That is, submarines. Service conditions on diesel submarines
The menu of sailors on a submarine has always been almost Michelin-starred: in their galleys you can find canned food with pork tongues in jelly, duck and turkey meat, ham, red caviar, cod liver, sprats, saury or pink salmon.
The main lunch dishes - meat, stews, vegetables - are made from products in packaging made of lamister material, this kind of aluminum lacquered foil. For breakfast and dinner, there are also special mixes - dry egg "Omelet", for pancakes with powdered milk. Potatoes, vegetables and fruits, fruit and berry compotes for submarines are pasteurized with biologically active substance"Super Nisolact". It brings the production of canned food closer to the life processes occurring in nature, and eliminates the use of harmful chemical substances.
So taking care of the healthy nutrition of submariners is an urgent need, and not that the naval authorities are particularly philanthropic. Lack of natural light and fresh air, closed space leads to digestive disorders - appetite decreases, and then performance. The limited movement also plays a role: if the calorie content of the products is not correctly calculated, the personnel can easily approach Shrek's constitution.
In total, the range of food products for divers includes about 135 items: there are freeze-dried apricots and strawberries, honey and jam - sometimes even pink or walnuts. In autonomous swimming, everyone is entitled to 50 grams of dry red wine, like Cabernet, because it removes radionuclides from the body.
Ration in the hands of sailors is given chocolate and roach. Why roach, if under wine? They say that when they planned how to support the forces of submariners - beer or wine, opinions were divided. Still, they settled on wine, but they forgot to remove the roach from the ration. The official version says that sailors love roach, especially when rolling, as it reduces unfavorable health during seasickness.
Bread deserves special mention - it is also canned. Previously, loaves were alcoholized for long-term storage. The cook pierced it with a knife, soaked it with water and placed it in the oven. Alcohol along with water evaporated, resulting in fresh hot bread. Now bread is preserved with heat - no matter how it sounds, but this is a healthier way to preserve it for a long time than alcohol sterilization.
Finally, underwater nutrition has two more outstanding moments. Firstly, it is by food that sailors determine whether it is morning, afternoon or evening. Secondly, three shifts work in turn per day, so the cooks need to be set and cleared from the tables endlessly - as if they were serving the endless crazy tea party of Alice from Wonderland.
The material is in many ways in tune with personal feelings about what is happening with the Russian navy, but at the same time it contains something that has never been heard of before, namely, a new way to detect and track submarines:
“... a technology that allows aircraft to carry out radar searches for submerged (submerged) submarines based on the disturbances of the surface environment generated by them during movement (radar detects, as it were, “traces” on the surface of the water that a submarine going in depth leaves).”
Of course, it became very interesting to understand what in question, fortunately, the author of the article, dear Alexander Timokhin, not only described the phenomenon, but also gave a fairly broad evidence base, with links to sources, including English ones.
So we have the thesis:
“Summing up all of the above, we have to admit: the possibility of detecting a submarine using radar and optoelectronic surveillance of the surface of water or ice is a reality. And this reality, unfortunately, is completely denied by the modern domestic naval strategy.
Let us study the sources on the basis of which the respected A. Timokhin formulated this thesis. So, the first is the report "A RADAR METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES" ("Radar method for detecting submerged submarines"), published in 1975. The author of this article downloaded and diligently translated English text, as far as it was in his power (alas, the level of English proficiency is "reading with a dictionary", so errors are possible). In short, the essence of the report is as follows:
1. Since the Second World War, and especially during 1959-1968. multiple cases of detection by radar of submarines following in a submerged position were recorded. Practically all types of American submarines that existed at that time were found at depths up to 700 feet (213.5 m).
2. Although in some cases it was possible to control the movement of the submarine for quite a long time (up to 2 hours), but in general, this effect was not permanent. That is, they could observe it at some point, and then not observe it: they could detect a submarine, immediately lose it and fail to restore contact, even knowing the position of the submarine.
3. And now - the strangest, and very unusual. The fact is that the radar did not detect a submarine at all - this is impossible, the radar does not work under water. It can be assumed that the radar detects some kind of traces above the submarine on the surface of the sea ... nothing like that! The radar detects disturbances in the airspace at an altitude of 1000-2000 feet (300-600 m) above sea level! It sounds completely crazy (which the author of the report himself admits), but, nevertheless, it has been repeatedly confirmed by observations.
To avoid misunderstandings with the translation, I will quote a fragment of the report in English:
“It is hard to imagine how a submerged submarine can give rise to an effect one or two thousand feet above the surface. It is indeed understandable why there might be skepticism. Nevertheless, it is an experimental observation reported on many occasions.”
Then the author of the report points out that the US has not been able to come up with a theory that could substantiate such a phenomenon and tries to explain what, in his opinion, is still happening. Having considered various "sources" that, at least theoretically, could lead to such a phenomenon (thermal trace, the influence of magnetic fields, etc.), the author comes to the following conclusion.
The radar sees some kind of "air turbulence", and it is formed like this. It is known that the layer of air near sea water is saturated with water vapor and is in constant motion (convection). A large underwater body, which is a submarine, exerts pressure on the water in which it moves, including upwards (that is, the boat, as it were, “pulls apart” the water column, “pushing” the water in different directions). This pressure creates an underwater wave, directed upward as well, which, reaching the surface layer of water, changes it relative to its natural state (in the report, this effect is called the "Bernoulli Hump" (Bernoulli Hump)). And these changes provoke the direction of convective air movement and eventually create the same air turbulences that the radar detects.
The author points out that work in this direction in the United States was curtailed, and believes that this was done in vain, because the indicated effect, which makes it possible to observe submarines, although it does not occur on a permanent basis, is still observed quite regularly. And the lack of a theory why this happens is not a reason to stop working in this direction. Interestingly, the report ends with a classic horror story: Russian BODs are equipped with very powerful radars, stronger than those used by the United States to monitor submarines, which means that they probably figured everything out a long time ago and ...
Thus, we can summarize: according to American data and under certain circumstances, a submarine that is in a submerged position can be detected using radar. But ... I must say that the Americans took the underwater threat very seriously. The memory of the “Doenitz boys” was still fresh, and the Soviet fleet in the 50s and 60s was built mainly underwater.
Diesel-electric submarines of project 613. In the period 1950-1957. 215 boats were built
And yet the Americans close the project. This can only mean one thing - despite many precedents at that time, the detection of submarines using radar did not reach the level of technology, that is, something that could give stable results when searching for enemy submarines. At the same time, there is no information that the Americans have resumed work in this direction. That is, we have a report in which the author considers it necessary to resume work on this project, but there is no evidence that his opinion was heeded.
The next argument in favor of the fact that the Americans not only resumed work on radar methods for detecting submarines, but also achieved complete success in them, is the story of Lieutenant General V.N. Sokerin, former Air Force and Air Defense Commander of the Baltic Fleet.
Without quoting it in full, let us briefly recall the essence: in 1988, Mr. Northern Fleet conducted exercises during which 6 nuclear and 4 diesel submarines were deployed at sea. At the same time, each of them received its own sea area, where it was supposed to be, however, within the given area (and they were quite extensive), the commander himself determined where his submarine was located. In other words, until the end of the maneuvers, no one, including the fleet command, could know the exact location of the deployed ships. And then the patrol "Orion" of our "sworn friends" appeared - it passed over the submarine deployment areas in a strange, "broken" route. And when the officers of the fleet compared the maneuvering of our submarines, then:
“... having superimposed the Orion’s “movement” route on the map, he made an unambiguous conclusion that all ten “turning” points of his actual track line were absolutely exactly above the actual location (for the duration of the flight) of all 10 (!) boats. Those. for the first time in 1 hour and 5 minutes, the second - in 1 hour and 7 minutes, one plane "covered" all 10 squares.
What would you like to say about this? Just a couple of words about the person who told us this: Viktor Nikolayevich Sokerin, Honored Military Pilot of Russia, commanded the Air Force and Air Defense of the Baltic Fleet in 2000-2004 and ... left this post, like the ranks of our armed forces, writing a report "on his own" , in protest against the collapse of the naval (and not only) aviation of the Russian Federation. But he was "in sight", "in good standing" with our powers that be. I think it makes no sense to explain that no matter how bad a particular branch of the military is, its top officers always have the opportunity to ensure a comfortable and comfortable existence. It’s all about keeping quiet diplomatically somewhere, somewhere cheerfully reporting what they expect to hear from you ... Yes, only Viktor Nikolayevich was a person of a completely different warehouse, from those for whom the business he is engaged in is above all. I recommend reading his collection of poems - yes, not Pushkin's style, but how much love for the sky and airplanes is in it ... And also - V.N. Sokerin served in the north for a long time and was friends with Timur Avtandilovich Apakidze.
Of course, the author of this article wanted to know in more detail what V.N. Sokerin on the detection of submarines by radar methods. And here the strangeness began. The fact is that the respected A. Timokhin writes that V.N. Sokerina were taken by him from the article “What to ask Ash”, M. Klimov, but ... the problem is that they are not there. The author of the article, Maxim Klimov, mentions the discovery of 10 Soviet submarines, but without any reference to the respected V.N. Sokerin. Well, let's search.
Google reported that these lines are found in the article “Anti-submarine warfare. View from the S.S.S.R. ”, published by Semenov Alexander Sergeevich.
“There was direct evidence that the US Navy had gone much further in developing 'non-traditional' search methods. I will give the testimony of the Commander of Naval Aviation of the Baltic Fleet ... "
.In confirmation of his words, A.S. Semenov gives an interesting screenshot
I would like to note the following. The authenticity of this screenshot does not cause the slightest doubt. It is well known that V.N. Sokerin, after leaving the reserve, did not shy away from the Internet at all, by the way, there is his material on VO), he was also most likely present on the AVIAFORUM website, from where, in fact, this screenshot was taken. Alas, today the discussion thread in which this comment by V.N. Sokerin, is in the archive, so it is impossible to get to him "from the Internet". However, one of the forum administrators was kind enough to confirm the existence of this comment.
And here the author of this article found himself in a very ambiguous position. On the one hand, the words of Viktor Nikolaevich do not require any confirmation or evidence - they themselves are evidence. On the other hand… If this had been said in an interview, or stated in an article, there could no longer be any options. But the replica on the Internet, especially taken out of context, is still a little different. In communication on such forums “for their own”, people can joke, tell stories, etc., without thinking that someone will then “defend a scientific dissertation” on their words. Again, much has become clearer, it would be possible to read the entire thread of the forum, but alas, it is not. And it will not work to ask Viktor Nikolaevich - he left this forum many years ago.
But here is what else needs to be specially noted - reading the words of V.N. Sokerin, we still do not see direct confirmation that the radar method for detecting enemy submarines was brought to fruition in the United States. Dear V.N. Sokerin only talks about the fact that the Orion detected the location of our submarines with high accuracy, and he himself is not the primary source of information (he speaks from the words of an unnamed officer) and makes the assumption that perhaps this is a consequence of the “Window” theme, which our abandoned, and the Americans advanced.
Royal Australian Air Force Orion
But remember that, in addition to hydroacoustic, there are other methods for determining the location of submarines. One of them is magnetometric, aimed at detecting anomalies in the Earth's magnetic field, which are created by such a large object as a submarine. Or, for example, infrared (which, by the way, should not be confused with radar in any case) - the fact is that a nuclear submarine uses water as a coolant, which is then discharged overboard, having, of course, a higher temperature than the surrounding sea or ocean. And it can be tracked. Of course, this method is only suitable for detecting nuclear submarines, but over time - who knows? After all, a submarine moves in the water column, “pushing” the water away from itself with a propeller or a water cannon, and in any case, this is friction. And friction, as you know, raises body temperature, and, in principle, the wake, probably at least a little, but warmer than the surrounding water. The only question is the "sensitivity" of surveillance devices.
That is, strictly speaking, the fact that the Americans detected our submarines (which, in fact, V.N. Sokerin is talking about), does not yet indicate the triumph of the radar method for detecting submarines - perhaps the Americans used some other, earlier existing method by improving it.
By the way, what kind of “window theme” is this? Let's try to deal with this on the basis of the same article “Anti-submarine warfare. A view from the U.S.S.R.” A.S. Semenov, especially since the respected A. Timokhin in his article “represents him as:
"One of the "fathers" of the "Window" theme, an anti-submarine pilot from the Pacific Fleet"
The principle of operation of the "Window" A.S. Semyonov describes it this way:
“... with the help of an airborne radar ... to find the same zones of disturbances, called the“ Standing Wave ”. With some experience and radar tuning, they looked like concentric circles, several tens of kilometers in diameter with a boat in the center of this circle ... An attempt to apply this method on Il-38, Tu-142 was not particularly successful. It was clear that for such a purpose, the development of a radar station of the appropriate frequency range was needed.
Let us immediately pay attention to the fact that, according to its principle of operation, the “Window” is fundamentally different from what the Americans were going to use. Those were going to look for an “air trail”, and we have a sea trail, some kind of concentric waves ... or not? The fact is that when describing the work of "Windows" A.S. Semyonov points out: Short description principle. From the story "Untradition".
What kind of "non-tradition" is this? And this is the story of the same A.S. Semenov. So what, the reader will say, can't the author take a description from his own "early" work? Of course, maybe this is normal, if only it weren’t for one “but”. Story genre. Simply by opening the page of A.S. Semenov at samizdat, we read (specially underlined in red)
Fantasy. No, it’s clear that “A fairy tale is a lie, but there’s a hint in it, a lesson for good fellows,” the work itself is based on the fact that the author falls into “himself”, that is, he returns to himself young in all the brilliance of his life experience for years of service and creates an alternate reality. Often in such works a lot of things that really existed are revealed ... But the problem is that we can only guess which of what is said in the story is true and which is fiction. And that is to say - the work is not written in the simplest language, it, so to speak, is intended rather "for their own and for their own", that is, for those who are familiar with the hardships of naval service firsthand, and who, apparently, are easily able to separate truth from fiction.
In general, A.S. Semyonov is a man who obviously knows, but what he wrote ... it turns out that it may be “so, not quite so, or even not at all like that.” But in this case, does it make sense to refer to his work?
And also, when reading his “Anti-submarine warfare. View from the S.S.S.R., which is positioned by the author precisely as an article, and not as a literary and fantastic work, this is what hurt the eye. A.S. Semenov, describing the state of our submarine forces (in short, according to A.S. Semenov - complete darkness, the Americans controlled us at every step and at any moment could take us for soft spots), refers to Vice Admiral Ryazantsev Valery Dmitrievich, the author of the book "In the wake of death." At the same time, A.S. Semenov characterizes Valery Dmitrievich as an extremely competent person.
So the whole point is that V.D. Ryazantsev in 2014 wrote an article with an extremely “talking” title: “Once again about sea tales and storytelling sailors”, in which, among other things, he paid attention to “Window”. According to him, the very beginning of work on this topic was a form of scam and juggling of facts that during intermediate tests the commanders of ships and aircraft received an order: “Bleed from the nose, but the results of the studies must be positive”, and that all this was done in order to get funding, and then:
“I would like to ask today those who have spent huge amounts of money: “Where is the new technology that would allow detecting foreign submarines? Where is the plane or helicopter on which this equipment is installed? There are no planes, no helicopters, no equipment. And there is no money. The “Window” theme turned out to be a soap bubble, a “Potemkin village”, an empty shell.”
However, about all this A.S. Semenov does not mention, although his article “Anti-submarine warfare. A view from the U.S.S.R.” was posted on "Samizdat" much later than the material of the Vice Admiral. However, the author is not at all going to reproach A.S. Semenov in deliberate concealment of information - after all, he was in no way obliged to read all the works of V.D. Ryazantsev and could well have simply skipped this article of his.
And here's what we get. An "alarm" sounds - the submarines of the Fatherland are in danger, the Americans are using a new method of radar detection of underwater submarines, they see everyone! However, when you begin to understand all this in detail, it turns out that the rationale for the “alarm” is:
1. A report born in 1975, from which it follows that work in this direction was once closed in the USA, and it is completely unclear whether they were resumed as a result of the report;
2. Forum remark of a very respected person;
3. And, finally, a work written in the fantastic genre "alternative".
Here the question arises - is this base sufficient for declaring an "alarm"? Let everyone who reads these lines decide for himself.
And one more thing - under-ice detection of submarines. Here, respected A. Timokhin refers to the words of “another Navy officer, an experienced anti-submarine officer, commander of an anti-submarine ship, captain of the first rank A.E. Soldatenkov. All this is true - dear A.E. Soldatenkov really published his memoirs “Admiral's routes (or flashes of memory and information from outside), but ... we have to admit that A. Timokhin quoted A.E. Soldatenkov is not entirely correct.
The bottom line is that the familiar A.E. Soldatenkova really observed a certain ellipse around the place where the submarine soon surfaced. Moreover, such ellipses were recorded by radars before (outside the ice), but for a long time no one associated them with submarines, considering them to be just interference. Then they tied it up, already using radar reconnaissance satellites: “So, for example, in the Cuban region in the Caribbean Sea, an American submarine was detected by a satellite by the annular effect.”
Generally speaking, all of the above correlates perfectly with the data of the report "A RADAR METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES" - similar formations were observed there as well. But then A.E. Soldatenkov is trying to explain the nature of this phenomenon... or rather, he is simply playing the reader.
“When the submarine moves in a submerged position, the specified diving depth is held by horizontal rudders, which are controlled by the boatswain or autopilot. Accuracy of holding the set travel depth within ±5 meters. That is, a gigantic mass of metal (from 6,000 to 33,800 tons) makes vertical oscillations in depth, and along with the mass, its gravitational field also fluctuates. Part of the gravitational field of the hull of an underwater ship, with the intensity recorded by the measuring instruments, comes to the surface of the water, to the border of two media - water and air. This part of the gravitational field, at some identical level of its tension, enters into resonant interaction with the near-surface layers of sea water and air.”
For those who have completely forgotten the course of physics behind the current troubles, we recall that the gravitational field is a fundamental physical field through which gravitational interaction between all material bodies is carried out. Moreover, the essence of this interaction lies in the fact that the force of gravitational attraction between two points is directly proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to the square of the distance separating them. That is, all the objects of the world are in the gravitational field - not only the “surface layers of sea water”, but also the Sun, Jupiter and Alpha Centauri interact with the same submarine, just the force of their interaction is negligible. But "a part of the gravitational field sticking out above the surface of the water" is, generally speaking, a physical and mathematical nonsense.
Of course, one could assume that the respected E.A. Soldatenkov simply did not quite correctly formulate his idea, and the “gravitational field of the boat” means the distance from it at which its gravitational attraction is able to noticeably affect some particles of air and water. But even in this case, his further explanation of this phenomenon does not look entirely scientific, and allows the respected author to be suspected of ... let's say, one of his favorite sea sports: "tagging tales" by gullible civilians.
But what is important is that A.E. Soldatenkov prefaces his scientific calculations with the words "Regarding all of the above, I dare to suggest the following." That is, he directly writes that his words are nothing more than his personal hypothesis. At the same time, A. Timokhin's quote looks like A.E. Soldatenkov is absolutely sure, and does not feel a shadow of doubt in his words.
But the most big question not even in this. As we said earlier, respected A. Timokhin in his article "A fleet without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse" made two key statements. The first is that modern technologies allow you to detect submarines that are submerged and even under the ice. And the second is that we completely ignore the existence of such opportunities.
So, to confirm the first thesis, A. Timokhin quotes a fragment of one of the chapters of the book by A.E. Soldatenkov. But for some reason he completely “forgets” to quote another fragment of the same chapter, in which A.E. Soldatenkov suggests ... that this method of detecting submarines is being used with might and main by the Russian Navy! We quote:
“But there are indirect signs that the polarization method for detecting submarines has made its way into life. So, for example, the hydroacoustic complex of the heavy nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" (for all its perfection) could not provide complete coverage of the underwater situation during the tragic events with the Kursk APRK, nevertheless it had it. Moreover, one of the officers of the press center of the General Staff of the Navy openly said that the underwater situation at the crash site was being monitored by radar. This could be mistaken for incompetence or a slip of the tongue of a former political worker, but the officer told the truth, it's just that no one believed in it. In addition, nowhere in the open press is there any mention of work in the field of the polarization method for detecting submarines. And this happens in two cases: the first, when no one deals with this problem at all, the second, when significant progress has been made and the topic has been classified. Another sign. Ultra-long trip of the heavy nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" around the world on Far East to participate in the exercises of the Pacific Fleet without escort ships. It seems to be a big negligence for the only ship of this class on the planet. But no, the BIP (or BIC) of the cruiser knew ALL the situation around the ship: surface, underwater, air, space, and would hardly let himself be offended. Another indirect sign: when communicating with the media in interviews with high naval commanders, tragic notes ceased to sound at the mention of an underwater threat from a potential enemy, and before that they were already torn from the consciousness of their own powerlessness. Plus, the loss of interest in anti-submarine surface ships and the reduction of OVR brigades in all fleets. Plus, the resumption of long-range aviation flights around the borders of the Russian Federation. After all, hundreds of tons of aviation kerosene are burned not only for training pilots.”
It turns out badly: where the words of the respected A.E. Soldatenkov confirm the theses of the author of the article “A fleet without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse”, they are not only quoted, but also presented to readers as a given (while A.E. Soldatenkov himself is only a personal hypothesis). And in cases where the opinion of A.E. Soldatenkova comes into conflict with the opinion of A. Timokhin, then what, it turns out, will we forget for clarity?
Well, what conclusion do you want to draw from all this? And no - at the disposal of the author there are no facts that would confirm or refute the assumptions of the respected A. Timokhin. And, despite all the above criticism of the evidence base on which the article “A fleet without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse”, it may well turn out that its main postulates are still absolutely correct.
The personal opinion of the author of this article, which he does not impose on anyone, is as follows. It is most likely that a method for detecting submarines in a submerged position using radar does exist. But it, like other methods for detecting submarines (magnetometric, hydroacoustic, thermal, and now, according to some reports, some kind of “chemical” is also patented), is not a guarantee of detecting and destroying submarines, although it can work under certain circumstances - as well as all the methods listed above. In other words, it is quite possible, and even more than likely, that it will now be even more difficult for submariners, but, nevertheless, submarines as a class of warships have not at all lost their combat significance.
Indirectly, this point of view is confirmed by the following considerations. Suppose, at the end of the 20th century, the United States really invented a method that allows you to detect submarines with an efficiency close to 100%. But in this case, the very concept of American nuclear submarines, implying the ability to operate independently in the face of a strong enemy ASW, loses its meaning. Why, then, are the Americans increasing the pace of commissioning their newest Virginias? After all, it is quite obvious that sooner or later potential US adversaries will also learn this method and be able to detect American nuclear submarines operating near the bases.
In such a case, it would be logical to expect the creation of some completely new type of submarines, and perhaps the abandonment of them altogether, or at least a slowdown in the programs for building new nuclear submarines - but nothing of the kind is happening. And, most likely, this indicates that with the methods of searching for submarines in a submerged position by radar means, everything is not so simple.
But in any case, we need to clearly understand that the submarine is not at all a self-sufficient means of fighting at sea. Illusions that, by developing one type of naval armed forces, it is possible to solve the tasks of the Navy as a whole, one should say goodbye as soon as possible. A submarine, for all its pluses, is not a child prodigy, and submariners will only be able to inflict damage on the enemy in close cooperation with surface ships, land-based and deck-based naval aviation aircraft and in the presence of a developed system of maritime reconnaissance and target designation - over-the-horizon radars, spy satellites, networks of underwater hydroacoustic stations and so on and so forth.
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Everyone who reads science fiction, perhaps at least once thought that it would be cool to live in some unusual place, for example, under water. Over the past half century, people have repeatedly tried to make this fantasy a reality and not without success. For those who are ready to shell out a tidy sum and don't mind living next door to a couple of tiger sharks, there are several options for living in the underwater world.
1. Sub-biosphere
One of the most ambitious attempts to create underwater housing is the project of Phil Pauley. The "underwater city" itself consists of several floors placed in separate capsules, each of which will accommodate up to 100 inhabitants. The sub-biosphere must be completely self-sufficient and provide its inhabitants with food and electricity. It is not known whether such a bold project will materialize, but Paulie continues to relentlessly seek funding to begin work on it. .
2. Conshelf
The world's most famous ocean explorer, Jacques Yves Cousteau, was the first to create underwater research buildings in which one could live. It is worth noting that the Conshelf project was not intended for long-term habitation, despite the fact that most of the comforts of an ordinary home existed in this underwater giant metal drum. In total, there were three iterations of the project, and in the last - Conshelf III, built at a depth of 100 meters, six researchers lived under water for a month. The idea first came to life in 1962, when the Conshelf I was created 10 meters below the surface. mediterranean sea off the coast of Marseille. Two scientists lived and worked there for a week. The underwater house was equipped with a library, television and radio.
3. Underwater laboratory La Chalupa
An underwater research station off the coast of Puerto Rico, La Chalupa Research Lab, owned by Taco Bell, was converted into an underwater hotel at the end of its life, which became popular with celebrities. The whole structure is completely submerged in water and is located at the bottom of the lagoon. At the same time, it is controlled by a control center located on land. The underwater hotel has two air-conditioned bedrooms and a common living area equipped with a TV, DVD player and telephone. Also in the bedrooms there are giant glass portholes, which divers love to look into.
4. Underwater laboratory Galatea
SeaOrbiter is a fully mobile concept for underwater research. It's kind of underwater spaceship drifting in the ocean around the world. The inspiration for the project was the Galatea underwater laboratory, which was discovered by Jacques Rougerie in 1977. Project leaders plan to soon develop underwater vehicles that would allow them to explore the ocean at depths of up to 6,000 meters.
5. Silab
One of the earliest attempts to allow humans to live below the surface of the ocean was the Sealab project, Taco Bell's research lab. Like Conshelf, the Sealab project also went through three iterations. The first Sealab was launched off the coast of Bermuda in 1964, but was quickly shut down due to an approaching storm. The Sealab II was launched in 1965 and already had a range of amenities such as hot water and a refrigerator. The 17-meter station could dive to 62 meters. Sealab III was launched in 1969 off the coast of California, but the project ended in tragedy when water began to seep inside the facility, and an unsuccessful repair attempt led to the death of "aquanaut" Berry Cannon.
6. Aquarius
Florida International University owns one of the last remaining operational underwater research facilities, Aquarius Station. Researchers study marine life off the coast of the Florida Keys in this metal cocoon. The station, which accommodates up to six people, can dive to a depth of 37 meters. Aquarius is a fully equipped underwater apartment that has a refrigerator, air conditioning, shower, toilets, microwave and even internet access.
7. Tektite
In 1969, the United States government funded a project called Tektite, named after meteors that crash into the ocean and sink to the bottom. As part of the project, four aquanauts lived at the underwater station from February to April 1969 and had to train astronauts for long-term space flights. The second iteration of the Tektite project was launched in 1970. Within its framework, 11 different missions were carried out, during which 53 aquanauts lived for 2-3 weeks under water.
8. Hydrolab
Over the years, hundreds of researchers have used the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration's Hydrolab to study life in the Atlantic Ocean. Located off the coast of the US Virgin Islands, Hydrolab allowed scientists to work for several weeks at the bottom of the ocean, with 4 scientists at the station at the same time. The laboratory itself, immersed to a depth of 40 meters, was rather small and cramped - its length was only 5 meters and its height was 2.5 meters.
9. Atlantic
NASA engineer Dennis Chamberland has developed the Atlantica project, which is another attempt to create a real underwater city. Chamberland has already built an underwater house for two people, but he is going to create a huge city that will allow people to stay at the bottom of the ocean permanently. According to his plans, Atlantica should combine the functions of a residential complex and a research center.
10.H2OME
Most underwater dwellings are only available to scientists or have not yet been built. However, there is another option - for "only" $ 10 million you can buy your own luxury underwater home - H2OME. The same company that built one of the most famous underwater hotels in the world, the Poseidon, is now offering custom underwater homes. Such houses consist of two floors, and they have a couple of bedrooms, a living room, and literally everything you could want in a house.
Publishes a translation of the U.S. Navy Submariner's Code. The main provisions set forth in the Code are understandable, well known and applied by submariners of all countries in their daily and combat activities. Russian submariners have a concept of "good underwater service practice" that combines much of what is outlined below. At the same time, there are significant differences determined by the historically established paths of development of submarine forces and underwater service.
war under water
The submarine front has brought a unique and indispensable set of tools and capabilities to US national security. Through stealth, surprise and daring, submarine forces provide a presence and deterrence effect on a scale far out of proportion to their size and numbers. When our invulnerable and undetected submarine forces operate in conjunction with the obvious and intimidating power of carrier strike groups and expeditionary marines, such a grouping represents a formidable, flexible and highly complex force projection of power.U.S. Navy Submarine Emblem
The role of the submarine forces in this alliance is based on the advantages dictated by being under water. Whether cold and lifeless arctic waters or warm and vibrant tropical, peaceful or war time, storm or calm - our submarine forces do everything to maintain stealth in order to threaten a permanent presence and increase combat capabilities. Stealth makes it possible to conduct a wide variety of operations unnoticed, allows you to penetrate deep into the enemy defenses, allows you to suddenly attack, surprising the enemy with the time and place of choosing a target, contributes to survivability and gives rise to uncertainty and uncertainty in the enemy, which greatly complicate his planning of operations. But all these advantages and attributes cannot be achieved without the tireless efforts of smart and courageous fighters. Our submarine forces must be staffed with highly professional personnel with specialized technical and military knowledge, skills in the use of stealth, the ability to act independently, proactively, prone to tactical innovation and aggressive combat tenacity. The courageous fighters of the underwater front are the guarantee that our submarine forces are ready to enter the fray in the shortest possible time, penetrate far ahead without interference, make full use of the underwater space for maneuver, seize the offensive action initiative and quickly adapt to the changing situation in the chaos of war.
For us, submariners, it is important that we understand the significance of the role played for the security of the country. While technology, adversaries, and battlefields have changed many times throughout history, the primary goal of our submarine force has remained the same: to exploit the properties of the underwater environment to provide the military advantage of the United States. The set of skills that submariners must possess has not changed. The purpose of the Code is to provide our submarine warriors with a common framework and perspective that will serve as the basis for their training, planning and conduct of training events and peacetime operations. Such a secure base will create the possibility of a smooth transition from peace to war, if necessary.
Part 1. Necessary qualities of American submariners
Success in submarine warfare depends on the skillful application of technically complex systems in an environment hostile in every respect. Although the military leadership combines the effect of submarine warfare with the overall efforts of the US Armed Forces, it is clear that submarine warfare is a type of independent warfare and is carried out with little or no external support. Underwater combat requires a special breed of warrior who is a technical and military specialist who can act covertly, autonomously, ready to show initiative, creativity and be angry and stubborn.Submarine warfare depends on submariners. It is not enough for the US Navy to have quiet and fast nuclear submarines with excellent technical and combat characteristics and the ability to carry various technical devices and devices on board and outside. The fleet must be manned by trained and experienced submariners to make the best use of expensive submarines and submersibles. To be effective, submarine forces must possess a number of qualities, and for this, submariners must also possess special qualities. The U.S. Navy requires professional submariners to:
- technical literacy,
- military experience,
- skills in the use of stealth,
- independence,
- initiatives
- tactical creativity,
- perseverance.
Independence cannot be magically acquired during a war - it is practiced daily when the operators find the full use of their capabilities. Innovation and creativity are also in demand in the context of exercises and in daily activities, so we are sure that they will also manifest themselves in war conditions.
Technical literacy and awareness
Underwater combat systems and submarines are machines, and there is no chance of success in underwater warfare if the weapons and equipment are not properly maintained and used for their intended purpose. As in aviation, submarine warfare is entirely dependent on the failure-free operation of submarines. Submariners know that technology can, in its own way, punish those who do not maintain it regularly or operate it incorrectly - such a punishment may not follow today or tomorrow, but a bad attitude towards technology will certainly lead to trouble. Poor maintenance of systems and mechanisms may not affect their operation today, but it will certainly lead to premature equipment failure many years later, when life will depend on this or that device.Submariners are competent and disciplined operators and look after their materiel. We know that achieving this level of excellence requires careful preparation and continuous training to meet the exacting standards of a ship's service. Absolute knowledge of technology is the most important basis for its effective use in combat. Knowledge Tests Possibilities technical means and provides experience in the use of design redundancy and reliability testing.
It is easy to see that there is technical readiness in relation to technical systems such as an echo sounder, a weather controller, torpedo and missile silos, fire fighting systems and a propulsion complex. But the concept of technical readiness also applies to other areas that are not so obvious. The combat effectiveness of a submarine can be quickly undermined due to poor management of spare parts stocks or due to illness of the crew due to poor sanitary conditions, due to injuries due to unsafe work practices, due to the need to return due to the failure of something. The need for technical experience in the performance of duties extends to all members of the submarine crew in all parts of the submarine force without exception.
Technical readiness is a key factor not only to eliminate material problems - it is the basis of a successful damage control. Practice in switching to standby modes of operation and manual control of systems that usually operate automatically is an essential component in the training of specialists. Exercises to fine-tune teamwork and organized action have always been an important element of our success. Hard training and careful analysis of the lessons learned from the practice of our best crews became a characteristic of the submarine fleet even before the Second World War. The experience accumulated over decades has been one of our main strengths.
The hostile underwater environment makes special demands on the character and personality of submariners. The safety of the entire crew often depends on the command of one person. Safety deep under water, in a complex machine with high fluid pressures, nuclear power, electrical voltage, explosives, is achieved by a common underwater service culture, personal responsibility, teamwork and mutual assistance. Generations of submariners have passed on these lessons to us, and we work hard to ensure that each new submariner learns them. It's part of us, it's part of our underwater DNA.
Combat Experience
In addition to technical training, which is very important in itself, real submariners have good combat experience. The basis of this experience is a reflection on what has been done in the historical past, and an understanding of how this legacy continues to influence today's reality. This includes an assessment of the use of submarine forces by other fleets, our own combat experience, which serves as a starting point for predicting the possible use of submarine forces in the future.There are many new aspects of modern warfare that have emerged from high degree automation in the computer age. On Aegis-equipped ships, for example, radar and sophisticated fire and weapons control systems can detect, track and intercept multiple aircraft automatically if necessary. Submarine warfare, however, despite the unconditional support of complex computer systems, will still depend on the human mind. The opaque nature of the underwater environment, the distortion of sound waves, the presence of interference, and the active efforts of opponents to confuse and deceive each other combine to place increased demands on the knowledge and experience of underwater warriors. In the next section, we will see that ambiguity and vagueness are indispensable companions of action under water.
Submarine forces often operate far ahead without the support of other friendly forces. This means that submarine forces are often the only ones actually operating in these areas. As a result, after the First World War, it was proposed to use single submarines for various military operations in the forward echelons. Each of the military categories has its respective military elements. Submarine crews are small—half to one-fourth the number of sailors per ton of ship displacement—compared to a typical surface ship. A small submarine crew must be able to perform the very diverse tasks of anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and air attack evasion, special operations force delivery, information operations support, reconnaissance and mine warfare. Often, these separate tasks must run concurrently.
Important for the combat use of submarine forces is knowledge of the geography of the main hot spots in the world's oceans. There are areas of the World Ocean, which become the sites of the most important battles. Knowing the conditions of the navigation area can be key here. This is especially true for submariners, who must make full use of the "3D" model of operations.
The stable nature of the mention of certain areas in naval history due to the sustainable nature of commercial shipping routes, the location of the world shopping centers, used straits and narrownesses. Submariners must have a solid understanding of the limitations of the area and make the best use of the available data on its geography. Even with modern systems determining the location knowledge of the geography of the navigation area is crucial for the submariner.
Ability to use stealth and attack confidently
Submarines are more likely to operate under conditions of information starvation than data glut. All the smallest fragments of the information we have are subject to careful study in order to understand their essence to the maximum extent. Most importantly, our submarine forces regularly work in conditions that allow us to hone the skills of crews in applying and evaluating the degree of their stealth, in a form they can understand. Stealth is an unmeasurable property resulting from the interaction of a submarine and a sensor, both of which are controlled by a person in a changing environment, riddled with natural and man-made effects. There is no "stealth gauge" that glows yellow when the risk is high and red when our submarines are detected. Submariners know that the only stealth sensor is in the brain and soul of every member of the submarine crew. All history shows that it is necessary to carefully calibrate this "stealth device" of a submariner in peacetime so that it can be used in wartime.Before the Second World War, our submariners were trained in stealth, using the same techniques, which affected the benefit of the enemy, and as a result, they realized that they needed to take extreme precautions and tricks in order to survive. They shifted to a constant practice of diving during the daytime, to performing daylight attacks using sonar data from maximum depths without the aid of a periscope, and to minimize the time spent on the surface. The transitions were slow, and the time spent in position was insufficient. The accuracy of torpedo attacks was very low. Too many commanders did not show sufficient perseverance. Early World War II experience commanders boats on assignment averaged 15.7 years of service, and by the end of the war - 9.8 years of service, of which 3.5 years they spent in combat campaigns.
Peacetime training, which did not meet the requirements of real combat, "calibrated" many commanders of the older generation, making the scale of their internal "stealth device" very sensitive, which limited their persistence and success. Of the 465 commanders who served in World War II, only about 15 percent were successful, accounting for more than half of total number all sunken ships. Of these 70 officers, only four were killed in action (Morton, Daly, MacMillan and Gilmour) and only four U-boats were lost (Wahoo, Harder, Thresher and Tang). This means that the most successful commanders and crews had significantly higher survivability than the submarine forces as a whole. The submariners in that 15 percent were three times more likely to return safely from a cruise compared to the other 85 percent of the crews. The professionalism of the attack, as a rule, is inseparable from a safe return to the base.
Today's submariners are preparing themselves for a future war by practicing in peacetime, taking into account the lessons of the past, striving to achieve the necessary skills and qualities that guarantee victory. Among these skills, stealth and cunning are mandatory. Stealth is more than just making a ship silent. It includes actions and activities performed in the order that is most appropriate for the conditions of the task being performed in order to extract the maximum benefit with the minimum risk. Stealth means more than protecting yourself from detection. Stealth - the inability to identify and classify the boat even after detection. Stealth also consists in the use of methods that prevent the location of the boat, even if it is detected and classified. Submariners should strive to ensure that all of these tools are used, because war may require the ship and crew to take risks, as a result of which the ship will be discovered, and then the survivability of the boat will depend on how the crew uses all possible means and methods available in such an environment.
Consider the example of a Marine Corps sniper. A sniper in a Ghillie camouflage suit is almost invisible. Indeed, in many cases the sniper's stealth is not about avoiding detection, but about avoiding recognition. Sometimes, when new snipers are introduced to training, cadets are surprised to discover that the "bush" they've been in the field for half an hour is actually a deadly shooter. Submariners have at their disposal the same variety of stealth options and the same skill and experience in using each of them.
During World War I, Great Britain landed troops at Gallipoli in an attempt to break through to the Black Sea and Russia, thereby separating the Ottoman Empire in Asia from the Axis powers in Europe. To assist the landing at Gallipoli, submarines entered the Sea of Marmara to tie down the actions of Turkish shipping, including in the port of Constantinople in the eastern part of the sea. These actions, taken for the first time in 20 years in the history of the combat use of submarines, included a full range of tasks: overcoming a minefield in narrowness, artillery shelling, landing swimmers for sabotage against coastal targets and on railway tracks, torpedo attacks on ships, landing and taking scouts on board and classical problems observations and reports. Even at this early stage, submariners instinctively understood the importance of maintaining stealth. As a classic example of the methods used to maintain stealth, the fact of setting up buoys "with a broom", imitating periscopes, is given. These fake periscopes were supposed to attract the attention of Turkish destroyers, who, when attacking a "submarine", unwittingly fall into a trap, opening the side of a real submarine, ready for a torpedo attack. Creativity, innovation and cunning in organizing an attack - Foundation stone submariner training.
autonomy
Since the nature of the operations of the American submarine forces involves a long stay at remote lines, it is clear that the submarine forces must be autonomous, and the crews must proceed from the reserves that are on board. Autonomy really depends on careful preparation, creative repair in conditions of limited opportunities. The care with which the storekeeper fills the lockers is as much a factor in the reliability of the submarine as the skill of a turner with a lathe or a technician with a soldering iron. In addition, proper daily maintenance reduces the problem of wear and tear and allows the submarine force to carry out planned operations without unscheduled external assistance.Submariners know that each entry into the base provides the enemy with a starting point, is a signal for reconnaissance. Each maintenance call takes time away from the task. Every moment with a faulty system reduces survivability and reliability, leading to greater danger to the ship. There must be certain reasons for unplanned changes in routes and tasks, unplanned external assistance. Such reasons arise both in peacetime and in wartime. Avoiding the causes of an unplanned service call means complicating the task of reconnaissance of the enemy. In addition, by following the planned schedule of actions, the submariners allow other forces to stick to their plans. All experienced divers know how troublesome it is to go out to sea instead of another submarine, which at the last minute, due to technical problems, could not do it. The less time for preparation, the less effective time for basic maintenance, the higher the chances of failure of the task, the loss of time for training. The most important quality of submariners is the ability to act autonomously and independently: to minimize the risk of problems by careful maintenance of equipment and its competent operation, continuous improvement of the ability to eliminate problems that have arisen with minimal deviation from operational plans.
Willingness to take the lead
Submarine warfare, by its nature, is conducted at considerable distances and with limited communication capabilities. In addition, submariners often have the opportunity to get a deeper understanding of the position, place and nature of the forces, which is not always available to the command. It is important that submarine commanders understand that they have the freedom to choose and act based on the information received at remote positions. As a result, the command determines priorities and communicates the "commander's intent," and the rest depends on the initiative and decision of the submarine commander. This freedom of action allows the submarine commander to make quick decisions in a rapidly changing environment in order to best meet the management's intent.Developing the self-confidence of the submarine commander is critical to the overall capability of the US submarine force to achieve the expected result. The initiative is trained and expected during combat training and on long-distance cruises in peacetime, transferred in the crew from senior to junior as experience and maturity are gained. Submariners are well known for pushing any initiative through the chain of command. Initiative needs to be constantly honed.
There is no room for error in the operation of submarines, especially in a combat situation. That is why the submarine fleet has long been using a system of training programs, advanced training on submarines and rewarding the best. In 1924, a few years after the pilots introduced the insignia - wings, the submarine forces introduced their own sign - a dolphin to indicate the qualifications of a specialist in submarines. Part of the training that is mandatory and necessary for all submariners is a thorough study of their ship and all systems so that all crew members can take all necessary measures in any emergency that may arise during a battle, accident or day-to-day operations.
Submariners are expected to take the initiative based on deep technical knowledge. Just as submarine commanders must take the initiative to decide on the tactical actions of their ship, so must each crew member take the initiative in the performance of their duties. Initiative is the foundation of combat potential, a necessary element of life on a submarine.
If a command is given to put the rudder to the left to set a new course, and the junior helmsman sees that he will quickly get on the course by shifting the rudder to the right, he is obliged to report this. This gives the commander the opportunity to correct his order, unless a turn to the left was justified. The submarine commander welcomes this initiative, as it shows that even one of the most junior sailors on the ship has a head and thinks. This sort of teamwork is a boon to the ship and is a sign of a successful underwater service.
Tactical creativity and innovation
Demonstration of tactical novelties has become a habit for submariners. In the history of submarine warfare, real combat operations have always differed from those that were expected before they began. The rules are constantly changing. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, US submarines were preparing to operate under regulations that required any civilian ship to be warned prior to attack. Six hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, COMSUBPAC (Pacific Submarine Forces Command) received an order from the Navy to "Initiate unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan." This required a quick adjustment to the operational use of submarines and how they perform combat missions.As already mentioned, submariners are opposed by much more capable anti-submarine warfare forces, which gives anti-submarine forces self-confidence, and makes submariners doubt their secrecy. Winston Churchill, describing the history of the Second World War, recalls how he was at sea in 1938, where he saw how effective sonar was in finding submarines. He notes that he was surprised by the "clearness and crispness" of the signal, as if he were "one of those beings asking to be destroyed". He lamented later: "No doubt, this time I overestimated their achievements, forgetting for a moment how vast the sea is." It is impossible to know what changes await those who go to sea on a combat operation, but submariners must clearly understand that tactics, rules and the military situation will be different than they expected, and that they will have to adapt to changes or expose themselves and their ships dangerous risk.
Tactical novelties should be applied on every ship, in every subdivision, discussed in every wardroom. The idea of the Eklund training ground was born at sea, and then was confirmed and refined by the teachers of the submarine school. The idea of quickly reloading torpedo tubes during the battle, rather than after leaving it, was developed and tested by a young torpedo officer on Parche during World War II and was critical to the success of the U-boat attack on the Japanese convoy on July 31, 1944. Red Ramage penetrated the center of the column on the surface at night and, remaining alone on the bridge, fired 19 torpedoes in 48 minutes, becoming the only living holder of the Medal of Honor among the submariners to this day.
"Tactical novelties" are not necessarily limited to combat. In 1972, the Barb rushed out of Guam, despite a typhoon warning coming in an hour, to make a 300-mile dash in an attempt to rescue 8 crew members of a B-52 that had crashed into the ocean shortly after takeoff from Andersen AFB. Heavy seas forced all other vessels to leave the search area, but the Barb crew took the initiative, as a result of which they managed to get 6 pilots on board, despite 40-foot waves. Leaving only the cockpit hatch open, the watch tied itself to the fence, and six people in a strong hull were ready to draw exhausted and wounded pilots from the surface of the sea. The torpedo sergeant major, who swam to the first group of lifeboats to hand over the end, was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal for heroism in the rescue. This kind of creativity on a submarine or other subsea systems will always be important, but divers should practice it regularly so as not to be dependent on circumstances.
The need for tactical innovation will only grow in the future with the introduction of new underwater technologies, especially unmanned systems. The need for coordination between subsea systems is becoming increasingly important. Submariners are the Navy's specialists in "underwater warfare" or underwater warfare. The Company is responsible for the full provision of these activities, providing a complete and coordinated set of funds. As pilots follow certain rules for avoiding collisions with aircraft, and the surface forces have established rules for avoiding collisions with ships, submariners must comply with certain requirements that govern the use of underwater spaces - including the prevention of mutual interference, maneuvering, managing underwater systems in the best possible way.
Unmanned submarine fleets (UUVs) are a new and rapidly growing part of the US submarine force, and the growth needs to be smooth and seamless. For example, the development of UUVs may require the emergence of new personnel specialists, knowledge of the operation of UUVs may become part of the training program for already existing branches of forces. UUVs can be placed on board and used by crews of other combat platforms (submarines, ships, coastal bases). Or UUVs may be an organic part of ship systems. Here are some of the toughest questions that submariners will have to face and tackle in the coming years. One thing is for sure: it is certain that in the near future it will be necessary to define and professionalize the staffing of the personnel team for the maintenance of UUVs and their associated systems. Submariners who currently make up submarine crews should be part of this team.
Assertiveness and anger
In the depths of the seas, most likely, submarine warfare will continue to be about the exchange of attacks and evasion from them. The success of submarine forces in the past has been built on tenacity and the will to keep attacking again and again until the target is hit or the opportunity to attack is irretrievably lost. Mush Morton once said to Dick O "Kane after a long chain of attacks:" Perseverance, Dick. Stay with the bastard until he sinks." Such aggressiveness was essential for the effective conduct of underwater warfare. A significant advantage is gained by one who knows how to use the chaos and disorder that came after the usual calm. Nerves are on edge, and sailors are all like humans, they will make decisions based on emotions, which can also be used for good.For the sake of a common goal, strength, audacity and courage are limited because it is generally recognized: the more order and discipline in joint actions, the better. However, such interdependence and joint effectiveness is suitable for surface forces, but does not work in the underwater world. Surface forces and air forces create "concentration" and "power", but this does not apply to submarines. Submarines act to achieve a common goal, in coordination with the rest of the naval forces, and submarines participate in the joint actions of the group, but it is best for them to achieve maximum effect - to act independently. Coordination and planning require time and constant communication, and this is exactly what submarine forces do not have, which sacrifice themselves in order to inflict damage on the enemy. The purpose of the submarine forces is to operate on the forward lines in such a way as to create and maintain in the mind of the enemy a sense of disorder, vulnerability, chaos and uncertainty.
What qualities of character a submariner should have is still being discussed, but perseverance and aggressiveness must be present. This does not mean that it is worth taking risks in times of peace that are possible in times of war. But it must be said that the creative application of perseverance, within the appropriate limits, in daily exercises or on sea voyages is acceptable and expected.
When Operation Desert Storm was being prepared, Pittsburgh commander Captain 2nd Rank Chip Griffiths was engaged in inter-pass repairs of his ship and did not plan to participate in battles. As one of the few vertical-launching TLAM submarines in the submarine fleet, Pittsburgh fell out of the picture. Griffiths, with the will and tenacity that characterizes most commanders in the history of submarine forces, gathered his wardroom and repair managers and asked: "What is everyone going to do to get this ship into right time Infecting the entire crew and repair crews with creative energy, he was able to complete repairs early, load missiles, and complete operational deployment before the operation began. This is tenacity. It is something like an unwillingness to fail, which is characteristic of most submariners.
The presence of exceptionally talented and well-trained personnel is a necessary, but not the only, condition for the success of submarine forces. Submarine forces must be equipped with the latest technology in order to effectively and fully contribute to national security. The next section discusses the advantages provided by weapons and equipment for successful use in the depths of the oceans.
Part 2. Military advantages of covert action from under the water
Submariners should be grateful to the depths of the water, which makes them invisible, for many military advantages. The use of these advantages inextricably links today's submariners with those of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. The Navy is deploying submarine power in a way that these advantages can be used to further the larger military and geostrategic goals of the military and the American people. Whether we're talking about submarine forces today, which are predominantly submarines, or forces in the future with a special focus on UUVs and other systems, submarine forces must always be able to take advantage of a set of unique military advantages. All of them are the result of secrecy. These advantages, in accordance with the "Concept of combat activities in the underwater environment" approved by the commander-in-chief, include:- the ability to penetrate into the depths;
- the ability to act undetected;
- the ability to penetrate enemy defenses;
- the ability to attack unexpectedly, independently choosing the time and place of the attack;
- the ability to survive without significant spending on defense;
- the ability to use the uncertainty and ambiguity of the underwater environment.
The ability to penetrate into the depths One of the most sought-after advantages, which is often achievable without submarines and vehicles. Underwater reach may simply mean the ability to install the system in an underwater environment, possibly without the need for any further maintenance and maintenance of its detection or concealment. Such a system may be a sensor installed underwater for the most efficient operation, or it may be search system, designed to collect something, or it is an oil production or oil exploration system, a fishing system, or even a dredge for dredging a shipping channel.
Some Tasks Requiring Reach seabed are best performed by submarines. For example, after the Challenger space shuttle crash off the coast of Florida, the NR-1 submarine and various remotely controlled vehicles (ROVs) were involved in the search and recovery of its parts. Stealth is not needed here, but the ability to deliver sensors with high resolution to the depth and carry out search and lifting operations directly at the bottom next to the search object. Another common example of underwater reach is to place a sonar system at a given depth, determined by the physics of acoustic propagation, to ensure high acoustic search efficiency. Similarly, surface ships deploy their GAS to maximum range by adjusting the sonar depth. The submarine uses its ability to dive to bring the onboard and towed sonar to the depths of the best acoustic search.
covert operations
Submarines allow you to perform tasks, the maximum effect of which is observed if they were not detected. These are intelligence gathering and surveillance tasks, which by their very nature are of particular importance if the enemy does not know that information about the presence and disposition of his forces has become known. If intelligence is discovered, then the enemy has many options for action that can reduce the value of the received data. These include changes to plans that have been compromised, reconsideration of modes of action or methods of use of force. Most importantly, if the adversary knows that certain information is available to the enemy, he can use this fact to spread disinformation or deliberate deception. Finally, the adversary can simply limit their activities and minimize losses. Operations can be undone or delayed, actions can be changed, and systems in non-secure modes can be restricted. These steps are costly and not always effective. The enemy loses the ability to selectively use intelligence protection tools when surveillance is carried out by submarine forces.
In addition to reconnaissance and surveillance, there are other operations, the success of which depends on the degree of secrecy. The build-up of submarine forces by moving more submarines into areas of potential conflict should go unnoticed. This allows the command to "deploy forces to the line of attack" covertly, preventing massive leakage of information about the location and nature of the operations being carried out. Another example of tasks where stealth is needed is tasks in support of special operations forces. Such forces, if detected, could be at great risk and their mission's success could be in doubt without support operations.
Penetration through enemy defenses
Movement under water significantly expands the ability of forces to penetrate enemy defenses and take up positions behind enemy lines. This interior position provides access to the most important targets, which are less protected than when they are outside the submarine's defensive perimeter. The position "inside the safe harbor" allows you to increase the potential for damage. The fact that the penetration is carried out covertly without a breakthrough provides several short-lived advantages:- more ammunition remains on board for use against the enemy immediately after taking a position;
- more objects are not ready to attack, therefore they are more vulnerable;
- more flexibility for the US political leadership, which does not need to take urgent action in advance and can expect greater and faster effect from submarines that have already penetrated enemy defenses.
Grieder later wrote: "... a submarine, as you know, is a deep-sea ship that needs spacious oceans and a large reserve of depth under the keel in order to operate. And ports are often dangerous, at best unpredictable, even if they are piloted by experienced pilots equipped with the most up-to-date information about the situation. It was complete madness for Wahoo to dive and enter the harbor of the enemy, even the location of which on the map was unknown to us. " When they were inside, and suddenly a destroyer was spotted, one sailor joked: "That's how they scouted the harbor! Let's get out of here." To which Morton replied, "God, no. We're going to go and blow him up. We'll take him by surprise. He's not waiting here for a submarine attack." As a result, Wahoo sank the Japanese destroyer Harusame and left the harbor. The next day, Wahoo sank all four ships of the convoy bound for Wiwak. Clay Blair, in a book about the history of the war of American submarines in the Pacific - "Quiet Victory" - writes that "this campaign, one of the most famous in the history of the war, became a new example for the entire submarine fleet - a kick in the ass."
In the Atlantic Ocean, in September of that year, the United Kingdom provided another example of covert penetration through defenses to very important targets. Three mini-submarines of the X-Craft type were delivered by submarines to Northern Norway to penetrate the fjord and attack the German battleship Tirpitz in September 1943 at the "holding point". The mini-submarines penetrated minefields and anti-submarine nets and avoided detection by anti-submarine forces of the Kaafjord fjord in Norway long enough to have time to place at least four two-ton charges under the Tirpitz hull, the explosion of which created a hole that resulted in the admission of 1400 tons of water into the hull, putting the battleship out of action for six months. X5 was lost with all her crew, while X6 and X7 were attacked and their crews were captured.
In a similar operation on the night of December 6, 1941, the Japanese prepared five midget submarines, which were towed to Hawaii to participate in the attack on Pearl Harbor. At least one of these submarines managed to penetrate the inner harbor and fire two 2,100-pound torpedoes at the battleships Oklahoma and West Virginia. Oklahoma is upside down. After transmitting the message "mission accomplished" on the night of December 7-8, the midget submarine was sunk by its crew in West Loch Bay and was not discovered until 1944, when the US Navy rescuers cleared the wreckage from the shipping channel, but even then the wreckage was safely disposed of to the mouth of the channel, where they would have been completely lost until they were rediscovered in 2009.
The examples cited underline that success depends on the courage of the sailors who are able to penetrate enemy defenses in order to gain access to the most important targets. In addition, the examples given testify to other characteristic features, such as surprise and survivability.
suddenness
Surprise - the ability to attack the enemy at his own choice, at his own choice of time and place, which provides a number of tremendous advantages, each of which enhances the effect of the attack. First, the underwater attacker can choose the attack conditions that best suit the circumstances. The attack may be performed immediately or may be delayed for various reasons.During the Falklands Campaign, the Conqueror maneuvered covertly near the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano all day, waiting for permission from the British headquarters to attack. In contrast, during the same campaign, when a detected target was classified as a submarine, the attack was carried out immediately because the contact with the submarine is so uncertain and fleeting that time cannot be wasted. None of these urgent attacks against the suspected U-boats were successful. The attack can be delayed by the submarine for maneuver to get into the optimal position to inflict maximum damage on the enemy and minimize the chance of a counterattack.
The second advantage of a surprise attack is that attacks can be launched at a time when the target is not fully ready, which provides a greater chance of dealing maximum damage. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was timed to coincide with a period of the lowest operational readiness of the US Navy, which increased the likelihood of causing more damage to the object of attack with less military losses for the attackers.
A third advantage of surprise is that it creates chaos, an effect that can lead to second-order damage such as collisions, reducing the effectiveness of defenses. It is difficult to expect orderly and systematic responses when the threat of a continuation of the attack remains, and thus the effectiveness of the counterattack is reduced. Surprise is one of the best tools of submarine warfare.
Vitality
The submerged position allows submarines to move undetected, maintaining the uncertainty of being in vast areas and significantly complicating the task of the enemy who seeks to detect them. The submerged position creates the effect of "protecting" submarines from attack without the need for any significant degree of defensive weapons. Which allows you to place more offensive weapons on board. In addition, the depth makes it much more difficult to assess the combat damage caused by the enemy. For example, an attack can be made on a suspected submarine and, when no submarine is later found, the attack is considered successful. An undamaged, but still vulnerable to attack, boat can get away, and the fact that its location and condition is unknown will protect it from a subsequent attack.Our SSBNs rely on depth protection and on their survivability, which allows them to provide a "guaranteed response" even after the first enemy strike. Survivability is the combined result of stealth and the use of vast expanses of ocean to make search forces as difficult as possible.
In addition to stealth and constant change of position, allowing the enemy to search the entire ocean area, submarine forces use defense systems, take countermeasures to reduce the likelihood of damage from an enemy attack. Impact protection, repair and restoration work, redundant mechanisms and a solid design make the submarine more tenacious.
The uncertainty of what is happening
The last benefit of depth, while not widely recognized, is in many ways one of the most important benefits. The fact that the ocean is an opaque medium makes it difficult to understand what is happening underwater; this obvious fact has far-reaching consequences that distinguish the aquatic environment from the air, or even from what happens on the surface of the sea. In the air and on the surface with the naked eye, a person is able to detect distant targets, which means that even inexperienced opponents can control these spaces. Not only are targets visible, they can be quickly identified and tracked with sufficient accuracy to make the right decisions. The contrast with the underwater environment is simply depressing.Under water, only those who can skillfully use the most high-tech, specialized and expensive devices can detect the enemy. Even if detected, they often have vague, fuzzy data that does not allow classification of the target, only giving a vague idea of \u200b\u200bits direction or location, which does not allow for immediate action.
Even when it is clear that "something" has happened or is happening, it is not easy to say exactly what, because the cause is hidden in the depths. This complexity and ambiguity has a significant impact on those who depend on the underwater environment. It complicates the work of the fishermen, who must decide where to cast their nets. The depth hides what happened to the Scorpion submarine and Air France Airbus. It allows drug smugglers to sink cargo in the full confidence that they will drown with it and no evidence of their guilt will be found. The uncertainty of the underwater environment led to a significant consumption of anti-submarine munitions used by the British Armed Forces against unidentified underwater targets during the Falklands War.
On March 26, 2010, a midget North Korean submarine torpedoed the South Korean frigate Cheonan in the Yellow Sea, which broke in two and sank, taking 46 sailors into the abyss. North Korea denied the attack. During the salvage efforts, which lasted several weeks, a ship and the tail section of a torpedo of the type used by North Korea were located and raised to the surface. A multinational panel of technical experts processed all available information and provided an official report, concluding with certainty that a North Korean torpedo attack was the cause of the sinking of the frigate. Due to the uncertainty of the underwater environment, despite all the technical analysis data and weeks of work by dozens of experts, funds mass media in the United States and other countries still do not claim the attack.
The uncertainty of what is happening can be used to create the impression that the submarine forces are not where they really are, to present disasters as the result of accidents or natural factors, rather than hostile actions, in order to distract, disrupt or delay the actions of the enemy. Each of these actions tends to disperse or divert the attention of the enemy, reducing the effectiveness of his actions and causing alarm.
Scapa Flow, October 1939
The first months of the war provide us with an example illustrating all the advantages of submarine action applied within the framework of one operation, which is sometimes called the most famous German U-boat attack.In order to reaffirm the belief that Germany could get the better of the Royal Navy and loosen the British blockade, Karl Doenitz and his staff devised a daring plan of attack, involving the penetration of a German submarine into the main port of the British fleet of Scapa Flow and attacking any targets that might be on raid. (During World War I, two German U-boats were lost attempting such an operation.) Careful staff and reconnaissance work revealed potential weak spots in the defenses: fifty-foot-wide gaps between the guardhouse and the underwater nets guarding all approaches to the anchorages. The favorable phase of the moon and the tidal cycle created a narrow "window" on the night of 13/14 October.
Günther Prien, a former merchant marine and Dönitz's best commander, was selected for the task and called to headquarters to study the plan over Saturday and Sunday and tell Dönitz if he could do it. When the commander confirmed the possibility of implementation, the plan was called "Operation P". Having updated the codes of the cipher machine, in complete secrecy from anyone not involved in the operation, U-47 plunged into Keele on October 8, heading for the northern tip of Scotland. U-47 crossed the North Sea on the surface at night, resting on the bottom during the day (undetected operations). After an unnoticed crossing, U-47 surfaced on the night of 13 October at 2331 with the aim of entering the Kirk Canal. After one failed attempt Prin nevertheless penetrated the gap in the protective barrier of the firewall and entered Scapa Flow (penetration through the defense) unnoticed.
Prien located the battleship Royal Oak at anchor with the tender Pegasus and attacked each ship with two torpedoes from a distance of 3500 meters. The attack was carried out quite suddenly on an unprotected target (surprise attack). One torpedo failed, two missed, and one exploded in the bow of the Oak Royal. The crew of the battleship and the admiral could not even think that the cause of the explosion was a torpedo attack, and that they were all under threat. No order was given to turn on the GAS or to pressurize the compartments of the ship (ambiguity and uncertainty). Prien took advantage of this uncertainty and, seeing no sign of detection, used the reload time of the torpedo tubes to get into position to make another attack. He fired three torpedoes from the bow torpedo tubes at Oak Royal. All three torpedoes hit the battleship's starboard side, causing it to capsize 13 minutes later, killing more than 800 of the 1,200 crew on board. Undetected due to chaos, U-47 left Scapa Flow at 0215 hours and headed back to Wilhelmshaven, where glory awaited the heroes.
Clay Blair in Hitler's Submarine War wrote that "the feat at Scapa Flow certainly attracted Hitler's attention and firmly planted in his mind and in all German minds the fact that one cheap submarine with a crew of only forty-four people could sink a huge a battleship with a crew of 1,200. From this it was not difficult to deduce what a massacre the huge fleet of submarines could arrange for the lightly armed vessels of the British merchant marine. Thus, the idea that Germany could defeat Britain at sea with the help of submarines received a "green light ". The prolonged "echo" of Scapa Flow was undoubtedly into the hands of the submarine forces.
Depth provides a wide range of military advantages that can be exploited by submarine forces. These advantages can be realized in separate operations, as in the example of Wahoo's penetration of Wiwak Harbor, or they can be combined with the activities of other forces and arms to achieve maximum success, as was the case with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Failure to properly integrate with the actions of other forces can reduce the effectiveness of underwater operations. On October 8, the day Prien left the base, the British fleet left Scapa Flow to intercept the heavy cruiser Gneisenau, which had been spotted in the North Sea, heading for a raid in the Atlantic. Gneisenau did not break through and returned to Kiel, and the fleet of the mother country was for a short time anchored off the coast of Scotland in Loch Ives. The Luftwaffe, unaware of Prien's mission, made a low reconnaissance of Scapa Flow on 12 October two days before the arrival of U-47, and this was seen by the British as a prelude to the bombing. As a result, most of the Royal Navy remained in Scotland, with only the flagship Royal Oak returning to Scapa Flow. If this planning error had not occurred, Scapa Flow would most likely have been crowded with ships (at least four battleships and aircraft carriers) and the damage done by Prien could have been even worse.
Joint Strategy
In general, the role of our submarine forces is to use depth to gain advantages over the enemy. These advantages can be used in the common interest of the active forces to achieve any specific operational and strategic goals.Our joint maritime strategy emphasizes six "key conditions" that the US Navy must work together to deliver: forward presence, maritime security, maritime control, force projection, deterrence, and humanitarian aid/disaster response. While the Joint Maritime Strategy is a relatively new idea, these key messages are well known and are for the most part the same as they were in the late 1970s when the ideas of "outcome-based" operations were first developed. Submarine forces make a valuable contribution to each of these key provisions of the military naval forces.
Forward Presence
Refers to the continued presence of U.S. naval forces in outlying operational areas, the speed with which they can be deployed in emergencies. Forward presence allows participation in exercises and operations with US allies, which contributes to US interests in the regions. If the US Navy does not ensure the continued presence of significant contingents of our troops on the front lines, then the vast distances that must be covered if necessary will delay the arrival of our troops. This delay can be easily exploited by a potential adversary, so the need for a forward presence becomes an important element in guaranteeing our security. As will be discussed below, submarine forces in particular use forward presence to secure key positions, carry out missions undetected and for the purpose of intimidation.Maritime security
These are the steps needed to ensure the day-to-day security of the ongoing maritime trade of the US and its allies on a day-to-day basis. Security is the result of the collective efforts of navies, intelligence organizations, law enforcement, allies and the government. Protection against terrorism and against the use of maritime vessels used in the support system of terrorism are key elements of maritime security, anti-drug operations and other areas of law enforcement assistance. The submarine force provides a significant contribution to intelligence and surveillance that assists the core activities of other US government maritime security forces, our allies and friends."Marine Control"
The ability of one state to use the sea for its own purposes, while limiting the ability of opponents to do the same. "Sea restriction" is a subspecies of sea control, when the ability of the enemy to use the sea is usually limited, but it is not possible to fully use the sea itself. "Maritime dominance" is a broader term than maritime control and refers to strong and sustained control of the sea over large areas. "Naval dominance" is maritime control over a specific geographical area of the sea for a specified period of time. Submarine forces are the main in ensuring the "Naval limit", but since the submarine forces themselves have limited capabilities, to fully ensure such a limit, as a rule, it is understood that the General Naval Forces provide the opportunity to further maintain and develop a positive effect of "Sea Restraint".Force projection
Refers to the use of maritime forces to provide support ashore, including offensive operations (such as participating in an air-missile strike) or amphibious operations. Submarine forces carry on board about a third of the Navy's strike missiles, but their strike power is limited compared to aviation or the naval expeditionary force, the possibility of application. The real significance of an underwater strike lies in its surprise from positions that are optimal for certain priority tasks. This "little or no notice" context greatly increases the value of the applied military force and can play a role in achieving the objectives of the general forces, providing them with subsequent access to the theater of operations.containment
Deterrence includes more than just nuclear deterrence, which is provided in the Navy exclusively by ballistic missile submarines. Deterrence operates day after day, forcing other states not to take actions contrary to US interests due to a clear threat. The response goes far beyond the use of military force. Submarine forces greatly increase the threat of the use of force by the United States, so the US Navy does not have to be visible to keep the enemy at gunpoint. This creates a deterrent effect, even if there is no open show of force. Below, we note that combat readiness is a key element of effective deterrence.Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR)
Usually conjures up images of helicopters assisting earthquake victims and rescuing sailors in distress. Indeed, this is the most significant and well-known part of the naval forces' efforts in HADR. The U.S. Submarine Force's HADR contribution is much narrower, highly specialized, but sufficient when a submarine rescue or underwater search is needed. The US Submarine Force is doing its share of the image of the United States as a "global force for good" by providing specialized rescue submarines and underwater search capabilities. Other countries do not need to develop their own capabilities in this direction, because they can rely on us in case of need. The international cooperation The practice we have in working with other countries to be prepared for potential underwater emergencies also serves as a basis for other areas of cooperation.I was advised to tell about the conditions of service on diesel submarines by my doctor colleague, who wrote to me in Odnoklassniki:
“I read about Ulysses Bay. In 1977, he had an internship there from the Naval Department for three weeks, lived in the medical unit, one day he sailed in a submarine (diesel) with a dive. The impressions are terrible, it is impossible to breathe, the head is spinning, the pillows are wrapped in newspapers, these are officers, the privates generally have hellish conditions. They told how one submarine sailed for 15 months in the oceans, several suicides. With billions of dollars spent on weapons, they saved on amenities for people "
Such an impression was made on the young man by a stay of only one day on a submarine that he writes about it with a shudder many years later. And most importantly, that does not exaggerate at all. It was all the same in those years. But before moving on to the story of modern submarines, where conditions are not at all like that, let's go back to the time the submarine appeared. The first people who dived on the antediluvian "hidden ships" risked much more than the sailors of the 60s and 70s of the twentieth century. The development of submarines continued for many years, but even at the beginning of the last century, during the First World War, when submarines proved to be a formidable weapon at sea, they were not a little more perfect than the first submarines, there were many equipment failures, and they swam shallow .
It is believed that Germany had the most advanced submarines during World War II. What they were like can be seen in the famous film "Submarine", filmed by the Germans in 1981. There you can see the life of the crew and their actions in extreme situations, when in order for the boat to go deeper faster, the crew ran headlong from stern to bow. You can see where the provisions were stored, and how everyone ate - both officers and sailors. If my impressionable colleague saw this, I wonder what he would write? Apparently, he advised Hitler, instead of 1000 submarines with such living conditions, to release half as many from the stocks, but with cabins for all crew members, air conditioners, etc. All this can be seen in the American film "Operation Petticoat" about an American submarine in the warm waters of the Pacific Ocean during World War II. Everything is there - clean linen, separate cabins, air conditioners, showers, and delicious food. There is only one thing missing - the sunken ships of the enemy. But the Germans during the war, in the absence of basic amenities, sank a huge number of allied ships, and this despite all the power of the combined fleets of the United States and England. Because the main thing on a boat is not living conditions, but the ability to perform the tasks assigned to the crew, first of all, to sink enemy ships, and on modern boats to hit military targets on enemy territory with ballistic and cruise missiles.
But let's get back to where the conversation began - to the living conditions on the submarines of those years when I served - in the early 70s. For three years of service, I constantly wore leather gloves, taking them off only during lunch, satisfaction of physiological needs and sleep. Ask why? On diesel, or rather, diesel-electric submarines, which it would be appropriate to call "diving", several diesel engines provide all the needs of the ship for running and generating electricity. Has anyone seen a diesel without streaks? Me not. Even Japanese and German diesel cars from the 80s and 90s have oil leaks on the engine and a specific smell of diesel fuel. But there the engine power is about 100-150 hp, and the submarine has 2-3 diesel engines of 1500-2000 hp each. And usually all diesels have streaks of both fuel and oil. The minders wipe it with a rag, holding it in their hands, from this their hands become oily. There is a big shortage of fresh water on boats, there is nothing to wash your hands with. Clean rags are also missing. Moreover, if a sailor needs to go to the toilet for a big or small need, he has no time to wash his hands. So it turns out that all the racks of inter-compartment doors, all kinds of handrails, etc. also oily, and even I, a doctor who has nothing to do with engines, will have my hands coated with a thin layer of oil or fuel. To prevent this, my hands were gloved. In addition, all my everyday clothes eventually acquired the characteristic smell of machine oil. So a submariner could also be identified by smell.
The submarine on which I had a chance to serve left the slipway in the early 50s. Approximately such a period of operation, about 15 years, had most of the submarines based in the Maly Uliss Bay near Vladivostok. Only boats of the 641 project were younger, but the living conditions in them were not much different. Our boat served in the Northern Fleet for many years, then was relocated to Kamchatka by the Northern Sea Route, and then came to Vladivostok for major repairs. It was in the final stage of repair that I was sent to serve her. During the repair, an air conditioner was installed in the second compartment, but I would not say that it helped a lot in hot weather in a submerged position.
As I mentioned, on all ships Soviet fleet the main attention was paid to the placement of weapons and other devices that help to successfully carry out a combat order. Therefore, sleeping places were not provided for the entire crew, only 2/3. Why? It’s just that 1/3 of the crew at sea kept a watch, and then went to rest on a still warm bunk after the next watchman got up from it. I, as the head of the medical service, had a place on my own submarine of project 611, the so-called large ocean submarine, but three officers, commanders of the navigational, torpedo and traffic groups, had to sleep where they could find a place on the boat. Separate cabins were only for the boat commander, senior assistant, commander of the warhead-5 and the political officer shared his cabin with the assistant boat commander. The commanders of BC-1 (navigator), BC-3 (torpedo pilot), BC-4 RTS (communications and acoustics) slept with me in the same cabin. But on diesel submarines of project 613, the so-called medium ones, the doctor slept in the wardroom, where he received patients and, if necessary, set up an operating room. On cruise missile boats 619 and 651 projects, the doctor had a separate cabin and a medical compartment.
But having a bunk didn't guarantee a good night's sleep. Why, I will try to explain. First, the bunk is quite narrow, like everything in a submarine. Especially if you sleep in it without undressing, which is usually done in winter conditions. Secondly, during the day the submarine goes underwater, and at night it emerges to charge the batteries. And on the sea there are not so often no waves, and sometimes they are very large. So there is both pitching and side pitching, especially since the cigar-shaped hull of a submarine is very rolled on a side wave. And in order not to fall from the second shelf in the cabin, I rested my left shoulder against the ventilation valve machine, and on the other side there was a bulkhead of the cabin, behind which there was a corridor of the second compartment. Thirdly, during the charging of the batteries, hydrogen is released, and the boat is actively ventilated, especially the second and fourth compartments, where these batteries are located in the hold. And in winter, by the end of charging in the compartments of the boat, the temperature is quite winter, a little above zero degrees. It was impossible to sleep comfortably in such conditions, so I most I spent my nights on the bridge, watching the waves roll on the hull of the boat. But I described all this in the story "Storm", so I will not repeat myself.
I tried to compensate for the lack of sleep at night with daytime sleep, preferring for this a free bunk in the sixth compartment, between the bulkhead and the peacefully humming electric motor. It was not very noisy there, and there was no pitching at depth in the underwater position.
In general, on a diesel submarine, bunks were attached wherever possible. And above the torpedoes lying on the racks, and above the various engines, and between them. And some sailors, throwing a mattress between the torpedoes, managed to sleep there too. In the mornings, making rounds in a submarine, I saw sailors sleeping in the most unusual places and unusual poses.
Night rest and sleep is very important for maintaining the health of sailors, so the so-called “admiral hour” is very popular in the navy, especially at a time when the boat is not at sea, but is at the pier. Then, after dinner, the entire crew, except for those on duty, goes to the barracks and prefers to sleep in their bunks for almost two hours. Here in the barracks these bunks are all personal, except for officers and midshipmen who sleep on the bunks of sailors on duty.
Of course, the most difficult conditions were during trips to the sea to practice combat training tasks in the winter. This is both storms and cold weather over the sea. And large temperature differences inside the hull of the boat. That is the heat when the boat is under water for a long time, and even the air regeneration plates are connected, which themselves emit heat. At this time, I want to undress from warm clothes, mostly tights, which the sailors wore instead of underpants. But the boat surfaced, began to ventilate and the temperature in the compartments dropped. It won't be long before colds. But I want to say that only physically healthy people were taken to the submarine, so there were no particularly serious cases of colds in my practice on the boat. But there were failures in conducting medical examinations in the draft boards, and more than once. The most memorable case of a call to service in the submarine fleet of a young man with the absence of 11 teeth in the oral cavity, while, according to the order in force at that time, a person in the absence of 6 teeth could no longer get into the submarine. This sailor joked: “Others have meat stuck between their teeth, but I have bones from compote.” I prepared the documents, and the guy was written off to the shore.
The coldest compartments in winter were the first and last, the seventh. These compartments were called torpedo compartments, and the first compartment was the largest in terms of cubic capacity. Along the sides on the racks lay long cigars 533 mm in diameter - torpedoes. Above them hung the bunks of the personnel. There were no mechanisms in this compartment, only a few personnel. It was about the same in the seventh compartment, only there were no spare torpedoes on the racks, they rested in the pipes of the 4 stern torpedo tubes. But there were many beds for personnel. So there was nothing to heat the interior of the compartment.
The second compartment was called the battery compartment, because batteries were located in the hold of the compartment, which ensured the progress of the boat in a submerged position. But on the deck of the compartment there was an officer's wardroom, cabins for officers and a cabin for foremen and midshipmen. The commander of this compartment was considered the head of the medical service of the submarine, for whom the wardroom was a workplace. It was in it that the operating room unfolded, so not ordinary, but shadowless lamps hung over the table. In the submerged position, the compartment was warm, but when the batteries were being charged, it became cold in it due to increased ventilation. This compartment had a shower room with a washbasin.
But the sixth compartment was the warmest on our boat, where 3 electric motors were installed, which powered the submarine in a submerged position, and when moored in a surface position, since the diesels had no reverse gear. There were not very many personnel in this compartment, there were numerous beds, on one of which I liked to sleep. There was also a latrine in this compartment, (Note - a toilet on ships), but we will talk about toilets later.
But the fifth compartment, although it was very warm, was also the noisiest and most gassed. Three diesel engines with a capacity of 2000 hp. forces each rattled very strongly, during operation, over time, gaps appeared between the gaskets of the oil rings, and oil leaks and exhaust gases were always present in this compartment. All mechanisms, valves, pipelines, etc. were the most oily to the touch in it.
In the fourth compartment in the hold there were batteries, and on the deck there were radio operator and hydroacoustic cabins, a galley (Note - a kitchen on all ships), a cabin for the commander of the BCH-5, foremen and personnel quarters. Like the second compartment, it was heavily ventilated while the batteries were being charged, with all the ensuing consequences.
The main for the entire submarine is the third, or central compartment. All the control levers of the submarine are concentrated here, therefore, during a combat alarm, many officers, midshipmen, foremen and sailors find themselves in it. They are located on three levels - in the conning tower, on the deck and in the hold. In the surface position, air flows through this compartment through all compartments through the open top-cutting hatch. Once I happened to sail on a submarine of radar surveillance, which had damage to its strong hull and could not dive. There was a storm for almost a week, and a huge amount of outboard water got into the third compartment through the top-handling hatch, which the submarine's pumps barely had time to pump out.
Meals during trips to the sea are organized according to the standards of marine autonomous rations at the rate of 4.5 rubles per day per person. It also includes some delicacies, such as tongues, sausages, smoked sausages, all kinds of compotes, and always a 15 gram chocolate bar. At sea, officers are supposed to drink 80 grams of dry wine, and sailors and foremen 180 grams of juice. Three meals a day plus evening tea at 22:00. The full autonomy of our submarine was 90 days, but usually the boats did not go out for such a period. More often it was 60 days. Can you imagine how much space is needed to load provisions for 60 days for 70 crew members on a boat? There were a couple of pantries, plus one large refrigerator in the hold, where some of the most scarce products were loaded. And many boxes and boxes with provisions were stored under the bunks in the compartments. But such as shown in the German film "Submarine", where meat carcasses were having fun at the ceiling of the compartments, I have not seen on our boats. In each compartment there was a metal box with an emergency food supply, which must be completed in accordance with the order of the Ministry of Defense. But usually some products were not reported to it, as negligent sailors pulled chocolate and some other delicacies out of it, although the box was locked with a key.
Unlike surface ships, where eating in stormy weather is akin to a small feat, submariners could always dive for this time and eat without pitching, without catching their plates spreading on the table. So we usually had a liquid first course, which the surfacers were deprived of in stormy weather. But the preparation of the same liquid dishes in the galley of a boat sailing on the surface in a storm presented certain difficulties. One day our main cook (note - the cook on the ships) was on vacation, and his assistant was cooking. He did not tolerate the pitching very well and periodically vomited. To collect vomit, he put a small pot, and next to it was a huge cauldron with the first course prepared for the entire crew. In such cases, I was worried that he would not mix up the containers. But nothing happened.
Water supply on diesel submarines was very scarce. In the winter it didn't work that way, but in the summer it did. It was especially difficult during the "autonomy" (Note - military service in open ocean, which usually lasted for two months) in the hot season, and even in the warm waters of the Kurasivo Current. The submarine was under water all day long, the temperature in the compartments reached 40, and sometimes 45 degrees, it was very difficult to restore the water-salt balance, since the juices taken by the crew did not quench their thirst. They are especially sweet, so by the end of the trip we did not have a single can of tomato juice left, which, under normal conditions, was not very drunk. All two months of the trip, with intense sweating, and in the presence of oily secretions from diesel engines, pustular diseases on the skin were saved, and then partially, by daily rubbing alcohol on exposed parts of the body. To prevent alcohol from being taken internally, all this was done under my control, and the fleece was collected in biks, and then burned on the upper superstructure.
All the water that the crew uses, goes to cooking and washing their faces, is in a special tank. When our boat was being repaired, this tank was also partially repaired. Therefore, before filling it with drinking water, it had to be disinfected with bleach. Water was pumped into the tank, a bleach solution was placed, a certain exposure was maintained, and then all the water from the tank was squeezed into the sea with compressed air. Water was pumped in again, and squeezed out again. It was necessary to ensure that the water did not smell of bleach, but we were in a hurry to go to sea trials, and the commander decided that a small amount of bleach in the water would not harm the body, but the smell of bleach was clearly felt in tea or coffee for some period, until the tank was not filled with a new portion drinking water.
A separate story requires the satisfaction of the physiological needs of a person, i.e. big and small needs. For these purposes, our submarine with 70 crew members had two latrines - in the third compartment, i.e. in the central post, and in the sixth. As a rule, they were closed during short-term exits of the submarine. Can you imagine what the smell will be in the post where the submarine is controlled if the latrine is visited by 30-40 people of the crew in great need? Therefore, for these purposes, there was a latrine of the shooting gallery "toilet" in the fencing of the conning tower. (Note - the conning tower is an element of a strong hull, of a very limited volume. Everything that we call the cabin in the photographs above the hull of the boat is a fence and the conning tower, and retractable devices, and sometimes missile silos. There is also a bridge, and on diesel boats and latrine, which is a partition with a hole at the bottom.When the boat is immersed, all the "good" is washed off by sea water).
But the use of latrines inside the boat required some skills. The toilet bowl itself is no different from that in our apartments, but rather, in train cars. Flushing is carried out as usual. Then the “good” accumulated over some time is thrown out from a special container with compressed air. Sometimes excess pressure remains in this container, and when an inept sailor washes away his “good”, it flies not into the container, but into his physiognomy. Can you imagine the look of such an "asshole"? To prevent this, there is a special valve that must be pressed before flushing.
As you can see, dear readers, there was no smell of comfort on submarines during the First and Second World Wars. And while the submarines have not received nuclear reactors and did not turn from "diving" into real submarines, it was. True, it must be said in fairness that there was enough comfort on American boats during the Second World War. Their boats, with the same amount of weapons, had about twice the displacement, and place optional equipment they weren't a problem. The first nuclear-powered ships largely repeated the design of their diesel counterparts, with the same minimum amenities for the crew. But with the increase in the displacement of submarines, it became possible to create amenities for personnel, such as separate beds, psychological relief rooms, and a small gym. And on the submarine 945 of the Akula type according to our qualification or the Typhoon according to NATO qualification, the largest in the world, there is even a small sauna with a small pool. AND fresh water, which is obtained on the submarine itself with the help of distillers, is enough for all kinds of needs, including for washing the entire crew. Diesel fuel, oil on the handrails are long gone. So not only the combat capabilities of modern submarines have grown significantly, but also the living conditions of crews who spend a very long time at sea, with a huge responsibility to protect the borders of their country, have improved. Regardless of which - Russia, the USA, France, England, China, India - because only these countries are armed with nuclear submarines.
