeat. Now you can specify many reasons for the defeat of the white movement. One of the reasons for the defeat of the white movement can be called its fragmentation, the desire of each of the leaders of the movement to act independently. Despite the fact that formally the head of the entire white movement was the "Supreme Ruler of Russia", Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak, in practice this was not the case. Particularly difficult relations were between the Don Cossacks and the leadership of the Volunteer Army, in particular with General Denikin. In addition, the outcome of the white case was affected by its low popularity among the people. This can be partly explained by the well-functioning Bolshevik propaganda. In the matter of propaganda, the Bolsheviks significantly outnumbered the "whites". So in the territory controlled by the Bolsheviks, political literacy circles were opened everywhere, agitation trains and steamboats ran, and cinema was widely used for propaganda. This was not the case on the territory of the "whites", and if it was, it was on a completely insignificant scale compared to the scale of Soviet propaganda. In addition, the motives of propaganda were also different. If the whites called for the restoration of order in the country, then the Bolsheviks' propaganda motives were different. Among the Bolsheviks, it was based on patriotism and internationalism. Another reason for the defeat should be called a different attitude towards the First World War. One of the slogans of the Bolsheviks was the immediate cessation of the war and the signing of a peace treaty with Germany and its allies. The approach of the "whites" was just the opposite. They advocated the continuation of the war to a victorious end and the fulfillment of an allied duty to the Entente. And naturally, the slogan of the Bolsheviks was more to the liking of the exhausted and war-weary soldiers who fought at the front.
In addition, the attitude towards the “white” movement from the outside deteriorated after the Entente countries began intervention. Since the “whites” actively received assistance from the countries participating in the Entente, the entire white movement was accused of having links with the interventionists. Thus, against this background, the struggle of the Bolsheviks became almost liberation, which could not but add new supporters to them. One of the main reasons for the defeat of the "whites" was their indecision. They put off carrying out full-fledged reforms for the future. Their first priority was to restore order. Their indecision also manifested itself in the peasant question. But it was very important, because at that time Russia was more an agrarian country than an industrial one, and the peasantry made up the majority of the country's population. On this issue, the "whites" were very reluctant to make concessions to the peasantry, fearing to lose the support of the big landowners. And so the land reforms of Denikin and Kolchak were unsuccessful. Wrangel's reform turned out to be the most advanced, in which he took into account the sad experience of his predecessors, but it turned out to be very belated and could not change anything. Another important issue was the issue of nationality. The policy of the "whites" in this matter was also not very popular, since they advocated a "united and indivisible Russia". And they did not allow the exit of the national outskirts from Russia. The policy of the Bolsheviks in this matter was more flexible and therefore more popular on the outskirts of the former Russian Empire.
One of the most interesting and, perhaps, controversial topics in the history of Russia is the Civil War. Today we will consider one of the parties to the conflict - the White Guard, as well as the sources of its financing abroad.
Throughout the war, the capitalist world stubbornly tried to prevent the formation of the Soviet state on the territory of the former Russian Empire. The bourgeoisie refused to recognize Soviet Russia, launched a military intervention and supported the counter-revolution within the country in every possible way. The equipment and equipment of the White armies, supplied with the money of the Entente, turned the White movement into a puppet of Great Britain and other capitalist countries interested in eliminating the power of the Soviets. Where did the money come from the White Guard? Who supported them and how? Was this done in sufficient amounts so that we have the right to consider the White Guard only servants of foreign capital?
Everyone knows that the main thing for waging any war, be it a civil, imperialist or even liberation war, is finance. Without money, it is impossible to ensure the supply of the army with the necessary, and therefore money and wars will always go hand in hand. Therefore, first of all, we should note that in 1919 all the main countries of Europe stopped quoting the Russian ruble, and the seizure of valuables that were stored in the State Bank and private banks, as well as the finances of local capitalists, almost did not give currency, since at best they finances were the tsarist ruble, which had become a useless piece of paper, and often local banknotes. This made the White movement from 1919 completely dependent on the allies, turning it into a tool in the hands of the latter to achieve their goals. But at the beginning of the war, in 1918, the ruble was still convertible, and therefore the main financial assistance to the White South still came from the local bourgeoisie and the Don Government, however, and funding from abroad had already begun.
For example, in the publication of reports on the finances of General Alekseev, among the foreign exchange earnings of foreign capital holders, the contributions of the French delegation in January of this year are mentioned. According to Milyukov’s memoirs, in November 1917 Alekseev drew up an estimate indicating the cost of maintaining the army, which he later had to transfer to the British government (recall that Milyukov had been in November 1918 in Western Europe, negotiating aid for the White Movement from the allies, but this list was never delivered to the addressee on time). Lockhart, assistant to the British consul in Moscow, confirmed that over the course of several weeks the financing of the Denikinists was provided for the most part by France.
After the landing of the allied troops in Arkhangelsk and the completely logical refusal of the Bolsheviks to let the Lockhart mission into the city, he "took part of the funding for himself", starting to support the White Army with his own money. The same information is confirmed by other sources, for example, Nina Nikolaevna Berberova, who wrote that it was in the summer that funds from Europe passed through Mr. Lockhart, which he distributed partly according to the instructions of British Prime Minister D. Lloyd George, and partly according to to your own discretion. The total amounts that Lockhart "poured" into the White Guard sometimes reached a million rubles, which at that time was a fairly large amount.
From the spring of 1918, assistance to the White Army in southern Russia also began to come from the British intelligence officer Sidney Reilly, who received funds from England and the United States.
"By mid-August, the White Army, organized in the south, began operations. This army, in the hope of French interventionists and with money received from France (for a start, 270,000 rubles), began its operations with success in the Donets Basin." (N. Berberova: "Iron Woman")
And again, defending bourgeois interests (as it always happens, not only Russian-bourgeois, but also the interests of more or less big bourgeois of Europe and America), but at the same time, of course, the "truly Russian" army not only fights against its own people on the money of foreign financiers, but also harbors hopes for the occupation of the country by interventionist troops. A similar striking hypocrisy manifested itself during the years of the Great Patriotic War, when yesterday's officers of the white movement led the cleansing of the German rear from the resistance to the Nazis of the very people that they came to "liberate" together with the German occupiers from the people's, in fact, power.
But back from reasoning to facts. The same aforementioned financial reports of General Alekseev contain information on receipts totaling 305,000 rubles from the French. The amount is close to the named Berberova. Thus, if we pay attention to the dimensions financial assistance from the Entente to early stages White Movement in the South of Russia, it can be found that it was, if not a decisive force in the formation of the Denikin Volunteer Army, then a very significant one. That is, in fact, the Volunteer Army owes its very existence to foreign capital.
In November 1918, Entente warships arrived at the port of Novorossiysk and the Whites began to harbor hopes that aid from foreign sponsors would finally begin to flow in a larger volume than before.
At a banquet on November 28, arranged in honor of the arrival of the Anglo-French forces, the notorious General Poole declared that he had been sent "to find out how and in what way you can be helped," promising to provide this help with pleasure. Indeed, the first ship with military cargo from England arrived on February 5, 1919, and a few days later 11 ships with a tonnage of up to 60 thousand tons arrived in Novorossiysk. However, the British did not provide financial support and manpower, which, in turn, was noted in the foreign policy summary of Denikin's political office of July 6, 1919.
However, already in May, the government of the United Kingdom allocated Denikin no less than 1 million pounds for arming and uniforming the White Army. Military instructors also arrived on account of this funding.
On October 7, the Cabinet of Ministers allocated 3 million pounds for military supplies to Denikin, and the next day another 14 million. October 24, 1919 E.V. Sablin informs S. D. Sazonov by telegram to Paris:
"I learn from a trusted source that Churchill managed to get through the Cabinet [meaning the Cabinet of Ministers] an appropriation to General Denikin for military supplies of all kinds, in total up to 14 million pounds, with the right, however, to allocate some part to General Yudenich."
In fairness, it should be noted that the text of the telegram clearly states that only military supplies were provided for the indicated amount, and not the foreign exchange earnings themselves in their pure form, i.e. England and France simply bought everything they needed at their own expense, later forwarding it to Deninin.
The total volume of British supplies is shown by the figure of the official debt of Denikin to the government of Britain by the autumn of 1919, which appeared in the newspapers of the South: 40 million pounds, and this does not take into account debts on trade operations.
Now we can once again evaluate Denikin's quotation from the Essays. "Not a penny", which cost Denikin a 40 million dollar foreign exchange debt. It is not surprising that England, realizing the unprofitability of such events, expressed its intention to curtail the sponsorship of Denikin with money and force the latter to buy everything necessary with his own funds:
"In the future it will be possible to buy equipment from me at the lowest prices," adds Churchill in his telegram to Denikin dated November 28, implying that now the White Army will have to buy what it needs at its own expense.
As for France, Denikin in the same Essays reports with obvious disappointment that the French, unlike the British, did not want to provide anything until some serious financial compensation was named. Denikin's major failures in the autumn of 1919 directly affected the attitude of the Entente towards the White movement.
Beginning to realize that large investments in this instrument of struggle against the popular masses of Russia, who had taken power into their own hands, simply threaten not to pay off, England confirmed its decision to cut off all ties with the White South, which did not justify any hopes of its bourgeois masters.
In November, D. Lloyd George announced that in March of the following year, any funding for Denikin would be terminated.
Between this statement and the statement of the Bolsheviks "wait until spring, and then advance until victory" can be safely equated. True, the Red Army did not have to wait for spring, and already at the beginning of 1920, taking advantage of the prevailing advantage, the Red Army launched an offensive from two sides at once, which sharply worsened the already deplorable state of Denikin, forcing him to retreat to the Black Sea.
And now the British have already offered Denikin to simply hand over Crimea to the Bolsheviks in exchange for a promise to obtain from the Soviets a guarantee of personal immunity for him and his army and assistance in evacuation (Milyukov testified to this). After the resignation of Denikin, power passed to Wrangel, who was well aware that as soon as the proposal of those on whose money the White Army directly depended became known, the entire front would collapse like a house of cards, along with the fall of the last hope for at least some more handout from Western masters.
The only thing left for Wrangel was to accept the offer, postponing its execution for two months, in exchange for a promise to keep everything a secret, hoping to sort things out in two months. In June, England finally stopped intervention and, in general, all support for the White movement, not wanting to invest more in an unprofitable project.
The reason for this was a certain arbitrariness of Wrangel - military expeditions to the north of Crimea, against which England was. At the end of the month, the British military mission left Sevastopol, leaving Wrangel to sort things out on his own, which in fact meant a death sentence for the entire counter-revolutionary struggle in the South.
Moreover, England not only left Wrangel, but also radically changed its position, ordering the fleet to detain all cargo going to the Crimea under the English flag.
Left without money, cargo and assistance, Wrangel turned to France, trying to negotiate some kind of help from those.
However, here, as V. Vladimirsky notes, the Soviet encyclopedia is mistaken, because the French did not provide Wrangel with exactly any funding, and the loan amount indicated there rather corresponds to the amount that the Volunteer Army owed for rations.
Thus, having carefully analyzed the financial activities of the White South based on the study of V. Vladimirsky, the memoirs of Berberova and other historians, we can find a direct dependence of Denikin’s army on the investments of the allies, who desperately poured millions into the whites, trying to prevent the formation of a direct threat to them in the East and their capital, the threat in the face of the state of the Soviets, positioning itself as the vanguard of the World Revolution.
But the civil war is not limited to the South. How did things stand in the east, where Mr. Kolchak settled comfortably in Siberia?
The commander of the British troops in Siberia, General Alfred Knox, as noted by Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn in the book The Secret War Against Soviet Russia", later proudly reported:
“We sent to Siberia hundreds of thousands of rifles, hundreds of millions of cartridges, hundreds of thousands of sets of uniforms and machine-gun belts, etc. Each bullet fired by Russian soldiers at the Bolsheviks during this year was made in England, by English workers, from English raw materials and delivered to Vladivostok in English holds.
To tell a story about the crimes that were committed by Kolchak’s men with the help of these bullets and rifles is not the purpose of this material, but if we give an example: one of Kolchak’s assistants, a former tsarist officer named Rozanov, as the authors of the same work testify, published such order:
"one. Occupying villages previously occupied by bandits (Soviet partisans), demand the issuance of leaders of the movement, and where leaders cannot be found, but there is enough evidence of their presence, shoot every tenth inhabitant.
2. If, during the passage of troops through the city, the population does not inform the troops of the presence of the enemy, to collect a monetary contribution without any mercy.
3. Villages, the population of which provides armed resistance to our troops, should be burned, and all adult men should be shot; property, houses, carts, etc. confiscate for the needs of the army."
It is also worth noting that if Denikin was shod and dressed at the expense of the allies, then Kolchak for the most part bought everything he needed at the expense of the gold reserves of Russia, exchanging the people's property for weapons to fight against this very people ... however, according to his own telegrams Temireva, since December 1917, Kolchak was an active officer in the British army, which already essentially makes him a kind of collaborator.
But Siberia was not limited to Kolchak alone. The same Sayers writes: “The soldiers of Semyonov and Kalmykov,” says General Grevs, “using the patronage of the Japanese troops, scoured the country like wild animals robbing and killing civilians ... Anyone who asked questions about these brutal murders was told that the dead were Bolsheviks, and, apparently, this explanation satisfied everyone.
Positioning itself as the defenders of the Russian people and Russia, the White movement from the very first days of the war was forced to turn to the Entente for help, resorting to foreign aid, in order to stay afloat, while the "Bolshevik hordes" did not need any foreign help, either financial or armed, to win.
All this very clearly shows the real character of the "White movement". Whom did it serve? Foreign powers, foreign capital, fully supported by the finances of England, the USA and France. The White Guard represented the interests of the big bourgeoisie, manufacturers and landlords.
What conclusion can be drawn from this?
The counter-revolutionary movement in Russia was nothing more than a tool in the hands of foreign capitalists to restore a bourgeois state in Russia, which, under the conditions of the victory of the whites, would also have found itself in complete economic dependence on the large capitalist countries.
History judged everything for us: having on its side the support of foreign capital and the troops of fourteen interventionist countries, the White Army was defeated, finding neither support nor understanding from the people. One can recall the Red Terror, the surplus appraisal, and much more, but for some reason all these "terrible crimes" of the Soviet government did not prevent the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army from winning, having the support of the majority of the population and not a penny of foreign capital.
History is written by the winners. We know a lot about the heroes of the Red Army, but almost nothing about the heroes of the White Army. Let's fill this gap.
Anatoly Pepelyaev
Anatoly Pepelyaev became the youngest general in Siberia - at the age of 27. Prior to this, the White Guards under his command took Tomsk, Novonikolaevsk (Novosibirsk), Krasnoyarsk, Verkhneudinsk and Chita.
When Pepelyaev’s troops occupied Perm abandoned by the Bolsheviks, about 20,000 Red Army soldiers were captured by the young general, who, on his orders, were released home. Perm was liberated from the Reds on the day of the 128th anniversary of the capture of Ishmael, and the soldiers began to call Pepelyaev "Siberian Suvorov."
Sergei Ulagai
Sergei Ulagay, a Kuban Cossack of Circassian origin, was one of the most prominent cavalry commanders of the White Army. He made a serious contribution to the defeat of the North Caucasian front of the Reds, but especially the 2nd Kuban Corps Ulagay distinguished himself during the capture of the "Russian Verdun" - Tsaritsyn - in June 1919.
General Ulagay went down in history as the commander of the special forces group of the Russian Volunteer Army, General Wrangel, who landed troops from the Crimea to the Kuban in August 1920. To command the landing force, Wrangel chose Ulagay "as a popular Kuban general, it seems, the only one of the famous who did not stain himself with robbery."
Alexander Dolgorukov
The hero of the First World War, who for his exploits was awarded admission to the retinue of His Imperial Majesty, Alexander Dolgorukov proved himself in the Civil War. On September 30, 1919, his 4th Rifle Division in a bayonet battle forced the Soviet troops to retreat; Dolgorukov captured the crossing over the Plyussa River, which soon made it possible to occupy Struga Beliye.
Dolgorukov got into literature. In the novel by Mikhail Bulgakov "The White Guard" he is bred under the name of General Belorukov, and is also mentioned in the first volume of the trilogy of Alexei Tolstoy "Walking through the torments" (attack of the cavalry guards in the battle of Kaushen).
Vladimir Kappel
The episode from the film "Chapaev", where the Kappelites go on a "psychic attack", is fictional - Chapaev and Kappel never crossed paths on the battlefield. But Kappel was a legend without cinema.
During the capture of Kazan on August 7, 1918, he lost only 25 people. In his reports on successful operations, Kappel did not mention himself, explaining the victory by the heroism of his subordinates, up to the sisters of mercy.
During the Great Siberian Ice Campaign, Kappel got frostbite on the feet of both legs - they had to be amputated without anesthesia. He continued to lead the troops and refused a place on the hospital train.
The last words of the general were: "Let the troops know that I was devoted to them, that I loved them and proved it with my death among them."
Mikhail Drozdovsky
Mikhail Drozdovsky with a volunteer detachment of 1,000 people walked 1,700 km from Yassy to Rostov, freed him from the Bolsheviks, then helped the Cossacks defend Novocherkassk.
Drozdovsky's detachment participated in the liberation of both the Kuban and North Caucasus. Drozdovsky was called "the crusader of the crucified Motherland." Here is his description from Kravchenko's book “Drozdovites from Iasi to Gallipoli”: “Nervous, thin, Colonel Drozdovsky was a type of ascetic warrior: he did not drink, did not smoke and did not pay attention to the blessings of life; always - from Jassy and until death - in the same shabby jacket, with a shabby St. George ribbon in the buttonhole; out of modesty, he did not wear the order itself.
Alexander Kutepov
A colleague of Kutepov’s on the fronts of the First World War wrote about him: “Kutepov’s name has become a household name. It means fidelity to duty, calm determination, intense sacrificial impulse, cold, sometimes cruel will and ... clean hands - and all this is brought and given to the service of the Motherland.
In January 1918, Kutepov twice defeated the Red troops under the command of Sievers near Matveev Kurgan. According to Anton Denikin, “this was the first serious battle in which the art and enthusiasm of the officer detachments were opposed to the furious pressure of the unorganized and badly managed Bolsheviks, mostly sailors.”
Sergey Markov
The White Guards called Sergei Markov the "White Knight", "the sword of General Kornilov", the "God of War", and after the battle at the village of Medvedovskaya - the "Guardian Angel". In this battle, Markov managed to save the remnants of the Volunteer Army retreating from Ekaterinograd, destroy and capture the armored train of the Reds, and get a lot of weapons and ammunition. When Markov died, Anton Denikin wrote on his wreath: "Both life and death - for the happiness of the Motherland."
Mikhail Zhebrak-Rusanovich
For the White Guards, Colonel Zhebrak-Rusanovich was a cult figure. For personal prowess, his name was sung in the military folklore of the Volunteer Army.
He firmly believed that "there will be no Bolshevism, but there will be only one United Great Indivisible Russia." It was Zhebrak who brought the Andreevsky flag with his detachment to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army, and soon he became the battle flag of the Drozdovsky brigade.
He died heroically, personally leading the attack of two battalions on the superior forces of the Red Army.
Viktor Molchanov
Izhevsk division of Viktor Molchanov was awarded special attention Kolchak - he handed her the St. George banner, attached St. George's crosses to the banners of a number of regiments. During the Great Siberian Ice Campaign, Molchanov commanded the rearguard of the 3rd Army and covered the retreat of the main forces of General Kappel. After his death, he led the vanguard of the white troops.
At the head of the Insurrectionary Army, Molchanov occupied almost all of Primorye and Khabarovsk.
Innokenty Smolin
In the summer and autumn of 1918, at the head of the partisan detachment of his own name, Innokenty Smolin successfully operated in the rear of the Reds, captured two armored trains. Smolin's partisans played an important role in the capture of Tobolsk.
Mikhail Smolin participated in the Great Siberian Ice Campaign, commanded a group of troops of the 4th Siberian rifle division, which numbering more than 1800 fighters came on March 4, 1920 to Chita.
Smolin died in Tahiti. V last years life wrote memoirs.
Sergei Voitsekhovsky
General Voitsekhovsky accomplished many feats, performing the seemingly impossible tasks of the command of the White Army. A faithful “Kolchakist”, after the death of the admiral, he abandoned the assault on Irkutsk and led the remnants of the Kolchak army to Transbaikalia on the ice of Baikal.
In 1939, in exile, being one of the highest Czechoslovak generals, Wojciechowski advocated resistance to the Germans and created the underground organization Obrana národa ("Protection of the People"). Arrested by SMERSH in 1945. Repressed, died in a camp near Taishet.
Erast Hyacinths
Erast Hyacinths in the First World War became the owner complete set orders available to the chief officer of the Russian Imperial Army.
After the revolution, he was obsessed with the idea of overthrowing the Bolsheviks and even occupied with friends a number of houses around the Kremlin in order to start resistance from there, but in time he realized the futility of such tactics and joined the White Army, becoming one of the most productive intelligence officers.
In exile, on the eve of and during the Second World War, he took an open anti-Nazi position and miraculously avoided being sent to a concentration camp. After the war, he resisted the forced repatriation of "displaced persons" to the USSR.
Mikhail Yaroslavtsev (Archimandrite Mitrofan)
During the Civil War, Mikhail Yaroslavtsev showed himself to be an energetic commander and distinguished himself by personal prowess in several battles.
Yaroslavtsev embarked on the path of spiritual service already in exile, after the death of his wife on December 31, 1932.
In May 1949, hegumen Mitrofan was elevated to the rank of archimandrite by Metropolitan Seraphim (Lukyanov).
Contemporaries wrote about him: "Always impeccable in the performance of his duty, richly gifted with excellent spiritual qualities, he was a true consolation for very many of his flock ...".
He was rector of the Church of the Resurrection in Rabat and defended the unity of the Russian Orthodox community in Morocco with the Moscow Patriarchate.
Pavel Shatilov is a hereditary general, both his father and his grandfather were generals. He especially distinguished himself in the spring of 1919, when, in an operation in the area of the Manych River, he defeated a 30,000-strong group of Reds.
Pyotr Wrangel, whose chief of staff was later Shatilov, spoke of him as follows: "a brilliant mind, outstanding abilities, having great military experience and knowledge, with great capacity for work, he knew how to work with a minimum expenditure of time."
In the autumn of 1920, it was Shatilov who led the emigration of whites from the Crimea.
white guard(White movement, White cause) - a military-political movement that arose after the abdication of the throne Russian emperor Nicholas II in the summer-autumn of 1917. It arose under the slogan of saving the fatherland and restoring it to February statehood, which meant the return and restoration of lost power, socio-economic rights and relations, a market economy and reunification with the lost regions that broke away from the Russian Empire in 1918.
The White Guard during the bloody Civil War of 1918–1922 against the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks (“Reds”), against the “Greens” (armed formations of Cossacks and peasants who fought against both the Whites and the Reds), the Petliurists of the Ukrainian Directory, the armed formations of N.I. .Makhno, against parts of the Georgian Democratic Republic (liberation of Sochi and the Black Sea province) in the following main areas:
- southern: Don, Kuban, Donbass, Stavropol province, Black Sea province, North Caucasus, eastern Ukraine, Crimea;
- eastern: the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia, Far East;
- northwestern: Petrograd, Yamburg, Pskov, Gatchina.
The emergence of the White movement.
After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution and the abdication of the Russian throne by Nicholas II, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma began to form the Provisional Government, which at first received serious support from the masses.
However, the inability to solve acute internal problems radically changed the attitude towards the Provisional Government, and already in June 1917 a large-scale demonstration took place in Petrograd under the slogans of the Bolsheviks, who were not included in the coalition government, and on July 2, the Cadets left the Provisional Government. The next day, July 3, there was a spontaneous uprising of the soldiers of the machine-gun regiment, joined by soldiers from other units and workers from many St. Petersburg factories. However, the Provisional Government, in view of the demonstrators' refusal to lay down their arms, severely suppressed their performance by shooting the protesters. Martial law was declared in Petrograd, the units that took part in the protests were disbanded, the death penalty and courts-martial, the persecution of the Bolsheviks began. At the end of July 1918 a new government was formed headed by the Socialist-Revolutionary A.F. Kerensky.
By the end of August, the situation at the front deteriorated catastrophically - the German troops went on the offensive and captured the well-fortified city of Riga.
After the defeat in Courland, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General L.G. Kornilov, sent the corps of General Krymov to Petrograd to protect the capital. Kerensky regarded this move as an attempt by Kornilov to overthrow the Provisional Government and establish a military dictatorship. The corps of General Krymov was stopped. By order of Kerensky, Petrograd workers were given weapons from state warehouses in order to "defend" the capital, which marked the beginning of the formation of the Red Guard. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, addressed an appeal to the Russian people, accusing the Provisional Government of conspiring with the Bolsheviks and the German General Staff, and openly opposed Kerensky, but he himself was accused of attempting counter-revolution, treason and rebellion, removed from the post of commander-in-chief and arrested. Many prominent generals of the Headquarters and fronts suffered the same fate. Communication between officers and soldiers was broken completely. The lawyer Kerensky declared himself the Supreme Commander, which caused bewilderment and indignation among the officer corps.
Many contemporaries and historians consider the performance of General Kornilov the beginning of the emergence of the White movement in Russia.
The symbolism of the white color should be interpreted as the personification of legitimate statehood and the restoration of the old order. Hence - "White Guard", "White Movement", "White Deed", "White Guards" and simply "Whites". Soviet historiography called "white" armed formations that fought against Soviet power during the Civil War - the Czechoslovak corps (White Czechs), the Polish armed forces (White Poles), the Finnish resistance (White Finns).
The beginning of the armed resistance of the White movement during the Civil War 1918–1922.
After the October Revolution, the generals arrested by Kerensky (Kornilov, Denikin, Markov, etc.), who were awaiting trial in Bykhov, were released on November 19 by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, Lieutenant General Dukhonin, who, after the news of the release of Kornilov, was torn to pieces by an angry crowd of soldiers.
Once free, the generals headed for the Don, where General A.M. Kaledin. The Don region was proclaimed independent of the power of the Soviets "until the formation of a nationwide, popularly recognized authority." The General of Infantry M.V. Alekseev, who arrived on the Don, began the formation of the paramilitary "Alekseevskaya organization" (later - the Volunteer Army) in Novocherkassk. Generals Kaledin and Kornilov joined him.
In Orenburg, Colonel N.N. Dutov declared disobedience to the Bolsheviks and gathered various Cossack military units around him.
In Transbaikalia, the Yesaul of the Transbaikalian Cossack army G.M. Semenov, with his loyal Cossack units, resisted the Bolshevik armed formations, having already created in January 1918 the Special Manchurian Detachment, which later became the basis for further armed struggle against the Soviets in the Far East.
Similar military formations arose in Siberia, the Urals, the Volga region and other regions of Russia.
Astrakhan, Terek, Don and Kuban Cossacks were closely associated with the Volunteer Army in southern Russia.
In the north-west of Russia in the Petrograd direction, pockets of resistance to the Soviets were created under the command of generals N.N. Yudenich, A.P. Arkhangelsky, E.K. Miller.
At first, the Bolsheviks managed to relatively quickly establish the power of the Soviets, to break and liquidate the resistance of scattered parts of the volunteer officers, Cossacks and junkers.
In January 1918, the Council of People's Commissars (SNK), headed by V.I. Lenin, adopted a decree on the organization of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA).
However, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, the "surplus appraisal" in the countryside, terror against the peasantry, the nobility, the clergy, the officer corps, the issuance of a decree on the separation of the state from the church, the execution royal family in Yekaterinburg in the summer of 1918, the Bolsheviks lost the support of many regions of Russia. The white movement, on the contrary, received an economic and social base in the grain-growing southern and eastern regions of the country for further struggle against the Soviets.
White Movement on the Eastern Front.
At the end of May 1918, while in the area of Tambov and Penza, the Czechoslovak corps (about 50 thousand people), which was formed in 1917 from captured Slavs (Czechs and Slovaks) of the Austro-Hungarian army, with the support of Entente agents, revolted against the Soviet power and took the side of the counter-revolutionaries. Many historians consider this the start of the Russian Civil War. Together with the Russian officers who came out of the underground, the White Czechs overthrew the Soviet government and captured a number of cities - Chelyabinsk, Novonikolaevsk (Novosibirsk), Penza, Tomsk, etc. In June 1918 Kurgan, Omsk, Samara, Vladivostok were occupied; in July - Ufa, Simbirsk, Yekaterinburg, Kazan. Thus, in a short time, in the territory from the Volga to the Pacific Ocean, the Bolsheviks practically lost their power. The Provisional Siberian Government is being created in Omsk; in Yekaterinburg - the Ural government, in Samara - the Committee of the Constituent Assembly ("Komuch").
In November 1918, Admiral Kolchak organized an armed coup in Omsk against the so-called. "Directorate" headed by the Social Revolutionaries, announced the acceptance of full power and proclaimed himself the Supreme Ruler Russian state.
At the end of November 1918, captured back in May by Colonel V.O. Kappel in Kazan, the gold reserves of the Russian Empire (about 500 tons) were transported to Omsk and placed in the Omsk branch of the State Bank. Admiral A.V. Kolchak introduced the strictest accountability, thanks to which it was possible to avoid the wholesale looting of Russian treasures. However, after the collapse of the eastern front at the end of 1919, the gold reserve was taken to Vladivostok and, under pressure from the Entente, transferred to the protection of the White Czechs. But already in early January 1920, the gold reserves were seized by the Bolsheviks and sent back to Kazan, having "lost weight" during this time by about 180 tons.
At the end of 1918, troops under the command of Admiral Kolchak captured Perm, and in March 1919 Samara and Kazan were occupied. By April 1919, Kolchak occupied the entire Urals and reached the Volga.
However, the bulk of the peasantry did not support Admiral Kolchak and the idea of the White movement, and in the autumn of 1919 mass desertion from the Siberian army began, as a result of which the Kolchak front collapsed. "Green" armed gangs were organized, which fought both against the whites and against the reds. Peasants en masse began to join the Bolshevik detachments.
The white Czechs treacherously conspired with the Bolsheviks and handed over Admiral Kolchak to the Reds, after which, on February 7, 1920, the Supreme Ruler of the Russian state, Admiral Kolchak, was shot together with the Chairman of the Ministers of the Russian government, monarchist V.N. Pepelyaev.
A month earlier, at the beginning of January 1920, Admiral Kolchak issued a decree declaring his intention to transfer the entirety of supreme power to General A.I. Denikin.
White movement in the south of Russia.
Alekseev, General of Infantry, who arrived on the Don in November 1917, began the formation of the Alekseevskaya Organization in Novocherkassk.
The volunteer army replaced the paramilitary formation of the Alekseevskaya Organization, which in early 1918 was headed by General Kornilov by agreement with General Alekseev. On the Don, generals Kaledin, Alekseev and Kornilov formed the so-called. triumvirate. Ataman Kaledin was the ruler of the Don region.
The army was formed on the Don. The relationship between Alekseev and Kornilov was rather complicated. There were frequent disagreements among the generals about the strategic and tactical perception of the situation. The army was small for a number of reasons, one of which was the ignorance of the broad masses about the goals of the Volunteer Army and about its leadership. This was exacerbated by a catastrophic lack of finance and food. The robbery of military and clothing warehouses flourished.
In this difficult situation, General Alekseev turned to the governments of the Entente countries with a proposal to finance the Volunteer Army, which, after the defeat of the Bolsheviks, was supposed to continue the war with Kaiser Germany.
The Entente agreed to finance the armed formations of the Volunteer Army, and already in January 1918 the army leadership received money from the French and American governments.
However, most of the Don Cossacks after the October Revolution did not share the views of the white generals. The tension between the emerging Volunteer Army and the Cossacks in Novocherkassk was growing. In this regard, on January 17, 1918, the Volunteer Army was forced to relocate to Rostov. The Cossacks of General Kaledin did not follow their chieftain to Rostov, and on January 28, 1918, General Kaledin, who stood at the origins of the Volunteer Army, committed suicide with a shot in the heart.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army was General of Infantry Kornilov, his deputy and successor in the event of the death of the first - Lieutenant General Denikin. Infantry General M.V. Alekseev was the chief treasurer and was responsible for external relations of the Volunteer Army, Lieutenant General A.S. Lukomsky - chief of staff of the army.
On April 13, according to the new style, 1918, during the assault on Yekaterinodar (the first Kuban ice campaign), General Kornilov, commander-in-chief of the Volunteer Army, died from a stray grenade explosion. General Denikin took over the leadership of the army.
On October 8, 1918, General Alekseev dies of pneumonia in Ekaterinodar, and General Denikin, after his death, becomes the sole Supreme Leader of the Volunteer Army.
In early January 1919, the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (VSYUR) were created by combining the Volunteer Army and the Great Don Army to continue the fight against the Bolsheviks under the general command of General Denikin.
On April 4, 1920, after the defeat in the south of Russia and the retreat of the White Guard units to the Crimea, the commander-in-chief of the All-Union Socialist Republic, Lieutenant-General Denikin, leaves his post and transfers the supreme command to Baron Wrangel.
Thus, the resistance of the White movement in southern Russia in the second half of 1920 continued only in the Crimea under the leadership of Baron Wrangel. In November 1920, the commander of the defense of the Crimea, General A.P. Kutepov could not hold back the advance of the army of Nestor Makhno, who fought at that time on the side of the Bolsheviks, and then the Red Army units under the command of Frunze.
About 100 thousand of the remaining White Guards, together with the last commander-in-chief of the All-Union Socialist Republic, Baron P.N. Wrangel, were evacuated from the Crimea to Istanbul with the support of the Entente fleet.
After that, a long and painful stage of the White emigration began.
The actions of the Volunteer Army in the south of Russia can be divided into the following stages:
2. The first (ice) Kuban campaign and the unsuccessful assault on Yekaterinodar (February - April 1918);
3. The second Kuban campaign and the capture of Yekaterinodar, the Kuban region, the Black Sea province, the Stavropol province, the Don and the entire North Caucasus (June - December 1918);
4. The battle for the Donbass, Tsaritsyn, Voronezh, Orel, a campaign against Moscow (January - November 1919);
5. Retreat of the Volunteer Army from Kharkov, Donbass, Kiev, Rostov, Kuban to Novorossiysk and withdrawal by sea to the Crimea (November 1919 - April 1920);
6. Defense of the Crimea under the command of Baron Wrangel (April - November 1920).
Organization of the Volunteer Army.
At first, the core of the Volunteer Army consisted of a cavalry battalion, an engineering company, officer and cadet battalions, and several artillery batteries. It was a small, but rather strong military formation in terms of combat and morale, which included about 4 thousand people, 80% of which were officers, ensigns and non-commissioned officers.
On February 22, 1918, units of the Red Army approached Rostov. The leadership of the Volunteer Army, in view of the superiority of the Reds, decided to leave Rostov and retreat to the village of Olginskaya, where Kornilov reorganized the army.
In March 1918, after the unsuccessful assault on Yekaterinodar (now Krasnodar) in the Kuban during the First Kuban Ice Campaign, the Volunteer Army united with the Kuban detachment and returned back to the Don. The size of the army increased to 6 thousand people.
The Volunteer Army did not have a permanent staff. During the period of its maximum power in the summer of 1919, it included 2 army corps under the command of generals Kutepov and Promtov; cavalry corps of Lieutenant General Shkuro; Terek plastun brigade; Taganrog and Rostov garrisons, the number of which reached up to 250 thousand bayonets and cavalry. Artillery, tanks, aviation, armored trains, engineering troops were used centrally, and thanks to this, the Volunteer Army was a military success, effectively interacting with various branches of the military. Armament and equipment were supplied by the Entente. A very important factor in the success of the Whites was the officer corps as part of the Volunteer Army, which fought with admirable persistence and self-sacrifice. The small army of the White Guards won many victories over the many times superior units of the Red Army. The officer corps took on the main blows of the Reds, as a result of which the best combat-ready formations suffered losses that were physically impossible to make up for.
Causes of the defeat of the White movement.
The reasons for the defeat of the "White Idea", which can be attributed to the entire White movement, which operated on various fronts of the Civil War, is the totality of contradictions in ideology, strategy, tactics, and the approach to resolving economic and agrarian issues in wartime and military dictatorship.
– The lack of clear concepts of a way out of the political and economic crisis could not but deprive the white movement social support from the masses and the peasantry.
- The complete inconsistency in actions between the White Guard formations in Siberia, the South and the West made it possible for the Bolsheviks to defeat the White regimes one by one.
- The betrayal by the allies and the support of the Entente countries for the new state formations that broke away from the Russian Empire in the Caucasus, Ukraine, the Baltic States, Finland, etc. could not but cause mistrust of the Entente on the part of the White movement, which did not want to recognize the new formations and fought for a "united and indivisible."
- In military terms, the main stake was placed on the officer corps, the prosperous Cossacks and complete disregard and contempt for the "soldier" and the peasant masses, which could not but cause the hostility of the latter and general desertion and going over to the side of the "socially close" Reds.
- Successful actions of the Red Army, partisan and gangster "green" detachments in the White Guard rear, disorganized the management and supply of units.
