Post soldiers 18th 19th century. Russian military costume in Russia XVIII - early XX century

17.05.2020

At the end of the 18th - beginning of the 18th centuries. The Russian army has undergone drastic changes. The old structure of the army no longer met the requirements of the defense of the state and the tasks foreign policy. The military reform was started by Peter I in the 90s. XVII century, and completed by 1709.

In 1690–1699 Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments were formed from the "amusing" detachments, and from the most combat-ready archers - two "elective" Moscow regiments under the command of P. Gordon and F. Lefort. At the same time, the government of the young Tsar Peter I began to create a large fleet of Azov.

In 1699, 29 infantry regiments and 2 dragoon regiments were formed. However, garrison archery regiments still remained and noble cavalry. It was liquidated after an unsuccessful battle between the Russian and Swedish armies near Narva on November 19, 1700. The place of the noble cavalry was taken by dragoon-type cavalry. The construction of the first ships for the Baltic Fleet began. In 1704, the Admiralty shipyard was founded in St. Petersburg. It became the center of shipbuilding in Russia.

In 1705, a new unified system for manning the army and navy was introduced in Russia - recruitment duty. In all provinces of the country, special "stations" were set up - recruitment points that were in charge of recruiting soldiers and sailors. As a rule, 1 recruit was recruited from 500, less often from 300, and in exceptional cases from 100 male souls. During these years, the Baltic Fleet was significantly strengthened. By the end of the Northern War, Russia had 120 sailing ships in the Baltic Sea (including 32 battleships) and about 400 rowing ships.

The new regular army and navy were created according to the Western European model. The army was divided into divisions and brigades, which, however, did not have a permanent composition. The only permanent unit in the infantry and cavalry was the regiment. The infantry regiment from until 1704 consisted of 12 companies, consolidated into two battalions, after 1704 - from 9 companies: 8 fusilier and 1 grenadier. Each company consisted of 4 chief officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 140 privates and was divided into 4 plutongs (platoons). Each of the plutongs had 2 corporals. In 1708, grenadier regiments were created in the Russian army, which possessed great firepower.

The cavalry (dragoon) regiment consisted of 10 companies, including one cavalry grenadier. Every two companies made up a squadron. Each company had 3 chief officers, 8 non-commissioned officers and 92 dragoons.

In 1701 in Russian army The first artillery regiment was formed. According to the state of 1712, it consisted of 6 companies (1 bombardment company, 4 gunnery companies, 1 miner company) and engineering and pontoon teams.

The total number of Russian armed forces by 1725 (the end of the reign of Peter I) reached 220 thousand people.

In the 1730s some reforms were carried out in the Russian army, initiated by Field Marshal B.K. Minich. Cuirassier regiments (heavy cavalry) and hussar light horse companies were formed from Georgians, Hungarians, Vlachs and Serbs who left for Russia. The Sloboda Cossack army was organized on the southern border.

By the middle of the XVIII century. the Russian army numbered 331 thousand people (including 172 thousand people in the field troops). Divisions and brigades became full-time formations, but had a different composition. During the war, corps and armies were created. The infantry consisted of 46 army, 3 guards and 4 grenadier regiments, cavalry - from 20 dragoon 6 horse-grenadier and 6 cuirassier regiments. Light jaeger infantry appeared, which by the end of the 18th century. consisted of over 40 battalions.

In the cavalry, in addition to dragoons and cuirassiers, hussar (light horse) regiments were formed. In 1751–1761 they were formed from Serbs, Moldavians and Vlachs and were of an irregular nature. After the liquidation of the Ukrainian Sloboda Cossack army, the so-called. "settled" hussar regiments from the former Sloboda Cossacks. From 1783, the hussar regiments became regular.

The Russian military fleet has changed qualitatively and quantitatively. The naval forces consisted of a sailing fleet operating on the high seas and a rowing fleet for landing operations in the coastal zone. The basis of the sailing fleet was battleships armed with 50 to 100 guns. The guns were installed along the sides and their barrels were exposed outside through special holes. In battle, the ships lined up against the same battle line of the enemy and brought down on him the fire of onboard guns, sometimes converged to board. Then they pulled the side of the enemy ship with hooks, landed on it and captured or destroyed the team. Frigates with 25-50 guns were smaller, but more maneuverable, they acted independently. Bombardier ships fought with coastal batteries. Paquebots, later replaced by brigs, served for reconnaissance and communications.

The sailing and rowing fleet consisted of galleys, shnyav, prem, brigantine, double-boats. At the beginning of the XVIII century. more common were scampavees (semi-galleys) with 18 pairs of oars and 3–5 cannons for firing at coastal fortifications. But at the end of the XVIII century. they were replaced by rowing gunboats with more powerful weapons, borrowed from the Swedes.

An important factor in the successful development of the Russian navy was the significantly improved training of sailors and officers, the coherence of the crews. In addition, it was the Russian naval commanders who initiated the creation of a new tactic of naval combat.

Victorious wars of the second half of the 18th century. with Turkey allowed Russia to reach the shores of the Black Sea. In 1783, the ships that formed the backbone of the Black Sea Fleet, who soon became famous thanks to the victories of F.F. Ushakov. By 1792, the Black Sea ship and galley fleet was armed with 756 copper and 1900 iron guns.

WEAPONS OF THE 18TH CENTURY

At the beginning of the 18th century, the infantry units of the Russian army were armed with smooth-bore guns with a baguette. The infantry smooth-bore gun (fuzeya) had a caliber of 19.8 mm, weighed 5.69 kg with a bayonet, and reached 1560 mm in length. The mass of each bullet was 23.1 grams. Baginet is a melee weapon in the form of a long blade, the handle of which was inserted into the gun barrel during hand-to-hand combat, forcing the soldiers to stop firing. Smoothbore guns in 1706–1708 were replaced by rifles with triangular bayonets. In addition to guns (fuses and muskets), the infantrymen of the time of Peter the Great were armed with swords, the officers were armed with protazans, and non-commissioned officers with halberds.

The dragoons were armed with lightweight guns (fuzei), broadswords and pistols in olsters (saddle holsters). The dragoon fuzeya had a caliber of 17.3 mm, weighed 4.6 kg with a bayonet, and reached a length of 1210 mm. The mass of each bullet was 21.3 grams.

The grenadiers were armed, in addition to guns, also grenades, and some of them were hand mortars. In every grenadier regiment there were 12 guns, while in the infantry regiments there were only 2 light guns and 4 mortars.

Significant changes have undergone Russian artillery. The variety of calibers and types of artillery pieces was eliminated. In field artillery, the division into guns, howitzers and mortars has been preserved. Fronts, charging boxes and caps appeared - canvas bags with gunpowder, the use of which facilitated the loading of guns. Permanent teams were established for the transport of guns - furshtadt.

In the middle of the XVIII century. The light flintlock gun of the 1753 model was adopted by the infantry.

Noticeable changes have taken place in the Russian artillery. In the middle of the XVIII century. during the military reform P.I. Shuvalov, elongated howitzer guns ("unicorns"), designed by M.V. Danilov and M.G. Martynov. Unicorns were mounted on lightweight carriages with an elevating screw to make it easier to aim the gun at the target. These howitzers had more advanced sights and could fire all types of projectiles (cannonballs, bombs, buckshot). Some types of unicorns have been adopted by the Navy.

The social conditions of Europe in the 18th century, which influenced the military system, were closely connected with the economic ones. The vast majority of the non-noble European population was engaged in agriculture, the rest were employed in the handicraft or trade sphere, in the state or military service. Soldiers were recruited mainly from peasants, which sharply limited the mobilization capabilities of any country in case of war: recruitment is too a large number peasants immediately affected the amount of agricultural production. In addition, the weak capacities of industrial facilities - factories and manufactories, which were not able to clothe and arm a truly large army, also imposed their own restrictions on the size of the armed forces. True, other categories of the population, from which any European army (except the Russian one), with the exception of peasants, were recruited, belonged to the least productive social groups. The officers belonged to the noble class, and a fairly large percentage of the soldiers were voluntarily recruited scum of society, vagabonds, the unemployed, etc.

Thus, the armies of this period were, as a rule, small in number, but they included highly professional soldiers who served for 15–25 years. The way they were recruited was the same throughout Europe and was based on recruitment - voluntary or forced conscription of mercenaries, including foreigners.

Especially many foreign mercenaries were in the armies of England and Prussia. So, the British Seven Years' War they fought mainly with the help of mercenary troops purchased or rented for a while from various German rulers (for example, the Landgrave of Hesse sold the 17,000th army to the British for 2,800,000 pounds). In France, in the same Seven Years' War, the size of the army reached 290 thousand, of which 20-30% were foreigners.

This was especially characteristic of Prussia - at that time a rather provincial German possession, not much different from the countless other principalities and electors of the "patchwork empire" of the Habsburgs. A small and poor country, divided into two parts and until recently was in fief dependence on the Commonwealth, nevertheless, it had a large mercenary army. Prussia's own human resources would not have made it possible to recruit an army of more than 89 thousand people, as was the case at the end of the reign of Father Frederick, and even more so - 200 thousand, as at the end of his own reign. All this gave little Prussia a noticeable weight in the vicissitudes of the then European politics, especially since its infantry in many respects surpassed not only the armies of other German rulers, but also (as the wars of two centuries showed) such powers as Sweden, Austria, France, the Commonwealth and Russia.

From the Middle Ages to late XVIII centuries, European wars were fought almost exclusively in the interests of the ruling dynasties, thus becoming the "sport of kings." However, at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries, previously hidden feelings of nationalism and patriotism began to appear among the population, which could no longer be brushed aside. The need to fight and die in the name of their monarch, despite the complete misunderstanding by the ordinary soldier of the goals of the war (in fact, did any of the soldiers of the warring armies understand the goals of the endless wars for the Austrian, Spanish, Polish inheritance, the essence of the Habsburg Pragmatic Sanction, publication which caused the first of these wars, the circumstances of the struggle for the imperial throne of the Habsburgs and the Bavarian Wittelsbachs or all the same Habsburgs and Bourbons for the Spanish throne), predetermined an extremely rigid political and social orientation, which was communicated to each fighter (both soldier and officer) by the entire system of the state and society. Knowing their job well, the mercenary soldiers, however, were by no means eager to give their lives for kings and princes.

Since the armies consisted of polished nobility, on the one hand, and inveterate scum on the other, this led to the emergence of such a huge gulf between officers and soldiers that there was neither before nor after the 18th century. The European commanders of the era of Frederick considered strict discipline and accuracy in the execution of all orders as the basis for the combat effectiveness of their armies. Indeed, only the strictest and most demanding "cane" education system, combined with cruel drill, could turn a gang of vagrants pulled out of stinking burrows by recruiters into real soldiers. In addition, the small number of personnel, the difficulty of recruiting new soldiers and the long time spent on training the clumsy "muzhiks" to own weapons and act in the ranks, made the loss from desertion the scourge of all the armies of Europe, comparable to losses from wounds and diseases. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the soldiers at that time fought because they were more afraid of their officers and corporals than of the enemy. All this stimulated a lack of imagination, initiative and gave rise to pedantry and pettiness in the army environment.

* * *

Throughout the XVIII century, without exception, all European armies professed the so-called linear tactics - the formation of troops on the battlefield in two lines deployed along the front, each with a depth of 3-4 lines. This was due to an increase in the rate of fire of infantry muskets, which made it possible to gradually reduce the depth of the formation from 6-10 ranks (early 17th century) to the above figure. In turn, this allowed, while maintaining total number soldiers, gradually lengthen the front of the battle formation and thus provide the opportunity to fire with an increasing number of barrels. The interval between the lines was on the order of 150–500 paces, and small units of troops and artillery were often also located in the intervals. The cavalry was built on the flanks. Consequently, in the 100 years that have passed since the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648, there have been almost no tactical or technical innovations in the troops.

The tactics of warfare were also identical in all the armies of Europe. Usually, the warring parties deployed their battle formations against each other and began a firefight with almost no maneuver at all. The long lines of infantry made it possible to develop fire of maximum force along the front, but bound the army like shackles: the entire battle formation could only move as a single whole and only on a completely flat, like a parade ground, terrain with a slow step. Any obstacle encountered in the way of the movement of troops could break the system and lead to the loss of control over them. Changing the battle order and rebuilding during the battle in response to a change in the situation was also recognized as impossible.

All this made direct contact between enemy armies and hand-to-hand combat an extremely rare occurrence: usually the enemies stopped at a short distance and opened salvo fire at each other. Rifle fire with a synchronized volley was recognized as the main element of the troops’ shooting training: it was believed that it was better to disable 50 enemy soldiers at once than 200 at different times (this had a greater moral effect). The whole battle at the same time turned into a dull skirmish, sometimes lasting several hours.

Bayonets were used very rarely: if one army launched a slow and cautious offensive (as mentioned earlier, more with fear of breaking its own system than reaching the enemy), its counterpart always had more than enough time to leave the battlefield, recognizing that thus, his "defeat". Battles on a really large scale with stubborn hand-to-hand combat and heavy losses at that time were extremely rare.

Not the last role in this was played by the risk of losing the most valuable cadres of well-trained soldiers in battle. Before starting (“opening”) the battle, a good commander should have calculated the approximate percentage of losses and its result. However, even if he wanted to join the battle, he could not improve the opportunity for this, since the enemy, for his part, having estimated the balance of forces, could easily withdraw without accepting the battle. Losses from salvo non-aimed firefights were, as a rule, low: from an infantry musket of the beginning - the middle of the 18th century, an individual could only be hit at a distance of less than a hundred steps, and even then in extremely rare cases, “and at a distance of three hundred steps - just as rarely a whole battalion.

This feature linear tactics brought to life the so-called "cordon" strategy. The wars of the Friedrichian period were characterized by the most complex maneuvering and the desire to occupy the most advantageous positions, cut off the enemy from the points he needed, supplies, etc. Sometimes entire campaigns took place in the complete absence of field battles and were expressed in relentless marches either after the enemy or away from him. Along the routes, barriers, or cordons, were constantly set up - army groupings that cut off the enemy's path to objects or areas of interest to him.

Despite the apparent complexity and unproductiveness of this strategy, it had its advantages. During the war, armies were generally not allowed to feed off the civilian population (in other words, to loot). Before the start of the next campaign, each side prepared equipment and food in advance in special warehouses called "shops". When invading into the depths of enemy territory, the chain of stores gradually advanced after the army. Thus, skillful maneuvering, combined with a competent arrangement of cordons (of course, in the absence of aggression and initiative on the part of the opposite side to give a general battle) could cut off the enemy from his stores, drive him into an environment or force him to leave the theater of operations. Thus, for example, when the same Frederick II invaded Bohemia in 1744, he was ousted from there by the Austrian Field Marshal Traun solely by means of maneuvers without a single battle, and the Prussian army reached its bases in Silesia in a state of complete decay.

The cordon strategy was successfully used until the beginning of the Napoleonic wars, when the French, unexpectedly for their opponents, began not to maneuver, trying to bypass the enemy cordons placed around, but to beat their scattered formations in parts. Throughout the 18th century, the opposing armies could chase each other ad infinitum - the success of military operations ultimately depended mainly on the energy of the commanders, who were able to catch up and force the enemy to fight.

Unfortunately, that time was characterized by a clear shortage of at least simply capable commanders. But the main problem of European military thought from the end of the 17th century until the appearance on the scene of Suvorov and Bonaparte was that none of the commanders was able to comprehend the need (perhaps due to some random circumstances) to overcome the outdated and routine military system, within the framework of which they acted and beyond which they did not go. This fully applies to the hero of our book - undoubtedly the most brilliant commander of the middle of the eighteenth century, who, nevertheless, was not able to discard the old schemes.

Tsar Peter of Russia, King Charles of Sweden, King Frederick of Denmark, King Augustus of Poland, King Louis of France, William of England, Leopold of Austria and most other kings and princes of that era sooner or later always brought their differences to the court of war. In the 17th and 18th centuries, just as in the 20th, war was assigned the role of an international arbiter in disputes between peoples. The rivalry of dynasties, the establishment of borders, the right to possess cities, fortresses, trade routes and colonies - everything was decided with the help of war. As one of the young courtiers of Louis XIV succinctly formulated this axiom: “Cannons are the most impartial judges. Their judgments are marks, and they are incorruptible."

The number of armies of Russia and Sweden during the time of Peter I

For fifty years - the whole second half of XVII century - the most powerful and most admired in Europe was the French army. In terms of the number of soldiers, it far exceeded any other European army. In peacetime, France maintained a standing army of 150,000 men, and during the war years its strength increased to 400,000. During the War of the Spanish Succession, eight large armies under the command of the marshals of France fought simultaneously in the Netherlands, on the Rhine, in Italy and in Spain. Under the care of the king and his minister of war, Louvois, the French soldiers were the best trained, armed and equipped in Europe. Thanks to such generals as Turenne, Conde and Van-dom, they were constantly successful. The crushing blow that the Duke of Marlborough inflicted on Marshal Tallard at Blenheim (Hochstadt), not without the help of Prince Eugene of Savoy, who fought on the side of the Duke, was the first major defeat of the French troops since the Middle Ages *. It was a time when the numbers, firepower and destructive power of all armies were rapidly increasing. As energetic finance ministers increased the tax base for maintaining armies, it became possible to field more and more troops on the battlefield. In the first half of the 17th century, no more than 25,000 soldiers could participate in European battles on both sides. In 1644, at Marston Moor, the decisive battle of the English Civil War, Cromwell fielded 8,000 men against an equal number of Charles I. Sixty-five years later, at Malplac, Marlborough led 110,000 allied troops against 80,000 French**.

* This battle took place in Bavaria on August 13, 1704. The British and Austrians defeated the French and Bavarians.

** The Battle of Malplaque (Flanders) took place on September 11, 1709. The Austrian commander Prince Eugene of Savoy and the English Duke of Marlborough defeated the French troops of Marshal Villard.

At the height of its military power, Sweden, with its own population of one and a half million people, maintained an army of 110,000 soldiers. Peter, even after disbanding the disorganized irregular gentry militia he had inherited from Sophia and Golitsyn, eventually created and trained an entirely new army of 220,000 men.

Although in the era of continuous wars, conscription for all classes became a necessary means of replenishing the army ranks, most of the armies of this period still consisted of professional soldiers. Many of them - both officers and privates - were foreign mercenaries: at that time, a soldier at his own discretion could join any army and fight against anyone but your king. Often, kings and princes who adhered to neutrality supplied entire regiments of mercenaries for warring neighbors. Thus, the French army had Swiss, Scottish and Irish regiments, the Dutch army had Danish and Prussian regiments, and representatives of all German states served in the army of the Habsburg Empire. Some officers moved from one army to another with the same ease with which modern clerks change jobs, but neither those with whom they served before, nor their future employers, saw nothing reprehensible in this. Marlborough, being a twenty-four-year-old colonel, served with Marshal Turenne, opposed the Dutch and, at a large parade, won the praise of Louis XIV himself. Subsequently, commanding an army consisting mainly of Dutch, Marlborough almost threw the Sun King from the throne. For some time - before and after Peter's accession to the throne - the senior officers of the Russian army were almost entirely foreigners; and if not for them, the tsar would have led not troops, but a crowd of peasants, on the battlefield. Usually, professional soldiers conducted military operations according to generally accepted rules. So, almost without exception, the seasonal rhythm was observed: summer and autumn were set aside for military campaigns and battles, winter and spring - for rest, recruitment and replenishment of all kinds of supplies. Basically, these rules were dictated by the weather, the harvest in the fields and the condition of the roads. Every year, the armies Waited for the snow to melt and the meadows to turn green, so that there would be enough fresh green grass for cavalry and baggage horses. In May and June, as soon as the dirt of the road dried up, long columns of people and convoys began to move. The generals had the opportunity to carry out maneuvers, besiege fortresses and get involved in battles until October. By November, with the first frosts, the troops began to move into winter quarters. These almost ritual rules were strictly observed in Western Europe. For ten consecutive years, while campaigning on the Continent during the War of the Spanish Succession, Marlborough left the army annually in November and returned to London until spring. In the same months, senior French officers returned to Paris or Versailles. A long-vanished attribute of those civilized wars were passports-passes issued to honored officers to travel through the territory of the enemy by the shortest route to the place of winter vacation. Privates, of course, did not enjoy such privileges. For them, the question of staying at home until the end of the war did not arise at all. If they were lucky, they lodged in the cities during the coldest months. However, much more often they ended up in overcrowded dilapidated barracks and barracks of winter camps, where they became prey to the cold. disease and hunger. In the spring, fresh recruits replenished the losses in the ranks.

At that time, armies on the march moved slowly, even when their advance was unimpeded. Few armies could march more than ten miles in a day, but the usual day's march was five. Marlborough's historic dash from the Netherlands up the Rhine into Bavaria before the Battle of Blenheim was considered "lightning fast" at the time, with 250 miles covered in five weeks. Artillery usually slowed down the movement. Horses, with difficulty pulling heavy, bulky cannons, the wheels of which left frightening potholes on the roads, simply could not move faster.

The armies advanced in long columns, battalion after battalion; in front and on the flanks there is a cavalry barrier, in the tail there are carts, wagons and charging boxes for guns. Usually the army set off at sunrise and bivouaced in the evening. The daily camping for the night required almost as much effort as the day's march. It was necessary to set up rows of tents, unpack the luggage, make fires for cooking, bring water for people and animals, and take the horses to graze. If the enemy was nearby, a place for the camp had to be looked for especially carefully and then temporary earthen fortifications with a wooden palisade had to be built in case of a possible attack. And in the morning, just before light, people who had not had time to rest were already raised, and in the predawn twilight they had to turn camp and again load everything onto carts for the next day's march.

Of course, not everything, even the most necessary, could be taken away in a wagon train. An army of fifty to one hundred thousand men could only support itself by moving across fertile terrain and thereby satisfying many of its needs or obtaining additional supplies by water. In Western Europe, large rivers served as the main roads of war. In Russia, the rivers flow north and south, and the military operations of the Russian and Swedish troops developed in the east-west direction, so the waterways were less important and the dependence of the armies on clothing carts and local foraging was stronger. In Western Europe, military campaigns were conducted, as a rule, slowly. Sieges were popular - they were clearly preferred to the much greater risk and unpleasant surprises that promised battle in the open field. Siege operations were carried out with a jeweler's, almost mathematical precision; at any moment the commander of both sides could answer the question of how things are at the moment and how they will develop further. Louis XIV was an ardent supporter of siege operations: there was no danger of losing a large army, created at the cost of considerable effort and huge costs. In addition, they allowed him to participate in the Mars amusements without risk to his life. And finally, at the disposal of the Sun-King was the largest master of fortification and siege art in the history of military affairs.

Sebastien de Vauban. Serving his sovereign, he successfully carried out the siege of fifty cities and succeeded everywhere, and the fortifications he built were considered exemplary throughout the century. A dense network of fortresses grew up along the entire border of France - from separate purely military forts to large fortified cities. All these fortresses, ideally adapted to the characteristics of the area, not only perfectly suited their purpose, but were genuine works of art. Their usual form is a giant star, with each wall located so that it was protected from longitudinal (enfilade) artillery or at least musket flanking fire. Each corner of the star was an independent fort with its own artillery, garrison, secret passages for unexpected sorties. The mighty stone walls were surrounded by ditches twenty feet deep and forty feet wide, also lined with stone, in front of which the advancing infantry felt very uncomfortable. When these fortresses were built, the French armies were on the offensive, and these formidable structures with massive gates decorated with gilded royal lilies were not intended for passive defense, but to serve as strongholds for the French field armies. Subsequently, when Marlborough's troops rushed to Paris and Versailles, Vauban's fortifications kept Louis on his throne. The Sun King himself paid tribute to his marshal: “The city defended by Vauban is impregnable; the city besieged by Vauban has already been taken.

* However, when Louis XIV himself was present at the siege, Vauban had to share his laurels with the king. As Ludovic put it: "Monsieur Vauban proposed to me a series of actions which I considered the best."

Warfare tactics in the 17th century

Vauban's siege operations were like theatrical performances impeccably choreographed and played out by the hour. Surrounding the enemy fortress, Vauban's troops began to dig a series of zigzag trenches, gradually creeping up to the walls. Vauban calculated the angles of fire with mathematical precision and positioned the trenches in such a way that the fire from the walls of the fortress would practically not cause damage to the infantry, which was burrowing closer and closer. Meanwhile, the artillery of the besiegers fired day and night on the fortifications, silencing the cannons of the defenders and punching holes in the walls. At the time of the assault, the infantrymen rushed out of the trenches and, filling the ditches with fascines - tight bundles of brushwood - overcame them and burst into gaps in the riddled walls. However, sieges rarely reached this climax. When it became obvious that the fortress was doomed, the besieged, in accordance with the strict etiquette that both sides adhered to, were free to agree to an honorable surrender, and not only the enemy, but also their own government, did not expect anything else from them in this situation. But if the inexperienced or overly ardent defenders refused to surrender, thereby forcing the attackers to attack, wasting time and people, the captured city was subjected to violence and plunder and burned.

Vauban's art has forever remained unsurpassed. However, in those days (as, indeed, now), the largest commanders - Marlborough, Charles XII, Prince Eugene - preferred to conduct a mobile war. The greatest of these was undoubtedly John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, who from 1701 to 1711 commanded the coalition armies of Europe in the wars against Louis XIV. There was no battle that he would lose, and there was no fortress that would stand before him. During the ten years of the war, fighting one after the other marshals of France, he defeated them all, and when, as a result of political changes in England, he lost his command, his troops moved irresistibly through the barrier of Vauban's powerful fortifications and straight to Versailles. Marlborough was not satisfied with the usual, limited strategy of the time, and his aspirations extended much beyond the conquest of a single fortress or city. He was a staunch supporter of decisive, large-scale action, albeit one that involved great risk. His goal was to destroy French army and shame the Sun King on the battlefield. He was willing to risk making the fate of a province, a campaign, a war, and even a kingdom dependent on the outcome of one day. Marlborough was the most successful and versatile boss of his time. He was at the same time field commander, commander-in-chief of the coalition forces, foreign secretary and de facto prime minister of England, which is about the same as if he alone had performed the duties of Churchill, Eden, Eisenhower and Montgomery during the Second World War.

But Marlborough's style of command has always been distinguished by a certain balance, the ability to balance large-scale strategy and tactical tasks. The most assertive and daring commander of that time was the King of Sweden - Charles XII. In the eyes of his opponents, and indeed of all of Europe, Charles was a warrior eager to fight at any moment, regardless of the balance of power. His tactics were characterized by swiftness and surprise. His impulsiveness and thirst for battle brought him to the accusation of recklessness, bordering on fanaticism. And, perhaps, he would willingly subscribe to the motto of George S. Patton: “Attack, only attack!”*

* Patton, George Smith (1885-1945), American general, participant in the first and second world wars, liberator of France in 1944.

But at the heart of the attacks of the Swedish troops was not blind rage, but tough drill, iron discipline, universal devotion to the cause, confidence in victory and an excellent system of operational command and control of troops. Drums gave signals, messengers delivered orders, and unit commanders always knew what was required of them. Any weakness in one's own army was quickly eradicated, any weakness in the enemy's troops was immediately exploited. Charles would willingly break with the tradition of seasonal warfare; hard frozen ground better withstand the weight of carts and guns, and his soldiers were accustomed to frosty weather - in a word, he was ready to fight in winter. It is obvious that in a mobile warfare, the army that has greater mobility has an advantage. The fate of the campaign depended on transport and rear work to the same extent as on pitched battles. Anything that could increase mobility mattered; the French, for example, were delighted with the advent of mobile bakeries, which made it possible to obtain fresh bread in a matter of hours.

When the enemy army was nearby, the commanders were certainly on their guard, although in the 17th and 18th centuries battles rarely took place unless both sides wanted it. Finding a suitable bridgehead and making the necessary formation of men, horses and guns was not at all easy. And the commander, not disposed to engage in battle, could easily evade him, hiding his forces among the hills, bushes and ravines. It took hours to bring the troops into battle order, and as soon as one general began to build, the other, if he did not want to fight, could calmly retreat. Thus, the two warring armies could be in relative proximity for days on end, avoiding a serious collision.

When both commanders were forced to fight - for example, for control of a river crossing or for a stronghold on the main road - the armies took up positions 300-600 yards from each other. If time allowed, the army that intended to defend itself (say, the Russians against Charles XII or the French against Marlborough) erected in front of the infantry line gouges from pointed stakes driven into the ground (chevaux de frise), which to some extent restrained the attacks of the advancing cavalry . Along the front lines, artillery officers deployed guns firing 3, 6, and 8 lb cannonballs, and heavy cannons even 16 and 24 lb cannonballs, 450 to 600 yards deep into enemy lines. The battle usually began with an artillery bombardment. A hail of cannonballs could inflict damage, but was rarely decisive in combat against experienced and disciplined troops. With amazing restraint, the soldiers stood in line, while the cannonballs whistled through the air and, bouncing off the ground in a ricochet, made bloody breaches in their ranks. In the 17th century, field artillery was significantly improved by the Swedes. Gustavus Adolf standardized the calibers of field guns, and in the heat of battle the same ammunition could fit any gun. Subsequently, when attention to artillery began to turn into an end in itself, the Swedish generals realized that gunners often forget about the need to support their own infantry. To eliminate this shortcoming, each infantry battalion was given two light cannons, which provided support to the soldiers by firing direct fire at the enemy infantry attacking this battalion. Later, the Swedes gave artillery even to cavalry units.

Horse artillery was extremely mobile - unharness the horses, open fire on the enemy cavalry and retreat to a new position, she could in a matter of minutes. But the outcome of the battle was decided not by artillery or cavalry, but by infantry. The great battles of the time were won by infantry battalions formed in phalanxes, armed with muskets, flintlocks and pikes, and later baguettes. The 17th century brought rapid changes in infantry equipment and tactics. For centuries, the ancient pike - a heavy shaft fourteen to sixteen feet long with a steel point - was the all-conquering "queen of battles." With long lances at the ready, the ranks of pikemen advanced on each other, and the outcome of the battle was determined by the pressure of the formation bristling with spears. With the development of firearms, the famous pike began to become obsolete. The pike could not compete with the musket: the musketeers fired from a safe distance, knocking out the pikemen. By the end of the century, pikemen rarely appeared on the battlefield, and their only purpose was to protect the musketeers from enemy cavalry. It still took a lot of courage for a rider to charge into the barrier of long, sharpened pikes, but as long as the attacking enemy didn't get close to the pikemen, they were of no use. The ORJ stood in a confused line, mowed down by artillery battery fire and musket rounds, their long lances outstretched and waiting for someone to impale themselves on the point.

Armament of soldiers of the time of Peter I

The baguinet, or bayonet, helped out, with the help of which the musket combined two functions: Firstly, it was still possible to shoot from it, and secondly, a point was attached to the barrel, and as soon as the enemy approached, the musket turned into a short pike. At first, the point was inserted directly into the musket barrel. But this prevented firing, and soon a baguette was introduced, fastened on a ring - in this form it continued to be used in our century. An infantryman could fire until close to the enemy, and then use a sparkling bayonet. Baginet, that is, a musket with a fixed bayonet, appeared just at the beginning of the Northern War. The Drabants - the Swedish guards - were armed with baguettes in 1700, and over the next few years they were adopted by most armies, including the Russian one.

At the end of the 17th century, the musket itself was significantly improved. The old matchlock gun was bulky and weighed over fifteen pounds.

* That is 6 kg.

In order to point and hold it, the musketeer needed a long wooden pod with a fork at the top: they stuck it into the ground and, resting the barrel on the fork, aimed and fired. To load a gun and fire just one shot, it was necessary to perform twenty-two separate steps, including: pouring gunpowder, hammering a wad and a bullet, inserting a fuse, raising it on the shoulder, aiming from the choke point at the target, lighting the wick and bringing it to the ignition hole. Sometimes the damp fuse did not want to ignite in any way, and the musketeer, who was waiting for the shot to be fired, was often disappointed - if disappointment is the feeling that you experience at the sight of an infantryman running straight at you or a cavalryman galloping at full speed.

The wick lock was replaced by a flint lock, in which a spark was struck mechanically, from the impact of a steel flint on a piece of flint, and fell directly into the powder chamber. The weapon became lighter, however, only relatively - now it weighed ten pounds, which made it possible to do without a pad, and the number of tricks needed to fire a shot was halved. A good shooter could fire several shots per minute. The flintlock musket soon became the standard infantry weapon in all Western armies. Only the Russians and Turks continued to make clumsy old-style wick squeaks, which clearly did not contribute to the increase in the firepower of their infantry.

Infantry, equipped with a new weapon - a flintlock musket with an attached bayonet - became highly effective, formidable, and very soon the leading force on the battlefield. Baginet did not just combine two types of weapons - a new weapon arose, not as clumsy as a pike, and the mobility of the infantry increased significantly with its appearance. The increase in rate of fire required the development of new tactics and battle formations to make the most of the increased firepower. Cavalry, which dominated the battlefield for centuries, has now receded into the background. Marlborough was the first to appreciate and use the new advantages of the infantry. English soldiers were taught to quickly turn from columns to ranks and, platoon after platoon, to conduct continuous, methodical fire. Since now the same intensity of fire could be achieved with fewer people, the battalions were reduced in strength and became easier to manage. Command and control over the execution of orders were simplified and accelerated. In order to be able to point as many guns at the enemy as possible at the same time, as well as in order to reduce the depth of the target for enemy artillery, the infantry began to stretch along the flanks, which, in turn, expanded the front line itself. All the actions of a soldier had to be brought to unmistakable automatism, and for this purpose endless exercises were carried out in peacetime. And the test came at that chilling moment when a wave of enemy riders with raised blades rolled over the musketeers and there was no time to reload the muskets.

It was thanks to the significantly increased firepower of the infantry that by the beginning of the 18th century the battlefield became a more dangerous place than ever before. Destroying people with deadly musket volleys was much easier than getting close and fighting hand-to-hand - as had been done for centuries. Previously, ten percent of the personnel were considered normal losses, now this figure has jumped sharply. Although the infantry came to dominate the battlefield, its own safety depended on maintaining perfect order. If the infantrymen held the formation and did not let it break through, they could inflict great damage on the attacking cavalry with their devastating fire. And the very life of the foot soldiers depended on maintaining the order: the enemy cavalry circled around like a whirlwind, ready to crush the ranks and trample the infantry to dust at the slightest weakening of the battle formations.

The organization of the battle - maintaining the battle order in an army of many thousands, the arrival of the necessary formations at the right time and in the right place, and all this under enemy fire - is in itself a most difficult task. Nature also often arranged some kind of trick for the commanders - it was difficult not to stumble upon a copse, a ditch, or even just a fence, which interfered with the movement of the columns and could break the building. But no matter how the situation developed, it was impossible to rush. It was necessary to advance into the zone of deadly enemy fire slowly but surely; haste could disrupt the coordination of the army. Often, even when the soldiers fell one by one, it was necessary to stop the advancing column in order to restore the broken formation or to allow the parallel column to catch up with it.

With rare exceptions, good luck accompanied the generals who preferred the offensive. Marlborough invariably opened the battle with an attack aimed at the strongest part of the enemy's battle formations. As a rule, he used his own, superbly trained English infantry for this purpose. The alarmed enemy commander began to draw up more and more new reserves to the attacked sector, but Marlborough did not reduce and even increased the onslaught, regardless of losses. Finally, when other sections of the enemy defenses turned out to be greatly weakened, Marlborough threw his reserves into battle, directing an avalanche of cavalry to some particularly exposed section of the enemy front. And now, for the umpteenth time, the enemy's defenses have been broken through, and the duke rides triumphantly across the battlefield.

However, if the speed and pressure of the attack are put in the first place, then the best infantrymen and cavalrymen in Europe were not the British, but the Swedes. Swedish soldiers were generally not accustomed to thinking about anything but the offensive. If the enemy somehow seized the initiative and began to attack himself, the Swedes immediately rushed towards him in order to disrupt the offensive with a counterattack. Unlike the English Marlborough army, whose infantry tactics were based on the maximum use of firepower, the Swedes relied on armes blanches - edged weapons in the attack. Both the infantry and the cavalry preferred close combat to the fire of muskets and pistols, in which everything was decided by the blade and bayonet.

The sight was awesome. Slowly, methodically, silently, to the roar of drums, the Swedish infantry moved forward, not opening fire until the last minute. Having approached the enemy, the columns turned around, and a wall of yellow-blue uniforms four ranks deep grew on the battlefield. The formation froze, a volley rumbled, and with bayonets at the ready, the Swedes burst into the trembling ranks of the enemy. Many years passed before the Russian soldiers of Peter learned how to repel the irrepressibly attacking Swedes. The unsurpassed power of the Swedish attack was due to religious fatalism, on the one hand, and continuous drill, on the other. Everyone - from the king to the soldier - believed that "God will not allow anyone to fall in battle until his hour comes." This conviction gave rise to unshakable courage, and the months and years spent on the parade ground to the sounds of combat teams provided the Swedish army with such maneuverability and cohesion that no one could compare with it,

The role of infantry and cavalry in the war with Sweden

Despite the increased role of the infantry as the decisive branch of the armed forces, the actions of the cavalry still filled the picture of the battle with drama: as soon as the enemy faltered, the cavalry broke through his ranks and won the victory. Light cavalry served to cover the army, reconnaissance, foraging and sudden raids on the enemy. The Russians used the Cossacks for these purposes, and the Turks used the Tatars. With the Swedes, the same cavalry units participated in battles and in auxiliary operations. The heavy regular cavalry was organized into squadrons of 150 men: the cavalrymen wore cuirasses that covered their back and chest, and were armed with broadswords and pistols, which were launched if the squadron was ambushed. In most armies of that time, cavalry was trained in tactical maneuvers no less carefully and strictly than infantry. But there were factors limiting the possibilities of its application. One of them, of course, was the landscape: soft terrain and open space were needed for cavalry operations. Another factor was the endurance of the horse: even the best cavalry horses could not withstand more than five hours of intense combat. There was another factor - increased infantry fire. The cavalry had to stay alert, given the increased accuracy and rate of fire of flintlock muskets. Both Marlborough and Charles XII sent cavalry into battle only at the decisive moment when, as a striking force, they could break through the disintegrating enemy ranks, attack the advancing infantry from the flanks, or, pursuing the enemy, turn his retreat into a rout.

Although the possibilities of using the cavalry were limited, the time of its glory was far from over. Before the battle of Waterloo, with its massive cavalry attacks, there was a whole century, and before the attack of the English light brigade at Balaklava - one and a half hundred years *. Cavalrymen made up from a quarter to a third of the strength of all armies, and in the Swedish army their percentage was even higher. Charles trained his cavalry to attack in close formation. The Swedish cavalry advanced on the enemy at a slow trot, forming a dense wedge. The wedge had a depth of three lines and broke through the ranks of the enemy's cavalry or infantry like a broad arrow, obedient to the will of the commander.

* The Battle of Balaklava took place on October 13, 1854 during the Eastern (Crimean) War of 1853-1856. It is notable for the effective attack of Lord Cardigan's brigade of English light cavalry, which led to the defeat of the Russian hussars. In turn, the British could not withstand the blow of the Russians and lost almost half of their soldiers and officers, most of whom belonged to the English aristocracy.

If one were to watch a cavalry charge from a distance, war might seem like a magnificent spectacle: riders in colorful uniforms rush across the open field, swords and cuirasses sparkle in the sun, pennants and flags flutter in the wind. But for the participants in the battle, this field is a place of bloody slaughter, a semblance of hell: cannons rumble and spewing flames, infantrymen on command load their guns and shoot, struggling to keep the line, and maimed comrades writhe at their feet in agony; riders at full gallop fall on the infantry line: screams, screams, groans; someone tries to get up and falls, the horsemen in a frenzy slash with sharpened blades of anyone who falls under the arm; footmen, almost blindly, furiously stab with bayonets - someone got a blow in the back, someone in the chest; an instant sharp pain, a last flash of surprise, a realization of what had happened, and a stream of scarlet blood gushing from the wound; people are running, horses that have lost their riders are rushing about, and heavy clouds of blinding, suffocating smoke are slowly creeping over all this. And when the cannonade ceased and the smoke dissipated, a blood-soaked field opened up, the groans and cries of the wounded were heard. Right there lay those who had ceased forever, their unseeing eyes fixed on the sky. Thus, contradictions between peoples were resolved.

European armies in the 18th century

In the XVIII century, the composition of all European armies was approximately the same. They consisted of sin the main branches of the infantry, cavalry and artillery. Most any of the armies were infantrymen, mostly part of the musketeer or fusilier regiments. The Prussian regiments were usually divided into two battalions and numbered approximately 1,700 men. V Austrian army three battalions made up a regiment of approximately 2,100 men. In the Austrian army there were no guards regiments, but there were grenadier battalions, which were usually consolidated units made up of grenadier companies of musketeer and fusilier regiments. The use of light infantry - chasseurs and Croatian pan-durs - was an innovation. The most dangerous enemy was the Austrian Croats, recruited from the wild eastern frontiers of the empire.

The life of the infantrymen was harsh. Fighting was only sporadic, and so they were either on the march, or getting their own food, or, if time allowed, participating in training. During the camps, the rations were usually insufficient, but on the march the situation was even worse. Due to bad weather and disease, the army suffered almost the same losses as during the fighting. The next largest (and much more attractive) branch of the military was the cavalry, considered the heir to the traditions of medieval chivalry. There were three categories of cavalry: heavy (cuirassiers), medium (dragoons) and light (hussars, light dragoons and chevoles). The regiment usually included four squadrons (although often their number increased to 10). The squadron averaged up to 80 soldiers. The heavy cavalry was the main striking force of the army. The cuirassiers rode large, powerful horses and were supposed to break through enemy lines in battle. Dragoons were trained as riding infantry, but were often used as heavy cavalry as well. The most famous light cavalrymen were the hussars. Their tasks included conducting reconnaissance and operations behind enemy lines. Artillery was the third largest, but a very important part of any army. During the battle, artillery operated in batteries of 6-10 guns. The caliber of a gun was determined by the weight of the projectile it fired. The most common field gun was the 6-pounder. The most powerful guns - up to 24 pounds - were most often used in sieges. The guns were heavy and could not be moved quickly from place to place. Therefore, the artillery deployed on the positions turned out to be vulnerable to the counter-battery fire of the enemy, his light troops and cavalry.

Armies traditionally consisted of a first line, a second line and a reserve. Usually the infantry was placed in the center, where the artillery was located, and the cavalry was located on the flanks. The line formation allowed the infantry regiment to make the most effective use of its firepower. The order of action could change, but usually the front rank fired a volley, then retreated to reload their guns and allow the second rank to fire. Well-trained troops with such tactics could produce 3-5 volleys per minute. A prudent commander always had a reserve with which, if necessary, he could strengthen the first line. Cavalry on the battlefield had to fight with the enemy cavalry. However, if she managed to outflank the infantry, she could disperse the infantry before they had time to regroup to counter the threat. Artillery was supposed to support the main defensive positions or attack and inflict the maximum possible losses on the enemy. The artillery performed these tasks by firing cannonballs - round iron balls. Shrapnel could also be used, which contained many small bullets. The range of action of such projectiles ranged from 400 to 800 meters. Another important factor influencing the outcome of the battle is the conditions of the terrain. The commander had to take care to select a terrain that would allow him to deploy his troops properly and satisfy the requirements of each of the branches of the military. Among the many factors that had to be taken into account were, for example, hills and forests, which were difficult for the enemy to overcome, and therefore provided cover for troops or made it possible to secure the flank.

The collection of military uniforms of the fabric and costume department of the State Historical Museum is one of the richest in Russia. Its formation began in 1883 - with a gift from the family of Admiral V.A. Kornilov. In the future, the fund of the museum was constantly replenished. After October revolution in 1917, many military museums were created in Russia, although they did not last long, their materials were then redistributed. In 1929 - 1930, the RIM collection was significantly replenished by the Military History Museum, formed on the basis of the regimental collections of the Moscow garrison. In 1935, the Military History Household Museum was liquidated, its funds were transferred to other museums, theaters and film studios. Some of them became the property of the State Historical Museum.

Particularly large contributions to the Department of Fabrics and Costumes of the State Historical Museum took place in 1947 - 1954, this included "non-core" materials from the Museum of the Revolution, the Museum of the Peoples of the USSR. Thanks to the activities of the lieutenant colonel of the clothing service G. N. Nesterov-Komarov, in 1954 the State Historical Museum received an excellent collection of memorial items of the royal family.

In total, the department of fabrics and costumes of the State Historical Museum stores more than 10 thousand items of military uniforms, 213 of them are memorial ones, including children's uniforms that belonged to the Grand Dukes and heirs to the throne. The rarest items of the fund are: "Poltava" camisole of Peter I; the uniform of A.F. Talyzin, in which Catherine II was dressed on the day of the palace coup in 1762; the uniform dress of Catherine II and the uniform of the Life Guards of the Finnish Regiment, in which the heir Tsarevich Alexei Nikolayevich was introduced to the regiment as a chief. Of no less interest are the things of A.I. Osterman-Tolstoy, Count F.E. Keller and others. famous people. The collection allows you to study in sufficient detail the history of the military costume of the Russian army.

Regular troops in Russia appeared in the era of Ivan the Terrible - they were archery regiments. Later, soldier regiments of the "foreign system" appeared. It is they who can be considered the prototype of the Russian regular army created by Peter I in 1683. From that time on, military clothing was unified and its evolution depended on civilian fashion. The borrowing of elements of the form of European armies had no less influence. The formation of the appearance of the Russian army at the end of the 17th - beginning of the 18th century was influenced by the traditions of the folk costume. "Funny regiments" - Izmailovsky, Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, created by Peter I in 1683, were the core of the regular Russian army of the European type. Initially, from the autumn of 1698, the Hungarian dress was introduced as the unified uniform of the Peter's regiments, since it was similar to the traditional Russian one.

Almost simultaneously with the army, Peter I decided to change clothes for the civilian population. At the beginning of 1700, a decree was issued according to which all men, with the exception of the clergy and peasants, were to wear Hungarian caftans, and the very next year, in 1701, a decree appeared requiring German, Saxon, and French caftans to be worn. This meant the rejection of the use of Hungarian costumes in the army and among the civilian population. In the autumn of 1702, 500 sets of French uniforms were prepared for the solemn entry into the capital of the Russian guard after the capture of Noteburg.

The dressing of the guardsmen in new uniforms was completed in 1703, and already in 1705 the entire regular army of Russia did not differ in appearance from other European armies.

Along with the establishment of a new uniform, the procedure for wearing it was also determined for the first time. Each warrior knew what he was supposed to wear during a parade, campaign and in peacetime. Everyone was aware of the responsibility for its safety. “If someone loses his uniform, loses his gun, sells it or gives it as a mortgage, he ... must be shot.”

This uniform was tested during the Northern War and well met the needs of soldiers and officers in the conduct of hostilities. Some of the uniforms were uncomfortable and poorly protected the soldier from cold and bad weather. For example, an epancha, whose purpose was to warm a soldier in winter, was only a cloth cape with a fastener on two hooks at the collar. In strong winds, the floors flew apart and protection from the cold was reduced to zero. Although, given that the wars were fought mainly in the summer, this form met the requirements: it was simple in design, comfortable and attractive. For the regular army created by Peter I, numerically superior to the old Russian, it was necessary to expand the production of cloth. At first, uniforms were sewn from fabric of different colors (only the Life Guards uniformed uniforms), but from 1720 the color of the uniform became the same, since Russian manufactories were already able to satisfy the needs of the army.

The introduction of a single form contributed to the improvement of discipline and organization of the Russian army.

After the death of Peter I, the influence of foreigners in the Russian army increased, which led to the introduction of a number of Western European borrowings. For the soldiers, powdered hairstyles, false mustaches, narrowed uniforms were introduced.

The homogeneous cavalry of the Petrine era was reformed according to the Western model. In the 1730s, cuirassiers appeared in it, and from 1740 - hussars. On the initiative of the chairman of the Military Board, Count Burchard Christoph Munnich, cuirassier regiments were created, the main task of which was to break through the line of enemy infantry. The cuirassiers were dressed in white leather tunics, leggings and over the knee boots. The chest was covered by a heavy metal cuirass (hence the name). White color The cuirassier uniform was preserved in the Russian army until the beginning of the 20th century.

Hussar regiments, from time to time joining the campaigns, from 1740 become part of the regular Russian army. The uniform of the hussars was close to the national Hungarian clothes and consisted of a short jacket - a dolman embroidered with a colored cord and a mentic - the same short jacket embroidered with a cord, but with fur lining. Dolomay and mentic were complemented by chakchirs - tight-fitting cloth leggings embroidered with cords and lace.

In 1742, the childless Empress Elizaveta Petrovna chose her nephew, the German prince Karl Peter Ulrich of Holstein-Gottorp, as her heir. He was the son of Duke Karl Friedrich and the eldest daughter of Peter I - Anna. Upon arrival in Russia, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp converted to Orthodoxy under the name of Pyotr Fedorovich and in 1745 married Princess Sophie Frederica Augusta of Anhalt-Zerbst, who later became Empress Catherine II. Russian Emperor from his youth, he chose the Prussian king Frederick II as his idol. In 1761, Peter III concluded a separate peace with Prussia, while the Russian army took Berlin and Prussia was preparing to capitulate. For unpatriotic actions in relation to Russia, Peter III received from Frederick II the highest military award of Prussia - the Order of the Black Eagle.

After accession to the throne, Peter III decided to dress the Russian army in the Prussian manner. In addition, he announced his intention to send the entire guard against Denmark, again to please the king of Prussia. Having turned thousands of guardsmen against him, this "Holstein" emperor could not count on a long reign. It took only seven months for discontent to spill over into a coup. On June 28, 1762, Peter was overthrown and killed a month later.

In the initial period of the reign of Empress Catherine II, the military uniform basically remained the same as under Peter III, although it was partially changed in the direction of returning to the uniforms of the Elizabethan era. At the end of 1762, by decree of Catherine II, a "temporary special commission" was created, which marked the beginning of military reforms. Never before or later did the Russian army undergo so many changes as in the period from 1762 to 1796.

The reforms took place in several stages. The first of these was completed by 1764. New tables, staffs, instructions and charters were developed, which were based on the notes of General Feldzeugmeister A.N. officer combat items in infantry regiments.

In 1766, Catherine II approved the "General Institution on the collection of recruits in the state and on the procedures that must be followed when recruiting." This document streamlined the army replenishment system. Monetary contributions were canceled for all "put in the head salary", the only exception was the artisans of factories and factories not assigned to villages and villages.

The order of service by the nobles under Catherine II remained the same as it had developed under her predecessors. The noble undergrowths who entered the regiments became sergeants in a year, and after two or three years - officers. This was especially abused by the guards. In the drunken days of the palace coup on June 28-30, 1762, the guardsmen earned the privileges of a serene life, the right not to take part in wars. Many young nobles, provided with recommendations, aspired to the guard, who immediately received the rank of sergeant. At the end of the reign of Catherine II, it came to the point that even infants were enrolled in the regiments, who, by the age of majority, received an officer rank and retired in accordance with the “Decree on the Liberty of the Nobility”. So, for example, in the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment, there were six thousand non-commissioned officers for three and a half thousand privates. Undergrowth, according to eyewitnesses, "there were no numbers." Among them were many recent lackeys, cooks, hairdressers, who were elevated to the rank of officer by generals and regimental commanders. Nepotism, along with a violation of the ranks, led to the fact that most of the officers did not feel like the defenders of Russia, but servants of the higher nobility. All of this contributed to the division officers. According to Count A.F. Langeron, "all generals, colonels ... treat chief officers with insufficient respect, but even with contempt."

Among the guards officers, who were the offspring of the oldest noble families, in the last decade of the reign of Catherine II, there was a complete disregard for the uniform. The officers of the guard companies of the Winter Palace, according to a contemporary, could afford to go out to watch the guard in a dressing gown and a sleeping cap.

At that time, only the soldiers of the army regiments retained actual combat capability and courage, which was repeatedly proved by them in the Russian-Turkish wars, in the battles of Rymnik, Kagul, Ochakov, Izmail.

The second half of the 18th century was marked by reforms in the equipment and organization of troops, carried out by His Serene Highness Prince G.A. Potemkin, who then headed the Military Collegium. He fought against Prussian influence in the Russian army. “Curling, powdering, weaving braids - is this a soldier’s business? - said Potemkin, - they have no valets. On WHAT booklets? Everyone must agree that it is more useful to wash and scratch your head than to weigh it down with powder, lard, flour, hairpins, braids. A soldier’s toilet should be like this: what you get up, then you’re ready.”

This echoed the well-known words of A.V. Suvorov: “Powder is not gunpowder, buckle is not a cannon, a scythe is not a cleaver, I am not a German, but a natural hare.” Having become the President of the Military Collegium in 1774, Field Marshal G. A. Potemkin immediately took up issues of uniforms and equipment for the army. For consideration by the Military Collegium, he submitted a "Note on the clothing and armament of the troops", in which he convincingly proved the need for a radical change in the existing uniforms. The samples of the uniform he proposed were far above the level of military equipment of the European armies of that time.

A new set of uniforms finally took shape in 1786, although some of its elements appeared in the regiments already in 1782 - 1783, mainly in Potemkin's army. Potemkin's reforms introduced practical shortened cloth jackets, trousers with leather leggings, half boots and light cloth helmets with a transverse bolster. The summer uniform consisted of white linen tunics and trousers to protect from the heat. However, not all officers accepted the unified comfortable uniform established by the Field Marshal General, because it did not at all correspond to the then prevailing fashion. Only soldiers and low-income officers appreciated inexpensive and simple clothes.

Having ascended the throne in November 1796, Paul I dramatically changed the appearance and organization of the Russian army. While still an heir, he denounced his mother's policies. Repeatedly, he presented notes to Catherine II with discussions about the army and the state, in which it was instructed "to prescribe to everyone, from the field marshal to the private, everything that they should do, then you can recover from them if anything is missed."

After visiting Berlin and meeting with the Prussian king Frederick II, the idol of his father, in 1783 Pavel created the Gatchina troops. Considering the Catherine's army undisciplined and dissolute, and the officers - unscrupulous, Pavel trusted only the Gatchina officers. This was due to the fact that these troops recruited primarily foreigners, most of whom served in the Prussian army. However, they were headed by a Russian - Alexei Andreevich Arakcheev, who was both the governor and manager of the military department of Gatchina. Flawlessly devoted to Paul, he was his favorite and closest assistant.

Changes military uniform during the reign of Paul I, they mainly touched the guards, in 1800 double-breasted caftans were approved for soldiers, and single-breasted for officers. A new pattern of gold embroidery was introduced and new form cuffs on officers' caftans. The generally accepted opinion about the inconvenience of Pavlovian uniforms is not true. The soldier's and officer's uniforms had ribbon ties on the bodice, which made it possible to put on a sheepskin sleeveless jacket or a fur vest under the uniform in winter.

Some uniforms, established by Paul I, took root for a long time, they were also worn in the era of his sons - Alexander I, Nicholas I (for example, the uniform of the cavalry guard and cavalry regiments).

The dissatisfaction of the guards officers with the Pavlovian reforms was connected not with the introduction of unpopular uniforms, but with the tightening of the service regime.

Upon accession to the throne, Emperor Alexander I announced that he would govern his people and state "according to the precepts of his grandmother Catherine the Great." After the Prussian order in the army, which Paul I managed to introduce, and the restrictions on noble privileges, Alexander's words were met with enthusiasm by the nobility. “After a storm, a terrible storm, today our beautiful day has come ...”, the guards officers sang. According to Alexander I, the army he inherited needed reforms.

The general antipathy to the innovations of Paul I demanded the abolition of all regulation and the mitigation of strictness. On July 24, 1801, by personal decree of the emperor, a “Special Military Commission” was created under the chairmanship of the brother of Alexander I, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich. It included General of Infantry I L. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, A.A. Prozorovsky, A.A. Arakcheeev, V.V. Dolgorukov and other prominent figures.

The commission had great powers "to consider everything that it finds necessary and useful for introduction or cancellation." Along with others, the commission was to discuss the question of the uniform of the army. Regarding uniforms, the emperor’s decree noted: “With less cost, give clothes the most militant and durable look, and not only for all turns of service and for maintaining the health and vigor of soldiers in general, the most convenient, but also the most decent for each branch of the military.”

Hearings on this issue caused serious controversy among the members of the commission. For their permission, in the name of the emperor, "dissenting opinions" of the members of the commission were presented on some "things needed for soldier's clothing." As a result of this work, new tailcoat cut uniforms, two-cornered hats, high boots and overcoats were installed. It was decided to cancel the powder and braids, and cut off the hair along the lower edge of the collar. “Powder should not be used otherwise, as in big parades and holidays.” Fully long hair and complex hairstyles were abolished in the army only in 1806.

The measures "taken for the development of state-owned production" were of great importance. The Irkutsk and Pavlovsk factories were significantly expanded, which was associated with the refusal to purchase fabrics abroad. In 1803, a factory was created in St. Petersburg for the manufacture of officer uniforms and equipment. It was ordered to release these things at the price at which they cost the state.

However, a decade of continuous wars with France and Turkey led to the fact that the supply of the army was in an unsatisfactory state. And this despite the fact that the state subsidized state-owned enterprises to increase their productivity.

In 1812, Emperor Alexander I personally authorized the purchase of cloth abroad. During the war with Napoleon of 1812-1814, the military department managed to meet the needs of the army in clothing, despite the fact that priority in supply was always given to the guard - the Yekaterinoslav cloth factory was fully working for it.

In January 1813, the Russian army was already well supplied. To make up for the loss of property during the war, about 60 thousand uniforms and overcoats were supplied to the army. At the same time, the production of uniforms in the territories liberated from the French was established. In Poland, Silszy, Saxony, Russia bought raw materials.

In general, for the campaign of 1813-1814, the Russian army was already better prepared economically than before. Based on the experience of the long wars with Napoleon, the Russian military command realized the importance of creating stocks of uniforms for its army.

Being well educated in military affairs, Nicholas I personally dealt with the problems of the army. However, the main attention of the emperor was attracted by the appearance of the soldier, and not by the technical equipment of the troops. Both before his accession and after, Nicholas I was directly involved in the development of military clothing samples. He was fascinated by the brilliance and elegance of the uniform. At the same time, the main purpose of the uniform was not taken into account - protection from the weather, ensuring freedom of movement and convenience when handling weapons in a combat situation.

Basically, in the military uniform for the period 1825 - 1854, there were no cardinal changes. Many different decorative elements were introduced, aimed only at decorating the uniform. The most significant innovations were the appearance in the army units of single-breasted uniforms and the replacement of the previously used pantaloons with leggings with leggings worn over boots. In 1846, uniforms of a new type were introduced for the troops of the Separate Caucasian Corps, the infantry received semi-caftans instead of tailcoat uniforms, and the cavalry received short jackets tucked into trousers.

During the reign of Nicholas I, headdresses were mainly transformed. So, in 1844 - 1845, shakos were everywhere replaced by helmets. The only exceptions were the hussars and lancers.

The consequences of the passion for "uniform and embellishment" in the reign of Nicholas I affected during Crimean War 1853 - 1856. Many participants in the battles wrote about the insufficient supply of things and weapons, most of them felt all the consequences of the carelessness and hindsight of the government.

“... The soldier at that time was dressed awkwardly ... They wore a helmet on their heads, which in parades and divorces was capable of producing an effect on the viewer, but militarily turned out to be completely impractical ... In Nikolaev, we were met by the adjutant wing Count Levashev with the order - to leave the helmets in special warehouses ... The soldiers thank you from the bottom of their hearts ... for the order to leave the helmets ... And then to say that the helmets not only did not bring us any benefit, but did harm. From the rain and then the intense heat, the helmets shrunk, shrinking to the point that they could barely hold on to the heads of the soldiers, crushing them and squeezing them to a headache. A slight wind - you look, and helmets fly from their heads. And the cleaning of copper jewelry, and the preservation of scales so that they do not break, and the links do not crumble, and the cone so that it does not break - did it absorb time and labor a little? - so wrote on October 12, 1854, one of the officers of the 11th Infantry Division P.V. Alabin.

But gradually the situation began to change for the better. By the spring of 1855, “... a new form of an officer's coat was received. Khrulyov hurried to do something for himself, and everyone could follow his example, but as there were no gray summer clothes in the city, they sewed what they could, and greenish, blue and even purple coats appeared. They didn't look at it there; even the soldiers in clothes had complete freedom; cloth caps were replaced with white ones and it was ordered not to take them off when meeting with officers, ”recalled P.I. Stepanov, a participant in the defense of Sevastopol.

Most likely, such liberalism in matters of uniform was formed under the influence of the Caucasian troops who arrived to help the city. In the Caucasus, it has long been worn not a dress uniform, but one that was closest to the war in the mountains. Soldiers and officers everywhere wore hats, Circassians, caps, frock coats.

The imperial family did not stand aside from everything that was happening. In December 1854, by the personal decree of Nicholas I, a regiment of 4,500 people was created at the expense of the family name. Responsibility for the creation of the regiment was assigned to the Minister of Appanages Count L. Aperovsky, he was also the first commander of the regiment. And by appearance, and according to the principle of recruitment, the regiment was significantly different from the rest of the units. He was recruited from the peasants of the northern provinces, mainly hunters, on a voluntary basis. The outfit was supposed to be "as close as possible to folk clothes." It consisted of a semi-caftan, reminiscent of an army coat, wide trousers tucked into high soft boots, and a hat with a square cloth top and a lamb band. All ranks of the regiment were allowed to wear a beard.

Many officers joined this regiment. famous people Russia: scientists, writers, public figures(for example, Count A. KLolstoy was a colonel, the Zhemchuzhnikov brothers were captains). The emperor himself became the chief of the regiment, the chiefs of the battalions and companies were the grand dukes.

The regiment did not take part in the hostilities, but already in 1857 it received the rights of the "young guard" and became known as the Life Guards.

During the reign of Emperor Alexander II, significant military and political events and social transformations took place in Russia. During the implementation of the reforms carried out with the participation of the Minister of War, Count D.A. Milyutin, military settlements were liquidated. Corporal punishment is prohibited. The system of manning the army was substantially rebuilt. In 1874, the "Charter on military service" was adopted, which abolished the recruitment sets established by Peter I. The term of service in the army was reduced from twenty-five years to six years in the ranks and nine years in the reserve.

The hard lessons of the Crimean War of 1853-1856 forced the government to seriously engage in the technical re-equipment of the army. Traditionally, military reforms began with innovations in uniforms. E.A.Shtakenshpeider writes about the abundance of changes in uniforms in the period 1856 - 1859: “One thing is perplexing - these are continuous changes in the form of the military. In St. Petersburg, it seems, there are no two officers of the same regiment, equally dressed: one is already in a new uniform, the other has not yet had time to sew for himself, and the third is already in the newest.

The transformation of the uniform in the second half of the 1850s began with the replacement of tailcoat uniforms with semi-caftans. In all troops, double-breasted uniforms and uniforms simplified in decoration were introduced, which in 1872 were replaced by single-breasted ones. The outerwear of all the chips began to sizzle. The lower ranks and officers of the cavalry received white linen tunics, first as a work uniform, and later as an everyday one.

In 1862, the type of headgear changed dramatically - caps were introduced 11-12 centimeters high at the back, 6-8 centimeters high at the front. During the parade, it was decorated with a sultan and a coat of arms. In the same year, white linen tunics were introduced for gymnastics. In the future, they became the main form of clothing for the lower ranks.

In the troops of the southern military districts and the Don Cossack army it was allowed to wear white covers on caps and caps, and in the Caucasian and Turkestan military districts they were sent to wear leather trousers made of sheep or goat skin, which, according to legend, protected from snakes. In 1869, a special type of uniform was established - a marching uniform. In this regard, a clear regulation of all uniforms and the procedure for wearing them are carried out, with an annual approval and notification of everyone about it. From now on, the uniform was subdivided into urban, front, festive, Sunday, everyday and marching.

As a result of the military reforms of the 1860s - 1870s, a truly comfortable marching uniform was introduced. The parade option has lost its self-contained meaning.

The transition to universal military service and the increase in the personnel of the army in the reign of Alexander II increased the cost of uniforms, which forced the military department to look for ways to reduce them. The advent of sewing machines and the establishment of standard sizes and heights marked the beginning of an industrial, cheaper way to produce uniforms.

According to the “Regulations on the clothing commissary allowance”, all items were divided into two types: urgent, issued regularly after a certain time, and one-time items, which were the property of the unit and were used until they were completely worn out. Items of the first type were annual things, that is, those for which a period of wearing was established. The second type included buttons, coats of arms, cockades. They were given out either in objects or in money.

During the wars, the supply was carried out in excess of the established norms. Additional things could be issued, but only with a special highest permission, that is, with the permission of the emperor himself.

In March 1881, Alexander III ascended the Russian throne and continued military reforms. A course was taken to increase combat readiness and the strictest cost savings. The military reform carried out by Count P.S. Vannovsky was mainly defensive in nature, because the emperor himself, by his nature, was inclined towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts, for which he was called the king-peacemaker.

In his manifesto of April 29, 1881, Alexander III highlighted “the maintenance of order and power, the observation of the strictest justice and economy. A return to the original Russian principles and the provision of Russian interests everywhere.

In the course of the reform of 1881 - 1883, the number of combat units was increased, their armament was improved. By shortening the validity period military service up to four years, the number of people trained in military affairs increased.

The entire cavalry, with the exception of the guards, underwent an American-style reform - it became homogeneous, capable of leading fighting both on foot and on horseback.

The appearance of the army has also changed significantly. The Minister of War General P.S. Vanpovsky and Alexander III simplified the cut of the military uniform. It has become more modest, practical and comfortable to wear. Its cut was close to the Russian national costume. The new uniform was spacious, looked like a jacket with a flared side without buttons. A deep smell in front and folds in the back are elements characteristic of folk outerwear, such as a hoodie or a zipun. The cut provided the soldier not only with freedom of movement, but also with warmth and comfort. A drawstring on the bodice of the jacket made it possible to pry a jersey under it in winter. The main advantage of the new uniform was that it was easy to fit it to the figure. When mobilized or recruited into the army, it could be issued ready-made.

The new uniform, with some differences, was distributed throughout the army. Ease of wearing, ease of fit were the positive qualities of the uniform. However, the abolition of decorative elements, the simplicity of the form caused new problem- negative attitude towards it. This was a negative result of the reform.

The emperor himself, with great pleasure and skill, wore a uniform that fully corresponded to his character and appearance. Here is how the artist A.N. Benois describes his meeting with Alexander III: “I was struck by his “cumbersomeness”, his heaviness and grandeur. Introduced at the very beginning of the reign, a new military uniform with a claim to a national character, its gloomy simplicity and, worst of all, these rough boots with trousers stuck in them, revolted my artistic feeling. But in nature, all this was forgotten, before that, the very face of the sovereign was striking in its significance.

With the change of the tsar in Russia, as a rule, the military uniform also changed. However, after death Alexander III That did not happen. Until 1897, it did not undergo any changes, with the exception of the restoration of some decorative details.

In 1897, the instrument colors - lapels, collars, cuffs - were unified in the cavalry, following the model of infantry regiments. The cut of the uniform was changed, it became double-breasted, with six buttons, pocket flaps and piping.

The development of military equipment and weapons to late XIX century radically changed the tactics of warfare. The closed formation was replaced by loose formation. Positional warfare spread widely. These new combat conditions caused changes in form. Bright colors began to disappear from field marching uniforms. A new form of clothing appeared - green, camouflage, the purpose of which was to make the troops less visible against the background of the terrain.

For the first time, protective colors of uniforms were introduced in the British army in 1895 as a tropical colonial uniform, and in 1904, after the Boer War, they were adopted as the main color for marching uniforms.

The Russian army was in no hurry to adopt this experience; it entered the Russo-Japanese war in the form of bright colors. But already in April 1904, the technical committee under the Main Quartermaster Directorate submitted for approval a sample of protective uniforms for the troops. active army on the Far East. It was brown-gray - the color of vegetation and soil in Manchuria. New uniforms were supplied only to newly arrived battalions. In other parts, in a combat situation, white tunics had to be repainted. It got ridiculous - the commander-in-chief A.N. Kuropatkin issued a special order: "Wash shirts less often so that they look more like the color of the area."

The next step in the transformation of the military costume was the introduction of a new dress uniform in 1908-1909.

In the orders of 1907, Nicholas II ordered: “To restore the uniforms of the reign of Alexander II to the guards units of the infantry, artillery and sappers” and “to install a double-breasted uniform for the army infantry, for all parts of the artillery and engineering troops and evenly and the uniform of the army cavalry uniform is subject to change” . The reforms brought back to life the elegant, spectacularly decorated military uniform of the 1870s.

And only the dragoon regiments received uniforms of a new cut. They were dark green in color and looked like the tunics of the guards cuirassiers. The headdresses of the guards infantry and army cavalry have changed especially strongly. The new infantrymen's headdress, introduced in 1909, looked like a shako, covered with cloth for officers, and black felt for lower ranks. It was decorated with pendants, armature, sultan or brush. Army dragoons received helmets with a transverse hair comb: black for the dragoon regiments and white for the regiments that were previously cuirassiers. Musicians of all regiments had red sultans.

The hats of the guards were made of lambskin with a regimental-colored hat, as a rule, in the color of shoulder straps. In 1912, a khaki cloth tunic was introduced for the lower ranks of all military branches. Also, shoulder straps of a new sample were installed - bilateral. They were sewn so that they could be repainted (if they burned out), that is, with an external seam.

By 1913, the problem arose of saving funds allocated for uniforms. The terms of wearing the dress uniform in Russia were short, but mostly an overcoat or tunic was worn, and military warehouses were filled with unclaimed uniforms. The way out of this situation was the introduction of a single type of uniform suitable for wartime and peacetime.

The technical commission of the Ministry of War received the emperor's task to develop new models by adding any decorations to the existing marching uniform. Moreover, the choice of decorations was left to the discretion of the regiments themselves. Based on all the reviews, a new form was established: a cloth tunic with a fastened lapel, collar and cuffs. A hat made of lamb or faux fur served as a headdress. For officers, decorative elements were attached to the tunic.

Only nine regiments managed to get new uniforms. Further reform was prevented by the First World War.