Battle of Castiglion 1796. Chapter X
This article is about the battle in 1796. For the fight in 1706, see Battle of Castiglione (1706).
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The Battle of Castiglione saw the French Army of Italy based General Napoleon Bonaparte attack the Habsburg army of Austria led by Field Marshal Dagobert Sigmund von Wurmser on August 5, 1796. Outnumbered, the Austrians were defeated and driven back along the line of hills at the crossing to Borghetto, where they retired across the Mincio River. The city of Castiglione delle Stiviere is located 10 km (6 miles) south of Lake Garda in northern Italy. This battle was one of four known victories won by Bonaparte during the War of the First Coalition, part of the wars of the French Revolution. The rest were Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli.
Castiglione was the first attempt by the Austrian army to open the French Siege of Mantua, which was the main Austrian stronghold in northern Italy. To achieve this goal, Wurmser planned to hold four converging columns against the French. This succeeded because Bonaparte lifted the siege in order to have sufficient manpower to meet the threat. But his skill and the speed of his troops' march enabled the French commander of the army to keep the Austrian columns divided and defeat each at length in about one week. Although the final flank attack was delivered ahead of schedule, it nonetheless resulted in victory.
- 1. History
- 1.1 Plans 1.2 Operations
2 Battle 3 Results 4 Commentary 5 Notes 6 References
Background
Watch Castiglione 1796 campaign order of battle for French and Austrian units and organizations.
Plans
After being defeated at the battles of Fombio, Lodi, and Borghetto by Bonaparte, the Austrian army under Feldzeugmeister Johann Peter Beaulieu left almost 14,000 soldiers in the fortress of Mantua and retreated north towards Trento. Mantua was one of four famous fortresses, known as a quadrilateral. The French army occupied three others, LEGNAGO, Verona and Peschiera.
On May 31, Bonaparte tried to throw himself off Mantova, but the attempt failed. By June 3, the French army had invested the place, which was defended by Joseph Franz Canto d "Irles" s Austrian garrison and 316 guns. In June Bonaparte's army forced the Papal States, Tuscany, Parma and Modena to reconcile by extorting large contributions. Taking artillery pieces from the conquered cities, the French general assembled a siege train of 179 cannons for his siege of Mantua. The formal siege began on 4 July.
Bonaparte deployed his 46,000 soldiers to guard the siege of Mantua. Pierre Francois Sauret will take Brescia and the western side of Lake Garda. André Masséna guarded the northern approaches with the bulk of his force in the upper Adige river valley on the east side of Lake Garda. Massena is also the garrison of Verona. Pierre Augereau covered the lower Adige on either side of the Legnago. Jean-Mathieu-Philiber Serurier led the forces besieging Mantua. Hyacinth Despinoy had one demi-brigade at Peschiera, another with Masséna and more troops on the march. The cavalry reserve of Charles Edward Jennings de Kilmaine lay at Villafranca di Verona, southwest of Verona.
Wurmser devised a four-column attack plan. He retained direct control over the two central columns. Leading the right center (2nd) Column, Michael von Melas struck south with 14,000 soldiers down the west bank of the Adige. Pavel Davidovich led 10,000 men from the left center (3rd) column down the east bank. Operating west of Lake Garda, Peter Quasdanovich commanded 18,000 men to the right (1) Author's column. Johann Meszáros von Szoboszlo lay at Vicenza, with 5,000 troops of the Left (4th) Column. His orders were, as soon as the French had evacuated the two cities, to occupy Verona and Legnago.
Operations
At the end of July the Austrian army advanced from Trento. Two-column center Wurmser defeated Masséna in difficult cross country near Rivoli Veronese on 29 July. For a loss of 800 men, the Austrians inflicted 1,200 killed and wounded, and captured 1,600 men and nine guns. One of Quasdanovich's brigades drives through Sauret's men from Salo on Lake Garda. The 2nd Austrian brigade pushed the French force out of Gavardo. On July 30, the remaining two brigades belonging to Quasdanovich surprised and captured Brescia. Augereau fell back to Mantua. Massena retreated to the southern tip of Lake Garda.
On 31 July Bonaparte retreated to the west bank of the Mincio and began to concentrate against Quasdanovich. That evening, Napoleon ordered Serurier to lift the siege of Mantua. From 31 July to 2 August a complex series of operations took place in the area of Brescia, Montichiari, Gavardo, Lonato del Garda and Salo. Bonaparte concentrated Augereau, Massena, Despinoy and Kilmaine and recaptured Brescia on 1 August, clearing the supply line to the west. Meanwhile, Wurmser landed a force under Major General (GM) Adam Bajalics von Bajahaza to lay siege to Peschiera. His column center reached Mantua, where they spent time demolishing the French siege lines and dragging abandoned siege weapons into the city. Bonaparte almost ordered a retreat to the west, but when he realized Wurmser was not quick to follow his success, he decided to fight him. Meszáros finally occupied LEGNAGO on 1 August.
On 2 August Wurmser's 4,000-man vanguard under GM Anton Lipthay de Kisfalud drove General of Brigade (BG) Antoine Valette's brigade from Castiglione. The next day, Augereau attacked Lipthay with 11,000 troops. In a bitter struggle, the French forced Lipthay back to Solferino, where he was reinforced by Davidovich. Finally, Wurmser approached with his entire field army and stopped Augereau's drive. The Austrians suffered 1,000 casualties and GM Franz Nicoletti wounded. French losses may have exceeded 1,000, including B. Martial Beyrand killed. At that time, Wurmser and Quasdanovich's forces were about eight kilometers away. On 3 August the French inflicted crushing defeats on the Austrian right column at the Battle of Lonato. Quasdanovich finally ordered a retreat to the north. Sending Sauret to watch pulling out the right column, Bonaparte was now centered against Wurmser.
On August 4 both armies exchange fire. Wurmser arranged for the Bajalics to send him reinforcements from four battalions under Franz Weidenfeld's Oberst. He also sent the Mészáros to block the Serurier from Bonaparte's entry. On this day the French captured 2,000 Austrians from Quasdanovich's column at Lonato.
Battle
Battle map
By 5 August Wurmser had concentrated 20,000 soldiers at Castiglion, including the brigade of GM Joseph Philipp Vukassovich provided by the Mantua garrison. Drawing up his army in two lines, he anchored his right flank on high ground near the village and castle at Solferino. The Austrian left will take Monte Medolano, a small hill topped by a redoubt and some heavy guns. Bonaparte's forces swelled to 22,500 in the divisions of Massena and Augereau. He expected to be reinforced by Despinoy during the day. While he held off Wurmser with a frontal attack, the French army commander positioned 5,000 men of the Serurier division to smash into the Austrian left rear. When the Austrian lines were bent into a V-shape, Bonaparte would break the hinge of the enemy's front with an attack on Monte Medolano.
To draw Wurmser further into his trap, Bonaparte ordered Massena and Augereau to retreat. When he suddenly pulled two divisions back, the Austrians obligingly followed. Serurier's troops, commanded that day by General of Brigade Pascal Antoine Fiorella, then turned out to be led by the 5th Dragoons. Wurmser switched his second line to keep this threat to his rear. The Austrian also quickly threw back the first line. At this point, Bonaparte began his en masse de break against Monte Medolano. The battalion chief Auguste Marmont rode his horse artillery up to point-blank range and opened fire. The grenadiers then stormed the mountain. As Masséna and Augereau attacked from the front, two of Despinoy's demigod brigades led by Brigade Chief Charles Leclerc arrived and captured Solferino. After a tough fight, Wurmser ordered a retreat to avoid being shrouded. Weidenfeld's force arrived in time to help fend off Massena's attempt to outflank the Austrian right flank. Covered by some cavalry led by GM Anton Schubirz von Chobinin, the Austrians managed to retreat across the Mincio to Borghetto that evening.
results
In the battle, the Austrians suffered 2,000 killed and wounded, as well as 1,000 men and 20 cannons captured. The French probably lost between 1,100 and 1,500 men. Lipthay was badly wounded. Deciding not to let Wurmser remain near Mantua, Bonaparte feinted with Augereau's division against Borghetto. But the real attack was launched by Masséna through Peschiera. These efforts forced the return of Bajalics and GM Anton Ferdinand Mitrowsky. His line of communication in the County of Tyrol threatened, Wurmser ordered a retreat north.
Before leaving the area, the Austrian commander reinforced Mantua with two brigades under GM Ferdinand Minckwitz and GM Leberecht Spiegel, sent in much needed food and evacuated the sick. Wurmser then retreated to the east bank of the Adige Trento. Bonaparte invested again in Mantua. But, without siege weapons, he could only blockade the place and hopefully starve him into surrender. In the campaign, the French lost 6,000 killed and wounded as well as 4,000 men and their siege train was captured. Total Austrian casualties numbered 16,700.
We will now proceed to the story of marvelous military operations; but in order that the reader may be able to feel all their greatness, I earnestly ask him to look at a more or less tolerable map of Lake Garda.
The shores of this lake, with their contrasts of magnificent forests and calm waters, are among the most charming landscapes in the whole world, and the young soldiers of the Italian army were by no means insensitive to their beauties. In the north towards Riva, the lake narrows, getting lost among high mountains, whose peaks are covered with eternal snow, and opposite the picturesque town of Salo, it spreads a beautiful expanse of water at least three leagues wide; there the traveler can see over ten leagues from Desenzano to the south coast, where the road from Brescia to Verona passes.
The shores of the lake and the surrounding hills are covered with magnificent olive trees, which in this region reach a considerable height, and on the south coast, protected from the north wind by hills that steeply drop off to the lake, mighty chestnut trees rise. The dark foliage of the beautiful orange trees growing here in the ground stands out wonderfully against the background of the mountains surrounding the lake, shrouded in a light, transparent haze.
Opposite Salo, on the eastern side of the lake, rises a huge, round, devoid of vegetation, which, I think, gave reason to call it Monte Baldo. Behind this mountain, east of the lake and at some distance from it, flows in a deep gorge the river Adige, famous for the battles we are about to tell.
Here, on a plateau or flat hill, located between the Adige, Monte Baldo and the town of Garda, from which the lake takes its name, the famous battle of Rivoli took place in January of the following year.
The wooded and fertile hills that separate the town of Desenzano from Lonato on the south side of the lake are perhaps the most pleasing to the eye and the most peculiar in all of Lombardy, famous for its picturesque forest-topped hills. The word atepo seems made for these captivating landscapes.
From the hills of Desenzano, along which the road winds up towards Brescia, you can enjoy the view of the lake and its shores. At his feet, the traveler distinguishes Cape Sirmio, sung by Catullus and remarkable even today for its age-old trees. Farther, a little to the right, towards Verona, one can see the gloomy fortress of Peschiera, squat and black, built like a mill sluice, in the place where the Mincio flows out of the lake. In 1796 it belonged to the Venetians; at one time, fearful of the League of Cambrai, they spent twenty million francs to build it.
* (The Cambrai League is an alliance of the German Emperor Maximilian I, Pope Julius II, the French King Louis XII and the Spanish King Ferdinand the Catholic, concluded in Cambrai on December 10, 1508 to fight the Venetian Republic. The war began successfully for the Allies, but strife between them soon led to the collapse of the league.)
In the distance, on the road to Brescia, the white spire of the church in Lonato looms. Farther south is Castiglione, a nondescript town nestled in a hollow in a barren, rocky plain. This is the only place without charm in the vicinity of the lake.
Behind Castiglione and Lonato, in other words, to the west of the lake, flows the river Chiese, which in summer even a short downpour turns into a turbulent stream. It flows from the Alps parallel to the lake, and the Austrians more than once attacked the left flank of the French army, marching along its banks. When they were driven back, they usually tried to hide in the chestnut-covered mountains of Gavardo.
No matter how much the officers objected, the soldiers left the peasant houses where they were placed to stay; they settled in the free air under the trees, of which there are so many in Gavardo and the environs. Often a whole company was stationed under a huge chestnut tree, and the next morning several soldiers were already shaking with a fever. It cannot be said that this was an unhealthy area like the Mantua plain; but the transition from the unbearable heat of the day to the freshness of the nights, still cooled by the wind from the Alps, is too abrupt for the French.
In that month when staying on the shores of the lake is especially pleasant, during the days of the scorching heat of August, the two towns located in its vicinity, Lonato and Castiglione, were forever glorified by the battles that are named after them. At this time of the year, the valleys and plains offered a spectacle of endless plantations of maize; in these regions maize reaches a height of eight or ten feet, and its stalks grow so luxuriantly that they can make it easier for the enemy to surprise attack. In addition, mighty elms grow in abundance on the plains and hills, twenty or thirty feet high; they are entwined with vines that are thrown from one tree to another, which gives the landscape the appearance of a dense forest. In summer, the eye often cannot penetrate more than a hundred paces away from the main road.
Pretty peasant women of the villages close to the lake affectionately received the soldiers - young, cheerful, who immediately received a salary for many months.
It can be said that at this time in the army many frivolous deeds were committed, but not a single meanness. Vile thefts were the lot of officials of all kinds, who came from Paris in droves and pretended to be relatives of Barras. It was inconvenient for General Bonaparte, who was under the patronage of Barras, to punish them too severely. And without that, the commander-in-chief disagreed with the Directory on a number of issues. Was he, in addition, supposed to interfere with the second cousins of the members of the Directory to profit?
These gentlemen performed brilliant follies in honor of the prima donnas, for in most of the towns occupied by the French army there were troupes of buff operas. Gro *, who at that time painted miniatures, an artist very popular in the army, where he was perhaps the most desperate daredevil, painted portraits of these beauties.
* (Gros, Antoine-Jean (1771-1835) - a prominent French painter, student of David. Created a series of paintings depicting individual episodes of the Napoleonic wars; these paintings are imbued with the idealization of Napoleon and his army.)
It can be said that the army never knew such gaiety as in the interval from the entry into Milan, May 15, to the beginning of the Battle of Arcola, in November. It must also be admitted that the discipline was weak; republican equality greatly undermined respect for rank, and officers were unquestioningly obeyed only in battle, but this did not bother them much: like their soldiers, they only thought about entertainment. Perhaps, in the whole army, only the commander-in-chief seemed indifferent to pleasures, although the unfortunate passion that the most famous and most charming actress of that time had for him was no secret to anyone.
Prior to the Battle of Lonato, Napoleon proved to be an excellent commander of the second rank in all battles. The crossing of the Po at Piacenza was swift, the crossing of the bridge at Lodi testifies to brilliant courage. But the French army has never been threatened with death. True, on the plains of Piedmont, she almost found herself in a dangerous position; but the court of Turin hurried to rescue her, breaking with Beaulieu and asking for a truce at Cherasco.
The military actions that we will now describe are of a completely different kind. If Napoleon had not won victories at Lonato and Castiglione, the army would have been destroyed. His young soldiers would not have been able to overcome the difficulties of an unsuccessful war, consisting entirely of retreats and incessant skirmishes, and he himself would not have been able to lead them. Here is the only one, though important property which his military genius lacked. His 1814 campaign in France is wholly offensive; after Waterloo he was completely discouraged; after the retreat from Russia in 1813, he should have remained on the Oder line to the last extremity.
It can be said that in his place on July 29, 1796, none of the generals of the Republic would have had the stamina to hold out. The Austrians went around the left flank of his army and at the same time attacked him in front with superior forces.
We will sequentially tell about the battles of Castiglion, Arcole and Rivoli, which put Napoleon in the first rank of great commanders. The battles of Castiglion and Rivoli are characterized by boldness of plan; under Arcola, this dignity was joined by an amazing perseverance in the skillful execution of details.
The extraordinary firmness of spirit, which Napoleon showed on two different occasions, without flinching either before Lonato or before Arcole, is perhaps the most beautiful expression of genius that can be found in the whole of modern history. And, mind you, this was not at all the despair of a limited mind. No, that was the decision of the sage, whom the imminent menacing danger does not deprive of the ability to clearly, quite clearly see what else can be done. This is an act from among those that even flattery cannot distort, for there is nothing higher in the world; and at the same time it is one of those deeds, or rather, the only deed in the world, which justifies despotism both from the point of view of the one who exercises it, and in the eyes of those who tolerate it.
Our idea of Hannibal, Caesar, Alexander lacks one thing: we do not know their history in enough detail to judge whether they ever reached such a deplorable state as Napoleon on the eve of Arcole.
In the battles of Montenotte, Millesimo and on the bridge at Lodi, Napoleon himself led his divisions into battle. Now, when the danger had increased a hundredfold, and when an oversight, an oversight, a momentary weakness could lead to the death of the entire army, he had to bring into action large forces, sometimes far beyond his sight. At the very least, he would need to have generals on whom he could rely * . But, by misfortune, increasing his fame, perhaps only Massena was worthy to carry out the plans of such a leader. Lannes, Murat, Bessieres, Lasalle were in the army, but served in junior ranks.
* (Such, for example, as Kleber, Saint-Cyr or Desaix, who during the Battle of Arcole commanded instead of Vaubois in Tyrol.)
The operations at Lonato and Castiglione, as if emphasizing their majestic beauty, were preceded by events that everyone considered to be the gravest defeats and which, thanks to these operations, managed to be corrected.
Brescia was suddenly captured by the enemy, and in Milan everyone, even the most ardent adherents of the French, believed that the army was lost forever.
Herr von Tugut, not without reason alarmed by the successes of Napoleon and the danger that threatened Mantua, decided to oppose the French new army and a new general. Therefore, to replace Beaulieu from Mannheim, Marshal Wurmser appeared at the head of a select army of twenty thousand.
Wurmser, born in Alsace to a noble family, served in the Austrian army for fifty years; he distinguished himself in both the Seven Years' War and the Turkish War. Thus, he had the glory of fighting Frederick the Great and Napoleon. In 1793 he broke through the enemy lines at Weissenburg, in 1795 he defeated Pichegru at Heidelberg and invaded the Palatinate; it was an old hussar, still full of energy.
In the last days of July 1796, the forces of the Austrian army concentrated in Trient reached sixty thousand people, and Napoleon could put up only thirty-five thousand against it. The eyes of the entire European aristocracy were fixed on Italy; she firmly believed that the French army would be crushed.
Wurmser wasted no time; at the head of thirty-five thousand men he set out from Tyrol, keeping to the valley of the Adige, which, as we have seen, runs parallel to the eastern shore of Lake Garda and is separated from it by Monte Baldo. Kvazdanovich with twenty-five thousand corps moved along the western shore of the lake to Salo and Brescia.
On the evening of July 29 in Verona and then at night, Napoleon received reports that Massena had left the important position of La Corona on the Adige under the pressure of the enemy, which immeasurably outnumbered him, and that fifteen thousand Austrians had unexpectedly attacked the division of General Soret in Salo , which, without showing due composure in decisive circumstances, retreated to Desenzano, instead of covering Brescia.
Any of the generals known at that time, if he were in the position of Napoleon, would consider himself dead; he realized that the enemy, by dividing his forces, thereby gives him the opportunity to wedge between the two main masses of his army and attack them one by one.
But it was necessary to immediately make a bold decision - this is the quality without which it is impossible to be a commander.
From here, by the way, it is clear why it is so easy to write smart things about the war and point out the right paths, after having thought them over maturely.
It was necessary at all costs to prevent Wurmser from linking up with Kvazdanovich on Mincho, for then his onslaught would be irresistible. Napoleon had the courage to lift the siege of Mantua, leaving one hundred and forty large-caliber guns in the trenches. It was all his heavy artillery.
He had the courage to reason as follows and to believe his reasoning: "If I am defeated, why do I need a siege park? I will have to immediately abandon it. If I succeed in defeating the enemy, then I will again find my cannons near Mantua." There was a third possibility: to defeat the enemy - and be unable to continue the siege of Mantua; but this misfortune would not be so great as the misfortune of being expelled from Italy.
Apparently, Napoleon wished to exert a moral influence on his generals, to enable them to get to know him and to get to know them better; he called a council of war. Kilmen and the learned generals were in favor of retreat; the Jacobin Augereau, full of noble fervor, declared that he would not leave before his division had engaged the enemy.
Bonaparte told them that by retreating they would lose Italy, that it would be impossible to bring ten thousand soldiers back to the Savona Rocks; that indeed the army of the Republic is too weak to stand against the totality of the forces of the Austrian army, but that it can smash one by one each of its two main masses. And, fortunately, these powerful columns will be separated by the waters of Lake Garda for another thirty or forty hours.
It was necessary to retreat quickly, cover the enemy column and, descending to Brescia, smash it utterly; then return to Mincho, attack Wurmser and drive him back to the Tyrol. But in order to carry out this plan, it was necessary to lift the siege of Mantua in twenty-four hours; it was impossible to delay even six hours. In addition, it was necessary to go without the slightest delay to the right bank of the Mincio in order to avoid the envelopment of the French army by the two main masses of the enemy troops.
Meanwhile, Madame Bonaparte, who had followed her husband to Verona, was on her way back to Milan, on her way to Desenzano and Brescia; but the enemy managed to cut this path. Thus, she found herself very close to the Austrian outposts and among the Austrian patrols. She decided that her husband was dead, shed a lot of tears and finally returned to Milan, but bypassing through Lucca. The respectful reception she received everywhere consoled her somewhat.
On the evening of July 30, the divisions of Massena and Augereau, together with the reserve, went to Brescia; but the Austrian division, which had captured this city, immediately set out from there to attack Napoleon, and had already approached Lonato. On July 31, General Dallemagne again occupied Lonato after a battle that dragged on for a long time with varying success. The 32nd Infantry Regiment acquired unfading glory there; it was commanded by the brave Colonel Dupuis (later killed in Cairo with the rank of general); that was the first battle of Lonato.
The French army is located on Chiesa. Kva-zdanovich withdrew to Gavardo by mountain passes. On August 1, at ten o'clock in the morning, Augereau's division, led by Napoleon, entered Brescia.
Things were not so bad for the Austrians; but in order to thwart Napoleon's so boldly conceived plan, Wurmser had to cross the Mincio at Peschiera on July 31 with all haste. He could easily reach Lonato and connect with Kvazdanovich; then the French army would have no choice but to immediately return to Ticino or Piacenza, and then Wurmser could freely enjoy his triumph in Mantua.
But instead of moving as soon as possible to connect with his assistant, Wurmser, to the sound of bells, made a triumphal entry into Mantua and only on August 2 in the evening, heading for Castiglione, crossed the Mincio at Goito. Kvazdanovich, to whom the mountains and forests of Gavardo made it easier to retreat, however, retreated, but he did not suffer much damage.
On the same August 2, in the evening, General Valet (shortly thereafter demoted), who was instructed to defend Castiglione and keep Wurmser's vanguard away from the army, left Castiglione with half of his detachment and appeared in Monte Chiaro, where he raised the alarm in Augereau's division.
On August 3, this division, reinforced by a reserve, moved on Castiglione; Massena's division was still stationed at Lonato.
In order to force Kvazdanovich to continue his retreat, the French commander threatened his communications with Tyrol and sent an order to General Guyot to hastily move towards Salo.
Everything happened quite differently than expected. Napoleon thought to strike at the troops of Wurmser, but instead stumbled upon the left flank of Kvazdanovich, who again tried to connect with his commander-in-chief by advancing to Lonato. True to the Austrian method, Kvazdanovich divided his forces into several columns. One of them attacked Massena's van at Lonato; the French entered the battle with excessive vehemence and suffered some casualties. But soon the commander-in-chief, arriving in time with the main forces of the division, restored the situation, captured Lonato with a swift onslaught and ordered that this column of Kvazdanovich be pursued on the heels.
But by a lucky chance for the enemy, a small Austrian column, which arrived in Salo earlier than Guyot, decided, not finding anyone there, to move further along the same road along which the column had just been defeated by Massena's division. She overtook the remnants of this column and helped rally them.
That evening (August 3) Quazdanovich brought his columns back to their original positions at Gavardo. In the meantime, Napoleon, intending to go to Wurmser, inflicted defeats on Kvazdanovich, Augereau at Castiglione attacked and defeated the vanguard of the Austrian marshal. On the same day and two days later, Augereau was a great general, which never happened to him again.
On August 4, discovering that Wurmser, after the failure he had suffered the day before, was moving very indecisively, Napoleon took advantage of this respite to throw Guyot and Saint-Hilaire against Quazdanovich. These generals managed to pass unnoticed behind Gavardo, where there were twelve or fifteen thousand soldiers of Kvazdanovich. The latter, in view of the threat from the rear, finally decided to move back to Riva, to the northern end of the lake.
So, Napoleon got rid of this corps, even on the eve of a very formidable one; the strength of this corps was as dangerous as the direction it had chosen; had he continued along this path, he might have ceaselessly disturbed the left flank of the French army and prevented it from reaching the Mincio.
These are the circumstances under which (August 4 at 5 p.m.), at the very time when Kvazdanovich decided to withdraw to Riva, the famous surprise attack at Lonato took place, which gave French general an opportunity to show such presence of mind.
Two thousand Austrians, who were threatened with execution, benevolently surrendered; they had four guns.
Here the difference in the spiritual warehouse of the two peoples is clearly revealed: at the very moment when the two thousandth Austrian detachment laid down their arms, without even thinking of trying their luck in battle, Guyot and Saint-Hilaire swiftly attacked the Austrian camp in Gavardo. The attack at Gavardo caused a disorderly flight of the Austrians, who numbered twelve to fifteen thousand. And the Austrian attack on Napoleon's headquarters brought him more prisoners than he had soldiers.
All these maneuvers we have outlined here were skilful and bold, but have not yet yielded decisive results. If Quazdanovich had not had the strange thought of running further than he was being chased, he might have been able to establish contact with his commander-in-chief across Lake Garda or even through Desenzano. Both main masses of the Austrian troops could strike at the same time and converge at Lonato.
But none of this happened: Wurmser lacked enterprise, and Kvazdanovich lacked courage.
Wurmser divided his army into several columns and finally did not think of anything better than to bring only twenty-five thousand people to the decisive battlefield. Only the divisions of Massena and Augereau, reinforced by reserves and located by Bonaparte near Castiglione, reached the strength of the enemy army, and the French commander was still waiting for Serrurier's division, which was supposed to go to the rear of the left flank of the Austrians.
“August 5, at dawn, we found ourselves face to face with the enemy,” writes Napoleon in his report to the Directory *. But even at six o’clock everything remained motionless. I forced the whole army to move back somewhat in order to attract the enemy.
* (The writings of Napoleon, 4 vols., ed. Pankuka, 1826, vol. I, p. 104.)
The battle has begun; but the French fought without trying to push the enemy back; suddenly, in the distance, on the plain, from the direction of Cavriana, Serrurier's troops appear. Then Bonaparte engages in a fierce battle on the right flank and in the center of his location.
Wurmser sees that he has been outflanked on the left flank; he is afraid of being thrown into Lake Garda; finally he realizes that only a hasty retreat can save him; he crosses back over the Mincio, leaving twenty guns behind.
But after all, he could call on the troops of Kvazdanovich and thoroughly strengthen himself on Mincio: nothing prevented him from relying on his left flank on Mantua, whose garrison - fifteen thousand fresh troops - now had complete freedom of action.
On August 6, while on Mincio the main forces of the French army attracted the attention of the Austrians with lively firing, Massena hastily crossed the river at Peschiera and fell on the right flank of Wurmser, located opposite this fortress; hastily built, barely completed field fortifications were taken by a swift onslaught, and the enemy finally decided to retreat into the Adige valley; in this case, General Victor distinguished himself.
On August 7, at ten o'clock in the evening, Napoleon again entered Verona. At the same time, the Venetian conductor played the most comical role; he assured that he was neutral, but in fact he behaved duplicitously; he tried to send troops against the victorious army, but did not find a single soldier who would agree to fight.
Wurmser showed for the first time that he could move quickly; he went through the Adige valley to Alla. General Bonaparte gave orders to pursue him, and finally, on August 12, the French army recaptured all the positions it had occupied before the Austrian marshal launched an attack.
These astonishing successes were bought at a high price - the irreparable loss of all the heavy artillery that the army had so hard to concentrate under the walls of Mantua. Serrurier's division, under the command of General Fiorella, again positioned itself in sight of this fortress, but there was no longer any thought of a siege. I had to limit myself to a simple blockade. This case was entrusted to General Sayuge.
Marshal Wurmser returned to Tyrol, far from pushing the French back to Alessandria. He lost ten or twelve thousand men and fifty guns, but more importantly, he lost his military honour.
If this commander's education had matched his personal courage, he might have drawn useful warnings from the history of wars. After all, it was here, in the very places where he was utterly defeated, that Prince Eugene of Savoy * in 1705 made his amazing campaign against the Duke of Vendôme. This general, reputed to be one of the most impetuous among the commanders of Louis XIV, took possession of Mantua, but allowed his left flank to be grasped. Prince Eugene had the unheard of courage to ferry his infantry in boats from the left bank of the lake to Gavardo, on waters where the wind causes the same rough sea as on the sea. This extraordinary maneuver took six whole days. It would not have taken Napoleon half that time to destroy an army that would have dared to make such an attempt in front of him. It must not be forgotten that between 1705 and 1796 the great Friedrich appeared, who introduced rapid transitions into the art of war.
* (Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736) - a prominent commander and diplomat, field marshal of the Austrian Empire. He kept the tactics of a swift offensive. One of the victories of Eugene of Savoy was won in the battle with the Turks near Vienna in 1683.)
We must get involved in the battle, and there we will see.
Napoleon Bonaparte
220 years ago, on August 3-5, French troops under the command of Napoleon defeated the Austrian troops under the command of Field Marshal von Wurmser in the battles of Lonato and Castiglione. The Austrian high command transferred additional troops to the Italian front and tried to stop Napoleon's advance and release Mantua, but the first Austrian offensive to liberate Mantua failed. On August 5, 1796, in the general battle of Castiglion, Wurmser was defeated by Napoleon's army.
The situation on the Italian front
The victory at Lodi allowed the French army under the command of Napoleon to occupy all of Lombardy along the line of the Adda River. On June 29, 1796, part of the French troops under the command of Murat occupied Livorno, eliminating the base of the English fleet there. General Augereau occupied Bologna. Bonaparte personally occupied Modena in mid-June, then it was the turn of Tuscany, although the Duke of Tuscany was neutral in this war. Having provided his rear with shops on the left bank of the Po River, the French commander-in-chief crossed the Mincio on May 30, threw back the troops of the Austrian general Beaulieu and, after a series of brilliant maneuvers, forced him to retreat to Tyrol. On June 4, the French army laid siege to Mantua. Now all of Northern Italy was in the hands of Napoleon.
Mantua was considered the key to Italy. Its garrison was 13 thousand people and had food supplies for 2.5 months. The fortress, which was considered impregnable, was covered from the north and east by lakes, and from south to west - by swamps overgrown with reeds, passable only along five available dams. It was difficult to take it, however, it was possible to block it with small forces. Having put forward Massena's division as a barrier against the troops of Beaulieu, who retreated to the north, Napoleon blocked Mantua and, having received siege weapons from Milan and Ferrara, proceeded to a gradual siege of the fortress. Most of French troops were located along the Adige River, thereby covering the siege of the fortress. Further fighting Austrians and French for eight months proceeded in the struggle for Mantua, which the Austrians tried to unblock.
Meanwhile, Napoleon came into conflict with the supreme leadership. By capturing and imposing an indemnity on the richest regions of Northern Italy, Napoleon was able to afford grand gestures. On May 20, 1796, the commander-in-chief of the Italian army announced to the soldiers that they would receive half of their salary in specie. None of the armies of the Republic paid like that. He decided it alone, without asking anyone's permission. In Paris, this excessive independence caused irritation, but in the Italian army, of course, Napoleon's decision was greeted with a bang.
Even earlier, on May 13, Napoleon received an order from the Directory that the army operating in Italy would be divided into two independent armies. One, operating in the north, will be led by General Kellermann, the second, under the command of General Napoleon, numbering 25 thousand soldiers, should go to Rome and Naples. This order came after the victory at Lodi (May 10) and completely contradicted Napoleon's plans and the general military-strategic situation. Napoleon reported to Paris that dividing the Italian army was against the interests of the Republic. He stated briefly and clearly: "Better one bad general than two good ones." And in his usual style, he went to aggravate the situation: “The position of the army of the Republic in Italy is such that you need to have a commander who enjoys your full confidence; if it is not me, you will not hear complaints from me ... Everyone is waging war as best he can. General Kellerman is more experienced than I am: he will lead her better; together we will lead her badly. Napoleon threatened to resign.
Thus, Napoleon correctly calculated everything and remained the commander of a single Italian army. The order to divide the army in Italy was forgotten.
Forces and plans of the parties
Napoleon at that time had about 56 thousand people, of which 10 thousand were located in the rear, guarding fortresses and communications, and 11 thousand near Mantua. French troops were deployed on a wide front of 120 km. Communication with Milan was provided by the newly formed division of Soret, who watched the mountain passes from Salo onwards. The blockade of Mantua was assigned to Serurier's division. Massena's division occupied Verona and Peschiera and observed the space from Lake Garda to the Adige River; Augereau was on the Adige, between Verona and Legnago; Despinua's division and cavalry stood at Roverbella, forming a reserve. The division of La Harpe, who was killed in action, was disbanded, and its personnel were distributed among other divisions. Thus, for actions in the field, Napoleon had about 35 thousand people.
Given the series of defeats of the Austrian army in Italy, the gofkriegsrat (court military council) decided to strengthen the Italian army. The troops were withdrawn from the Rhine front. The passivity of Jourdan in the German direction allowed the Austrian high command to strengthen its troops in the Italian theater of operations, transferring the army of General Wurmser here. By May 20, 16 battalions and 8 squadrons approached the Italian front, then the talented commander Dagobert von Wurmser arrived from the Army of the Rhine with 19 battalions and 18 squadrons. At the end of May, he took command of the army from Beaulieu. By July 20, Wurmser had 50,000 men. army, not counting the garrison of Mantua (13 thousand people). Wurmser, at the direction of the Hofkriegsrat, had to take offensive operation to deblockade Mantua and oust the French from Lombardy.
Commander of the Austrian army Dagobert Sigismund von Wurmser
Wurmser planned an offensive in four columns on a broad front, intending to further connect them for action near Mantua. The column of General Kvazhdanovich (17 thousand soldiers and 52 guns) was to advance west of Lake Garda in order to cut off the communication of French troops with Milan. Melas' column (15,000 men and 52 guns) was ordered to move east of the lake in the direction of Rivoli. Davidovich's column (10,000 soldiers with 60 guns) was heading along the left bank of the Adige River, while Messarosh's column (5,000 men and 18 guns) was advanced to Bassano and Vicenza for demonstrative purposes. Wurmser himself moved with Melas's column. Thus, Wurmser fragmented his army, his troops had to join only when meeting with the main enemy forces. Napoleon had an opportunity to operate along the internal lines of operations and to concentrate superior forces compared to each of the individual columns of the enemy. The French commander, acting quickly and decisively, could break the enemy piece by piece.
Wurmser's first offensive. 1796 Source: V. V. Beshanov. Sixty battles of Napoleon
First Austrian offensive against Mantua. Battles of Lonato and Castiglione
The preparation of the Austrian army for the offensive did not remain a secret for the French, but their intentions were not yet clear. On July 28, the Austrian columns began an offensive march. Initial actions of Kvazhdanovich were successful. Under the onslaught of the enemy, the French cleared Salo and the mountain passes leading to the Po valley. On July 30, Kvajanovich's troops had already occupied Brescia. They intercepted the Milan-Mantua road and advanced towards Montepiaro in advanced units. Thus, Kvazhdanovich became on the messages of the French army. In the future, Kvazhdanovich, advancing to the southeast, was going to connect with Wurmser and surround the French army.
In order to delay the movement of the Wurmser column in the main direction, Napoleon sent Massena's division. But Wurmser's troops pushed her back. Augereau's division was put forward to help Masséna, but the Austrians also threw it back. On July 29, the Melas-Wurmzer column occupied the Rivoli plateau with a fight. The situation was becoming extremely dangerous for the French army, and then Napoleon made his maneuver, which, according to military researchers, could in itself secure immortal glory for him, even if he were then killed.
Having received reports of the failures of the French troops at Salo and Rivoli, a council of war was assembled, at which the majority voted for a retreat across the Olio River, but Augereau advised to go on the offensive. Napoleon decided to attack the enemy. On the night of July 30-31, Napoleon planned to lift the siege of Mantua, abandon the siege artillery park and gather as many forces as possible to strike at Kvazhdanovich's corps, setting up barriers against the Melas column. The French commander-in-chief began to concentrate his forces at Lonato and Montechiaro. Moreover, the parts of Augereau and Kilmen transferred here, moving forward, ousted the Austrians from Brescia, and Soret again occupied Salo, ensuring communication between the French and Milan.
Meanwhile, Wurmser was celebrating his victory. He calmly entered Mantua, thus lifting the siege from it. There, the Austrian commander-in-chief learned that Napoleon had gone east with all his might. After some hesitation, Wurmser left the fortress, pushing back the French barrier under the command of Valette. Then he sent the columns of Melas and Messaros through the Mincio to the rear of the French army. As a result, Napoleon's troops found themselves between the troops of Wurmser and Kvazhdanovich. Recognizing his position as very risky, Napoleon even thought about retreating, but after a meeting with the generals, he retained his previous plan: first strike at Kvazhdanovich. Against Wurmser, at Montechiaro, the divisions of Augereau and Kilmen were left.
On August 3, Napoleon threw his remaining troops against Kvazhdanovich north of Lonato and defeated the enemy. One of the columns surrendered, the rest retreated to the north. Napoleon then turned his army against Wurmser. The Austrian commander-in-chief, having learned about the failure of Kvazhdanovich, nevertheless decided to attack the enemy and deployed his troops in battle formation at Castiglione.
The battle of Castiglion began on August 5, 1796, at around 6:00 am. Napoleon tied down the main forces of the Austrians in the center and on the right flank, and dealt the main blow to their left wing of the enemy. By 9 o'clock, the division of General Verdier, operating in the main direction, had captured the dominant height of Medol and, having installed artillery on it, opened flanking fire on the main forces of the Austrian army. The Austrians stubbornly fought back, but their entry into the flank and rear of the advanced units of the division of General Serurier, approaching from Mantua, and a simultaneous strike from the front of the entire French army decided the outcome of the battle. The Austrians retreated.
Battle of Castiglione
Results
The defeated the Austrian army of Wurmser retreated to the north, losing 3 thousand people and 20 guns. Thus, the more advanced French tactics - columns combined with loose formation - showed their superiority over the outdated linear tactics Austrians. While Wurmser distributed his troops evenly along the entire line, not even allocating a reserve, Napoleon concentrated forces and means in the main direction. A strong frontal blow, combined with a maneuver to the flank and rear of the enemy, ensured his victory.
The Austrian command scattered its forces, acted slowly, indecisively, which led to the defeat of the entire offensive operation. Napoleon, on the contrary, acted decisively and quickly. He correctly set goals: he decided to lift the siege of Mantua and abandon his siege park in order to defeat the advancing enemy troops in parts. Concentrating forces in one direction, he defeated and threw back the enemy army. Then the French troops again besieged Mantua.
After the lifting of the siege from Mantua, an Austrian detachment was sent from the fortress to pursue Seryuye's troops. However, due to the failure of Wurmser's army, this detachment retreated to Mantua. The remnants of Wurmser's army went to Tyrol. Total losses Austrians in the first attempt to release Mantua amounted to 13 thousand people and 71 guns. The French lost 4 thousand people, as well as 187 siege guns abandoned near Mantua - this was the most difficult and irreparable loss. However, in addition to repulsing the enemy offensive, this victory gave huge moral advantages.
Napoleon always took this into account: “The Austrian army, after its defeat, still consisted of 40,000 people, but from now on, one battalion of the Italian army put four enemy to flight, and everywhere the French captured cannons, prisoners and items of military equipment. Wurmser, however, supplied the Mantua garrison with supplies. He withdrew the brigades of Rokkovin and Vukasovich from there, which he replaced with fresh troops, but he took with him only half of his excellent army, and nothing can compare with the demoralization of this army and the loss of its combat effectiveness after the failures suffered.
As the historian A. Z. Manfred noted: “In the campaign of 1796-1797, Bonaparte proved himself to be a brilliant master of maneuver warfare. In principle, he continued only what was new that had been created before him by the armies of revolutionary France. That was a new tactic of columns, combined with a loose formation and the ability to provide extraordinary speed of movement in a limited area of a quantitative superiority over the enemy, the ability to concentrate forces into a shock fist that breaks through the enemy’s resistance in his weak spot. This new tactic has already been used by Jourdan, Gauche, Marceau; it had already been analyzed and generalized by the synthetic mind of Lazar Carnot, but Bonaparte managed to breathe new strength into it, to reveal the possibilities lurking in it.
Death of John Talbot at the Battle of Castiglion.
Castillon de Bataille, near Bordeaux
French victory
Battle of Castillon- the battle that took place on July 17, 1453 between the English and French troops near the town of Castillon-de-Bataille in Gascony. The battle was the last battle of the Hundred Years' War and ended with the complete defeat of the English troops. Along with this, the battle was one of the first battles in European history in which artillery played a decisive role.
background
After the French liberation of Bordeaux in 1451, the Hundred Years' War began to decline. Be that as it may, the inhabitants of Bordeaux, after almost three hundred years of British rule, considered themselves English subjects, sending a delegation to London to King Henry VI with requests to free them from the French. These actions of the Gascons were also prompted by the fact that the reconquest by the French of Gascony, which had long-standing economic ties with England, hurt the trade of Gascon merchants. Yielding to the demands of the delegation, the English king sent a three thousandth detachment of soldiers to France under the leadership of the famous military leader John Talbot. When the British approached Bordeaux, the townspeople drove the French garrison out of the city and opened the gates to the British troops. Meanwhile, during the winter, the French King Charles VII was gathering troops for the upcoming campaign against the British. With the onset of spring, the king at the head of the army marched to Bordeaux.
Battle
Talbot, meanwhile, received three thousand reinforcements, but his forces were not enough to repel the many thousands of French troops advancing in three detachments on Gascony. When the advanced French army besieged Castillon, Talbot was forced to change his plans and come to the aid of the besieged. The French commander Jean Bureau ordered his troops (7,000-10,000 people) to fortify the camp, surrounding it with a moat and a palisade. The French had 300 artillery pieces, which were actively used in the defense of the fortified camp. On July 17, 1453, the advance detachment of the British (1300 people), led by Talbot, reached the French camp, defeating a large detachment of French militia riflemen along the way in the forest.
A few hours after the first clash, Talbot was notified that the French army had begun to retreat. However, the townsman, who informed Talbot of the French retreat, misunderstood the significance of the maneuvers taking place in the French camp: the French did not plan retreats at all, and only civilians who were ordered to leave because of the approaching battle left the camp.
Hastily regrouping his forces, Talbot at the head of his troops advanced on the French camp. To his surprise, the fortifications were defended by thousands of archers and crossbowmen, supported by numerous artillery. Nevertheless, Talbot decided to storm the camp, which turned out to be suicidal. Talbot himself did not take a direct part in the battle: in the past, being in French captivity, upon release, he gave an obligation not to fight against the French.
The British, having attacked the camp and crossed the ditch, were met with a hail of arrows and fierce enemy artillery fire. Soon, the English troops were replenished with reinforcements pulled up to the battlefield, but these forces were not enough to capture the camp. An hour after the start of the battle, a detachment of the Breton cavalry that arrived at the battlefield attacked the right flank of the British. The British took to flight. During the flight near Talbot, a horse was killed, and the commander, crushed by the weight of a dead animal, lay on the battlefield until one of the French militia recognized him and hacked him to death with an ax.
The French won a complete victory. Three months later the French took
Sixty battles of Napoleon Beshanov Vladimir Vasilievich
Lonato and Castiglione. August 3-5
We must get involved in the battle, and there we will see.
General Bonaparte
Napoleon knew perfectly well that Mantua was the key to Italy. Once in possession of her, he never let go of her again until he parted with his crown: and until then the dominion of Italy was never in serious danger.
F. Engels. Military works
“Starting the war in April 1796, Bonaparte acted according to a carefully thought out and worked out plan. He counted. As in a chess game, all variations, all possible moves - one's own and one's opponent - until the twentieth move. But now the time has come when the 20th move was made, when the previously thought out options for the plan were exhausted. The war has entered a new stage - into the sphere of the unforeseen; the time of improvisations has come, the time of instant, not allowing for delay decisions. And then Bonaparte discovered for himself for the first time that it was this sphere that was his element, in which he had no equal, it brought the greatest success! This 27-year-old army commander overturned all established principles of warfare.
So Mantua was the key to Italy. Its garrison was 13,000 people and had food for 2.5 months. The fortress, considered impregnable, was covered from the north and east by lakes, and from south to west - by swamps overgrown with reeds, traversed only by five available dams. It was hard to get into it, but it was possible to block it with a handful of people. Having advanced Massena's division against the Beaulieu group, which had retreated to the north, Bonaparte blockaded Malta and, having received siege weapons from Milan and Ferrara, proceeded to gradually attack the fortress. Most of the French troops stood along the Adige River, thereby providing cover for siege operations. Further hostilities of the opponents for eight months proceeded in the struggle for Manguya, which the Austrians tried to release.
By the end of July, Bonaparte's army had strengthened to 46,000 men, besides the 10,000 left as garrison in Lombardy and Piedmont. The French were deployed on a broad front from Legnago to Peschiera. Communication with Milan was provided by the newly formed division of Soret, who watched the mountain passes from Salo onwards. The blockade of Mantua was assigned to the Serurier division - 11,000 soldiers. The division of La Harpe, who was killed in action, was disbanded, and its personnel were distributed among other divisions.
The sluggish actions of Jourdan on the German front made it possible for the Austrians to strengthen their troops in the Italian theater of operations by transferring the army of General Wurmser here. He took command of the combined forces of the Austrians against Bonaparte. In addition to the garrison blocked in Mantua, Wurmser had 50,000 people concentrated at Trient with 192 guns, with which, at the direction of the Hofkriegsrat, he was to launch an offensive operation to unblock the fortress and oust the French from Lombardy.
Wurmser planned an offensive in four columns on a broad front, with a view to further linking them up for action near Mantua. The column of General Kvazhdanovich (17,000 men and 52 guns) was to advance west of Lake Garda in order to cut off Bonaparte's communication with Milan. Melas' column (15,000 men and 52 guns) was ordered to move east of the lake in the direction of Rivoli. A column of ten thousand Davidovich, with 60 guns, was heading along the left bank of the Adige River, and a column of Messarosh (5,000 people and 18 guns) was advanced to Bassano and Vicenza for demonstrative purposes. Wurmser himself followed with a column of Melas.
The preparation of the Austrians for the offensive did not remain a secret for Bonaparte, but their intentions were not yet clear. On July 28, the Austrian columns began an offensive march. Initial actions of Kvazhdanovich were successful. Under the onslaught of the enemy, the French cleared Salo and the mountain passes leading to the Po Valley, and on July 30, Kvazhdanovich's troops were already occupying Brescia. They cut the Milan-Mantua road and advanced in advance towards Montepiaro. In the future, Kvazhdanovich, advancing to the southeast, intended to connect with Wurmser and surround the French.
Wurmser's first offensive. 1796
In order to delay the movement of Wurmser's column in the main direction, Bonaparte sent Massena's division. But Wurmser threw it away. Augereau's division advanced to Masséna's aid and was also driven back by the Austrians. On July 29, the Melas column occupied the Rivoli plateau with a fight. The situation was becoming desperate for the French, and then Bonaparte made his maneuver, which, in the opinion of all military theorists, could in itself secure immortal glory for him, even if he were then killed.
Having received reports of failures at Salo and Rivoli, Bonaparte decided on the night of July 30-31 to lift the siege of Mantua and gather as many forces as possible to strike at Kvazhdanovich's troops, setting up barriers against Melas's column. The French commander began to concentrate his forces at Lonato and Montechiaro. Moreover, the parts of Augereau and Kilmen transferred here, moving forward, ousted the Austrians from Brescia, and Soret again occupied Salo, ensuring communication between the French and Milan.
Wurmser was celebrating his victory at this time. He entered Mantua, thus lifting the siege from it, when he suddenly learned that Bonaparte had gone east with all his might. After some hesitation, Wurmser left the fortress, pushing back the French barrier under the command of Valette. Then he sent the columns of Melas and Messaros through the Mincio to the rear of the French army. As a result, the concentrated forces of Bonaparte found themselves between the troops of Wurmser and Kvazhdanovich. Recognizing his position as very risky, Bonaparte even thought about retreating, but after a meeting with the generals, he remained at the decision made: to strike at Kvazhdanovich. Against Wurmser, at Montechiaro, the divisions of Augereau and Kilmen were left.
On August 3, Bonaparte threw the remnants of his army against Kvazhdanovich north of Lonato and defeated all three of his columns. One of them surrendered, the rest retreated to the north. Bonaparte then positioned his army against Wurmser. The Austrian commander-in-chief, having learned about the failure of Kvazhdanovich, nevertheless decided to give the French a battle and deployed his troops in battle formation at Castiglione.
The battle, into which the French entered on the move, began on August 5 at about 6 o'clock in the morning. Bonaparte tied down the main forces of the Austrians in the center and on the right flank, and dealt the main blow to their left wing. By 9 o'clock, the division of General J.-A. Verdier captured the dominant height of Medol and, having installed artillery on it, opened flanking fire on the main forces of the Austrian army. The Austrians stubbornly resisted, but their entry into the flank and rear of the advanced units of the division of General Serurier, approaching from Mantua, and a simultaneous strike from the front of the entire French army decided the outcome of the battle. Wurmser's defeated army retreated northward, losing 3,000 men and 20 guns. Thus, the more advanced French tactics of columns combined with loose formation showed their superiority over the obsolete linear tactics of the Austrians. While Wurmser distributed his troops evenly along the entire front, not even allocating a reserve, Bonaparte made a decisive massing of forces and means in the main direction. A strong frontal blow, combined with a maneuver to the flank and rear of the enemy, ensured his success.
Battle of Castiglione.
After the lifting of the siege from Mantua, a detachment was sent from the fortress to pursue Seryuye's troops. But due to the failure of the field troops of the Austrians, this detachment withdrew to Mantua. The remnants of Wurmser's army went to Tyrol. The total losses of the Austrians in the first attempt to release Mantua amounted to 13,000 people and 71 guns. The French lost 4,000 men, as well as 187 siege guns left near Mantua - this was the most irreparable loss. In addition to material results, victory also brings colossal moral advantages. Napoleon always took this into account: “The Austrian army, after its defeat, still consisted of 40,000 people, but from now on, one battalion of the Italian army put four enemy to flight, and everywhere the French captured cannons, prisoners and items of military equipment. Wurmser, however, supplied the Mantua garrison with supplies. He withdrew the brigades of Rokkovin and Vukasovich from there, which he replaced with fresh troops, but he took with him only half of his excellent army, and nothing can compare with the demoralization of this army and the loss of its combat effectiveness after the failures suffered.
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