26th reserve army combat path. What is not normal here

26th Army of the 1st Formation formed in July 1940 in the Kiev Special Bom Military District.
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, having in its composition the 8th rifle and 8th mechanized corps, the 8th fortified area, as well as artillery, engineering and other units, was included in the Southwestern Front of the 1st formation, participating -la in the border battle, fought heavy defensive battles in the Vinnitsa direction, east of Proskurov.
Then its troops were transferred to other armies of the front, and the field administration united the 6th and 64th rifle corps, 116th, 196th and 227th rifle divisions focused south of Kiev.
During the Kiev strategic defensive operation (July 7 - September 26, 1941), army troops launched several counterattacks on the German 1st Panzer Group and delayed its advance south of Kiev.
At the end of August 1941, the army troops were withdrawn to the left bank of the Dnieper, where they fought defensive battles in the area south of Kiev - Zolotonosha. From mid-September, as part of the Kiev group of troops of the front, she fought in the environment.
On September 25, 1941, the field administration of the army was disbanded, and its troops that had left the encirclement were transferred to the staffing of formations and units of the South Western Front.
Army Commander - Lieutenant General Kostenko F. Ya. (July 1940 - September 1941)
Member of the Military Council of the Army - Brigadier Commissar Kolesnikov D. E. (March - September 1941)
Chief of Staff of the Army - Colonel Varennikov I. S. (1940 - September-September 1941)

26th Army of the 2nd Formation formed on October 10, 1941 on the basis of the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of October 9, 1941 in the Moscow Military District on the basis of the 1st Guards rifle corps with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The army included the 6th Guards Rifle and 41st Cavalry Divisions, the 5th Airborne Corps, the 4th Tank Brigade and several different units.
Not having completed the formation, the army entered into heavy defensive battles with the 2nd Panzer Army of the enemy, advancing in the Oryol-Tula direction. During fierce battles in the Mtsensk region, her troops suffered heavy losses.
On October 25, 1941, the field administration of the army was disbanded, and the troops were transferred to the 50th Army of the Bryansk Front of the 1st Formation.
Army Commander - Lieutenant General Kurkin A. V. (October 1941)
Army Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General Sokolov G. G. (October 1941)

26th Army of the 3rd Formation It was formed on October 30, 1941 on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of October 24, 1941 in the Volga Military District with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. By the beginning of December, it included the 264th, 327th, 329th, 344th rifle, 73rd and 74th cavalry divisions, 53rd Rifle Brigade and 704th Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, artillery and other units.
December 18, 1941 the army was included in the Volkhov Front 1st formation.
On December 25, the army was transformed into the 2nd shock army of the same front.
Army Commander - Lieutenant General Sokolov G. G. (October - December 1941)
Member of the Military Council of the Army - Brigadier Commissar Mikhailov A.I. (October - December 1941)
Chief of Staff of the Army - Major General V. A. Vizzhilin (October - December 1941)

26th Army of the 4th Formation formed 4 April 1942 on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of March 27, 1942 as part of the Karelian Front on the basis of its Kem operational group. It included the 23rd Guards Division, 27th, 54th, 152,186th and 263rd Rifle Divisions, the 67th and 80th Marine Rifle Brigades, artillery and other units.
In April 1942 - August 1944, the army troops firmly held the defense lines in the Kestenga, Ukhta and Rebol directions. After the defeat of the Finnish troops in the Vyborg (June 10-20, 1944) and Svir-Petrozavodsk (June 21 - August 8, 1944) offensive operations, the army troops went out at the end of September in the Kestenga and Ukhta directions to the Soviet - Finnish border.
Subsequently, until the completion of the troops of the Karelian Front and the forces of the Northern Fleet of the Petsamo-Kirkenes strategic operation (October 7-29, 1944), the army troops defended the state border of the USSR with Finland at the turn east of Kemijärvi - Ehrinavar .
On November 15, 1944, the army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
On January 28, 1945, its field administration was transferred to the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The army included the 30th and 133rd rifle and 18th tank corps, other parts.
At the end of January - the first half of February 1945, army troops took part in the hostilities at the final stage of the Budapest strategic operation (October 29, 1944 - February 13, 1945), defeated a strong enemy grouping that broke through to Danube south of Budapest. In March, during the Balaton defensive operation (March 6-15), the army troops, in cooperation with the troops of the 4th Guards, 27th and 57th armies, inflicted heavy damage on the advancing enemy grouping and stopped its advance in the south east of Lake Balaton.
In March - April 1945, army troops took part in the Vienna strategic operation (March 16 - April 15), during which they defeated formations of the 6th tank army enemy SS. Then, developing the offensive in the direction of Veszprem, Szombathely (Szombathely), army formations reliably ensured the actions of the main grouping of the 3rd Ukrainian Front from the south against the army of the Balck group, and contributed to the capture of Vienna (April 13).
The army was disbanded in August 1945.
Army commanders: Major General Nikishin N. N. (March 1942 - May 1943); Major General, from August 1943 - Lieutenant General Skvirsky L. S. (May 1943 - January 1945 G.); Lieutenant General Hagen N. A. (January 1945 - until the end of the war).
Members of the Military Council of the Army: Divisional Commissar Batrakov P.K. (March - November 1942); Brigadier Commissar, from September 1943 - Major General Druzhinin V.I. (November 1942 - until the end of the war).

Chiefs of Staff of the Army: Colonel Malitsky M. I. (March - August 1942); Major General Kozlov G.K. (August 1942 - May 1943); Colonel I. V. Zhashkov (May 1943 - June 1944); Major General Golovinchin M. A. (June 1944 - March 1945); Major General Fomin B. A. (March 1945 - until the end of the war).

Our country is 1941. Mysterious not only for us, but also for the soldiers who have passed through this year. A paradoxical year. Heroism of the defenders Brest Fortress, border guards, pilots who made several air rams already on the first day of the war - contrast sharply with the surrender of the masses of the Red Army. What is the problem?

The contrasts of 1941 give rise to a variety of interpretations of what happened. Some say that Stalinist repressions deprived the army of normal command staff. Others - that the Soviet people did not want to defend the hated by them social order. Still others - about the insurmountable superiority of the Germans in the ability to lead fighting. There are many judgments. And there is a well-known phrase of Marshal Konev, who did not begin to describe the initial period of the war: “I don’t want to lie, but they won’t let me write the truth anyway.”

It is clear that few could write something at least close to the truth. A private, a major, a colonel, and even a combatant general do not see much. The picture as a whole is visible only from high headquarters. From the headquarters of the fronts, from Moscow. But again, we know that the headquarters of the fronts had poor control over the situation, and, accordingly, incomplete information was received in Moscow.

Thus, neither Konev, nor Zhukov, nor even Stalin could tell the truth if he managed to write his memoirs. Even they did not have enough information.

But the truth can be CALCULATED by the inquisitive mind of the researcher who asks the right questions. Unfortunately, few people try to ask the right questions, and the majority simply do not know how to put the right questions. Once Sergei Ivanovich Vavilov defined the experiment as follows: "An experiment is a question clearly posed to nature, to which a completely unambiguous answer is expected: yes or no." A well-posed question always requires a YES or NO answer. Let's try to approach the problem of 1941 with questions in this form.

Was the German army irresistibly stronger than the Red Army?

The whole logic of general ideas pushes for the answer - it was. The Germans had the experience of several successful military campaigns in Europe. The Germans had an impeccably debugged mechanism for the interaction of military branches. In particular, interaction with ground forces was specially practiced for 2.5 years in Spain by the Condor Legion. Richthofen, who had this experience not yet fully appreciated in the literature for a wide range of readers, commanded German aviation in the strip of our Southwestern Front in the summer of 1941.

But there is one BUT. It turns out that exactly those armies against which the enemy delivered blows with obviously superior forces, on which the full power of the blow fell, were precisely those that were not defeated. Moreover, they fought successfully for a long time, creating problems for the German offensive. This is the answer to the question.

Let's draw a diagram. On the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, the German offensive was parried by three fronts: Northwestern, Western and Southwestern. Starting from the Baltic coast, our armies were deployed in the following sequence (from north to south): the 8th and 11th armies of the North-Western Front. Further, the 3rd, 10th, 4th armies of the Western Front, the 5th, 6th, 26th and 12th armies of the Southwestern Front. Behind the back of the armies of the Western Front covering the border in the Minsk fortified area (UR) was the 13th Army of the Western Front.

On June 22, the enemy's tank wedges hit the 8th and 11th armies, the 4th army and the 5th army. Let's see what happened to them.

In the most difficult situation was the 8th Army, which had to retreat through the hostile Baltic. However, her connections in July 1941 are found in Estonia. Retreat, take up defensive positions, retreat again. The Germans beat this army, but do not crush it in the very first days. Regarding the mass capture of the Red Army troops in the Baltic direction, nothing slips in the memoirs of the enemy. And Liepaja, which was held for several days by the fighters of the 8th Army and the Red Navy, could well claim the title of a hero city.

11th army. On the first day of the war, even before all the orders for a counterattack, its 11th mechanized corps, almost the weakest in composition in the entire Red Army, armed with weak T-26s, attacked the advancing Germans, knocking them out of the border. In the attacks of the next two or three days, he loses almost all of his . But it was precisely the counterattacks of the tanks of the 11th mechanized corps of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front that were noted in the history of the war as the battle near Grodno. Subsequently, the 11th Army retreats, trying to join the fight to hold the cities. But this army fails to keep them. The retreat continues. The army is losing contact both with the headquarters of the front and with Moscow. Moscow does not know for some time whether this same 11th Army exists. But the army exists. And, having more or less sorted out the operational situation, the army headquarters gropes for the enemy's weak point - the weakly covered flanks of a tank wedge moving towards Pskov. It falls on these flanks, cuts the road, stops the enemy advance for a few days. Subsequently, the 11th Army is preserved as a military formation. Participates in the winter offensive of the Red Army in 1941-42.

Thus, both armies of the North-Western Front, which fell under the crushing power of the first blow of the Germans, were neither crushed nor broken by this blow. And they continued to fight. And not without success. There is no information about any mass surrender of soldiers of these armies. The soldiers do not show their unwillingness to fight for the Soviet Motherland. The officers quite competently assess the possibilities of conducting combat operations. Where to retreat so as not to be bypassed, where to take up defense, and where to deliver a dangerous counterattack.

4th Army of the Western Front. She came under attack from the enemy through Brest. Two divisions of this army, which neither the command of the Belarusian Military District nor their own army commander gave the order to leave the city for summer camps, - were shot by German artillery right in the barracks in the city of Brest. The army, nevertheless, entered the battles, participated in the counterattack with the forces of the mechanized corps it had, retreated, clinging to the frontiers. One of the divisions of this army, having gone to the Mozyr UR on the old border, held it for a month. Scattered detachments of the encirclement made their way to this division, which remained far to the west. And the headquarters of the defeated 3rd Army made its way here. On the basis of this headquarters, numerous encircled detachments and the only organized combat formation - the 4th Army division, the 3rd Army was recreated. A new one to replace the old one. However, by that time the division itself had already ceased to be a division of the 4th Army, but was reassigned to the 21st Army. But it is important for us to track her fate. After all, this is a division from among those that entered the battle on June 22 in the direction of the main attack. Not only did this division survive, but a larger military formation, the army, was revived on its basis. Which will have a long military fate.

And what about the rest of the 4th Army. Her story ends on July 24, 1941. But by no means because of the defeat and captivity. Before disbanding, it conducts offensive battles in order to help the troops of the 13th Army escape from the encirclement. Unsuccessfully. At night, the infantry of the 4th Army knocks the enemy out of towns and villages, and during the day they are forced to give up the same towns - in view of the presence of tanks, artillery, and aviation in the enemy. The front is not moving. But it’s not possible to make a hole for the encircled people either. In the end, the four divisions available by that time in the 4th Army were transferred to the 13th Army, in which there was nothing more than the command of the army and the command of one rifle corps. And the headquarters of the 4th Army, left without troops, becomes the headquarters of the new Central Front.

The troops of the army, which took upon itself the brunt of the most powerful blow of the Germans through Brest, defended on one of the most important highways leading to Moscow - on the Warsaw highway - not only were not defeated and captured, but fought offensive battles in order to assist the encircled troops. And these troops became an organized combat core, around which two armies were revived. And the army headquarters became the headquarters of a whole new front. Subsequently, the chief of staff of the 4th army, Sandalov, will actually lead the 20th most successful 20th army in the Moscow counteroffensive (commander Vlasov, who is absent from the army during this period - is being treated for some kind of illness), will participate in a successful Burnt- Gorodishche operation in August 1942, in the operation "Mars" in November-December 1942 and beyond.

The 5th Army of the Southwestern Front received a blow at the junction with the 6th Army. And in fact it had to retreat, turning the front to the south. The mechanized corps of this army participated in a counterattack in the Novograd-Volynsky region. On the front of this army, the Germans were forced to stop for a week on the Sluch River. Subsequently, when the breakthrough of the enemy’s tank wedge to Kiev between the 5th and 6th armies became a reality, the 5th army, whose front, facing south, stretched for 300 km, delivered a series of crushing blows to the flank of the Kiev wedge, intercepted the Kiev highway - and thereby stopped the advance on Kiev. The German tank division approached the Kiev fortified area, which literally had no one to defend, and stopped. Primitively left without shells - because of the communications intercepted by the troops of the 5th Army.

Against the 5th Army, clinging to the Korosten fortified area on the old border, the Germans were forced to deploy 11 divisions. They had 190 divisions on the entire Soviet front. So, every 1/17 of the entire Wehrmacht was turned against the only 5th Army at the very time when they arrived at the front from the depths of the country Soviet armies with numbers 19, 20, 21, ... 37, 38 ... Within 35 days, the army inflicted 150 blows on the Germans. The troops of the army secretly and quickly maneuvered in the Pripyat forests, appeared in unexpected places, smashed the enemy, and then they themselves slipped away from the blows of the Germans. Artillery was also successful. She also secretly maneuvered and delivered unexpected, very sensitive blows against concentrations of enemy troops, at stations and on columns of vehicles supplying enemy troops. There were ammunition. The fortified area, for which the army was hooked, is not only pillboxes, which in essence lost their value in the conditions of maneuver warfare. The fortified area is primarily warehouses, ammunition, food, fuel, uniforms, and spare parts. The artillery of the 5th Army did not experience difficulties with shells. And consequently, the enemy had a very difficult time. Later, already in 1943-44, during the offensive operations of the Red Army, it was revealed that 2/3 of the corpses of German soldiers had traces of being hit by artillery fire. So they were soldiers in the trenches. And the artillery of the 5th Army, acting according to the data of reconnaissance and sabotage groups, struck at the concentrations of troops.

Accordingly, in the directives German command the destruction of the 5th Army was set as a task equal in importance to the capture of Leningrad, the occupation of Donbass. It was the 5th Army, which took the battle on June 22, that caused the so-called. Pripyat crisis, which forced the Germans to stop the attack on Moscow and turn Guderian's tank group to the south - against the Kiev group. This army dealt crushing blows to communications even when the Germans launched a large-scale offensive against it - after August 5th. With this German offensive itself, an anecdote came out. It began on August 5 instead of August 4 for a curious reason. The reconnaissance and sabotage group of the 5th Army intercepted a package with a German directive to start an offensive. The directive did not reach the troops.

The army was not defeated. She faded in battles. Commander-5, General Potapov, asked the front for marching reinforcements - and practically did not receive them. And the army continued to torment 11 full-fledged German divisions with unexpected and successful strikes, remaining on a 300-kilometer front with only 2,400 active bayonets.

Remark. The staff of the German infantry division was 14 thousand people. 11 divisions is 150 thousand. And they are being held by an army, which, in terms of the number of active bayonets, is 20 (!) times inferior to the regular strength of these troops. Digest this number. The army, which is 20 times inferior in the number of bayonets to the opposing enemy, is conducting offensive battles, which become a headache for the German General Staff.

So. The armies, which suffered the brunt of the blow of the German army, were not defeated by this blow. Moreover, they demonstrated survivability, activity and the ability to competently retreat, and then also smash the many times superior enemy. “Not by number, but by skill.

In addition to the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front, one should note the actions of not the whole army, but the right-flank 99th Red Banner Division of the 26th Army near Przemysl. This division successfully fought two or even three German divisions advancing in this place. She threw them across the San River. And the Germans couldn't do anything about it. Despite the power of the blow, despite all the German organization and air superiority No offensive was carried out against other divisions of this army in the first days of the war.

The main question of the paragraph was answered by large military formations: armies and divisions that took the brunt of the blow. The answer is NO. The Wehrmacht did not have a qualitative advantage over Soviet soldiers and commanders.

And after this answer, the paradox of the catastrophe of 1941 becomes much more serious. If the troops, on which the power of the German offensive was brought down, fought successfully, then where did the millions of prisoners come from? Why the loss of thousands of tanks and aircraft, gigantic territories?

Did the 12th Army fight?

What about other armies? - The ones that weren't hit. Or was relatively weak.

Let's start with the most interesting army to clarify the situation - the 12th army of General Ponedelin. This army occupied the front from the Polish border in the south of the Lvov region, with two divisions of the 13th Rifle Corps it covered the Carpathian passes on the border with Hungary, which did not enter the war on June 22. Further, the corps of this army were located along the border with Romania to Bukovina.

On June 22, the troops of this army were alerted, received weapons and ammunition - and took up positions. When troops moved to combat positions, they were bombed. Aviation, subordinated to the command of the 12th Army on June 22, did not rise into the air. She was not given the order to take off into the air, bomb someone, or, on the contrary, cover her own troops from the air. The commander of the army and the headquarters of the army did not give orders. The commander and headquarters of the 13th Rifle Corps, parts of which were precisely exposed to enemy aircraft. However, after entering the positions, the troops were not attacked by anyone. According to the border guards of three border detachments guarding the border south of Przemysl and further along the Carpathians, until June 26, inclusive, the enemy did not attempt to attack on this huge multi-hundred-kilometer front. Neither against the 13th Rifle Corps, nor against the left-flank divisions of the neighboring 26th Army.

On the Internet there are letters from the front of the artillery officer Inozemtsev, who on June 22, as part of the artillery battery of the 192nd rifle division, went into position, and two days later they were forced to retreat due to the fact that they could be bypassed. So the fighters explained. 2 days later, June 24th. There was no order from the headquarters of the Southwestern Front to withdraw the 12th Army. The order of the headquarters of the corps was.

The border guards, who were removed from the outpost at the Veretsky Pass by order of the headquarters of the rifle corps, also confirm that there was a written order.

There is one more recollection - an officer of the railway brigade, who interacted with the 13th rifle corps. The book "Steel hauls". The brigade served the railways in the south of the Lviv region. Sambir, Stryi, Turka, Drohobych, Borislav. On the morning of June 25, a group of railroad bombers arrived at the location of the headquarters of the 192nd Infantry Division to receive orders to blow up - and did not find the headquarters. I found rifle units completing the withdrawal from their previously occupied positions.

Everything converges. Three mutually confirming evidence of the abandonment of positions by the 13th Rifle Corps of the 12th Army on the border with Hungary on the evening of June 24 - in the morning of June 25. Without minimal pressure from the enemy. And without the order of the front headquarters. In the combat report of the 12th army, which is also posted on the Web, -

On June 25, Army Commander Ponedelin informs the front headquarters that the position of the troops of the 13th Corps is unknown to the army headquarters. On the flank of the South-Western Front, completely untouched by the war, the commander does not know what is happening in his right-flank corps - which is 2-3 hours away from the army headquarters by car, with which there is a connection even through the civilian telephone network that has not yet been affected.

Meanwhile, the border guards of the outpost that covered the Veretsky pass receive permission to return to the outpost. And they find the Germans on the road that descends from the pass. In his memoirs, the border guard describes that their outpost kicked the Germans out of the way and from the pass. But the very fact of the advance of the Germans along the pass, from which the border guards were removed by order of commander-13, is present. Moreover, advances from the territory of Hungary, which by this time had not yet entered the war.

In the memoirs of the railroad, meanwhile, there are interesting details. The orders to blow up the structures that they received at the headquarters of the rifle division were somehow strange. Instead of important objects, they were ordered to destroy dead-end branches and some insignificant communication line. And on June 25, a quartermaster ran up to them with a request to help destroy the army's aviation gasoline depot. He was given a verbal order to destroy the warehouse, but he, the quartermaster, simply does not have the means of destruction. And if the warehouse is left to the enemy, then he will put a bullet in his own temple. The railroad workers, having received a receipt from the quartermaster, destroyed this warehouse. And how many other military depots were left without noise at the same time?

In the following days, when railroad bombers destroyed everything they could get their hands on, the Germans dropped leaflets with death threats - precisely because they destroyed everything. The Germans, it seems, were very counting on the contents of the warehouses, which were quietly left to them by Commander-13 Kirillov and Commander-12 Ponedelin.

But the most interesting is further. The order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front for the withdrawal of the 12th and 26th armies was received. It was developed at the front headquarters at 21:00 on the evening of June 26. And later it was found to be unfounded. Due to the fact that the troops of the left-flank divisions of the 26th army and the right-flank divisions of the 13th brigade of the 12th army were not subjected to pressure. The headquarters of the front hastened. But at the same time, he indicated to the 13th Rifle Corps exactly those withdrawal lines to which the corps retreated on its own accord on June 24-25.

We have a very clear fact of treason, in which they are involved

1) division commander-192, who gave orders for the destruction of insignificant objects, but left the warehouses not blown up;

2) Commander-13 Kirillov, who signed the order to withdraw troops from positions and to remove border guards from the Veretsky Pass (at the same time, outposts in the mountain wilderness between the passes were not removed);

3) commander-12 Ponedelin and his headquarters, which for 2 days "did not know" where the troops of the 13th corps were; 4) the leadership of the Southwestern Front, consisting of the front commander Kirponos, the chief of staff Purkaev and a member of the Military Council of the front Nikishev, without the signature of each of which the order of June 26 recognized as unreasonable was invalid.

Further fate of the 12th army.

At the end of June, she received an order from the front headquarters to retreat to the old state border, gradually turning to the east, starting with the 13th Rifle Corps. It does not enter into combat contact with the enemy, except for some minor skirmishes between the rearguards and motorcyclists. The aviation of this army is preserved. At least until July 17 - in contrast to the fighting armies, which by that time had long forgotten what red-star aviation was overhead.

And this 12th army, exhausted by the rapid march from Western Ukraine, having lost the material part of the mechanized corps assigned to it, which turned into a foot corps, takes up positions on the old border. And only here, on July 16-17, the enemy begins to put pressure on her. And the infantry. The German infantry breaks through the Letichevsky fortified area, about the insufficient armament of which Ponedelin reports to the higher authorities just before the breakthrough. Although he stood this UR without the influence of the enemy for a full week.

The same young artillery officer Inozemtsev from the 192nd division, in a letter to his relatives from the front, reports that on July 9 he finally reached the positions on the old state border, where they would certainly give the Germans a fight.

So. The Germans are breaking through the Letichevsky UR, and who would you think is responsible for the defense in the breakthrough sector? - the commander of the 13th Rifle Corps, Zakharov, noted by us. Commander Ponedelin responds to the breakthrough with a formidable combat order to strike at the enemy who has broken through. The next day the order is repeated. Schedules an offensive at 7 am after bombing the enemy with aircraft, allocates such and such formations for the offensive. And the same unit, which was supposed to be in offensive battles near the border from 7 in the morning, tens of kilometers from the army headquarters, - at 17 o'clock on the day of the offensive, Ponedelin sees next to his headquarters in Vinnitsa. This is noted in the documents of the 12th Army. Those. the order was written for the report, and no one was going to move the troops anywhere.

After that, the troops of the 12th army begin to fight very successfully to hold the bridge across the Southern Bug, along which the army of Ponedelin and the neighboring 6th army of Muzychenko leave the threat of encirclement from the fortified areas on the old state border. From the rugged, wooded beams of the Podolsk Upland, from the zone of warehouses of property, food, ammunition, fuel, weapons, which can be fought for at least a month (in the image and likeness of the 5th Army), to the bare steppe. After Muzychenko was wounded, the two armies ended up under the overall command of Ponedelin. And marching columns through the bare steppe come to the Uman cauldron. Where August 7 and are captured. Led by Ponedelny and commander Kirillov.

However, not everyone was captured. Our familiar artilleryman Inozemtsev at this time finds himself on the left bank of the Dnieper. And letters from him go to relatives right up to 1943. The Chief of Staff of the 12th Army and the Chief of Aviation of the 12th Army are not captured. Tens of thousands of soldiers are taken prisoner, who were not allowed to fight, but were literally taken prisoner, i.e. driven into conditions in which it was hopeless to fight.

The 12th army did not actually fight. Moreover, she did not fight, not because the soldiers or officers did not want to, but because she was not allowed to fight by her own command, which committed treason. The irrefutable evidence of which I was lucky to unearth and combine into a coherent picture.

Did the mechanized corps fight?

Before dealing with the fate of other armies, let's ask ourselves what happened to the tanks of numerous mechanized corps.

What were they doing? In principle, we know from history about the giant tank battle in Western Ukraine, in which tanks were actually lost. But still, since we have revealed oddities in the behavior of the entire army, oddities in the orders of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, let's see, what if not everything is going smoothly here. As we know, the 5th Army showed itself in the highest degree brilliantly. It included two mechanized corps 9th and 19th. One of these corps was commanded by the future Marshal Rokossovsky, who proved both his devotion to the Motherland and the ability to fight competently in all his front-line ways. Rokossovsky is also noted for the fact that he did not bring anything from defeated Germany, except for his own suitcase. Not involved in looting. Therefore, we will not look closely at what is happening in the corps of the 5th Army. Apparently, they honestly fulfilled their duty, despite the difficulties and confusion.

But it would be necessary to deal with the corps belonging to the 6th and 26th armies. What did we have in the Lviv region? There were the 15th and 4 mechanized corps of the 6th Army and there was the 8th microcorps, subordinate to the 26th Army. 4th mechanized corps.

The first oddity of the events associated with the use of these corps is that already in the middle of the day on June 22, the 26th army, which was conducting serious battles in the Przemysl region, was taken away 8 microns, reassigned to the front headquarters and sent away both from the front and from their own supply bases and spare parts warehouses located in Drohobych and Stryi. First, the corps comes under its own power to the Lviv region, then it is redirected to the city of Brody in the east of the Lviv region. With a daily delay against the order of the front headquarters, he is concentrating in the Brody area for an offensive in the direction of Berestechko. And finally, on the morning of June 27, it begins to advance towards Soviet territory. As noted in the combat report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front dated 12 noon on June 27, the advancing 8 microns had not met the enemy by that moment. In the same direction, in interaction with it, 15 microns also occurs. On Soviet territory far from the border. And there is no enemy in front of them.

Meanwhile, reconnaissance of the front on June 25 discovered the accumulation of mechanized enemy forces north of Przemysl, i.e. to the north of the 99th Red Banner Division, which was fighting beautifully, which beat the superior enemy forces. On June 26, these mechanized forces break through the front of the left-flank division of the 6th Army, then cut railway Stryi-Lviv and find themselves on the outskirts of Lviv - at the station Sknilov.

What is not normal here?

It is abnormal that from the main location of the 8th microdistrict in the city of Drohobych to the German strike line southwest of Lvov is less than 50 km. If he were in his place, he could easily parry the German blow. And thus ensure the opened flank of the 26th army. Those. prevent the capture of Lvov, while acting in the interests of their own army. After the emergence of a breakthrough, Commander-26 Kostenko had to compete in infantry in speed with the mechanized forces of the Germans, who bypassed his army from the north. He needed tanks of 8 microns to cover his own flank.

But the corps was already taken away a couple of hundred kilometers to the east of the Lviv region, and even they gave the order to advance towards the Rivne region. More east. Moreover, there is no reaction of the headquarters of the South-Western Front to information from its own intelligence about the concentration of enemy mechanized forces as such.

And Lvov, which was abandoned as a result, is a place of concentration of gigantic warehouses of all kinds of military equipment, the same spare parts. There were two of them in the territory of the Lviv region, Lvov and Stryi. Moreover, in Lviv itself, which is an old city, it is inconvenient to place warehouses. In Lvov in the 1970s and 80s, the Sknilov station, which I have already mentioned, was the main warehouse center of the city. It was here that the Germans broke through on June 26. They didn’t need Lvov, but Sknilov with gigantic reserves of everything and everything for the entire 6th Army and for its two tank corps: the 4th and 15th.

And where do we have the 4th mechanized corps of the future hero of the defense of Kiev, the future creator of the ROA Vlasov? You will not believe. On the direction of the German strike from the area north of Przemysl to Sknilov. In the forests southwest of Lvov. The Germans pass by Vlasov's corps as if it does not exist. And Vlasov himself on the evening of June 26 receives an order from the front headquarters to retreat towards the Ternopil region. One of the two most powerful corps in the Red Army with a thousand tanks, with the best security of the corps in the Red Army with motor vehicles - does not react in any way to the German breakthrough to Sknilov, but not only does not react itself! The fact that God himself ordered him to defeat the advancing German mechanized units is not remembered by the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, which actually assigned Vlasov a place of concentration in the forests southwest of Lvov. This is according to the front headquarters' own documents! Instead of a combat order to defeat the enemy, the corps, which in the first days of the war had already uselessly wound more than 300 km on the tracks of tanks (while wasting the engine life of the equipment), is ordered to a new long-range march, in isolation from the spare parts base in the same Lvov, which he should have protect. Neither the front headquarters nor Vlasov himself has any thoughts that this is wrong.

There is, however, one person who is sounding the alarm. Chief of the Armored Forces of the Southwestern Front, Major General Morgunov, who writes reports on the inadmissibility of continuous marches of mechanized corps. He writes on June 29 about the loss of already 30% of the equipment abandoned due to breakdowns and lack of time and spare parts for tankers to repair them. Morgunov demands to stop the hulls, let them at least inspect and adjust the equipment. But the mechanized corps are not allowed to stop. And already on July 8 they are taken to the reserve - as having lost their combat capability due to the loss of materiel. As we remember, the mechanized corps from the 12th Army had become on foot by the time they reached the old border - without fighting at all.

There are no complaints about the commanders of the 8th and 15th mechanized corps. They eventually got to the enemy, the battle of the Soviet mechanized corps with the advancing Germans near Dubno was. The 8th mechanized corps was noted in it with its actions. The problem with the incomparably more powerful 4th mechanized corps of Vlasov, the problem with the command of the 6th army, the problem with the command of the front.

Ultimately, we are forced to state. The mechanized corps basically did not fight. They were deprived of the opportunity to act where they could change the course of events, and were driven by marches along the roads until the motor resource of the equipment was used up. Moreover, despite the documented protests of the head of the armored forces of the front.

ctrl Enter

Noticed osh s bku Highlight text and click Ctrl+Enter

26th Army of the 1st Formation created in July 1940 in the Kiev Special Military District. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, having in its composition the 8th rifle and 8th mechanized corps, 8th fortified area, as well as artillery, engineering and other units, included in Southwestern Front I formation, participated in the border battle, fought heavy defensive battles in the Vinnitsa direction east of Proskurov.

Then its troops were transferred to other armies of the front, and the field administration united the 6th and 64th rifle corps, the 116th, 196th and 227th rifle divisions, which were concentrated south of Kiev. During the Kiev strategic defensive operation, the army launched several counterattacks on the German 1st Panzer Group and delayed its advance south of Kiev. At the end of August, the army troops were withdrawn to the left bank of the river. Dnieper and continued to conduct defensive battles in the area south of Kiev, Zolotonosha. Since mid-September, as part of the Kiev group of troops of the front, she fought in encirclement.

On September 25, 1941, the field administration of the 26th Army was disbanded, its troops that had left the encirclement were transferred to the staffing of formations and units Southwestern Front.

26th Army II Formation It was created on October 10, 1941 on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 002815 of October 9, 1941 in the Moscow Military District on the basis of the 1st Guards. rifle corps with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The army included the 6th Guards Rifle and 41st Cavalry Divisions, the 5th Airborne Corps, the 4th Tank Brigade and a number of units. Not having completed the formation, she entered into heavy defensive battles with the 2nd Panzer Army of the enemy, advancing in the Oryol-Tula direction. During fierce battles in the Mtsensk region, the army suffered heavy losses.

On October 25, 1941, by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 004058 of October 22, 1941, its field administration was disbanded, the troops were transferred to 50th Army Bryansk Front I formation.

26th Army III Formation It was created on October 30, 1941 on the basis of the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 004097 dated October 24, 1941 in the Volga Military District with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. By the beginning of December, it included the 327th, 329th, 264th and 344th rifle, 73rd and 74th cavalry divisions, the 53rd rifle brigade and the 704th light bomber aviation regiment, artillery and other units .

December 18, 1941 the army was included in the Volkhov Front I formation.

26th Army IV Formation was established on April 4, 1942 on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of March 27, 1942 as part of Karelian Front on the basis of his Kem task force. It included the 23rd Guards, 27th, 54th, 152nd, 186th and 263rd Rifle Divisions, the 67th and 80th Marine Rifle Brigades, a number of artillery and other units.

In April 1942 - August 1944, the army troops firmly held the defense lines in the Kestenga, Ukhta and Rebol directions. After the defeat of the Finnish troops in Vyborgskaya and Svirsko-Petrozavodskaya offensive operations The 26th Army in the Kestenga and Ukhta directions at the end of September reached the Soviet-Finnish border. Subsequently, until the completion of the troops of the Karelian Front and the forces Northern Fleet Petsamo-Kirkenes strategic operation defended state border USSR with Finland at the turn east of Kemijärvi, Ehrinavar.

On November 15, 1944, the army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On January 28, 1945, her field administration was transferred to 3rd Ukrainian Front, where it united the 30th, 133rd rifle and 18th tank corps, a number of other units. At the end of January - the first half of February, the army took part in the hostilities at the final stage of the Budapest strategic operation, defeated a strong enemy counterattack grouping that had broken through to the Danube south of Budapest. In March, during the Balaton defensive operation, the troops of the 26th Army, in cooperation with 4th Guards , 27th and 57th armies inflicted great damage on the advancing enemy grouping and stopped its advance southeast of Lake Balaton. In March - April, the army took part in the Vienna strategic operation, during which it defeated the formations of the 6th SS Panzer Army of the enemy. Then, developing the offensive in the direction of Veszprem, Szombathely (Szombathely), the formations of the army reliably ensured the actions of the main grouping of the 3rd Ukrainian Front from the south, against the army of the Balk group, and contributed to the capture of Vienna.

In August 1945, the 24th Army was disbanded.