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There are never too many battleships

It took 35 years before the second time there was a situation where the dominance of the sea was a key factor in ensuring victory in the war. This happened during the Second World War in the Mediterranean. Of course, there were other theaters where the fleet played a significant role, such as the Pacific Ocean. But will anyone venture to assert that the American fleet, with all its overwhelming superiority in forces, has established firm dominance there? No. Well, the Americans are not to blame for this, it's just that the ocean itself was too big for anyone to control it, the Japanese had the opportunity to conduct some kind of operation until the very last moment. But in the Mediterranean, after several clashes, Reggia Marina did not dare to stick her nose into the sea, which had a catastrophic effect on the position of the Axis armies in North Africa.

The leader of the nation, Benito Mussolini, was greatly impressed by the successes of the Wehrmacht, and after 9 months of delay, he decided to enter the war, because he was sure: "To participate in the world, you must participate in the war." Or, simply put, he was afraid of being late for the division of the pie. That is why on June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on the already defeated France and practically defeated England, in any case, Mussolini considered it as such. The main issue was control over the central part mediterranean sea, through which the communications connecting the Italian metropolis and North Africa passed. It would seem that this area is confidently controlled by the Italians, who have a large number of airfields on the coast and large fleet. There were many battles and small clashes in the Mediterranean theater, but three events became decisive, in each of which an important role was played by battleships, however, each time is completely different. It's about about the battle at Punta Stilo, the attack of Taranto and the battle at Cape Matapan. Events such as the battle at Cape Teulada or the two battles in the Gulf of Sirte played a noticeably smaller role.

Somehow it suddenly turned out that the Italian armed forces were completely unprepared for war, in any case, the state of the fleet was just that. The fact is that of the 6 battleships on the lists, only 2 were ready for combat, and the weakest ones. They were opposed by 4 British battleships of the Mediterranean Fleet and the French Lorrain, also stationed in Alexandria, and 4 French battleships in Toulon. But on June 22, France capitulated, and the British had to hastily fill the vacuum that had formed in the west; the battlecruiser Hood and 2 battleships, as well as the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, were transferred to Gibraltar. Alas, the former French allies in Mers-el-Kebir became the first victim of the British battleships, but they did not have to wait long to meet the real enemy. The Italians prepared a convoy to Africa, with reinforcements for their army (2,200 soldiers, 72 tanks and other cargo), and Admiral Cunningham, who commanded the Mediterranean Fleet, organized two convoys from Malta to take out extra people and equipment from there. As a result, on July 9, the fleets met near Cape Punta Stilo.

The Italian Admiral Campioni had the battleships Cavour and Cesare, 6 heavy and 8 light cruisers, and 20 destroyers. Admiral Cunningham had the battleships Warspite, Royal Sovereign, Malaya, aircraft carrier Eagle, 5 light cruisers, 16 destroyers. It seemed that something grandiose like the Battle of Jutland might well take place, although there were noticeably fewer battleships, but fate would have decreed otherwise. The fact is that the day before, the reconnaissance aircraft of both opponents counted the ships at sea, but at the same time, the Italian pilots saw as many as 4 battleships, which alarmed the command. Even Marshal Badoglio intervened in maritime affairs, who turned to the command of the fleet with a proposal to send the latest battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto to the sea, but they were not yet considered combat-ready and, moreover, simply did not have time to the scene, so the proposal was rejected.

On the morning of July 9, Sunderland flying boats from Malta discovered the Italian fleet and began to follow it, but the Italian scouts missed. The Italians could not imagine that Cunningham would go straight to the coast of Italy, and they were looking for him further south. Cunningham ordered the Igloo to send torpedo bombers to attack the Italian battleships, but the Swordfish at 1315 found only the heavy cruisers, which attacked unsuccessfully. Admiral Paladini wrote that the British attacked well, but the Italian ships maneuvered simply superbly.

This trouble told Admiral Campioni what to do, and his cruisers were raised in search of 6 seaplanes, as a result, the British were found 80 miles to the northwest, that is, they could cut off Campioni from the bases. So far, this turn of events did not frighten the Italian commander, he himself longed for battle and headed for the enemy. Cunningham, having cut off the Italians from Taranto, at 14.15 also went to meet the Italians. The English ships sailed in three groups: ahead of Admiral Tovey's cruiser, 8 miles behind them Cunningham himself on the Worspite with 5 destroyers, and another 8 miles behind the other 2 battleships, an aircraft carrier and 10 destroyers.

At 1447, the light cruiser Orion spotted smoke on the horizon, and a little later the British saw Italian battleships 15 miles to the west. Admiral Tovey turned back, the Italian light cruisers pursued him, and at 1515 Cunningham ordered his vanguard to take the fight. At 1520, the cruisers began skirmishing at a distance of 22,300 yards, which was too much for 152-mm guns, they could shoot at such a distance, hit - only with great luck. However, an explanation for this was immediately found. One of the officers of the British cruiser Neptune confidently stated that the weather, of course, was ideal, but smoke screens and splashes from enemy shells, as well as forced transfers of fire, did not allow hitting the target. This did not prevent the cruiser from firing 136 shells in 10 minutes.

At 1526 hours the Warspite opened fire on the Italian light cruisers, who began to withdraw. Therefore, at 1542 Admiral Campioni's battleships and heavy cruisers turned to the northeast to help their light cruisers. The heavy cruisers were the first to fire on the Warspite, and at 15.53 the duel of battleships began. At the same time, Cunningham, although he was very eager to start the fight, still did not lose his sobriety. He warned Tovey not to get too far away from him, as the Warspite would try to link up with the rest of the battleships.

The Italian admiral immediately made a more than dubious decision. His flagship, the Cesare, fired at the Warspite from 29,000 yards, the Cavour was ordered to fire on the Malaya, the distance to which was already quite fantastic. In any case, the British battleship fired two test salvos, but received such shortfalls that it immediately stopped firing. The Worspite took aim at the Cesare, and the British determined the distance as 26,000 yards. There were no hits yet, but the Italian overflights lay in unpleasant proximity to the British destroyers, who preferred to get away.

Taking advantage of the fact that the attention of the Worspite's gunners was diverted, the Italian heavy cruisers again approached to bombard her, and at 15.55, the Trento fired three volleys at the British flagship. The rest of Admiral Paladini's ships exchanged fire with Tovey's cruisers, but to no avail.

Suddenly, Italian observers saw a small flash aboard the Worspite and thought it was evidence of a hit, when in fact it was a small fire on the reconnaissance aircraft after the X-turret salvo. The plane was simply thrown overboard. But the Warspite itself at 15.59 hit the Cesare. The projectile hit the rear chimney, made a hole in it with a diameter of about 6 meters, and its warhead flew deep into the hull, where it stopped, hitting the side armor from the inside. The damage itself turned out to be small, but the fans drove the smoke and flames of the explosion into the boiler rooms, and 4 boilers failed. The Cesare's speed dropped to 18 knots. Cunningham proudly claimed that the Warspite had achieved a hit from a record distance of 13 miles, and it was absolutely true: no other battleship hit the target from such a distance.

Admiral Campioni decided that his flagship was seriously damaged and immediately ordered to turn to the left, interrupting the battle. The battle of the battleships ended, and it lasted only 7 minutes. Again we see the same transience that has already been mentioned, although here it can be explained not by the results achieved, but only by the timidity of the Italian admiral - he still believed that he had collided with 4 British battleships. However, by 16.45 Cesare's damage was almost fixed, and the ship picked up speed again. The cruiser firefight continued for some time, but then the Bolzano received 3 hits from the Neptune, and one fell below the waterline. The cruiser took about 3,000 tons of water and also temporarily lost speed, after which Admiral Paladini repeated the maneuver of his boss, that is, he turned away and left the battle.

The Italian destroyers covered the withdrawal of heavy ships with smoke screens and carried out something like a torpedo attack. But they fired from a distance of 5 to 8 miles, so the British had every reason to call this attack indecisive, although the Italians spent 32 torpedoes. A retaliatory attack by British destroyers was nipped in the bud by Italian cruiser fire. In general, the second Battle of Jutland clearly did not work out. In total, during the battle, the British battleship fired 17 volleys with its main caliber, Cesare used up 74 heavy shells, Cavour - 41. British cruisers also spent shells without saving at all: Sydney - 411, Neptune - 512.

Since the British blocked the way to Taranto, the Italians were forced to go to the Strait of Messina, which did not particularly upset them. Cunningham decided to bypass the Italian smokescreen from the north to resume the artillery battle, but when he did so at 1735, the only thing visible from the Worspite's bridge was the coast of Calabria. It was probably risky, but Churchill liked to accuse his admirals of being too cautious, it is very convenient to do this from the Checkers estate, shells weighing a ton cannot reach there, and the admiral went a little further than common sense dictates. But Cunningham had to abandon his futile attempts to catch up with a faster opponent, and he headed back to Alexandria.

And then Italian planes arrived at the scene, after which a uniform comedy began, because the pilots bombed everything in a row, not making out whose ships were below. Between 4:40 pm and 7:00 pm, a total of 76 bombers dropped their cargo on the British ships, 50 on the Italian ships from 12,000 feet, but no hits were made. One significant drawback of Italian aviation affected here - the absence of heavy bombs, out of about 500 bombs, only 8 weighed 500 kg, the rest were 250 and 100 kg, which obviously could not seriously damage the battleships. In the evening, the Italian ships took refuge in Augusta and Messina, and Cunningham calmly set off for Malta.

The next day, Cunningham went back to Alexandria, but before that he had time to check out another old theoretical development. Late in the evening of July 10, 9 Swordfish from the Igla attacked Italian ships in the harbor of Augusta, they damaged the tanker and sank the destroyer Leone Pancaldo. This attack can be considered a direct predecessor of the raid on Taranto, although the old Eagle himself could not participate in this operation.

Italian propaganda tried to declare the battle at Punta Stilo their victory, for which a picture of the Malaya was published in the newspapers with obvious damage - a 102-mm installation and two 152-mm guns were broken. However, it quickly became clear that this picture was taken back in 1936 after a battleship collided with a merchant ship.

Admiral's compound H tried to support the Mediterranean Fleet, Cunningham suggested that Somerville bombard some Italian port, the same Naples, for example. However, Somerville decided to be more modest and made a demonstrative exit to the shores of Sardinia. There, on July 9, Force H was attacked by numerous Italian aircraft with the same results - that is, zero. But the British admirals remembered the idea of ​​shelling Italian ports.

This battle, for all its apparent ineffectiveness, actually dealt the heaviest blows to two pre-war theories. All admirals at that time believed that the general battle would result in an artillery duel at a great distance. Theorists scrupulously calculated the zones of free maneuvering of battleships under the fire of enemy guns, issued recommendations such as "fighting at distances from 22,180 to 24,115 yards at heading angles from 15.7 to 23.4 degrees starboard." In fact, these recommendations, as it turned out, were not worth the paper on which they were written. Tons of shells were senselessly thrown into the water for the sake of one or two hits, which gave little. It turned out that the admirals actually count on the smile of Lady Luck, on the notorious "golden bullet". Despite the significant improvement in fire control systems, even battleships could not effectively shoot at distances exceeding 100 cables, not to mention cruisers. New confirmation of the collapse of this theory was the daytime part of the battle in the Java Sea in 1942 and the battle near the Commander Islands in 1943.

Billy Mitchell's theory also received several large holes, although it was difficult to call it a surprise. Even during his first experiments, sailors honestly warned: bombing ships on the move on the high seas is not at all the same as sinking stationary targets. And so it turned out: horizontal bombers could not achieve anything in the fight against maneuvering ships.

Many years after the end of the war, new fighting broke out around Punta Stilo. The fact is that in his report to the Admiralty, Admiral Cunningham confidently stated that the British fleet after this battle received a noticeable moral superiority, and English historians began to repeat this phrase with pleasure. The Italian historian Marc-Antonio Bragadin is sure of the opposite: "The British went to sea to inflict a decisive defeat on the Italians, they did not succeed at all." Well said! They did not defeat us, which means they failed completely ... For some time these points of view coexisted side by side, but now the apologists of the Italian fleet undertook to zealously refute the opinion of the British. The statements of Italian officers and admirals are used as evidence. But we remember that facts are stubborn things, and we will try to see what happened next.

And then on August 17, 3 battleships of the Mediterranean Fleet carried out a massive shelling of the port of Bardia in Libya, which the Italians were unable to prevent. On August 30, the British fleet undertook major operation for the passage of reinforcements from Gibraltar to Alexandria through the Strait of Sicily, which was considered "tightly blocked" by the Italian fleet and aircraft. The battleship Valiant, the new armored aircraft carrier Illastries, 2 air defense cruisers and 4 destroyers proceeded to the east. For the first time, the Italians put to sea almost the entire fleet - 5 battleships, 10 cruisers and 34 destroyers. “At this moment, the Italian fleet was in excellent condition in terms of its effectiveness, combat readiness and fighting spirit,” writes the same Bragadin. However, for unknown reasons, Admiral Campioni did not dare to meet with Cunningham, who had only 2 battleships - Warspite and Malaya. By this time, the Royal Sovereign's cars were in such a deplorable state that he did not even go to sea. By the way, this was precisely the reason that Cunningham asked for reinforcements, and not at all a lack of forces, as some historians try to argue, whose views we will consider below. Moreover, 5 battleships of Admiral Campioni, among which were the newest Vittorio Veneto and Littorio, which had just entered service, did not even dare to stop two transports that solemnly arrived in Malta from Alexandria. So who had the moral high ground?

In November 1940, the Italian fleet received two deafening pokes that finally put everything in its place. We are talking about the famous raid on Taranto on the night of November 11/12 and the lesser known but also quite revealing battle at Cape Teulada on November 28.

All history buffs are well aware of the history of the strike of the British aircraft carrier aircraft on the Italian battleships, and the assessment of this operation has always been completely unambiguous. Even the Italian historian Bragadin admitted: “The Taranto attack had temporary, but serious strategic consequences, because the Italian fleet had only 2 battleships left in service.” Antonio Tizzino agrees with him: “The defeat that the Italian fleet suffered without a fight on the night of November 11/12 determined the nature of the future war between Great Britain and Italy. Taranto has become the Italian Trafalgar." English historians, such as Stephen Roskill, do not argue with them: "The success of the operation was amazing, especially given the small number of aircraft involved." Jack Green and Alessandro Massignani write, "The attack was brilliantly conceived and brilliantly executed." According to Geoffrey Till, Taranto completely changed the strategic situation.

However, there is a group of historians, who can be loosely called Italian revisionists, who are trying to prove that in Taranto the British suffered their biggest setback. Known for his pro-Italian views, James Sadkovich argues that "the attack of Taranto again failed to establish British moral superiority, and it is not entirely clear whether it established British superiority in the eastern and western basins or not." But his views seem very moderate against the background of other statements.

The widely held belief that the British attack on Taranto was a decisive victory with strategic results is fundamentally wrong. The failure to exploit the opportunities created by this attack had significant consequences, as it affected the deployment of British naval forces in literally all theaters. The failure of the British to strike a decisive blow at Taranto forced them to keep many ships in the Mediterranean that were needed elsewhere.

The idea of ​​​​a torpedo attack on the fleet stationed in Taranto was born in 1935 during the Abyssinian crisis, however, this was only a development of the old ideas of Admiral Beatty, who back in 1918 was preparing to attack the Fleet with the help of ship torpedo bombers high seas who took refuge in Kiel. In 1938, the commander of the Glories aircraft carrier, Captain 1st Rank Lister, began to work out practically and in 1940 presented a revised plan to Admiral Cunningham.

Lister's plan called for a night attack in the moonlight, with torpedo bombers attacking battleships stationed in the outer roadstead, and bombers attacking ships in the inland and port facilities. The attack group consisted of two waves of 15 aircraft each: 9 torpedo bombers and 6 bombers. But Lister's plan had one significant addition - the next night, a second attack was envisaged by 15 aircraft: 6 torpedo bombers, 7 dive bombers and 2 illuminators. The torpedo bombers were supposed to come in from the west towards the rising moon, so the date of the attack was made dependent on the phase of the moon and the time of the rising of the night star.

In general, the British started a too complicated strategic game, linking the raid on Taranto with the simultaneous escort of several convoys and a number of other operations. These were convoys AN-6, MW-3, ME-3, operations Cote and Crack, the passage of the cruiser Orion to Piraeus with RAF personnel on board, and, finally, the raid of the cruisers into the Strait of Otranto, at sea 5 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 10 cruisers, 30 destroyers and several transports left. From all this it can be seen that the attack of Taranto was quite an ordinary event.

The Italians relied on the shallow depths in the harbor of Taranto, which allegedly did not allow the enemy to use torpedoes. However, they did not take into account that the British already had such experience: the attack of the battleship Richelieu in Dakar, the Dunkirk attack in Mars el Kebir, the attacks of Italian ships in various ports. Paradoxically, the successful actions of the Swordfish were largely due to their low flight characteristics, the torpedoes were dropped from low altitude and at low speed, so the initial “dive” after the drop was insignificant. Experimentally, the British managed to find out that if you set the Mk XII torpedo at a speed of 27 knots, instead of the usual 40, the "dive" will be minimal. The running depth was set at 33 feet, which was sufficient for Taranto, where the depths were 42 feet.

Even before the start of the operation, the British deprived the Eagle aircraft carrier, which was forced to repair damage received from close bomb explosions during Italian air attacks. And although some of his aircraft were transferred to the Illustrious, the strike group looked unconvincing, especially since the British suffered additional non-combat losses - 3 Swordfish crashed due to contaminated fuel. As a result, the first wave consisted of 6 torpedo bombers and 6 bombers, and the second wave consisted of 5 torpedo bombers and 4 bombers, for a total of 21 aircraft. Of the 11 torpedoes dropped, five hit the target: three in Littorio and one each in Cavour and Duilio. A few torpedoes still got stuck in the muddy bottom. Of the 60 bombs dropped, a quarter did not explode, including bombs that hit the cruiser Trento and the destroyer Libeccio. The British lost only 2 aircraft, the pilots who returned to the Illustrious were ready to repeat the attack, but Cunningham did not dare to do this and took his fleet away.

And now we will take up the exposure of the English falsifiers, worse than that, the conspirators. The same James Sadkovich in the creation of the myth of the British victory and some kind of "moral superiority" sees the presence of a direct Anglo-American conspiracy against the Reggia Marina, because the Italian fleet did not die in Taranto and did not even lose a single battleship irretrievably. "Cavour" simply did not have time to repair, the war ended too quickly.

According to a number of historians, Admiral Cunningham made several gross mistakes in planning and conducting the operation. For example, any normal military operation assumes the development of success, so why didn't the British strike again the next day? Another mistake was that only 2 aircraft were allocated for the Vittorio Veneto attack, which was completely insufficient. Damage to both modern battleships would put the Italian fleet in a really difficult position, otherwise it was a semi-success. An interesting variant of participation in the Ark Royal attack is proposed. The aircraft carrier could hastily arrive at a rendezvous with Cunningham's fleet, passing through the Strait of Sicily, and act in conjunction with the Illustrious. The more experienced Illustrious pilots were to act as group leaders. Another use of the Ark Royal could be to intercept the surviving battleships in the Strait of Messina, since retreat to safe bases on the western coast of Italy was quite obvious.

Even the available forces Cunningham could use much better, he should have used all the Swordfish as torpedo bombers, without diverting them to solve secondary tasks, which were still failed. In a word, Cunningham did not foresee, did not understand, did not guess, did not organize, did not manage, did not use ...

An excellent proof of the failure of the raid on Taranto was the fact that the British were still unable to conduct convoys through the Mediterranean and were forced to drag them around the Cape of Good Hope. Of the 21 ships that left England for the Middle East before 18 December, only five ventured into the Mediterranean. The threat from the Italian battleships fettered all the actions of the British even after Taranto.

Another indication of the failure of the British plans was a sharp increase in shipments to Libya, which ensured the successful offensive of Rommel's army. From October 1940 to June 1941, the number of delivered cargoes doubled, and if they were still not enough to fully support the Afrika Korps, then the Italian fleet was by no means to blame.

The British were openly afraid of the Italian fleet, because by the summer of 1941 they concentrated 5 of their battleships in the Mediterranean Sea (in Gibraltar, 4 in Alexandria), while only 3 ships of this class remained in the Metropolitan Fleet.

In general, the Taranto attack only once again proved what was already obvious: English pilots are courageous people. In general, the operation should be considered unsuccessful, because the British command and Admiral Cunningham in particular failed to solve three critical tasks. They never managed to complete the destruction of the Italian battleships. They failed to destroy the infrastructure of the bases that supported the operations of the battle fleet, in particular the dry docks in Genoa. They failed to ensure the free passage of their convoys through the Mediterranean.

This is the explanation of events in Taranto that the Italian revisionists offer us. To agree with them or not - let everyone decide for himself.

At the end of November, Force H left Gibraltar to lead 3 transports to Malta, at the same time it was planned to lead several ships of the Mediterranean Fleet through the Strait of Sicily, going to England for repairs. Note the confidence with which the British acted in the center of the Mediterranean, that is, in the area theoretically under full control Italians. Compound H of Admiral Somerville included the battlecruiser Rinaun, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, 4 light cruisers and 9 destroyers, Compound D, the battleship Ramillis, 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers, was moving towards him. Admiral Cunningham coldly reports that his flagship Worspite, which was escorting Force D, had been cruising off Sicily for several days without firing a single shot.

The Italians discovered the British ships, and on November 26, the battleships Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare, 6 heavy cruisers and 14 destroyers under the command of Admiral Campioni, left Naples on November 26, at dawn on November 27 they circled near the southern tip of Sardinia, waiting for new information from aircraft - scouts. They reported that Somerville had no aircraft carriers, and Campioni went to meet Formation H. However, he had orders: “Avoid combat with the enemy if he has a clear superiority ... Every time show an aggressive spirit and remember that the difficulties of replenishing losses in warships during wars require us to calmly analyze the profitability of each battle. However, the possibility of losses is not an excuse for refusing to fight or ending it immediately after the start. In other words, read it the way you want.

Campioni knew that some British ships were moving through the Strait of Sicily, but he hoped to intercept Force H before the two British detachments met. But errors in the reports confused the plans of both admirals. The Swordfish of the Ark Royal reported at 0852 that they were seeing 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers 65 miles to the northeast, but this radiogram was over an hour late. At 10.15, another aircraft spotted the Italian battleships, the Rinaun increased its speed to 28 knots and went towards them, leaving only a couple of destroyers with the aircraft carrier.

Reports from Italian aircraft were also belated and inaccurate. Admiral Campioni recalled: “The number of ships discovered by the Bolzano aircraft coincided with what the destroyer saw at Cape Bon at night. However, they were much farther to the west than would have been possible on the basis of the destroyer's report, even if the British formation turned back a few minutes after contact. Nevertheless, at 1045 he turned south and increased his speed to 18 knots, unaware of the presence of Formation D. The English squadrons met at 1130, and after some hitch, Somerville selected the most combat-ready ships and turned north. However, the Italians also began to turmoil, since Campioni had to collect his scattered detachments, but he did not really have time to do this, at 12.20 his heavy cruisers opened fire on the English cruisers, although Campioni had just transmitted the strictest order on the radio: “Do not enter, I repeat, do not fight.

Literally two minutes later, the cruiser Berwick received a stray shell in the barbet of the Y turret, and at 12.24 Rinaun opened fire on the Italians from a distance of 26,500 yards. "Remillis" also fired two volleys for the sake of greater fear, but, like the "Malaya" in the battle at Punta Stilo, he could only watch the battle from a distance. The doctrine of daylight fighting at long distances was subjected to a new cruel test and again failed. For about 20 minutes, the cruisers exchanged volleys, but the only success was the hit of another shell on the Berwick, which destroyed the stern switchboard. Alas, even the Rinaun could not keep up with its cruisers, and even more so with the Italian ones. True, he still managed to fire a volley at 12.45 on the Trento cruiser, but since the distance had already increased to 30,700 yards, this was pointless by definition.

At 12.40 British planes intervened - 11 Swordfish attacked the Vittorio Veneto. Although they dropped torpedoes from a distance of no more than 800 yards, there were no hits. This failure also became a good tradition of Mediterranean clashes. Although the Italians were very afraid of the British torpedo bombers, they showed excellent results only in the fight against ships in port, on the high seas their successes were more than modest.

In the meantime, Rinaun almost shot down two French liners who were in the wrong place at the wrong time, and finally noticed the Italian battleships at 12.50. The prospect of such a battle did not please him, and he turned back south towards the Ramillis, but noticing that the Italians themselves turned back, Somerville rushed in pursuit, the British cruisers did the same.

The strange game of cat and mouse continued. "Vittorio Veneto", leaving to the north, still managed to fire a couple of volleys at the enemy's cruisers, the combat debut of the new battleship took place. Let us turn again to the memoirs of Admiral Campioni: “When the distance was reduced to 32,000 yards, I opened fire from the stern tower and followed the same course to get closer to the cruisers. If the range were reduced to 28,000 yards (the maximum range for the Cesare guns), I would turn to the right to shoot with all sides. In short, if only they caught up with me, then I would have them ... But the British cruisers quite reasonably did not tempt fate and turned away, the distance instantly increased to 40,000 yards, and the battle died out by itself.

In general, as one medieval oriental historian wrote: “The invincible army of the great lord valiantly raised the banner of retreat. The vile enemy, wrapped in a cloak of cowardice, vilely pursued her to the walls of our capital.

Further actions were reduced to mutual fruitless air attacks. At 15.30 the Swordfish attacked the Italian cruisers, at 15.35 the Scua dive bombers did the same, then the Italian S-79 bombers tried to cover the Ark Royal. The bomb explosions were very effective and completely ineffective.

What were the results of this fight? The Italian cruisers expended 660 203 mm shells, achieving as many as 2 hits, that is, 0.3 percent. "Vittorio Veneto" fired 19 volleys with the main caliber, "Rinaun" - only 16, there were no hits. The daytime artillery battle at a long distance more and more clearly turned into an outright chimera. Oh yes, I almost forgot, another result of the battle was the investigation into the case of Admiral Somerville, which was initiated by Churchill. In his opinion, Somerville did not show sufficient aggressiveness and perseverance. The Italians once again missed a great opportunity to defeat the weak British detachment, for which they soon paid dearly. In February 1941, the British Navy gave the enemy a completely insulting slap in the face, and again leading role the old and weak battlecruiser Rinaun played in the events.

After a brutal scolding that followed from London, Admiral Somerville decided to be extremely active, demonstrating what his connection was capable of. It was decided to bombard Genoa and the nearby naval base of Livorno. This plan alone showed that the British did not put a penny on the Italian fleet, because even the remaining intact "Vittorio Veneto" would be enough to destroy Somerville's formation.

On February 8, the Italian command learned that a British aircraft carrier had been sighted somewhere south of the Balearic Islands. The Italians decided that another operation was being prepared to transfer aircraft to Malta, but soon received an unpleasant surprise. On February 9, at 07:14, heavy shells rained down on Genoa. Rinaun, Malaya and the light cruiser Sheffield fired 273 381mm and 782 152mm shells at the town and port from 18,000 to 21,000 yards. They managed to sink 5 transports, another 18 ships were damaged. The battleship Cayo Duilio, which was being repaired at the shipyard, was not injured. The Italian coastal batteries looked very impressive: 2 - 381 mm, 2 - 190 mm and 8 - 152 mm guns, but they could not do anything, an excuse was found immediately - morning fog. True, part of the shells hit the city, where 144 people died. But Somerville was absolutely right when he said, "By all accounts, Genoa got a damn good beating."

Now Compound H had another, no less difficult task - to sneak out without getting a "damn good beating". The fact is that to the south of Sardinia the fleet of Vice Admiral Iachino (he replaced the unsuccessful and timid Admiral Campioni) was cruising, consisting of the battleships Vittorio Veneto, Doria and Cesare, 3 heavy cruisers and 10 destroyers. As soon as the news of the shelling of Genoa was received, Iachino immediately went north, but then his own command let him down. Naval headquarters gave him the wrong target coordinates, confusing a British squadron with an innocent French convoy. As a result, the opponents never saw each other, although at some point the distance between the two fleets did not exceed 90 miles.

February 11 Force H solemnly returned to Gibraltar, not having received a single scratch. The British again brilliantly proved that it is they who have complete and unconditional dominance in the Mediterranean, which the Italian fleet is not able to challenge. True, Somerville himself on this occasion spoke as follows: "The guardian angel, to whom I always treated with great respect, was obviously in a good mood."

Now we are smoothly moving on to the third significant event in the Mediterranean theater, namely the battle at Cape Matapan. By the way, if we accept the Italian point of view, then we will have to admit that in fact it was not one, but two whole battles, because the book of one of the main actors Admiral Angelo Iaquino is called “Gaudi e Matapan”, that is, “Battles at Gavdos and Matapan”. It is also interesting that all orthodox Italian revisionists unanimously blame this battle (no, no, not defeat, if you think so) on the Germans, who demanded at least some action from the Italian fleet, especially since the most suitable occasion turned up. The British army in Greece was suffering one defeat after another, and the opportunity arose to cut it off, ending the job with total annihilation. To do this, the Italians were required to make a sortie to the Crete region and defeat the British forces that had turned up. The Germans even promised the help of their reconnaissance aircraft. And they persuaded!

On the evening of March 26, the battleship Vittorio Veneto left Naples, on which Admiral Angelo Iachino held the flag. Already at sea, several divisions of cruisers and destroyers joined him, in total, the Italian admiral had at his disposal 1 battleship, 6 heavy and 2 light cruisers, 13 destroyers. The operation plan assumed that two divisions of cruisers would conduct a search along the northern coast of Crete, while the Vittorio Veneto, along with escort ships, would cruise near the island of Gavdos, off the southwestern tip of Crete.

But the radio intelligence of the British turned out to be on top, the famous Enigma worked, and Admiral Cunningham found out that the enemy was up to something, so on the evening of March 27, Compound A went out to sea from Alexandria - the battleships Warspite, Barham, Valiant, the new aircraft carrier Formideble and 4 destroyers. A few hours later, Compound C left the port - 5 more destroyers. In this way, the British hoped to mislead the Axis agents with whom Alexandria was literally teeming. The squadron of Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippel was already at sea - 4 light cruisers and 4 destroyers.

On the afternoon of March 27, British aircraft spotted Iaquino's squadron, but they themselves were also seen. After some hesitation, the Italian command ordered the operation to continue, because air reconnaissance reported that the British battleships were calmly anchored, but the plan of the operation was still changed. The raid of cruisers to the northern coast of Crete was canceled, and the entire squadron was to jointly follow to the island of Gavdos.

At 0600, the Vittorio Veneto and the cruiser Bolzano reconnoitred Ro-43 seaplanes, and within half an hour they spotted the British cruisers about 40 miles southwest of the Italian squadron. Once again, the Italians had a good opportunity to succeed, and Admiral Iacchino ordered Admiral Sansonetti's 3rd cruiser division to catch up with the British, Vittorio Veneto increased speed to 28 knots to support them. Formideble's planes spotted the Italian cruisers, but Pridham-Whippel doubted their report, as he thought the pilots were seeing his own ships. However, at 0800, all doubts were dispelled when Italian cruisers were sighted to the north.

Pridham Whippel immediately turned around and sped at 30 knots to link up with the main body 90 miles behind them. At 0812 the Italian heavy cruisers opened fire, but the range was too great—more than 26,000 yards—and the shells fell short. The superiority of the Italians in speed was minimal, and although they were catching up with the British, it was too slow. At 0829, the British cruiser Gloucester fired three volleys, but her 152-mm shells, all the more, did not reach the enemy. The Italians continued ineffectual firing, having used up 445 203-mm shells, until at 8.55 Iacino gave a direct order to stop the pursuit. Once again, long-range combat turned into a waste of ammunition.

Admiral Cunningham at that time was trying to sort out the heap of conflicting information that came to him, but in the end he gave up on everything and at 9.39 ordered the Formideble to raise planes to attack the Italian cruisers. The aircraft carrier was a formidable force, in its hangar there were as many as 27 aircraft (despite the fact that ships of this type, even according to the project, could receive up to 36 aircraft). At 10.00 they were on their way - 6 Albacore torpedo bombers, Swordfish reconnaissance aircraft and 2 Fulmar fighters. By the standards Pacific War, it was ridiculous, but in the Mediterranean, both the British and Italians believed that it was a lot and scary.

Admiral Iaquino at that time was solving approximately the same riddles. Air reconnaissance at 9.13 informed him that 1 aircraft carrier, 2 battleships, 9 cruisers and 14 destroyers of the enemy were at the point that he himself had passed an hour and a half ago! The admiral decided to ignore such nonsense and try to pincer the British cruisers. To do this, he ordered Sansonetti to follow the same course, and on the Vittorio Veneto he tried to cut off Pridham-Whippel's retreat. The plan was good, but it didn't work because the British were much further north than Iaquino thought.

Still, the British cruisers were taken by surprise when the Vittorio Veneto appeared on the horizon, one of the Pridham-Whippel staff officers naively asked: “What kind of battleship is this? I thought ours were somewhere far away.” At 10.55 an unambiguous answer followed in the form of a salvo of 381-mm guns. The English cruisers turned back again and full swing went to meet Cunningham.

And then the planes appeared on the scene. Seeing the battleship, the pilots immediately forgot about the cruisers, and at 11.18 the strike group was on the left beam of the Vittorio Veneto. The problems experienced by the British pilots were unknown to the pilots of other countries. “He was traveling at 30 knots, we had a headwind of 30 knots at our altitude, so we were approaching him at 90 knots at a relative speed of 30 knots.” That is, British torpedo bombers went on the attack a little slower than torpedo boats. All torpedoes missed, but this attack put an end to the aggressive moods of the Italian admirals, Iachino turned home. However, for some reason he was sure that the British were much further away than they actually were, so he was in no particular hurry. As a result, before dark, British aircraft managed to carry out 8 more attacks, and bombers and torpedo bombers from coastal airfields joined the aircraft carriers, in total 48 aircraft took part in these attacks, which well shows the weakness of British aviation. I repeat, on pacific ocean such forces acted as part of a single shock wave.

Most of the attacks were unsuccessful, but once a year the stick shoots, so at 15.10 one torpedo hit the stern of the Vittorio Veneto, damaging the left propellers. The battleship briefly lost speed, but then quite quickly on the right propellers alone gave 19 knots. Cunningham, deceived by the pilots' over-optimistic reports, gave chase.

However, he quickly realized that this was an empty occupation, and at 16.44 he ordered Pridham-Whippel to catch up and destroy the damaged Italian battleship, giving it 9 destroyers to the cruisers. However, this was also useless, if it were not for a happy combination of circumstances for the British. During the last attack of torpedo bombers, one of them fired the very “golden bullet” that in the spring of 1941 decided the outcome of several naval battles. The heavy cruiser "Paul" was hit by a torpedo and lost speed.

At this point, none of the admirals on either side had any idea of ​​the exact situation. The British completely misjudged the course and speed of the Italian troops, and the Italians had no idea where the English battleships were. When Iachino found out about this, he sent Vice Admiral Cattaneo's 1st cruiser division, which included the stricken ship, to help the Field. He believed that the British ships discovered by the aircraft were Pridham-Whippel cruisers, which Cattaneo's heavy cruisers could handle without difficulty. Cattaneo himself hinted that it would be better to send 2 destroyers to the Field, but Iakino ordered the admiral to follow there himself.

Then the comedy of errors continued. At 0815, the Orion's radar detected a cruiser standing idle, but Pridham-Whippel decided that it was the notorious battleship, and left it to the destroyers, while he himself went northwest with the cruisers to look for other Italian ships. However, Captain 1st Rank Mack, who commanded the destroyers, did not receive this order and continued to follow the same course. Paradoxically, the immobile cruiser had a chance to survive! Well, we don’t even talk about “Vittorio Veneto”, he was not at all where the British expected to find him, and he was already completely safe. So, the battle near the island of Gavdos ended, ahead was the battle at Cape Matapan.

In the meantime, Admiral Cattaneo sent the last radiogram at 21.50: "The range remaining in the Alfieri division is very limited and does not allow for a battle, which, I think, will be almost certain." The admiral believed that the battle would take place the next day, when he would drag the Paula in tow. At the same time, the Ajax radar spotted Cattaneo's ships, but Pridham-Whippel for some reason decided that he saw Mack's destroyers and even turned even further north so as not to engage in battle with his own. Mack, having intercepted the Ajax message, also decided that the cruiser was seeing him, as a result, Cattaneo quietly slipped between the two English detachments! As you can see, the famous battle turns out to be a chain of mutual blunders.

At 10:10 p.m., the Valiant's radar detected a target 6 miles to the southwest without a move. At the same time, the Cattaneo cruisers approached the Field, and the Fiume crew was preparing to take their comrade in tow. The night was moonless and cloudy, so visibility did not exceed 5,000 yards. When they noticed obscure silhouettes in the north from Paula, they decided that they were their own and fired a red rocket, from Zara they noticed this rocket to the left along the course and turned in that direction. And at that moment, Admiral Cunningham made the maneuver that only a genius is capable of. Violating all traditions and instructions, he turned his heavy ships on the enemy. Given the availability of radar in the British and its absence in the Italians, he risked little, the only unpleasant thing was that Formideble was walking in a common column between the Valiant and Barham.

The British had not yet seen Cattaneo's ships, but when they were sighted, Cunningham lost no time in rebuilding his battleships back into the wake column. By the way, here a sarcastic question arises: what does the British radar have to do with it? After all, the cruisers of Admiral Cattaneo were discovered visually. "Formideble" hastily left the system, so as not to be involved in an unpleasant artillery battle for itself.

From the book History of Aviation 2005 04 author author unknown

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From the book Aircraft Carriers, Volume 1 [with illustrations] author Polmar Norman

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After the battle, the sailors calculated that it took them 2876 shots of the main, medium and universal caliber before the Bismarck turned into flaming ruins and completely lost its combat capability. Seeing his condition, the British cruisers closed in and fired a torpedo salvo. From that moment on, the German battleship was no longer a tenant. The crew opened the kingstones, and the wounded Bismarck sank to the bottom, never lowering the flag in the face of the enemy.

“Whistles, and rumbles, and rumbles all around. The thunder of cannons, the hiss of shells ... "

Fortunately, sea battles involving large warships, with the exchange of powerful blows and with colossal destruction were very rare. Midway, the Battle of Leyte Gulf or the aforementioned pursuit of the Bismarck, which was preceded by a fleeting but bloody battle in the Danish Strait... There are only a few dozen such "episodes" in the history of World War II.

As for large-scale effective battles involving battleships, there are not as few such cases as it is commonly believed. But not so much on the scale of the entire Second World War.

Battles in Atlantic waters (battleships and their trophies):

Aircraft carrier Glories (sunk by fire from the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, 06/08/40);

The French battleship Brittany was sunk, the battleships Dunkirk, Provence and the leader of the destroyers Mogador were damaged (an attack on the French fleet in Mars el Kebir in order to prevent it from passing into the hands of the Third Reich. The British battlecruiser "Hood", battleships "Barham" and "Resolution", 03.07.40);

Italian heavy cruisers "Zara" and "Fiume" (sank by fire from LK "Barham", "Valient" and "Worspite" in the battle near Cape Matapan, 03/28/41);

Battlecruiser "Hood" (sunk by fire LK "Bismarck", 05/24/41);

Battleship "Bismarck" (sunk by fire from the British battleships "Rodney" and "King George V", with the participation of cruisers and carrier-based aircraft on May 27, 1941);

The battlecruiser Scharnhorst (heavily damaged by fire from the Duke of York LK, finished off by torpedoes from British destroyers, 12/26/43);

"Scharnhorst"

This also includes a skirmish near Calabria and a battle between the British battlecruiser Rinaun and the German Gneisenau - both times there were no serious consequences.

A couple more cases with firing from the main caliber: the American battleship Massachusetts shot the unfinished Jean Bar in Casablanca, another French battleship, the Richelieu, was damaged by fire from the British battleships Barham and Resolution during the attack on Dakar.

The French Jean Bart survived all his peers, was excluded from the fleet only in 1961

Battles in the Pacific:

The battlecruiser Kirishima (destroyed by the fire of the South Dakota and Washington LKs in a night battle near Guadalcanal, 11/14/42);

Battleship "Yamashiro" (sunk by fire from LK "West. Virginia", "California", "Maryland", "Tennessee" and "Mississippi" with the participation of destroyers in the Surigao Strait, 10/25/44);

Also in the battle at Fr. Samar was sunk by the escort aircraft carrier "Gambier Bay" and three destroyers, several more escort aircraft carriers were damaged by the fire of the Japanese squadron. On that day, the battleship Yamato opened fire on the enemy for the first time. The specific results of his shooting remained unknown.

Agree, the number of victories is small.

Italians in battle! Littorio and Vittorio

Are battleships obsolete? Let's say.

But how can one explain that only six aircraft carrier duels were recorded in the entire vast Pacific theater of operations (Coral Sea, Midway, Solomon Islands, Santa Cruz, the battle of the Mariana Islands and Cape Engano). And that's it! During the remaining four years, aircraft carriers smashed bases, attacked single ships and struck along the coast.

US Marines, supported by thousands of ships, stormed the Japanese defensive perimeter in the Pacific Islands. Submarines "cut" enemy communications. The destroyers intercepted the "Tokyo Express" and covered the convoys. Battleships used to fight each other, but most of the time they were engaged in problems far from naval combat. "North Caroline", "South Dakota" and other monsters provided air defense squadrons and fired at coastal fortifications, while their small Japanese rivals stood in bases, "licking" their wounds.

The war turned into an endless chain of short battles, in which aviation, submarines and anti-submarine / escort ships (destroyers, frigates, boats) played a decisive role. Large warships- aircraft carriers and battleships - were responsible for the general situation in the theater of operations, by their very presence not allowing the enemy to use similar means to disrupt landing operations and disperse "small" ships.

Great standing of battleships

A similar situation has been observed in European waters since 1942: Allied heavy artillery ships were regularly involved in fire support for landings, while a few of the remaining German and Italian battleships and heavy cruisers were idle in bases, having neither adequate tasks nor chances. to success if they go to sea. To go anywhere in the conditions of enemy dominance at sea and in the air meant certain death. Avid for fame and orders, British admirals will throw dozens of ships and combat aircraft to intercept such a “tasty” target. With obvious consequences.

British battlecruiser Repulse on the march

The Germans played the best in these conditions, turning the Tirpitz parking lot into a powerful bait, which attracted the attention of the metropolitan fleet for three years. Unsuccessful squadron attacks on Alta Fjord, 700 sorties of aviation, abandoned PQ-17 convoy, force attacks special operations with the use of mini-submarines ... "Tirpitz" pretty shook the nerves of us and our allies, and, in the end, was packed with 5-ton Tollboy bombs. Other less shocking remedies proved ineffective against him.

However, Tirpitz had a “protégé” in the form of his deceased brother - the meeting with the Bismarck so shocked the British Admiralty that for the rest of the war the British suffered from battleship phobia and were shaking at the thought: “What if Tirpitz goes to sea”?

There was another reason for the “standing of the battleships”, an economic one. The fuel consumption for raising steam in the Tirpitz boilers was equivalent to the trip of the "wolf pack" of submarines! An unaffordable luxury for resource-limited Germany.

Battleships against the shore

On December 26, 1943, the last battle of battleships died down in European waters: the British squadron, led by the battleship Duke of York, sank the German Scharhorst in the battle off Norkup Cape.

From that moment on, the Axis battleships were inactive. The battleships of the Royal Navy switched to performing routine tasks - covering the landing forces and shelling enemy fortifications on the coast.

The landings in Sicily (summer 1943) were largely without the support of heavy naval guns: five British battleships had to fire on the coast only twice. But all subsequent landings and coastal operations were carried out with the direct participation of battleships.

The landing in Normandy was covered by 7 British and American battleships - Waspite, Rammills, Rodney, Nelson and their overseas counterparts - Texas, Arkansas and Nevada, with the support of heavy cruisers and British monitors with 15 inch guns!

Here are brief excerpts about their combat work:

Both battleships and monitor concentrated their fire on the fortified batteries of Villerville, Benerville and Houlgate. By 9:30 a.m. the batteries fell silent and did not open fire in the following days, although they were in very strong concrete fortifications. On June 6, the Warspite fired six times at the Villerville Battery, firing 73 shells and scoring 9 direct hits.

On June 7, "Rodney" came into action. The Worspite fired at various targets, including the Benerville battery. From the beginning of the landing, he fired three hundred and fourteen 381-mm shells (133 armor-piercing and 181 high-explosive), and in the evening of the same day he went to Portsmouth to replenish ammunition. The Rodney and Nelson continued to shell enemy targets, while the Ramilles was sent to support the Allied landings in southern France.

The Warspite returned on 10 June and was ordered to support the American bridgehead in the west of the landing area. The battleship fired 96 381-mm shells at four targets and received gratitude from the American command.

Warspite came to the British sector at Arromanches. Here he used artillery to repel an enemy counterattack in the zone of action of the 50th British division. In the evening of the same day, the battleship returned to Portsmouth, and from there went to Rosyth to change the worn-out gun barrels.

And here is a story from the Yankees vs. Cherbourg Coastal Batteries series:

The battleship "Nevada" at 12:12 opened fire from a 356 mm gun at a target located 5 km south-west of Kerkeville. Shooting was corrected from the shore, and the shells fell exactly on the target. At 12:29 a.m., a message was received from the shore: "You hit the target." After another 5 minutes, when the Nevada fired 18 shots, they reported from the shore: “Good fire. Your projectiles smoke them out." 25 minutes after the shelling began, at 12:37, a new message arrived: "They are showing a white shield, but we have learned not to pay any attention to it, continue firing."

The large-caliber guns of the battleships proved to be the only effective means against well-fortified coastal forts, armored bunkers and batteries. Calling in bomber aircraft every time with concrete-piercing bombs and Tallboys was unreasonably difficult, expensive, and often impossible.

40 years have passed, but New Jersey continues to fire cannons and launch Tomahawks

Naval artillery was distinguished by its mobility and short reaction time: just a few minutes after receiving a request, a salvo of heavy shells covered the point with the specified coordinates. The shots of the guns of the battleships gave confidence to the landing forces and demoralized the personnel of the German units.

In the absence of an enemy of equal strength at sea, the battleships of Great Britain and the United States proved to be excellent assault equipment. Their guns "smeared" any target within range of their fire, moreover, the thick-skinned monsters themselves were not very susceptible to return fire from coastal batteries. They razed enemy positions to the ground, smashed bunkers and pillboxes, covered the landing force and mine-sweeping ships operating near the coast.

Bathroom in the admiral's cabin of the museum battleship USS Iowa (BB-61)
In memory of the journey of F.D. Roosevelt aboard a battleship across the Atlantic

On the high seas, they were used in the form of powerful air defense platforms to cover squadrons and aircraft carrier formations, and were used as VIP transport for high officials states (Roosevelt's trip aboard the Iowa battleship to the Tehran-43 conference) and similar tasks where their excellent security, lethal artillery and monumental appearance were required.

Battleship - the weapon of the winners!

Battleships are ineffective in combat against an enemy of equal strength. Farewell salvos at the North Cape and in the Surigao Strait became the "swan song" of the battleship fleet. Together with the Scharnhorst and Yamashiro, all the outdated concepts of naval battles developed in the first half of the 20th century went into oblivion.

The situational awareness of a battleship compared to an aircraft is too low. And any submarine will surpass many times in stealth and general rationality of warfare at sea. By the end of World War II, the battleship survived only as a means of fire support. An exceptionally offensive weapon for devastating coastal bombardments.

This is what largely explains the failures of the Italian, German and Japanese battleships. Under the circumstances, they could not reveal their potential and turned out to be of little use.

There is no sadder story in the world than the story of Yamato and Musashi

The largest non-carrier ships in history could not cause significant damage to the enemy and were mediocrely lost under enemy air strikes.

“These ships are reminiscent of the calligraphic religious scrolls that old people hang in their homes. They have not proven their worth. This is only a matter of faith, not reality ... battleships will be useful to Japan in a future war in the same way as a samurai sword.

Admiral Yamamoto was well aware that in a future war, Japan would not have time for entertainment with the shelling of coastal forts. The Imperial Navy would have to stealthily send "Tokyo Express" at night and flee during the day under the blows of superior enemy forces.

The age of battleships came to an end, and the funds spent on the construction of the Yamato and Musashi should have been spent in a different, more rational way.

Of course, from the position of our days it is obvious: regardless of the prophetic phrases and brilliant strategic moves of Isoroku Yamamoto, the war was already lost at the moment when the first bomb fell on Pearl Harbor. Reflections on the construction of new aircraft carriers to replace super battleships are far from reality. Imagine for a moment that the Japanese built a couple of ships similar to the Soryu instead of the Yamato ... And what would it give?

Aircraft carriers need modern aircraft and experienced pilots - there was nowhere to get enough of them. Let's remember how the campaign in the Mariana Islands went (summer 1944): the ratio of losses in the air was 1:10, one of the Yankee pilots dropped the sacramental phrase on this occasion: "Damn, this is reminiscent of turkey hunting"!

The campaign in the Philippines ended even brighter and more tragically - the Japanese managed to “scrape together” only 116 aircraft for 4 aircraft carriers (moreover, the Japanese pilots did not have the proper experience, and their aircraft lost to American aircraft in all performance characteristics). The once proud Kido Butai was given the humiliating role of… bait for US aircraft carrier groups. The main blow was to be delivered by cruising forces and battleships.

In addition, aircraft carriers had extremely low survivability and sometimes died from being hit by just one bomb or torpedo - a critical drawback in the face of the enemy's numerical superiority. Unlike protected cruisers and battleships, which could go for hours under the blows of the Americans (for example, Takeo Kurita's squadron).

One way or another, the Japanese super battleships were built. They took part in the battle. Demonstrated excellent survivability. The battleships and their crews held out to the last drop of blood, fulfilling their duty to the end.

The Japanese leadership is deservedly reproached for the incorrect use of these ships - they should have been thrown into battle earlier. For example, near Midway. But who knew that everything would turn out so sadly for the Japanese there ... a pure coincidence.

"Yamato" and "Musashi" could play an important role in Guadalcanal. But human thrift intervened: the leadership of all the fleets tended to keep their most powerful, secret weapons for the “general battle” (which, of course, will never happen).

It was not worth it to classify unique ships like that, but it was necessary, on the contrary, to turn them into a powerful PR project to intimidate the enemy. Shocked by the Yamato main caliber (460 mm), the Americans would rush to build their super battleships with 508 mm caliber guns - in general, it would be fun.

Alas, the battleships were thrown into battle too late, when there were no tricks and tactical moves left. And yet, the moral aspect of the fighting career of "Yamato" and "Musashi" surpassed all others, turning the ships into legends.

The Japanese still cherish the memory of their "Varyag" - the battleship "Yamato", which, in fact, single-handedly went against eight aircraft carriers and six battleships of the 58th US Navy task force. The spirit and pride of the nation is built on such stories.

Museum of Military Glory "Yamato" in Kure

By the beginning of the First World War, battleships were considered the main striking force in the fight at sea, but in reality they almost did not participate in hostilities - with the exception of the only general battle between the British and German fleets, which took place in 1916 off the coast of the Jutland Peninsula. Basically, the powerful dreadnoughts defended themselves in bases throughout the war and, following the well-known principle of “fleet in being”, threatened the enemy with the very fact of their existence.

However, such a passive use of battleships did not save them from significant losses. The first to die in October 1914 was the Odeishes: it hit a mine off its coast and sank, clearly showing the weakness of the underwater protection of the British dreadnoughts. Another 4 battleships became victims of fires and subsequent explosions of ammunition - in 1916-1918, for this reason, the Italian Leonardo da Vinci, the English Vanguard, the Japanese Kawachi and the Russian Empress Maria were killed directly in their bases.

On the other hand, battlecruisers acted much more actively - in the outbreak of the world war, not a single major naval battle could have done without their participation. The "finest hour" of the English "Invincible" and "Inflexible" - the destruction in December 1914 near the Falkland Islands of the German armored cruisers "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau". A month and a half later, a fierce battle took place off Dogger Bank in the North Sea between British and German battlecruisers. The British realized their numerical advantage by sinking the old armored cruiser "Blucher", for some unknown reason, included in the detachment of stronger high-speed ships. He became the only victim of the battle, although the English "Lion" was on the verge of death. In the heat of battle flagship Admiral David Beatty was hit in the engine room. Insufficient protection affected: the turbine failed, and the cruiser got a roll. One of the German shells pierced the roof of the gun turret on the Lion and almost destroyed the ship. As a result, the admiral was forced to hand over command to the junior flagship, who preferred to finish off the already badly damaged Blucher instead of continuing the pursuit and might win a more decisive victory.

The battle at Dogger Bank was the first serious test for the German battlecruisers. A 343-mm projectile from the Lion pierced the barbet of the Seydlitz aft turret and ignited the charges in the reloading compartment. Apparently, someone, escaping, opened the door to the lower compartments of the neighboring tower ... One way or another, but the fire engulfed both aft towers at once. About 6 tons of gunpowder broke out - the flame soared higher than the masts, instantly swallowing 165 crew members. Everyone expected an explosion, but it did not happen: the rational design of the cellars and brass sleeves made it possible to avoid a catastrophe.

Even if the famous historian Siegfried Breuer begins to tell the story of a battleship from prehistoric times, then, as they say, God himself ordered us to follow his example. For example, the first battle in which the “ships of the line” of that era played a decisive role was the battle of Salamis in 480 BC. The famous Athenian triremes then served as a prehistoric battleship. By the way, it is with the battle of Salamis that the first of the mysteries is connected. naval history. Do you remember how the course of this battle is described in the vast majority of sources? The cunning Themistocles lured the Persians into a narrow strait, where the Persians could not use their huge numerical advantage, and the heavy Persian ships could not maneuver, and the nimble Greek triremes inflicted heavy losses on the Persian fleet. However, recently some historians have asked a reasonable question: where did the Persians get their heavy ships from? And they offered a completely different description of the battle. The cunning Themistocles lured the Persians into a narrow strait, where heavy Greek triremes steam-rolled through light Persian ships, most of them mobilized merchant ships of the Phoenicians. Who is right? Well, now we are unlikely to know.

In general, for many centuries ahead, a battleship became a rowing vessel - a trireme, a penter, and so on, and a ram was considered the main tactical technique in naval battles. Alas, the ancient "artillery" in the form of ballistas and catapults was too inaccurate and underpowered to sink ships with it. True, during the Punic Wars, the Romans, who were clearly inferior to the Carthaginians in naval training, found an original way to turn a naval war into a land war. They invented the boarding bridge, which for some reason was called the "crow". As a result, each battle turned into a series of boarding battles, which the Roman legionnaires won with a clear advantage. This was the first, but by no means the last time that tactics took a step back.

For a long time, the oar was considered the main mover, and the slaves - the engine of the ship. And even the no less famous battle of Lepanto in 1571, that is, two thousand years after Salamis, still carried out all the same rowing ships, even if now they turned into galleys. But then shipbuilding made a sharp breakthrough, and by the time of the Anglo-Dutch wars, the sail had finally replaced the oar, which is not surprising - you can’t particularly wave the oar in the ocean. In addition, by this time, warships had finally separated from armed merchant ships, and a real battleship appeared, still sailing, and artillery became the main weapon. The first purpose-built artillery ship was the English carrack "Mary Rose". Then the history of rowing ships repeated itself - for a long time the entire evolution of the battleship was reduced to an increase in size in the absence of any qualitative changes.

TO early XIX century, the sailing battleship reached the limiting dimensions that wooden shipbuilding allowed. The 100-gun battleships were the pinnacle of its development at this stage. By the way, it was during the Napoleonic Wars that a record was set for the number of battleships of the same type. The first attempts at standardization were made by the Spaniards when building their West Indian galleons, but the undisputed superiority in this area belongs to the French. The French designer Jacques Sanet created such a successful project for a 74-gun ship of the line that 107 ships of this type were laid down from 1782 to 1813! By the way, it was Sane who created the project, according to which the largest series of heavy battleships was built - the 118-gun Commerce de Marseille - 16 ships with a displacement of 5100 tons. By the way, these ships even had a kind of armor - the thickness of the oak plating at times reached 1.5 meters, and not every core took it.

It was the era of the sailing battleship that gave the most outstanding naval commanders: de Ruyter, Jervis, Nelson, Suffren. The outcome of many wars was decided in battles at sea, and the main role in these battles was played by the battleship. For a long time, any battle turned into an artillery duel of two wake columns on parallel courses, and tactics like cutting through the enemy formation still remained a rare episode.

But everything flows, everything changes. The advent of the steam engine in the middle of the 19th century changed little in naval strategy and tactics, it remained nothing more than an auxiliary mechanism in case of calm. A much more serious blow to the proud connoisseurs of the seas was caused by the appearance of a bomb cannon. The French General Peksant sharply increased the weight of the projectile, instead of a 36-pound cannonball, a 68-pound explosive bomb appeared, which no wooden ship could resist. The battle of Sinop in 1853 put an end to this dispute, after which it became clear to all admirals: you can’t live like this anymore!

But the first to draw this conclusion were the Russians who did not win the battle and the Turks who did not lose it, organizational conclusions followed in the homeland of the bombing guns - in France. By the way, this is very easy to explain. Crimean War became the first of the wars of the new time, when one of the decisive factors was the level of development of the country's industry, which supplies the army with the most modern and most powerful weapons systems. And the further, the more important this factor played. To fight the Russian coastal batteries, the French built several armored floating batteries, which demonstrated their combat value on October 17, 1855. This day should be considered the first significant date in the history of an armored battleship, although there were still several years before its birth.

The next step was taken by another industrialized country - the United States. During civil war many ships of a new type were built there - monitors, and even the first battle of armored ships took place. March 9, 1862 on the Hampton raid met the tower "Monitor" of the northerners and the casemate battleship of the southerners "Virginia". But let's not exaggerate the significance of this small episode, because every single clash in the course of this war took place in coastal waters or on rivers. None of the armored ships of the opponents on the high seas dared to appear due to their negligible seaworthiness. And their armor, to be honest, was more than strange.

It is these considerations that make one doubt the true meaning of the French attempt to get a seaworthy battleship, hanging their wooden ships with forged strips of iron. Still, the first true warship of the new generation was the British Warrior, which introduced two revolutionary changes in shipbuilding: an iron hull and rolled thick armor plates. This is what gives us reason to call it the first real battleship in the full sense of the word.

On July 20, 1866, the first battle of armored fleets took place in the Adriatic Sea near the island of Lissa - no longer an accidental skirmish of a pair of ships near the coast, but a real one. sea ​​battle In the open sea. But, unfortunately, this battle had the most detrimental effect on the development of armored fleet tactics. The temporary weakness of the artillery forced Admiral Tegetthoff to use the ram as his main weapon, and this technique was adopted by all other fleets, despite the rapid qualitative improvement of heavy guns. A paradoxical combination: a leap forward in the development of technology and a rollback in tactics.

After that, until the end of the 19th century, admirals and shipbuilders tried to find the ideal type of battleship. The battery battleship, which was also called the armored frigate because it had one gun deck, was replaced by the battleship with the central battery. Now the guns were placed not along the entire length of the deck from stem to stem, but only in the central part of the hull, but the battery was covered from longitudinal fire by armored traverses. By the way, the French Magenta, which had two gun decks, should be mentioned as the only "true" battery battleship.

They say beginners are lucky!
Only God thought differently

And he said dryly to the battleships:
"You will not see good luck in battles!"

Those who sweep away the hordes of enemies?!
And why did you fall for this?!
But with each other indeed, lords,
You didn't fight much in that war.

Purely offhand, from memory, nine major fights took place in European waters during the war years, in which the “ocean lords of steel” managed to shoot at each other.

Battle in the Danish Strait. The result - the "Hood" was sunk.

"The Hunt for Bismarck". The result - the Bismarck was sunk.

Skirmish "Rinaun" with "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau". All participants escaped with moderate damage, without loss of combat capability and the threat of sinking ships. The battle had major strategic implications: a British battlecruiser was able to drive off the German heavy ships that were covering the landing area in Norway. Deprived of battleship cover, the Germans lost 10 of the newest destroyers with landing forces.

Meeting of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau with the aircraft carrier Glories (the aircraft carrier Glories and its escort were sunk).

Pogrom in Mars-el-Kebir. British attack to prevent the transition of the French fleet to the side of the Third Reich. Result: one old battleship sunk, two damaged, the stern of the destroyer leader was torn off.

Skirmish in Casablanca between the American LK "Massachusetts" and the French battleship "Jean Bar". The result - five hits with 1225-kg “suitcases”, the target was disabled. And for nothing that "Jean Bar" was not completed. If it had been completed and armed according to the project, kaput would have come: an American shell flew into the cellar of the UK, fortunately empty.

"Shot at Calabria". Accidental hit in the Italian LK "Giulio Cesare" from a distance of 24 kilometers. The British Warspite distinguished itself in the battle. The impact of the 871-kg blank caused extensive destruction, injury and death of 115 crew members of the Cesare.

Battle at Cape Matapan. Three Italian heavy cruisers (Pola, Fiume and Zara) were sunk by British battleship fire.

New Year's battle near the North Cape.

The British are eager for battles,
Pipes breathe ominously, hot.
In the gray darkness of the polar night
Duke of York catches up with Scharnhorst!

Caught up and sunk.

Nine major battles, some of which had the most serious strategic consequences.

Battle cruiser "Rinaun"

“They stood for the whole war in the bases”, “outdated”, “turned out to be useless”. It’s not even about the notorious “battleships vs aviation” confrontation, but about the inability (or unwillingness) of most military lovers to open a book and write down all the events on a piece of paper. Instead, like parrots, they repeat the phrase about the uselessness of this species.

“There are three useless things in the world: the Chinese wall, the pyramid of Cheops and the battleship Yamato.

Than at the pier to rust in obscurity,
One per squadron proudly
It's better to go out - that's more honor!
And in my dreams I, steel lords,

With a boldly tossed head,
Gritting your teeth, straightening your shoulders,
I'm always preparing you for battle
Although I know that the fight is not eternal.

Is the problem of Yamato in the discrepancy between the costs of its construction and the achieved result? The battleship was built, fought and died a hero's death. The enemy had to use an entire air army, pulling 8 aircraft carriers into the area. So what more?

In the desperate situation that Japan was in, no other options gave the Imperial Navy a chance to win. Building instead of "Yamato" and "Musashi" four aircraft carriers? Proponents of this theory somehow do not think about where the Japanese would get another five thousand trained pilots and additional fuel. In the conditions of the enemy's absolute superiority at sea and in the air, the battleship at least possessed the necessary combat stability, unlike the Taiho, which fell apart from the very first torpedo.

The only miscalculation of the Japanese is in strict secrecy around the Yamato. Such a ship should be proud of and terrify the enemy with it. Having heard about the 410 mm belt and 460 mm guns, the Yankees would rush to build their super battleships with a main caliber of 500 mm, overstraining their industry and taking funds from other important areas (destroyers, submarines).

And, probably, the Yamato should have been used more actively during Midway. If such a powerful air defense platform were next to aircraft carriers, everything could have happened differently.

So leave Yamato alone. The ship was excellent, with more competent use, it would have had no price at all.

Since we started talking about the Pacific theater of operations, then there were three fierce battles in which battleships fired.

On the night of November 14, 1942, the American LK "Washington" and "South Dakota" mutuzed the Japanese "Kirishima". The Japanese soon drowned, and the South Dakota was out of action for 14 months.

The sinking of the battleship "Yamashiro" in a fierce artillery battle - seven to one. (Philippines, October 1944)

And a unique battle near the island of Samar on October 25, 1944. A large Japanese formation that broke into the landing zone in the Philippines and marched for several hours under endless attacks by more than 500 aircraft from all surrounding airfields.

The Japanese failed the mission, but the Americans did not succeed that day either. Despite air strikes and a suicidal destroyer counterattack, all Japanese cruisers and battleships left the DB zone and safely reached Japan (with the exception of three TCRs). The battle is notable for the fact that the Japanese managed to sink an escort aircraft carrier (“Gambier Bay”) from cannons and riddle the rest of the jeep boxes. Fortunately, for armor-piercing shells, the aircraft carrier was not any significant obstacle.

"Yamato" also participated in the shooting of jeeps. Whether he hit at least once is unknown, but the essence of the battle was different. The Japanese had a chance to kill the entire American landing, and the Yamato guns would have been covered in blood up to the very breech. Objectively, the Americans did not have the means to stop the battleships. The retreat was ordered by Takeo Kurita himself. As he later admitted, he made a mistake. They say that the Japanese admiral was not in the best shape: he was still under stress from the night shipwreck, which he became a member of just a day before the above events (the death of the Atago TKR).

And again, the Japanese superlinker was in the balance of triumph. He was in the thick of things. Not only did it pass unnoticed through all the cordons and deceived the air group of 1200 aircraft, penetrating into the restricted zone, but only a dozen miles ahead - and the Yamato became the main culprit in the disruption of the American landing in the Philippines.

And then in the books they will write: “useless”, “not needed”.

Someone will smile skeptically - only three battles with battleships. Well, how many such ships were there? Japanese - can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The Americans built 10 high-speed battleships, not counting the obsolete LCs from the WWII. Moreover, some were damaged at Pearl Harbor and stood at the docks until 1944.

Only five to ten ships on both sides in the vast ocean! By the way, the great aircraft carriers met with each other no more often, despite the fact that their number was two times higher than the number of LCs.

Strictly speaking, of all the participants in World War II, only the six most developed maritime powers had real battleships. Fast, powerful and extremely protected battleships of the late period, designed for operations in the open ocean.

And these three dozen ships - 12 serious battles.

Without taking into account small, daily "fights" and participation in large-scale operations, involving diverse forces of aviation and navy.

These are endless (but not very successful) attempts to intercept British convoys by the forces of the Italian fleet. The most famous are the battle at Cape Spartivento or the battle in the Gulf of Sirte, when the Littorio hit the enemy destroyer with a 381-mm projectile. The reasons for the low performance of the Italian fleet were not so much the naval capabilities of the "pasta" as the lack of radar. If they had radars and modern SLAs, as on the ships of the allies, the results of the confrontation could be different.

These are the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau raids in the Atlantic (22 sunk and captured transports with a total displacement of 115 thousand tons).

These are the campaigns of American LKs as part of high-speed aircraft carrier formations, where battleships were used as powerful anti-aircraft platforms. The most famous fight is “South Dakota”. Covering her formation in the battle near Santa Cruz, the battleship shot down 26 Japanese aircraft. Even if we divide the declared figure by two, the achievement of South Dakota was a real military-technical record. But the most important thing: having such a powerful air defense “umbrella”, none of the ships of the formation received serious damage.

The anti-aircraft fire from the battleship was so intense that from the side it seemed as if fires were blazing on it. In 8 minutes, the ship repulsed at least 18 attacks, in which it shot down from 7 to 14 aircraft.

"WITH. Carolina" covers the AB "Enterprise" in the battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands.

This is the “red zone” in Normandy. German command forbade armored vehicles to approach the coast for a couple of tens of kilometers, where there was a high risk of being hit by naval artillery.

This is 77 amphibious assaults in the Pacific Ocean, each of which was supported by the mighty guns of the battleships. Apart from raiding operations - strikes along the coast of Formosa, China and the Japanese islands, in which capital ships also took part.

The first strikes on the Kwajelein Atoll began on January 29, the North Caroline began bombarding the islands of Roy and Namur that were part of the atoll. On the approach to Roy, the battleship noticed a transport standing in the lagoon, which immediately fired several volleys that caused fires from bow to stern. After the Japanese airstrips were disabled, the battleship bombarded assigned targets at night and all the next day, while covering the aircraft carriers that supported the landing of troops on neighboring islets.

Combat chronicle of North Carolina.

Tennessee supports landing on Okinawa. During the operation, the battleship fired 1490 shells of the main caliber (356 mm) and fired 12 thousand rounds of universal artillery (127 mm).

The only battleship that stood in bases throughout the war was the German Tirpitz. He didn't need to go anywhere. He dispersed the PQ-17 convoy without firing a shot. Withstood 700 sorties of allied aviation, raids by British squadrons and well-planned attacks using underwater special equipment.

"Tirpitz" creates general fear and threat at all points at once.

W. Churchill.

The fears were not in vain. While at sea, the Tirpitz was invulnerable to conventional ships. There is little hope for aviation. In polar darkness, in a snowstorm, aircraft will not be able to detect and successfully attack the battleship. The submariners had no more chances: the low-speed WWII submarines could not attack such a fast maneuverable target. So the British had to constantly keep three battleships in case the Tirpitz went to sea. Otherwise, the escort of the Arctic convoys would have been impossible.

Contrary to the myth of “bulky, useless battleships,” capital ships were the most combat-ready and active participants in the naval battles of World War II. A huge number of ships perished at the first meeting with the enemy. But not battleships! Highly protected battleships continuously participated in combat operations, received damage and returned to service again!

This is the standard. This is how modern surface ships should be. Hurricane power and excellent combat stability!

Getting in doesn't mean breaking through. And to break through does not mean to disable.

Let someone laugh at the death of the Bismarck, comparing it with Commissar Cattani. 2600 rounds of main and medium caliber! The British hollowed out the doomed ship with all their guns until they dared to come closer and sink the burning wreck with torpedo fire.

The difference between Bismarck and Commissar Cattani is that until the last moment, until the battleship disappeared under water, most of his crew remained unharmed. And the ship itself kept moving, some systems functioned on board. In other conditions (suppose the battle took place off the coast of Germany, the German squadron and Luftwaffe aircraft arrived to help), the Bismarck had a chance to get to the base and, after a year of repairs, return to service. After dozens (maybe hundreds) of shells from enemy ships!

Why did they stop building such magnificent battleships after the war?

After the war, they stopped building any surface ships with a displacement of over 10 thousand tons. Savings caused by the advent of compact missile weapons and the removal of body armor under the pretext of lack of need. In the age of jet aviation, any "Phantom" could lift a couple of dozen bombs and fill them with a battleship from bow to stern. While the air defense systems of those years were completely useless in repelling such attacks.

Modern air defense systems will stop any attempts of top-mast bombing. While guns with adjustable projectiles organically complement missile weapons when striking along the coast.

Everything is gradually returning to normal. In America, destroyers with a displacement of 15,000 tons are already being built. Russian shipbuilders, without undue modesty, give data on the destroyer "Leader" at 15-20 thousand tons. Any classification is conditional. Call them whatever you want - cruisers, destroyers, battleships, offshore missile platforms...

20 thousand tons - opens the possibility of creating warships, whose security would not be inferior to the battleships of past years, with half the displacement (if modern technologies and optimization of protection for new types of threats).