Battle of Borodino 26 August. Battle of Borodino (1812)

"RUSSIAN GOT THE GLORY TO BE UNDEFEATED"

After the battle near Smolensk, the retreat of the Russian army continued. This caused open discontent in the country. Under pressure from public opinion, Alexander I appointed him commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Kutuzov's task was not only to stop Napoleon's further advance, but also to expel him from Russian borders. He also adhered to the tactics of retreat, but the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle, which was found near the village. Borodino, 124 kilometers from Moscow.

The Russian army approached the village of Borodino on August 22, where, at the suggestion of Colonel K.F. Tolya, a flat position up to 8 km long was chosen. From the left flank, the Borodino field was covered by the impenetrable Utitsky forest, and on the right, passing along the bank of the river. Kolochi, Maslovsky flashes were erected - earthen arrow-shaped fortifications. Fortifications were also built in the center of the position, which received different names: Central, Kurgan height, or Raevsky battery. On the left flank, the Semyonov (Bagrationov) flushes were erected. Ahead of the entire position, from the left flank, near the village of Shevardino, a redoubt was also begun to be built, which was supposed to play the role of an advanced fortification. However, the approaching army of Napoleon, after a fierce battle on August 24, managed to capture it.

Location of Russian troops. The right flank was occupied by the battle formations of the 1st Western Army of General M.B. Barclay de Tolly, on the left flank were units of the 2nd Western Army under the command of P.I. Bagration, and the Old Smolensk Road near the village of Utitsa was covered by the 3rd Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General N.A. Tuchkov. Russian troops occupied a defensive position and were deployed in the shape of the letter "G". This situation was explained by the fact that the Russian command sought to control the Old and New Smolensk roads leading to Moscow, especially since there was a serious fear of the enemy's bypass movement on the right. That is why a significant part of the corps of the 1st Army turned out to be in this direction. Napoleon, on the other hand, decided to deliver his main blow to the left flank of the Russian army, for which on the night of August 26 (September 7), 1812, he transferred the main forces across the river. Kolochu, leaving only a few cavalry and infantry units to cover their own left flank.

The beginning of the battle. The battle began at five o'clock in the morning with an attack by parts of the corps of the Viceroy of Italy E. Beauharnais on the position of the Life Guards of the Jaeger Regiment near the village. Borodin. The French took possession of this point, but it was their red herring. Napoleon brought down his main blow against Bagration's army. Corps of Marshals L.N. Davout, M. Ney, I. Murat and General A. Junot attacked the Semenov flushes several times. Parts of the 2nd Army fought heroically against the enemy outnumbered. The French repeatedly broke into the flushes, but each time they left them after a counterattack. Only by nine o'clock did the Napoleonic armies finally capture the fortifications of the Russian left flank, and Bagration, who tried to organize another counterattack at that time, was mortally wounded. “The soul seemed to fly off from the entire left flank after the death of this man,” witnesses tell us. Furious fury, a thirst for revenge took possession of those soldiers who were directly in his entourage. When the general was already being carried away, the cuirassier Adrianov, who served him during the battle (handing out a telescope, etc.), ran up to the stretcher and said: “Your Excellency, you are being taken to be treated, you no longer need me!” Then, eyewitnesses report, “Adrianov, in the sight of thousands, launched like an arrow, instantly crashed into the ranks of the enemy and, having hit many, fell dead.”

The struggle for the Rayevsky battery. After the capture of the flashes, the main struggle unfolded for the center of the Russian position - the Raevsky battery, which at 9 and 11 o'clock in the morning was subjected to two strong enemy attacks. During the second attack, the troops of E. Beauharnais managed to capture the height, but soon the French were driven out of there as a result of a successful counterattack by several Russian battalions led by Major General A.P. Yermolov.

At noon, Kutuzov sent the Cossacks to the cavalry general M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of Adjutant General F.P. Uvarov to the rear of Napoleon's left flank. The raid of the Russian cavalry allowed Napoleon to divert attention and delayed a new French assault on the weakened Russian center for several hours. Taking advantage of the respite, Barclay de Tolly regrouped his forces and put fresh troops on the front line. Only at two o'clock in the afternoon did the Napoleonic units make a third attempt to capture Raevsky's battery. The actions of the Napoleonic infantry and cavalry were successful, and soon the French finally captured this fortification. The wounded Major General P.G., who led the defense, was captured by them. Likhachev. The Russian troops withdrew, but the enemy could not break through the new front of their defense, despite the best efforts of two cavalry corps.

Results of the battle. The French were able to achieve tactical success in all major areas - the Russian armies were forced to leave their original positions and retreat about 1 km. But the Napoleonic units failed to break through the defense of the Russian troops. The thinned Russian regiments stood to the death, ready to repel new attacks. Napoleon, despite the insistent requests of his marshals, did not dare to throw his last reserve - the twenty thousandth Old Guard - for the final blow. Intense artillery fire continued until the evening, and then the French units were withdrawn to their original lines. It was not possible to defeat the Russian army. Here is what the Russian historian E.V. Tarle: “The feeling of victory was definitely not felt by anyone. The marshals talked among themselves and were dissatisfied. Murat said that he did not recognize the emperor all day, Ney said that the emperor forgot his craft. Artillery thundered from both sides until evening and bloodshed continued, but the Russians did not think not only to flee, but also to retreat. It was already very dark. There was a light rain. "What are the Russians?" asked Napoleon. "Stand still, Your Majesty." - “Intensify the fire, it means they still want it,” the emperor ordered. “Give them more!”

Gloomy, not talking to anyone, accompanied by his retinue and generals who did not dare to interrupt his silence, Napoleon drove around the battlefield in the evening, looking with inflamed eyes at the endless piles of corpses. The emperor did not yet know in the evening that the Russians had lost not 30 thousand, but about 58 thousand people out of their 112 thousand; he also did not know that he himself had lost more than 50,000 of the 130,000 that he had brought to the Borodino field. But that 47 (not 43, as they sometimes say, but 47) of his best generals were killed and seriously wounded, he learned this in the evening. The French and Russian corpses covered the ground so thickly that the imperial horse had to look for places where to lower its hoof between the mountains of the bodies of people and horses. The groans and cries of the wounded came from all over the field. The Russian wounded struck the retinue: “They did not emit a single groan,” writes one of the retinue, Count Segur, “perhaps, far from their own, they counted less on mercy. But it is true that they seemed more firm in bearing pain than the French."

In the literature there are the most contradictory facts about the losses of the parties, the question of the winner is still controversial. In this regard, it should be noted that none of the opponents solved the tasks assigned to them: Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army, Kutuzov - to defend Moscow. However, the enormous efforts made by the French army were, in the end, fruitless. Borodino brought Napoleon bitter disappointment - the outcome of this battle did not at all resemble either Austerlitz, or Jena, or Friedland. The bloodless French army was unable to pursue the enemy. The Russian army, fighting on its territory, was able to restore the number of its ranks in a short time. Therefore, in assessing this battle, Napoleon himself was most accurate, saying: “Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French in it showed themselves worthy of victory. And the Russians have gained the glory of being undefeated.”

RESCRIPT OF ALEXANDER I

“Mikhail Illarionovich! The current state of the military circumstances of our active armies, although preceded by initial successes, but the consequences of these do not reveal to me that rapid activity with which it would be necessary to act to defeat the enemy.

Considering these consequences and extracting the true reasons for this, I find it necessary to appoint one common commander-in-chief over all active armies, whose election, in addition to military talents, would be based on seniority itself.

Your well-known virtues, love for the fatherland and repeated experiences of excellent deeds acquire for you the true right to this power of attorney of mine.

Choosing you for this important cause, I ask the almighty God to bless your deeds to the glory of Russian weapons and may the happy hopes that the fatherland places on you be justified.

REPORT OF KUTUZOV

“The battle of the 26th, the former, was the most bloody of all those that are known in modern times. The place of the battle was completely won by us, and the enemy then retreated to the position in which he came to attack us; but the extraordinary loss, and done on our part, especially by wounding the most necessary generals, forced me to retreat along the Moscow road. Today I am in the village of Nara and must retreat to meet the troops coming towards me from Moscow for reinforcements. The prisoners say that the enemy's loss is very great, and that the general opinion in the French army is that they lost 40,000 men killed and wounded. In addition to Divisional General Bonami, who was taken prisoner, there are others killed. By the way, Davoust is wounded. Rearguard action happens daily. Now, I learned that the corps of the Viceroy of Italy is located near Ruza, and for this, the detachment of Adjutanate General Vintsengerode went to Zvenigorod in order to close Moscow along that road.

FROM THE MEMOIRS OF CALENCOUR

“We have never lost so many generals and officers in one battle ... There were few prisoners. The Russians showed great courage; the fortifications and territory which they were forced to cede to us were evacuated in order. Their ranks did not fall into disorder ... they bravely met death and only slowly yielded to our valiant attacks. Never before has an enemy position been attacked so fiercely and so systematically, and defended with such stubbornness. The emperor repeated many times that he could not understand how the redoubts and positions, which were captured with such courage and which we so stubbornly defended, gave us only a small number of prisoners ... These successes without prisoners, without trophies did not satisfy him ... »

FROM THE REPORT OF GENERAL RAEVSKY

“The enemy, having arranged his entire army in our eyes, so to speak, in one column, went straight to our front; approaching it, strong columns separated from its left flank, went straight to the redoubt and, despite the strong grapeshot fire of my guns, without a shot, their heads climbed over the parapet. At the same time, from my right flank, Major General Paskevich with regiments attacked with bayonets on the left flank of the enemy, behind the redoubt. Major General Vasilchikov did the same on their right flank, and Major General Yermolov, taking a battalion of rangers of regiments brought by Colonel Vuich, hit with bayonets right on the redoubt, where, having exterminated everyone in it, he took the general leading the columns prisoner . Major Generals Vasilchikov and Paskevich overturned the enemy columns in the blink of an eye and drove them to the bushes so hard that hardly any of them escaped. More than the action of my corps, it remains for me to describe in a nutshell that after the extermination of the enemy, returning again to his places, he stayed in them until repeated attacks of the enemy, until he was reduced to complete insignificance by the dead and wounded and my redoubt was already occupied by Mr. General Major Likhachev. Your Excellency himself knows that Major General Vasilchikov gathered the scattered remnants of the 12th and 27th divisions and with the Lithuanian Guards Regiment held an important height until the evening, located on the left limb of our entire line ... "

GOVERNMENT MESSAGE ON LEAVING MOSCOW

“With the extreme and contrite heart of every son of the Fatherland, this sadness is proclaimed that the enemy of September 3rd entered Moscow. But let the Russian people not lose heart. On the contrary, let each and every one swear to boil with a new spirit of courage, firmness and undoubted hope that all the evil and harm inflicted on us by enemies will finally turn on their head. The enemy occupied Moscow not because he overcame our forces or weakened them. The Commander-in-Chief, on the advice of the leading generals, found it useful and necessary to give in for a time of necessity, so that with the most reliable and best methods later, turn the short-term triumph of the enemy into inevitable death for him. No matter how painful it is for every Russian to hear that the capital city of Moscow contains the enemies of his fatherland; but she contains them in herself empty, naked from all treasures and inhabitants. The proud conqueror hoped, having entered it, to become the ruler of the entire Russian kingdom and prescribe for him such a world as he pleases; but he will be deceived in his hope and will not find in this capital not only ways to dominate, lower than ways to exist. Our forces gathered and sometimes more accumulating around Moscow will not cease to block all his paths, and the detachments sent from him for food were exterminated daily, until he sees that his hope of defeating the minds of the capture of Moscow was futile and that involuntarily he will have to open a way for himself from by force of arms…”

Tell me, uncle, it's not for nothing that Moscow, burned down by fire, was given to the French?

Lermontov

The Battle of Borodino was the main battle in the War of 1812. For the first time, the legend of the invincibility of Napoleon's army was dispelled, and a decisive contribution was made to changing the size of the French army due to the fact that the latter, due to large-scale casualties, ceased to have a clear numerical advantage over the Russian army. In the framework of today's article, we will talk about the battle of Borodino on August 26, 1812, consider its course, the balance of forces and means, study the opinion of historians on this issue and analyze what consequences this battle had for the Patriotic War and for the fate of the two powers: Russia and France.

➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤

History of the battle

The Patriotic War of 1812 at the initial stage developed extremely negatively for the Russian army, which constantly retreated, refusing to accept a general battle. This course of events was perceived by the army extremely negatively, since the soldiers wanted to take the battle as soon as possible to defeat the enemy army. Commander-in-Chief Barclay de Tolly was well aware that in an open general battle, the Napoleonic army, which was considered invincible in Europe, would have a colossal advantage. Therefore, he chose the tactics of retreat, in order to wear down the enemy troops, and only then accept the battle. This course of events did not inspire confidence among the soldiers, as a result of which Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was appointed commander in chief. As a result, several significant events took place that predetermined the prerequisites for the Battle of Borodino:

• Napoleon's army advanced inland with great complications. The Russian generals refused a general battle, but actively got involved in small battles, and the partisans were also very active. Therefore, by the time Borodino began (late August - early September), Bonaparte's army was no longer so formidable and significantly exhausted.
• Reserves were brought up from the depths of the country. Therefore, Kutuzov's army was already comparable in number to the French army, which allowed the commander in chief to consider the possibility of practically entering the battle.

Alexander 1, who by that time, at the request of the army, had left the post of commander in chief, allowed Kutuzov to make his own decisions, insistently demanded that the general accept the battle as soon as possible and stop the advance of Napoleon's army inland. As a result, on August 22, 1812, the Russian army began to retreat from Smolensk in the direction of the village of Borodino, which is located 125 kilometers from Moscow. The place was ideal to take the fight, as excellent defense could be organized in the Borodino area. Kutuzov understood that Napoleon was only a few days away, so he threw all his strength into fortifying this area and taking the most advantageous positions.

The balance of forces and means

Surprisingly, most historians who study the Battle of Borodino are still arguing about the exact number of troops on the opposing sides. The general trends in this matter are such that the newer the study, the more data showing that the Russian army had a slight advantage. However, if we consider the Soviet encyclopedias, then the following data is presented there, in which the participants in the Battle of Borodino are presented:

• Russian army. Commander - Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov. At his disposal were up to 120 thousand people, of which 72 thousand were foot soldiers. The army had a large artillery corps with 640 guns.
• French army. Commander - Napoleon Bonaparte. The French emperor brought a corps of 138 thousand soldiers with 587 guns to Borodino. Some historians note that Napoleon had reserves of up to 18 thousand people, which the French emperor kept to the last and did not use them in the battle.

Very important is the opinion of one of the participants in the Battle of Borodino, the Marquis of Chambray, who provided data that France put up the best European army for this battle, which included soldiers with extensive experience in military operations. On the part of Russia, according to his observations, recruits and volunteers were at their core, who, in their entire appearance, indicated that military affairs were not the main thing for them. Chambray also pointed to the fact that Bonaparte had a large advantage in the field of heavy cavalry, which gave him some advantages during the battle.

Tasks of the parties before the battle

Since June 1812, Napoleon has been looking for opportunities for a general battle with the Russian army. A well-known catchphrase that Napoleon expressed as a simple general in revolutionary France: "The main thing is to impose battles on the enemy, and then we'll see." This simple phrase reflects the whole genius of Napoleon, who, in terms of making lightning-fast decisions, was perhaps the best strategist of his generation (especially after the death of Suvorov). It was this principle that the French commander in chief wanted to apply in Russia. The Battle of Borodino provided such an opportunity.

Kutuzov's tasks were simple - he needed active defense. With its help, the commander-in-chief wanted to inflict the maximum possible losses on the enemy and at the same time save his army for further battle. Kutuzov planned the Battle of Borodino as one of the stages of the Patriotic War, which was supposed to make a radical change in the course of the confrontation.

On the eve of the battle

Kutuzov took up a position, which is an arc passing through Shevardino on the left flank, Borodino in the center, the village of Maslovo on the right flank.

On August 24, 1812, 2 days before the decisive battle, the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt took place. This redoubt was commanded by General Gorchakov, who had 11,000 men under his command. To the south, with a corps of 6,000 men, was General Karpov, who covered the old Smolensk road. Napoleon set the Shevardinsky redoubt as the initial target of his strike, since it was as far as possible from the main grouping of Russian troops. According to the plan of the French emperor, Shevardino should have been surrounded, thereby withdrawing the army of General Gorchakov from the battle. To do this, the French army in the attack consisted of three columns:

• Marshal Murat. Bonaparte's favorite led a cavalry corps to hit Shevardino's right flank.
• Generals Davout and Ney led the infantry in the center.
• Junot, also one of the best generals in France, was moving along the old Smolensk road with his guards.

The battle began on the afternoon of 5 September. Twice the French unsuccessfully tried to break through the defenses. Toward evening, when night began to fall on the Borodino field, the French attack was successful, but the reserves of the Russian army that came up made it possible to repel the enemy and defend the Shevardino redoubt. The resumption of the battle was not beneficial for the Russian army, and Kutuzov ordered a retreat to the Semyonovsky ravine.

The initial positions of the Russian and French troops

On August 25, 1812, both sides carried out general preparations for the battle. The troops were busy finishing the defensive positions, the generals were trying to learn something new about the plans of the enemy. Kutuzov's army took up defense in the form of an obtuse triangle. The right flank of the Russian troops passed along the Kolocha River. Barclay de Tolly was responsible for the defense of this section, whose army numbered 76 thousand people with 480 guns. The most dangerous position was on the left flank, where there was no natural barrier. This section of the front was commanded by General Bagration, who had 34,000 men and 156 guns at his disposal. The problem of the left flank acquired significant relevance after the loss of the village of Shevardino on September 5. The position of the Russian army met the following tasks:

• The right flank, where the main forces of the army were grouped, reliably covered the path to Moscow.
• The right flank made it possible to deliver active and powerful blows to the rear and flank of the enemy.
• The location of the Russian army was deep enough, which left ample room for maneuver.
• The first line of defense was occupied by infantry, the second line of defense was occupied by cavalry, and reserves were placed on the third line. The well-known phrase

reserves should be kept as long as possible. Whoever retains the most reserves by the end of the battle will be the winner.

Kutuzov

In fact, Kutuzov provoked Napoleon to attack on the left flank of his defense. Only as many troops were concentrated here as they could successfully defend against the French army. Kutuzov repeated that the French would not be able to resist the temptation to attack a weak redoubt, but as soon as they had problems and they resorted to the help of their reserves, it would be possible to put their army behind them and in the flank.

Napoleon, who conducted reconnaissance on August 25, also noted the weakness of the left flank of the defense of the Russian army. Therefore, it was decided to strike here the main blow. In order to divert the attention of the Russian generals from the left flank, simultaneously with the attack on Bagration's position, an attack on Borodino was to begin in order to further capture the left bank of the Kolocha River. After mastering these lines, it was planned to transfer the main forces of the French army to the right flank of the Russian defense, and deliver a massive blow to the army of Barclay De Tolly. Having solved this problem, by the evening of August 25, about 115 thousand people of the French army were concentrated in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe left flank of the defense of the Russian army. 20 thousand people lined up in front of the right flank.

The specifics of the defense that Kutuzov used was that the Battle of Borodino was supposed to force the French to go on a frontal attack, since the general front of the defense occupied by Kutuzov's army was very extensive. Therefore, it was almost impossible to get around him from the flank.

It is noted that on the night before the battle, Kutuzov reinforced the left flank of his defense with the infantry corps of General Tuchkov, and also transferred 168 artillery pieces to Bagration's army. This was due to the fact that Napoleon had already concentrated very large forces in this direction.

Day of the Battle of Borodino

The battle of Borodino began on August 26, 1812 in the early morning at 5:30. As planned, the main blow was inflicted by the French on the left flag of the defense of the Russian army.

Artillery shelling of Bagration's positions began, in which more than 100 guns took part. At the same time, the corps of General Delzon began a maneuver with a strike at the center of the Russian army, at the village of Borodino. The village was under the protection of the chasseur regiment, which could not resist the French army for a long time, the number of which in this sector of the front exceeded the Russian army by 4 times. The Jaeger regiment was forced to retreat and take up defensive positions on the right bank of the Kolocha River. The attacks of the French general, who wanted to move even further deep into the defense, were unsuccessful.

Bagration flushes

Bagration's flushes were located along the entire left flank of the defense, forming the first redoubt. After half an hour of artillery preparation, at 6 o'clock in the morning, Napoleon gave the order to launch an attack on Bagration's fleches. The French army was commanded by Generals Deshay and Compana. They planned to strike at the southernmost flush, going out to the Utitsky Forest for this. However, as soon as the French army began to line up in battle formation, Bagration's Jaeger regiment opened fire and went on the attack, disrupting the first stage of the offensive operation.

The next attack began at 8 o'clock in the morning. At this time, a second attack on the southern flush began. Both French generals increased the number of their troops and went on the offensive. Bagration, in order to defend his position, sent the army of General Neversky, as well as Novorossiysk dragoons, to his southern flank. The French were forced to retreat, having suffered serious losses. During this battle, both generals who led the army to storm were seriously wounded.

The third attack was carried out by the infantry units of Marshal Ney, as well as the cavalry of Marshal Murat. Bagration noticed this maneuver of the French in time, giving the order to Raevsky, who was in the central part of the flushes, to move from the front line to the second echelon of defense. This position was reinforced by the division of General Konovnitsyn. The attack of the French army began after a massive artillery preparation. The French infantry struck between flushes. This time the attack was successful, and by 10 o'clock in the morning the French managed to capture the southern line of defense. This was followed by a counterattack undertaken by the division of Konovnitsyn, as a result of which it was possible to recapture the lost positions. At the same time, the corps of General Junot managed to bypass the left flank of the defense through the Utitsky forest. As a result of this maneuver, the French general actually ended up in the rear of the Russian army. Captain Zakharov, who commanded the 1st cavalry battery, noticed the enemy and struck. At the same time, infantry regiments arrived at the scene of the battle and pushed General Junot back to their original position. More than a thousand people lost the French in this battle. In the future, historical information about Junot's corps is contradictory: Russian textbooks say that this corps was completely destroyed in the next attack of the Russian army, while French historians claim that the general participated in the Battle of Borodino until its very end.

4 assault on Bagration's flushes began at 11 o'clock. In the battle, Napoleon used 45 thousand troops, cavalry and more than 300 guns. At that time, Bagration had less than 20 thousand people at his disposal. At the very beginning of this assault, Bagration was wounded in the thigh and was forced to leave the army, which had a negative impact on morale. The Russian army began to retreat. General Konovnitsyn assumed command of the defense. He could not resist Napoleon, and decided to retreat. As a result, the flushes remained with the French. The retreat was carried out to the Semenovsky stream, where more than 300 guns were installed. The large number of the second echelon of defense, as well as a large number of artillery forced Napoleon to change the original plan and cancel the attack on the move. The direction of the main attack was shifted from the left flank of the defense of the Russian army to its central part, commanded by General Raevsky. The purpose of this strike was to capture the artillery. The attack of the left flank by the infantry did not stop. The fourth attack on the Bagrationovskaya flushes was also unsuccessful for the French army, which was forced to retreat behind the Semyonovsky stream. It should be noted that the position of the artillery was extremely important. Throughout the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon made attempts to capture the enemy's artillery. By the end of the battle, he managed to take these positions.

Battle for Utitsky Forest

The Utitsky forest was of great strategic importance for the Russian army. On August 25, on the eve of the battle, Kutuzov noted the importance of this direction, which blocked the old Smolensk road. An infantry corps under the command of General Tuchkov was stationed here. The total number of troops in this area was about 12 thousand people. The army was located covertly in order to suddenly strike at the right moment on the enemy's flank. On September 7, the infantry corps of the French army, commanded by one of Napoleon's favorites, General Poniatowski, advanced in the direction of the Utitsky Kurgan in order to outflank the Russian army. Tuchkov took up defense on the Kurgan, and blocked the further course of the French. Only by 11 o'clock in the morning, when General Junot arrived to help Poniatowski, the French delivered a decisive blow to the mound and captured it. The Russian General Tuchkov launched a counterattack, and at the cost of his own life managed to return the barrow. The command of the corps was taken by General Baggovut, who held this position. As soon as the main forces of the Russian army withdrew to the Semenovsky ravine, the Utitsky Kurgan, it was decided to retreat.

Raid of Platov and Uvarov

At the moment of the onset of a critical moment on the left flank of the defense of the Russian army during the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov decided to let the army of Generals Uvarov and Platov into battle. As part of the Cossack cavalry, they were supposed to go around the French positions on the right, striking in the rear. The cavalry consisted of 2.5 thousand people. At 12 noon, the army advanced. Having crossed the Kolocha River, the cavalry attacked the infantry regiments of the Italian army. This blow, which was led by General Uvarov, was intended to impose a fight on the French and divert their attention. At this moment, General Platov managed to go unnoticed along the flank and go behind enemy lines. This was followed by a simultaneous attack by two Russian armies, which brought panic into the actions of the French. As a result, Napoleon was forced to transfer part of the troops that stormed the Raevsky battery in order to repel the attack of the cavalry of the Russian generals, who went to the rear. The battle of the cavalry with the French troops lasted several hours, and by four o'clock in the afternoon Uvarov and Platov returned their troops to their original positions.

The practical significance of the Cossack raid led by Platov and Uvarov is almost impossible to overestimate. This raid gave the Russian army 2 hours to reinforce a reserve position for an artillery battery. Of course, this raid did not bring a military victory, but the French, who saw the enemy in their own rear, were no longer acting so decisively.

Raevsky battery

The specificity of the terrain of the Borodino field was due to the fact that in its very center a hill towered, which made it possible to control and shell the entire surrounding territory. It was an ideal place to place artillery, which Kutuzov took advantage of. In this place, the famous Raevsky battery was deployed, which consisted of 18 guns, and General Raevsky himself was supposed to protect this height with the help of an infantry regiment. The attack on the battery began at 9 o'clock in the morning. Having struck at the center of the Russian positions, Bonaparte pursued the goal of complicating the movement of the enemy army. During the first offensive of the French, the unit of General Raevsky was transferred to defend the Bagrationov Flesh, but the first attack of the enemy on the battery was successfully repulsed without the participation of the infantry. Eugene Beauharnais, who was in command of the French offensive in this sector, saw the weakness of the artillery position and immediately delivered another blow to this corps. Kutuzov transferred here all the reserves of artillery and cavalry. Despite this, the French army managed to suppress the Russian defenses and penetrate into his stronghold. At this moment, a counterattack of the Russian troops was carried out, during which they managed to recapture the redoubt. General Beauharnais was taken prisoner. Of the 3,100 French who attacked the battery, only 300 survived.

The position of the battery was extremely dangerous, so Kutuzov gave the order to redeploy the guns to the second line of defense. General Barclay de Tolly sent an additional corps of General Likhachev to protect Raevsky's battery. Napoleon's original plan of attack has lost its relevance. The French emperor abandoned massive attacks on the left flank of the enemy, and directed his main attack on the central part of the defense, on the Raevsky battery. At this moment, the Russian cavalry went to the rear of the Napoleonic army, which slowed down the French advance by 2 hours. During this time, the defensive position of the battery was further strengthened.

At three o'clock in the afternoon, 150 guns of the French army opened fire on Raevsky's battery, and almost immediately the infantry went on the offensive. The battle lasted about an hour and, according to its results, Raevsky's battery fell. The original plan of Napoleon counted on the fact that the capture of the battery would lead to cardinal changes in the balance of forces near the central part of the defense of the Russian troops. This did not turn out, he had to abandon the idea of ​​\u200b\u200ba offensive in the center. By the evening of August 26, Napoleon's army had not been able to achieve a decisive advantage in at least one of the sectors of the front. Napoleon did not see the essential prerequisites for victory in the battle, so he did not dare to use his reserves in the battle. He hoped to the last to exhaust the Russian army with his main forces, to achieve a clear advantage in one of the sectors of the front, and then to bring fresh forces into battle.

End of the battle

After the fall of Raevsky's battery, Bonaparte abandoned further ideas of storming the central part of the enemy's defenses. There were no more significant events in this direction of the Borodino field. On the left flank, the French continued their attacks, which did not lead to anything. General Dokhturov, who replaced Bagration, repelled all enemy attacks. The right flank of the defense, commanded by Barclay de Tolly, had no significant events, only sluggish attempts at artillery shelling were made. These attempts continued until 7 pm, after which Bonaparte retreated to Gorki to give the army a rest. It was expected that this was a short pause before the decisive battle. The French were preparing to continue the battle in the morning. However, at 12 o'clock at night Kutuzov refused to continue the battle further, and sent his army beyond Mozhaisk. This was necessary in order to give the army a rest and replenish its human reserves.

Thus ended the Battle of Borodino. Until now, historians from different countries are arguing about which army won this battle. Domestic historians talk about the victory of Kutuzov, Western historians talk about the victory of Napoleon. The most correct thing to say is that during the Battle of Borodino there was a draw. Each army got what it wanted: Napoleon opened his way to Moscow, and Kutuzov inflicted significant losses on the French.

Results of the confrontation

The victims in the Kutuzov army during the Battle of Borodino are described differently by various historians. At its core, the researchers of this battle come to the conclusion that the Russian army lost about 45 thousand people on the battlefield. This figure takes into account not only the dead, but also the wounded, as well as those taken prisoner. Napoleon's army, as part of the battle on August 26, lost a little less than 51 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. Comparable losses of both countries are explained by many scholars by the fact that both armies regularly changed their roles. The course of the battle changed very often. At first, the French attacked, and Kutuzov gave the order to the troops to take up defense, after which the Russian army went on the counteroffensive. At certain stages of the battle, Napoleonic generals managed to achieve local victories and take the necessary lines. Now the French were on the defensive, and the Russian generals were on the offensive. And so the roles changed dozens of times in the course of one day.

The battle of Borodino did not produce a winner. However, the myth of the invincibility of the Napoleonic army was dispelled. Further continuation of the general battle for the Russian army was undesirable, since at the end of the day on August 26, Napoleon still had untouched reserves, with a total number of up to 12 thousand people. These reserves, against the backdrop of a tired Russian army, could have a significant impact on the result. Therefore, having retreated beyond Moscow, on September 1, 1812, a council was held in Fili, at which it was decided to allow Napoleon to occupy Moscow.

Military significance of the battle

The Battle of Borodino was the bloodiest battle in the history of the 19th century. Each side lost about 25 percent of its army. In one day, the opponents fired more than 130,000 shots. The totality of all these facts later led to the fact that Bonaparte in his memoirs called the Battle of Borodino the largest of his battles. However, Bonaparte failed to achieve the desired results. The illustrious commander, accustomed exclusively to victories, formally did not lose this battle, but did not win either.

Being on the island of St. Helena and drawing up a personal autobiography, Napoleon wrote the following lines about the Battle of Borodino:

The battle for Moscow is the most important battle in my life. The Russians had the upper hand in everything: they had 170 thousand people, an advantage in cavalry, artillery and terrain, which they knew very well. Despite this, we won. The heroes of France are Generals Ney, Murat and Poniatowski. They own the laurels of the winners of the Moscow battle.

Bonaparte

These lines clearly show that Napoleon himself considered the battle of Borodino as his own victory. But such lines should be studied exclusively in the light of the personality of Napoleon, who, while on the island of St. Helena, greatly exaggerated the events of the past days. For example, in 1817, the former emperor of France said that in the Battle of Borodino he had 80 thousand soldiers, and the enemy had a huge army of 250 thousand. Of course, these figures were dictated only by Napoleon's personal conceit, and have nothing to do with real history.

Kutuzov also assessed the Battle of Borodino as his own victory. In his note to Emperor Alexander 1, he wrote:

On the 26th, the world saw the bloodiest battle in its history. Never before has recent history seen so much blood. A perfectly matched battlefield, and an enemy that came to attack but was forced to defend.

Kutuzov

Alexander 1, under the influence of this note, and also trying to reassure his people, announced the Battle of Borodino as a victory for the Russian army. Largely because of this, in the future, domestic historians also always represented Borodino as a victory for Russian weapons.

The main result of the Battle of Borodino was that Napoleon, who was famous for having won all the general battles, managed to force the Russian army to accept the battle, but failed to defeat it. The absence of a significant victory in the general battle, taking into account the specifics of the Patriotic War of 1812, led to the fact that France did not receive any significant advantages from this battle.

Literature

• History of Russia in the 19th century. P.N. Zyryanov. Moscow, 1999.
• Napoleon Bonaparte. A.Z. Manfred. Sukhumi, 1989.
• Hike to Russia. F. Segur. 2003.
• Borodino: documents, letters, memoirs. Moscow, 1962.
• Alexander 1 and Napoleon. ON THE. Trotsky. Moscow, 1994.

Panorama of the Battle of Borodino

The Patriotic War of 1812 was the greatest test for the Russian people and at the same time a turning point in the spiritual life of the whole country. The enemy's invasion of Russia, the battle of Borodino, the fire of Moscow, the tense struggle against the armies of Napoleon caused a mighty popular upsurge.

Napoleon long and carefully prepared for war with Russia. Two operational plans for possible military operations were prepared. The first provided for the luring of Russian armies beyond the borders of the Russian Empire, into the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw dependent on Napoleon, the encirclement and defeat of Russian troops. The second plan called for a decisive blow to the Russians. The emperor intended to cross the Neman with the forces of a 610,000-strong army and beat the enemy in one pitched battle.

The Russians chose a defensive war plan, and the military command drew up a disposition for the deployment of three Western armies. 1st Western Army, the largest (commander-in-chief - Minister of War M. B. Barclay de Tolly; more than 120 thousand with 550 guns stood at the crossroads to St. Petersburg and Moscow, between the city of Vilna (Vilnius) and the upper course of the Neman River , occupying a defense line of 180-200 km.

The 2nd Western Army of Bagration (about 45 thousand with 180-200 guns) defended a line 100 km south of the 1st Army. It was assumed that she would close the road to Moscow and Kiev, acting on the flank of Napoleon's army. The 3rd Western Army of A.P. Tormasov (45 thousand with 170 guns) stood much to the south, 200 km from Bagration in the Lutsk region in Volyn. Its main task was to protect Kiev from a possible invasion by Austrian troops.

On June 11-18, the French "Great Army" crossed the Russian border. On June 13, the city of Kovno was occupied, and on the 16th the French entered Vilna; On June 19, having clarified the situation, Napoleon decided not to allow the Russian armies to join. Against the army of Barclay de Tolly, he led Murat's cavalry, and against the army of Bagration, Napoleon - 3 columns of troops that were subordinate to Marshal Davout. The French emperor expected this maneuver to strike at the flank of the troops of the 2nd army moving north.

Under the circumstances, both Russian armies were forced to start a retreat to join. By June 29, the 1st Army concentrated in the Drissa camp, where it received reinforcements (10 thousand people) and rest.

The actions of the 2nd Army took place in a difficult situation. By 21, having passed 80 km, the army reached Nikolaev and the next day began crossing the Neman. But it soon became known that the enemy was striving to cut off all escape routes for her. Then Bagration decided to fight his way through. July 14 at the village. Saltanovka, Bagration, rushing out of encirclement, dealt a serious blow to Davout's troops, and on 13-14, when Bagration's forces were crossing the Dnieper, the 1st Army fought several heated rearguard battles. On July 13, under Ostrovshchina, General Osterman-Tolstoy ordered his troops to "stand and die", holding back Murat's attacks. The next day there was a fight Kakuvyachyne. The Russians retreated to Vitebsk, where Napoleon approached on July 15.

However, the French failed to impose a general battle here. On July 22, breaking away from the French, the 1st and 2nd Russian armies joined near Smolensk. The initial period of the war is over. The enemy troops withdrew beyond the Western Dvina-Dnepr line. Napoleon achieved a major political success. In his hands were Lithuania, Belarus and most of Courland.

Napoleon had to abandon the attack on Petersburg. Having captured Riga, it was impossible to carry out offensives along the coast; The Kiev direction lost its meaning after Davout refused to oppose Russia. The only option left was an attack on Moscow. Napoleon regrouped his troops, and also rebuilt the rear. The new operating line ran from Warsaw to Minsk, Orsha and further to Smolensk.

For the Russians, Moscow became the main operational direction. It turned out that the Russian army did not have a reserve base behind the line of the Dvina and the Dnieper. The question arose again of basing, of new lines of operations. But it was no longer Barclay de Tolly, not Bagration, but Kutuzov who had to solve them.

The main event of the Patriotic War of 1812 was undoubtedly the famous battle on August 26 (September 7) not far from Mozhaisk, near the village of Borodino.

Pursuing the retreating Russian troops, Napoleon all the time strove for a pitched battle, hoping to destroy the Russian army and end the war with one blow. At the beginning of the campaign, he had a great chance of winning, as he had a significant superiority in strength. Having delved into the vast expanses of Russia for almost 1000 km, Napoleon faced the fact of a gradual alignment of the balance of power. However, before the battle of Borodino, the French army was still numerically superior to the Russian, and, in addition, Napoleon hoped for a qualitative superiority of his troops and command staff. Therefore, he was firmly convinced of his victory and set himself the goal of completely defeating the Russians in a decisive battle and thereby opening his way to Moscow, after the capture of which he would quickly conclude peace. The battle of Borodino clearly showed the failure of Napoleon's strategy.

Kutuzov, having taken command of the army stationed in Tsarevo-Zaimishche on August 17, also considered it necessary to give the French a general battle on the way to Moscow. He knew that Napoleon still had a numerical superiority over the Russian army. He highly appreciated the military talent of Napoleon and his marshals, as well as the combat effectiveness of the French troops. But Kutuzov hoped to compensate for the superiority of the French by the skillful organization of the battle in a pre-selected position. The goal of the battle Kutuzov set was the defeat of the attacking army of Napoleon and the defense of Moscow.

Upon arrival at Tsarevo-Zaimishche, Kutuzov rode around the intended position on horseback and made sure that it was impossible to take the battle on it. The commander-in-chief decided to continue the retreat until a more favorable situation.

On August 22, Kutuzov with the main forces approached the village of Borodino. The commander of the Russian rearguard, General P.P. Konovnitsyn, having endured two heated battles with the French avant-garde: at Gridnev, about 25 km from Borodino, and at the Kolotsky Monastery, about 10 km from Borodino, joined the main forces on the same day.

So, on the morning of August 22, 1812, the main forces of the Russian army began to concentrate in the area of ​​​​the village of Borodino. M. I. Kutuzov carefully examined the area and ordered the construction of fortifications to begin.

The area in the area of ​​Borodino (located 12 km west of Mozhaisk) is heavily hilly and crossed by a significant number of rivers and streams that have formed deep ravines. The eastern part of the Borodino field is more elevated than the western. The river flows through the village. Koloch. It has a high and steep bank, which well covered the right flank of the position of the Russian army. The left flank approached a shallow forest, heavily overgrown with dense shrubs and swampy in places. This forest presented serious difficulties for the movement of significant masses of enemy infantry and cavalry, in the event of an attempt to make a flank bypass. Most of the tributaries of the Kolocha - the river Voina, the streams Semenovsky, Kamenka, Ognik and others, the banks of which were densely overgrown with shrubs, crossed the Borodino field from south to north and therefore could serve as a convenient position for shooters. From west to east through vil. Valuevo passed Bolshaya, or New, Smolenskaya road, which was of great strategic importance. Almost parallel to it, about 4 km south of the village of Borodino, the Old Smolensk road passed. Having taken a position at Borodino, the Russian army had the opportunity to cover both of these roads leading to Moscow. In the depths of the position, the terrain was also wooded. It made it possible to successfully position and camouflage reserves well.

On the right flank, well protected by the high banks of the Kolocha and essentially impregnable to the enemy, as well as in the center, Kutuzov decided to deploy significant forces: three infantry, three cavalry corps and a large Cossack detachment of General M. I. Platov. By deploying his troops in this way, the commander sought to force the French emperor to conduct a frontal offensive with the main forces in a narrow defile between Koloch and Utitsky forest, excluding the possibility of enveloping the flanks of the Russian position. The troops of the right flank, occupying a position near the New Smolensk road, were a strong grouping of infantry and cavalry, which posed a serious threat to the left wing of the Napoleonic army. These troops could also be used as a reserve. Kutuzov ordered the construction of bridges, crossings over ravines and streams so that, if necessary, it would be possible to transfer the troops of the right flank to the left at the moment when the enemy would launch an offensive there with the main forces. The most vulnerable part of the Borodino position was its left flank. Kutuzov understood this well and took measures to strengthen his position with engineering structures. On the left flank, near vil. Semenovskoye, three flushes (earth fortifications) were built, which later received the name "Bagration's", since during the Battle of Borodino they were defended by Bagration's troops. To the west of the flushes there was an advanced fortification - the Shevardino redoubt. On the right flank, near vil. Maslovo, the Russians erected a group of earthen fortifications, redoubts and lunettes. In the center, at the height of Kurgannaya, they built an 18-gun battery, which went down in history as the Raevsky battery.

By the time it approached Borodino, Napoleon's army had suffered very heavy losses (killed, sick, deserters). Significant detachments were assigned to guard the sprawling lines of communication to secure the flanks of the main forces advancing on Moscow. Only about 130 thousand soldiers of the "Great Army" reached Borodino. (Kutuzov M.I. Materials of the anniversary session of the military academies of the Red Army, dedicated to the 200th anniversary of the birth of M.I. Kutuzov, - Voenizdat, 1947. S. 88.) But these were selected soldiers, the strongest, most persistent, hardened in battles, confident in their own invincibility, in the outstanding qualities of their generals and officers, in the brilliant military talent of their leader. They believed Napoleon, who said that they were facing the last crushing one; according to Russian, after which they will have rich booty in Moscow, a choir of an apartment, generous rewards and a happy return home. Thus set up, well trained and organized, the French army near Borodino was a formidable force. She rushed into battle to overturn the last obstacle - the Russian army, blocking the road to Moscow and to the world. Napoleon Bonaparte brought the best part of his army to the Borodino field: the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th corps, reserve cavalry, as well as the elite of the French troops - the Imperial Guard, led by marshals Mortier and Bessières. But no less formidable force opposed the French on the Borodino field. The Russian army, reorganized in the period 1807-1813, was not much inferior to the French. And with courage, boundless readiness to defend the Motherland from the conquerors, the Russians surpassed Napoleon's army.

In the Patriotic War of 1812, the names of Bagration, Dokhturov, Barclay de Tolly, N. N. Raevsky, Konovnitsyn, Miloradovich, Platov and many others were covered with immortal glory. As for the soldiers, although there were many recruits in Kutuzov's army, there were also veteran heroes of the Suvorov and Kutuzov campaigns, especially non-commissioned officers. Many of them had already fought the French in 1799, 1805 and 1807. These veterans, no less than Napoleon's Old Guard, had the right to consider themselves invincible, and the young soldiers of the Russian army were equal to them.

All the memoirs of contemporaries testify to the high patriotic upsurge in the ranks of the Russians on the Borodino field. The army had long been waiting for a decisive battle with the enemy and grumbled, complaining about the constant retreat. When it became clear to everyone that the battle would really be given, that the retreat was over, the Russian troops began to prepare for battle. They decided to die, but not let the French go to Moscow. The officers asked Kutuzov's permission to dress up in battle uniforms. The soldiers cleaned and sharpened weapons, put uniforms and equipment in order. The heroic Russian army was preparing for the last formidable parade. In front of the Russian position was the Shevardinsky redoubt, which had the character of an advanced fortification. Behind him lay the entire left flank of the Russians, where at vil. Semenovskoye fortifications were erected. On August 24, the battle of the troops of General M. D. Gorchakov on the 2nd took place with the main forces of Napoleon for Shevardino. Until the very night, the Russians held back the attacks of the French, thus giving Bagration time to strengthen his positions.

After a tough battle on August 24, the Russians occupied the line of Maslovo, Borodino, Semenovskoye, Utitsa. The French began to deploy for an attack on the front west of Borodino, Aleksinki, Shevardino and south. On August 25, both sides prepared for battle, reconnaissance ended and final orders were given. The French carried out a series of military operations (reconnaissance) north of Borodino and south of Utitsa, which confirmed Napoleon's assessment of the terrain in these directions: it was unsuitable for large masses of troops. Judging by the available data, on August 25, both commanders - Napoleon and Kutuzov - as a result of the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt and reconnaissance, adopted the following battle plans.

NAPOLEON'S PLAN. With a massive blow of infantry and cavalry, with the support of powerful artillery fire, to break through the Russian combat position in the Semenov flushes sector, the Kurgan battery. Following this, introduce reserves into the breakthrough, direct a strike to the north at the flank of the Russian grouping that covered the New Smolensk road, press it against the Moscow River and destroy it. At the same time, on the flanks against Borodino and Utitsa, carry out auxiliary attacks, of which the attack on Utitsa, which contributed to the breakthrough from the south near the Semenov flushes, was to be of particular importance.

PLAN KUTUZOV. By the evening of August 24, Kutuzov quite accurately determined the direction of the main attack of the French. In this regard, he made a partial regrouping on August 25, strengthening his left flank. In its final form, Kutuzov's plan boiled down to inflicting the greatest possible losses on the enemy in the direction of his main attack by stubborn resistance of limited forces and upsetting him. At the same time, to maintain complete freedom of maneuver of their reserves, placing them during the battle outside the reach of the enemy. Accordingly, Kutuzov deployed a large contingent of troops, reliably covering the New Smolensk road.

On August 26 at 5:30 the sun came out. Napoleon's order was read to the troops. It said: “Warriors! Here is the fight you've been longing for. Victory is up to you. She is necessary for you, she will provide us with everything we need: comfortable apartments and a speedy return to the fatherland. Act as you acted under Austerlitz, Friedland, Vitebsk, Smolensk. May later posterity proudly remember your exploits in this day. Let them say about each of you: he was in the great battle near Moscow! (Rastunov I. I. Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1987. S. 22.)

The dawn broke, the fog dissipated, the first ray of the sun flashed. "This is the sun of Austerlitz!" Napoleon exclaimed. A heavy gun rumbled from the direction of the Russian positions, as it seemed that the French were approaching. But there was no movement yet.

At about six o'clock in the morning an attack began against the right flank of the Russians on the village of Borodino. The soldiers of the Life Guards of the Chasseurs Regiment engaged in a firefight with the enemy, and then in hand-to-hand combat. In his report to Alexander I about the battle of Borodino, Kutuzov writes that the Life Guards of the Chasseurs Regiment stopped the enemy and that for more than an hour, in full view of the entire army, they held back the onslaught of the French.

However, the Russians had to retreat behind the river. Koloch. The French on the shoulders of the retreating broke into their positions. But at that moment, the 1st Jaeger Regiment arrived in time to help the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment. Connecting with the retreating, he rushed to the enemy. With a cry of "Hurrah!", the Russians not only drove the enemy from their positions, but also themselves, having crossed the river. Kolocha, broke into the French positions. However, it was very risky to stay there, and the Russian soldiers moved back, and the last retreating ones set fire to the bridge across the river. During the entire battle of Borodino in this area, the French and Russians limited themselves to skirmishing. The attack on the village of Borodino is over. However, this enemy offensive was demonstrative in nature. The main events unfolded at the Bagration flushes of the 1st battery of Raevsky.

At 6 o'clock the troops of Marshal Davout launched an attack on the flushes. The flashes were defended by the consolidated grenadier division of M. S. Vorontsov and the 27th infantry division of D. N. Neverovsky. Despite the triple superiority of the enemy, the Russians fought courageously and were fearless. They met the attacking columns of the French with powerful artillery fire, and after approaching they rushed at the enemy with hostility. The enemy could not stand it and, leaving piles of dead and wounded, randomly retreated. The first French attack on the fleches bogged down.

At this time, on the extreme left flank, near the village of Utitsa, the French attacked the Russians. Rather, the Poles attacked, since the corps of I. A. Poniatovsky, who was entrusted with this sector of the front, mainly consisted of Poles. Poniatowski managed to capture the village of Utitsa. The commander of the Russian troops in this area, Tuchkov, moved to the Utitsky Kurgan and entrenched himself there.

At 7 o'clock the enemy resumed the attack on the flushes. The goal of heavy losses, he managed to capture the left flush of the Semenov fortifications. By order of Bagration, several battalions counterattacked the enemy on the flank. The taken aback French were thrown back, having suffered new heavy losses in people. The second attack also ended in a bloody French failure. Napoleon was overwhelmed by the stubborn resistance of the Russians. Reinforcing Davout's troops with Ney's corps and Murat's cavalry, he gave the order to resume the onslaught. In turn, Bagration took the necessary measures to strengthen the defense. He moved the 1st Grenadier and 3rd Cuirassier Divisions to the front line from the reserve. Here he also sent 8 battalions from Raevsky's 7th Corps, which defended itself north of the flushes and, in addition, placed the 3rd infantry division of Konovnitsyn near the village of Semenovskoye. Kutuzov, who closely followed the course of the battle, sent large reserves to reinforce Bagration's troops. However, the transfer of these forces could be carried out no earlier than in 1.5-2 hours. It follows that when repulsing the next attack of the French, Bagration had to rely only on his own forces.

At 8 o'clock, after artillery preparation of 160 guns, the enemy launched a third attack. Coming out of the forest, the French lined up in several dense columns and moved to the Bagration flushes. Russian artillerymen, having waited for the enemy at the nearest shot, opened deadly fire on him. At the same time, the infantry fired several volleys. The French fell in dozens. But it is necessary to note the courage of the enemy. Under canister fire, the French imperturbably continued to move towards the flushes, where they managed to break into at the cost of incredible efforts. But at that moment, Count Vorontsov with his grenadier battalions hit with bayonets. A strong onslaught mixed the ranks of the Napoleonic soldiers and forced him to retreat back in confusion. Then the French tried with a dashing attack of the cavalry to capture the flushes that had just been beaten off from them. The French cavalry, which swiftly rushed at the Russians, was met by the Life Guards of the Izmailovsky, Lithuanian and Finnish regiments, which, lining up in a square, bristling with bayonets, were waiting for the enemy. Having let the enemy in on a rifle shot, they opened fire, which forced the enemy to retreat. The retreating French cavalry and the cuirassiers who came to the rescue, turning around, again rushed at the Russians. And again, our soldiers, letting the enemy get closer, opened rifle fire on him. Those who were able to break through to the ranks were stabbed with bayonets.

At this time, Poniatowski tried several times to take the Utitsky barrow. Surrounding the mound on all sides, the enemy attacked the 1st Grenadier Division. In his report, Kutuzov wrote later: “The brave grenadiers, after waiting for the enemy, opened the most severe fire on him and, without any delay, rushed at him with hostility. The enemy could not withstand such a swift attack, left the place of battle with damage and disappeared into the nearby forests. Lieutenant General Tuchkov was wounded by a bullet in the chest, and Lieutenant General Alsufiev took command of him. (Ibid., p. 141.)

Thus, the first stage of the battle ended with minor French successes in the directions of auxiliary attacks and a decisive failure in the direction of the main attack. Both commanders begin to pull up fresh forces here.

By order of Napoleon, at about 9 o'clock, the attacks on Bagration's fleches were resumed.

During the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th attacks, the area around the Bagration Flushes was littered with the corpses of Russians and Frenchmen. The French attacked Bagration's flushes continuously. The infantry, which the Russians threw back with bayonet strikes, was replaced by cavalry, which was fired upon by a few surviving Russian cannons. At a time when the enemy cavalry and infantry were reorganizing and stocking up on ammunition, French artillery was constantly hitting the Russian positions.

At about 10 o'clock the French launched a large flush attack. This time, against 18,000 soldiers of Bagration and 300 guns on a front of 1.5 km, Napoleon moved 45,000 of his soldiers and 400 guns. The Russians met the enemy with a crushing bayonet strike. A hand-to-hand fight ensued. The Russian officer F. I. Glinka, a participant in the Battle of Borodino, wrote: “... The picture of that part of the Borodino field near the village of Semenovskoye was terrible, where the battle was in full swing, like in a cauldron. Thick smoke and bloody steam eclipsed the midday sun. Some sort of faded, uncertain twilight lay over the field of horrors, over the field of death. Nothing could be seen in this twilight, except formidable columns, advancing and broken, squadrons running ... The distance presents a view of perfect chaos: torn, broken French squadrons collapse, agitate and disappear in smoke, giving way to infantry, acting harmoniously! .. Having comprehended the intention of the marshals and seeing the formidable movement of the French forces, Prince Bagration conceived a great deed. The orders were given, and our entire left wing, in its entire length, moved from its place and went with a quick step at bayonets. Agreed! .. “There is no language to describe this dump, this knocked down, this lingering crack, this last struggle of a thousand! Everyone grabbed the bowl of fatal scales in order to pull them over to their side ... And the Russians did not give up an inch of their place. ” (Rastunov I. I. Patriotic War of 1812 - Knowledge, 1987. P. 23.)

In this battle, Bagration was wounded, a fragment of a French grenade hit him in the leg. The flashes have been captured. Immediately the corps of Ney and the cavalry of M. -V. -N. Latour-Maubourt and E.-A. -M. The Nansouti rushed into the breach. The Russians, under the onslaught of the enemy, had to withdraw. The command of the Semyonov flushes was temporarily taken over by Konovnitsyn. A very difficult task fell to his lot: until a new general was appointed to the place of the wounded Bagration, while the forces allocated by the command from the reserve moved to help the 2nd Army, he had to keep the enemy rushing forward at all costs.

Dokhturov, who soon arrived on the left flank and was appointed to replace Bagration, found the 2nd Army bleeding, but was ready to fight to the end.

At the same time, in the center of the Russian position, the French stubbornly stormed the Rayevsky battery, approximately in the middle of the 7th French attack on Bagration's flashes, Barclay de Tolly noticed the enemy moving towards the center of the Russian position. To reinforce the center of the Russians, the commander of the 1st Army ordered the 4th Corps to join the right wing of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, which, with the Semenovsky and Finland regiments, remained in reserve. Behind these troops he placed the 2nd and 3rd cavalry corps, behind them were the regiments of the cavalry and horse guards. As soon as the Russians settled in new positions, they were subjected to fierce artillery fire, after which the enemy advanced in dense columns to the Raevsky battery and overturned the 26th division, which could withstand his superior forces. A difficult situation has arisen.

Kutuzov ordered General Yermolov to go to the artillery of the left flank and put it in order. The chief of the main staff of the 2nd Army, Count E.F. Saint-Prix, was wounded, and Yermolov was to take command. Yermolov took with him three companies of horse artillery.

Driving past Raevsky's battery, Yermolov saw that the position was captured by the French, and the Russians were fleeing. Realizing the danger of the situation, the brave general immediately began to act. He rushed to the 6th corps, the closest to the height, ordered the 9th battalion of the Ufa infantry regiment to move quickly forward and stop the fleeing and retreating 18th, 19th and 40th chasseur regiments. The enemy could not use the guns of the captured battery, but, pulling up his light artillery, he began to shower the Russian troops from the flanks. The three cavalry companies that accompanied Yermolov stopped on the left flank of his small position and, diverting fire on themselves, made it possible to capture the lost battery. Yermolov later recalled: “The battery and the slope of the hill to the top were covered with the bodies of the enemy. All those who resisted paid with their lives, only Brigadier General Bonami was taken prisoner, having received twelve wounds with bayonets. All of our lost guns were returned, but the damage from my part in terms of people was terrible ”(Borodino. Documents, letters, memoirs. P. 358.)

At this time, a fierce battle was going on on the Utitsky Kurgan for mastering the height. Poniatowski first occupied this mound, but was soon driven out of there.

Thus, the 3rd stage of the battle ended with a major success for the French in the main direction. The Russian front was broken through, and the breakthrough was only weakly closed east of Semenovsky. It took time for the new reinforcements sent here by Kutuzov to approach. The position of the Russians was difficult. But the French also needed reserves and fresh forces. Napoleon reluctantly agreed to the use of the Young Guard to increase the breakthrough on the Semyonov Fleches.

But here Kutuzov makes a brilliant move. He sends the cavalry of Platov and F. P. Uvarov to the rear of the French. Uvarov's cavalry captured Bezzubovo, but here they were detained by the French (more precisely, by the Italian units of the French army). The Cossacks, breaking into the rear of the French, made a panic there. Napoleon stopped the 3rd attack of the French troops on the Raevsky battery and the movement of the Young Guard, and he himself went to the left flank to clarify the situation. He spent about 2 hours on this, during which Kutuzov completed the regrouping of troops and firmly secured his left flank. Thus, the time for success was lost.

At about 2 p.m., the French attacked Raevsky's battery for the 3rd time. As a result of this attack, by 17 o'clock in the afternoon, the defenders of the battery were almost completely destroyed, and the French took possession of it. The Russians retreated without panic, by order of the command. The French then tried to attack the Russians in their new position, but to no avail. At the end of the day, Poniatowski managed to capture the Utitsky barrow.

By 18 o'clock the Russians were firmly entrenched in the position of Gorka - the Old Smolensk road. Seeing the futility of further attacks, Napoleon ordered them to stop and withdraw troops to the river. Ring for the night. The battle of Borodino is over.

The opponents dispersed, leaving mountains of corpses and wounded on the battlefield. In this battle, the losses of the Russians were no less than the losses of the French. Various sources give completely different casualty figures for both sides. However, it is officially known that after the flight of the Napoleonic army from Russia, 58,520 human corpses and 35,478 horse corpses were found on the Borodino field. No wonder Borodino was called by contemporaries "the grave of the French cavalry." (Levitsky N. War of 1812. M., 1938. S. 26.)

It is also difficult to determine the winner of this bloody battle. You can argue for a long time who won on this terrible day. But, despite the seemingly “indisputable” defeat of the Russians, Napoleon suffered a crushing moral defeat in the Battle of Borodino. After August 26, the combat energy of the French army began to steadily fall. The blow inflicted on her by the Russians near Borodino was ultimately fatal.

The battle of Borodino entered the history of the liberation struggle of the peoples of our country as one of its brightest pages. The legendary feat of the heroes of Borodin was an inspiring example of the patriotic fulfillment of duty to the Motherland for subsequent generations of Russian people.

The Battle of Borodino (in French history - the Battle of the Moscow River, French Bataille de la Moskova) is the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian army under the command of General M. I. Kutuzov and the French army of Napoleon I Bonaparte. It took place on August 26 (September 7), 1812 near the village of Borodino, 125 km west of Moscow.

During the 12-hour battle, the French army managed to capture the positions of the Russian army in the center and on the left wing, but after the cessation of hostilities, the French army withdrew to its original positions. Thus, in Russian historiography, it is believed that the Russian troops won, but the next day, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, M.I. army.

Russian historian Mikhnevich reported the following review of Emperor Napoleon about the battle:

“Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory in it, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible ... Of the fifty battles I have given, in the battle near Moscow [the French] showed the most valor and won the least success.

According to the memoirs of the French General Pele, a participant in the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon often repeated a similar phrase: “The battle of Borodino was the most beautiful and most formidable, the French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians deserved to be invincible.”

It is considered the bloodiest one-day battle in history.

September 8 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the Borodino battle of the Russian army under the command of M. I. Kutuzov with the French army (this date was obtained by erroneous conversion from the Julian calendar to the Gregorian, in fact, the day of the battle is September 7).

background

Since the beginning of the invasion of the French army into the territory of the Russian Empire in June 1812, Russian troops have constantly retreated. The rapid advance and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the French deprived the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, of the opportunity to prepare troops for battle. The protracted retreat caused public discontent, so Emperor Alexander I removed Barclay de Tolly and appointed General of Infantry Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. However, the new commander-in-chief chose the path of retreat. The strategy chosen by Kutuzov was based, on the one hand, on exhausting the enemy, on the other hand, on waiting for reinforcements sufficient for a decisive battle with Napoleon's army.

On August 22 (September 3), the Russian army, retreating from Smolensk, settled down near the village of Borodina, 125 km from Moscow, where Kutuzov decided to give a general battle; it was impossible to postpone it further, since Emperor Alexander demanded that Kutuzov stop the advance of Emperor Napoleon towards Moscow.

On August 24 (September 5), the battle took place at the Shevardinsky redoubt, which delayed the French troops and made it possible for the Russians to build fortifications on the main positions.

The alignment of forces at the beginning of the battle

Number of troops

The total number of the Russian army is determined at 112-120 thousand people:

historian Bogdanovich: 103 thousand regular troops (72 thousand infantry, 17 thousand cavalry, 14 thousand artillerymen), 7 thousand Cossacks and 10 thousand militia warriors, 640 guns. Total 120 thousand people.

from the memoirs of General Tolya: 95 thousand regular troops, 7 thousand Cossacks and 10 thousand militia warriors. In total, 112 thousand people are under arms, "with this army there are 640 artillery pieces."

The number of the French army is estimated at about 138 thousand soldiers and 587 guns:

According to the data of the Marquis of Chambray, the roll call, held on August 21 (September 2), showed the presence of 133,815 combat ranks in the French army (for some of the lagging soldiers, their comrades responded “in absentia”, hoping that they would catch up with the army). However, this number does not take into account 1,500 sabers of the cavalry brigade of Divisional General Pajol, who came up later, and 3,000 combat ranks of the main apartment.

In addition, the registration of the militias in the Russian army implies the addition to the regular French army of numerous non-combatants (15 thousand) who were present in the French camp and corresponded to the Russian militias in terms of combat effectiveness. That is, the size of the French army is also increasing. Like the Russian militias, the French non-combatants performed auxiliary functions - carried out the wounded, carried water, and so on.

It is important for military history to distinguish between the total strength of the army on the battlefield and the troops that were committed to battle. However, according to the balance of forces that took a direct part in the battle on August 26 (September 7), 1812, the French army also had a numerical superiority. According to the encyclopedia "Patriotic War of 1812", at the end of the battle, Napoleon had 18 thousand in reserve, and Kutuzov had 8-9 thousand regular troops (in particular, the Guards Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments). At the same time, Kutuzov said that the Russians brought into battle "everything to the last reserve, even the guards in the evening", "all the reserves are already in action."

If we evaluate the qualitative composition of the two armies, then we can refer to the opinion of the participant in the events of the Marquis of Chambray, who noted that the French army had superiority, since its infantry consisted mainly of experienced soldiers, while the Russians had many recruits. In addition, the advantage of the French gave a significant superiority in heavy cavalry.

Battle for the Shevardino Redoubt

The idea of ​​​​the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, was to inflict as many losses as possible on the French troops through active defense, change the balance of power, save Russian troops for further battles and for the complete defeat of the French army. In accordance with this plan, the battle order of the Russian troops was built.

The position chosen by Kutuzov looked like a straight line running from the Shevardinsky redoubt on the left flank through the large battery on Red Hill, later called the Raevsky battery, the village of Borodino in the center, to the village of Maslovo on the right flank.

On the eve of the main battle, in the early morning of August 24 (September 5), the Russian rearguard under the command of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, located at the Kolotsky Monastery, 8 km west of the location of the main forces, was attacked by the enemy's vanguard. A fierce battle ensued, lasting several hours. After the news was received about the enemy's bypass movement, Konovnitsyn withdrew troops across the Kolocha River and joined the corps that occupied a position near the village of Shevardino.

A detachment of Lieutenant General Gorchakov was stationed near the Shevardino redoubt. In total, under the command of Gorchakov there were 11 thousand troops and 46 guns. To cover the Old Smolensk road, 6 Cossack regiments of Major General Karpov remained.

Napoleon's great army approached Borodino in three columns. The main forces: 3 cavalry corps of Marshal Murat, infantry corps of marshals Davout, Ney, division general Junot and guards - moved along the New Smolensk road. To the north of them, the infantry corps of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, and the cavalry corps of divisional general Pear advanced. The corps of divisional general Poniatovsky was approaching along the Old Smolensk road. 35 thousand infantry and cavalry, 180 guns were sent against the defenders of the fortification.

The enemy, covering the Shevardinsky redoubt from the north and south, tried to encircle the troops of Lieutenant General Gorchakov.

The French twice broke into the redoubt, and each time the infantry of Lieutenant General Neverovsky knocked them out. Twilight was descending on the Borodino field, when the enemy once again managed to seize the redoubt and break into the village of Shevardino, but the Russian reserves approaching from the 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions recaptured the redoubt.

The battle gradually weakened and finally stopped. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, ordered Lieutenant General Gorchakov to withdraw troops to the main forces behind the Semyonovsky ravine.

Starting position

All day on August 25 (September 6), the troops of both sides were preparing for the upcoming battle. The Shevardinsky battle gave the Russian troops the opportunity to win time to complete the defensive work at the Borodino position, made it possible to clarify the grouping of the French forces and the direction of their main attack. Leaving the Shevardinsky redoubt, the 2nd Army pushed back its left flank across the Kamenka River, and the army's battle formation took the form of an obtuse angle. Both flanks of the Russian position occupied 4 km each, but were unequal. The right flank was formed by the 1st Army of Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, consisting of 3 infantry, 3 cavalry corps and reserves (76 thousand people, 480 guns), the front of his position was covered by the Kolocha River. The left flank was formed by the smaller 2nd Army of Infantry General Bagration (34,000 men, 156 guns). In addition, the left flank did not have such strong natural obstacles in front of the front as the right.

After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt on August 24 (September 5), the position of the left flank became even more vulnerable and relied only on 3 unfinished flushes.

Thus, in the center and on the right wing of the Russian position, Kutuzov placed 4 out of 7 infantry corps, as well as 3 cavalry corps and Platov's Cossack corps. According to Kutuzov's plan, such a powerful grouping of troops reliably covered the Moscow direction and at the same time made it possible, if necessary, to strike at the flank and rear of the French troops. The battle order of the Russian army was deep and allowed for wide maneuvers of forces on the battlefield. The first line of battle formation of the Russian troops was made up of infantry corps, the second line - cavalry corps, and the third - reserves. Kutuzov highly appreciated the role of the reserves, pointing out the battle in the disposition: "Reserves should be protected as long as possible, because the general who still retains the reserve is not defeated."

Emperor Napoleon, having discovered on reconnaissance on August 25 (September 6) the weakness of the left flank of the Russian army, decided to deliver the main blow to it. Accordingly, he developed a battle plan. First of all, the task was to capture the left bank of the Kolocha River, for which it was necessary to capture the village of Borodino in the center of the Russian position. This maneuver, according to Napoleon, was supposed to divert the attention of the Russians from the direction of the main attack. Then transfer the main forces of the French army to the right bank of the Kolocha and, relying on Borodino, which has become, as it were, the axis of entry, push the Kutuzov army with the right wing into the corner formed by the confluence of the Kolocha with the Moscow River, and destroy it.

To accomplish the task, Napoleon on the evening of August 25 (September 6) began to concentrate the main forces (up to 95 thousand) in the area of ​​​​the Shevardinsky redoubt. The total number of French troops in front of the front of the 2nd Army reached 115 thousand. For distracting actions during the battle in the center and against the right flank, Napoleon allocated no more than 20 thousand soldiers.

Napoleon understood that it was difficult to cover the Russian troops from the flanks, so he was forced to resort to a frontal attack in order to break through the defenses of the Russian army in a relatively narrow area near the Bagration Flushes, go to the rear of the Russian troops, press them to the Moscow River, destroy them and discover way to Moscow. On the direction of the main attack in the area from the Raevsky battery to the Bagration flushes, which had a length of 2.5 kilometers, the bulk of the French troops were concentrated: the corps of marshals Davout, Ney, Murat, division general Junot, and also the guard. To divert the attention of the Russian troops, the French planned to carry out auxiliary attacks on Utitsa and Borodino. The French army had a deep formation of its battle formation, which allowed it to build up its strike force from the depths.

Sources point to a special plan of Kutuzov, which forced Napoleon to attack precisely the left flank. Kutuzov's task was to determine for the left flank the necessary number of troops that would prevent a breakthrough of his positions. The historian Tarle cites the exact words of Kutuzov: “When the enemy ... uses his last reserves on the left flank of Bagration, then I will send him a hidden army on the flank and rear.”

On the night of August 26 (September 7), 1812, based on the data obtained during the Shevardinsky battle, Kutuzov decided to strengthen the left flank of the Russian troops, for which he ordered the 3rd Infantry Corps to be transferred from the reserve and transferred to the commander of the 2nd Army Bagration Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st, as well as an artillery reserve of 168 guns, placing it near Psarev. As conceived by Kutuzov, the 3rd Corps was to be ready to act on the flank and rear of the French troops. However, Kutuzov's chief of staff, General Bennigsen, led the 3rd Corps out of the ambush and placed it in front of the French troops, which did not correspond to Kutuzov's plan. Bennigsen's actions are justified by his intention to follow a formal battle plan.

The regrouping of part of the Russian forces on the left flank reduced the disproportion of forces and turned the frontal attack, leading, according to Napoleon's plan, to the rapid defeat of the Russian army, into a bloody frontal battle.

The course of the battle

Beginning of the battle

At five thirty minutes in the morning of August 26 (September 7), 1812, more than 100 French guns began shelling the positions of the left flank. Simultaneously with the beginning of the shelling on the center of the Russian position, the village of Borodino, under the cover of morning fog, the division of General Delzon from the corps of Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais moved in a distracting attack. The village was defended by the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment under the command of Colonel Bistrom. For about an hour, the huntsmen fought off a four-fold superior enemy, but under the threat of a bypass from the flank, they were forced to retreat across the bridge across the Kolocha River. The 106th line regiment of the French, encouraged by the occupation of the village of Borodino, followed the rangers across the river. But the guards chasseurs, having received reinforcements, repelled all the enemy’s attempts to break through the Russian defenses here:

“The French, encouraged by the occupation of Borodin, rushed after the chasseurs and almost crossed the river with them, but the guards chasseurs, reinforced by the regiments that came with Colonel Manakhtin and the chasseur brigade of the 24th division under the command of Colonel Vuich, suddenly turned to the enemy and joined with those who came to they were hit with bayonets to help them, and all the French who were on our shore were the victims of their daring undertaking. The bridge on the Kolocha River was completely destroyed, despite strong enemy fire, and the French did not dare to make attempts at the crossing for a whole day and were content with a shootout with our rangers.

Bagration flushes

Fleches on the eve of the battle were occupied by the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division under the command of General Vorontsov. At 6 o'clock in the morning, after a short cannonade, the French attack on Bagration's flushes began. In the first attack, the French divisions of Generals Desse and Kompan, overcoming the resistance of the chasseurs, made their way through the Utitsky forest, but, having barely begun to build on the edge opposite the southernmost flush, they came under shotgun fire and were overturned by the flank attack of the chasseurs.

At 8 o'clock in the morning the French repeated the attack and captured the southern flush. Bagration, to help the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division, sent the 27th Infantry Division of General Neverovsky, as well as the Akhtyrsky Hussars and the Novorossiysk Dragoons to strike on the flank. The French left the flushes, suffering heavy losses in the process. Both divisional generals Desse and Kompan were wounded, while falling from a dead horse, the corps commander, Marshal Davout, was shell-shocked, and almost all brigade commanders were wounded.

For the 3rd attack, Napoleon reinforced the attacking forces with 3 more infantry divisions from the corps of Marshal Ney, 3 cavalry corps of Marshal Murat and artillery, bringing its strength to 160 guns.

Bagration, having determined the direction of the main attack chosen by Napoleon, ordered General Raevsky, who occupied the central battery, to immediately move the entire second line of troops of his 7th Infantry Corps to the flashes, and General Tuchkov 1st to send the 3rd Infantry Division of General Konovnitsyn to the defenders of the flashes . At the same time, in response to the demand for reinforcements, Kutuzov sent the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments, the 1st consolidated grenadier division, 7 regiments of the 3rd cavalry corps and the 1st cuirassier division to Bagration from the reserve of the Life Guards. Additionally, Lieutenant General Baggovut's 2nd Infantry Corps began to move from the far right to the left flag.

After heavy artillery preparation, the French managed to break into the southern flush and into the gaps between the flushes. In a bayonet battle, the division commanders, Generals Neverovsky (27th Infantry) and Vorontsov (2nd Grenadier), were seriously wounded and carried away from the battlefield.

The French were counterattacked by 3 cuirassier regiments, and Marshal Murat almost got captured by the Russian cuirassiers, barely managing to hide in the ranks of the Württemberg infantry. Separate parts of the French were forced to withdraw, but the cuirassiers, not supported by the infantry, were counterattacked by the French cavalry and repulsed. Around 10 a.m., the fleches remained in the hands of the French.

The counterattack of the 3rd Infantry Division Konovnitsyn came to the rescue corrected the situation. In the battle, Major General Tuchkov 4th, who led the attack of the Revel and Murom regiments, died.

At about the same time, the French 8th Westphalian Corps of Divisional General Junot made its way through the Utitsky forest to the rear of the flushes. The situation was saved by the 1st cavalry battery of Captain Zakharov, which at that time was heading to the area of ​​the fleches. Zakharov, seeing the threat to the flashes from the rear, hastily deployed his guns and opened fire on the enemy, who was building up to attack. The 4 infantry regiments of the 2nd corps of Baggovut, who arrived in time, pushed Junot's corps into the Utitsky forest, inflicting significant losses on it. Russian historians claim that during the second offensive, Junot's corps was defeated in a bayonet counterattack, but Westphalian and French sources completely refute this. According to the memoirs of direct participants, Junot's 8th Corps participated in the battle until the very evening.

By the 4th attack at 11 o'clock in the morning, Napoleon concentrated about 45 thousand infantry and cavalry against the flushes, and almost 400 guns. Russian historiography calls this decisive attack the 8th, taking into account the attacks of Junot's corps on the flushes (6th and 7th). Bagration, seeing that the artillery of the fleches could not stop the movement of the French columns, led a general counterattack of the left wing, the total number of troops of which was approximately only 20 thousand people. The onslaught of the first ranks of the Russians was stopped and a fierce hand-to-hand fight ensued, lasting more than an hour. The advantage leaned towards the Russian troops, but during the transition to the counterattack, Bagration, wounded by a fragment of the cannonball in the thigh, fell off his horse and was taken out of the battlefield. The news of the wounding of Bagration instantly swept through the ranks of the Russian troops and had a huge impact on the Russian soldiers. Russian troops began to retreat.

General Konovnitsyn took command of the 2nd Army and was forced to finally leave the fleches behind the French. The remnants of the troops, who almost lost control, were assigned to a new defensive line behind the Semyonovsky ravine, along which the stream of the same name flowed. On the same side of the ravine were untouched reserves - the Life Guards of the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments. Russian batteries of 300 guns kept the entire Semyonovsky creek under fire. The French, seeing a solid wall of Russians, did not dare to attack on the move.

The direction of the main attack of the French shifted from the left flank to the center, to the Rayevsky battery. At the same time, Napoleon did not stop the attack on the left flank of the Russian army. To the south of the village of Semyonovsky, the cavalry corps of Nansouty advanced, north of Latour-Maubourg, while the infantry division of General Friant rushed from the front to Semenovsky. At this time, Kutuzov appointed the commander of the 6th Corps, Infantry General Dokhturov, as the head of the troops of the entire left flank instead of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn. The Life Guards lined up in a square and for several hours repulsed the attacks of Napoleon's "iron horsemen". The cuirassier division of Duki was sent to help the guards in the south, the cuirassier brigade of Borozdin and the 4th cavalry corps of Sivers were sent in the north. The bloody battle ended with the defeat of the French troops, who were thrown back behind the ravine of the Semyonovsky stream.

Russian troops were never completely driven out of Semyonovsky until the end of the battle.

Battle for the Utitsky Kurgan

On the eve of the battle on August 25 (September 6), on the orders of Kutuzov, the 3rd Infantry Corps of General Tuchkov 1st and up to 10 thousand warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias were sent to the area of ​​the Old Smolensk Road. On the same day, 2 more Cossack regiments of Karpov joined the troops. To communicate with the flashes in the Utitsky forest, the chasseur regiments of Major General Shakhovsky took up a position.

According to Kutuzov's plan, Tuchkov's corps was supposed to suddenly attack from an ambush the flank and rear of the enemy, who was fighting for Bagration's flushes. However, in the early morning, Chief of Staff Bennigsen pushed Tuchkov's detachment out of the ambush.

On August 26 (September 7), the 5th Corps of the French army, consisting of Poles under the command of General Poniatowski, moved around the left flank of the Russian position. The troops met in front of Utitsa at about 8 o'clock in the morning, at the moment when General Tuchkov 1st, on the orders of Bagration, had already sent the Konovnitsyn division at his disposal. The enemy, coming out of the forest and pushing the Russian rangers away from the village of Utitsy, found himself on the heights. Having installed 24 guns on them, the enemy opened heavy fire. Tuchkov 1st was forced to retreat to the Utitsky Kurgan - a more advantageous line for himself. Poniatowski's attempts to advance and capture the barrow were unsuccessful.

Around 11 a.m., Poniatowski, having received support from Junot's 8th Infantry Corps on the left, concentrated fire from 40 guns against the Utitsky Kurgan and captured it by storm. This gave him the opportunity to act around the Russian position.

Tuchkov 1st, in an effort to eliminate the danger, took drastic measures to return the mound. He personally organized a counterattack at the head of a regiment of Pavlovsk grenadiers. The mound was returned, but Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1 himself received a mortal wound. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Baggovut, commander of the 2nd Infantry Corps.

Baggovut left the Utitsky mound only after the defenders of the Bagration flushes withdrew behind the Semyonovsky ravine, which made his position vulnerable to flank attacks. He retreated to the new line of the 2nd Army.

Raid of the Cossacks Platov and Uvarov

At the critical moment of the battle, Kutuzov decided to raid the cavalry of the generals from the cavalry of Uvarov and Platov to the rear and flank of the enemy. By 12 noon, Uvarov's 1st Cavalry Corps (28 squadrons, 12 guns, a total of 2,500 horsemen) and Platov's Cossacks (8 regiments) crossed the Kolocha River near the village of Malaya. Uvarov's corps attacked the French infantry regiment and the Italian cavalry brigade of General Ornano in the area of ​​the crossing over the Voina River near the village of Bezzubovo. Platov crossed the Voina River to the north and, going to the rear, forced the enemy to change position.

The simultaneous blow of Uvarov and Platov caused confusion in the enemy camp and forced the troops to be pulled to the left flank, which stormed the Raevsky battery at Kurgan height. The Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, with the Italian Guard and the Pear Corps, were sent by Napoleon against the new threat. Uvarov and Platov returned to the Russian army by 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

The raid of Uvarov and Platov delayed the decisive attack of the enemy for 2 hours, which made it possible to regroup the Russian troops. It was because of this raid that Napoleon did not dare to send his guards into battle. Cavalry sabotage, although it did not cause much damage to the French, caused Napoleon to feel insecure in his own rear.

“Those who were in the battle of Borodino, of course, remember the moment when the stubbornness of attacks decreased along the entire line of the enemy, and we ... could breathe more freely,” wrote military historian General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky.

Raevsky battery

A high mound, located in the center of the Russian position, dominated the surrounding area. A battery was installed on it, which had 18 guns by the beginning of the battle. The defense of the battery was assigned to the 7th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Raevsky.

At about 9 o'clock in the morning, in the midst of the battle for Bagration's fleches, the French launched the first attack on the battery with the forces of the 4th Corps of Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, as well as the divisions of Generals Morand and Gerard from the 1st Corps of Marshal Davout. By influencing the center of the Russian army, Napoleon hoped to hinder the transfer of troops from the right wing of the Russian army to the Bagration fleches and thereby ensure his main forces a quick defeat of the left wing of the Russian army. By the time of the attack, the entire second line of troops of Lieutenant General Raevsky, on the orders of Infantry General Bagration, was withdrawn to defend the flashes. Despite this, the attack was repulsed by artillery fire.

Almost immediately, the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene de Beauharnais, attacked the mound again. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, at that moment brought into battle for the Raevsky battery the entire horse artillery reserve in the amount of 60 guns and part of the light artillery of the 1st Army. However, despite heavy artillery fire, the French of the 30th regiment of Brigadier General Bonami managed to break into the redoubt.

At that moment, the Chief of Staff of the 1st Army, Yermolov, and the Chief of Artillery Kutaisov, who followed Kutuzov's order to the left flank, were near Kurgan Heights. Having led the battalion of the Ufa Infantry Regiment and having attached the 18th Chasseur Regiment to it, Yermolov and Kutaisov hit with bayonets right on the redoubt. At the same time, the regiments of Major Generals Paskevich and Vasilchikov hit from the flanks. The redoubt was recaptured and Brigadier General Bonami was taken prisoner. Of the entire French regiment of 4,100 men under the command of Bonami, only about 300 soldiers remained in service. Major General of Artillery Kutaisov died in the battle for the battery.

Despite the steepness of the sunrise, I ordered the chasseur regiments and the 3rd battalion of the Ufa regiment to attack with bayonets, the favorite weapon of the Russian soldier. The fierce and terrible battle did not last more than half an hour: desperate resistance was met, the elevation was taken away, the guns were returned. Wounded by bayonets, Brigadier General Bonami was spared [captured], there were no prisoners. The damage from our side is very great and is far from commensurate with the number of attacking battalions.

Chief of Staff of the 1st Army Yermolov

Kutuzov, noticing the complete exhaustion of Raevsky's corps, withdrew his troops to the second line. Barclay de Tolly sent Major General Likhachev's 24th Infantry Division to defend the battery.

After the fall of the Bagration fleches, Napoleon abandoned the development of an offensive against the left wing of the Russian army. The original plan to break through the defenses on this wing in order to reach the rear of the main forces of the Russian army lost its meaning, since a significant part of these troops failed in the battles for the fleches themselves, while the defense on the left wing, despite the loss of the fleches, remained intact . Drawing attention to the fact that the situation in the center of the Russian troops had worsened, Napoleon decided to redirect his forces to the Raevsky battery. However, the next attack was delayed for 2 hours, since at that time Russian cavalry and Cossacks appeared in the rear of the French.

Taking advantage of the respite, Kutuzov moved from the right flank to the center the 4th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy and the 2nd Cavalry Corps of Major General Korf. Napoleon ordered to intensify the fire on the infantry of the 4th Corps. According to eyewitnesses, the Russians moved like machines, closing ranks as they went. The path of the 4th Corps could be traced on the trail of the bodies of the dead.

General Miloradovich, commander of the center of the Russian troops, ordered adjutant Bibikov to find Eugene of Württemberg and tell him to go to Miloradovich. Bibikov sought out Yevgeny, but no words could be heard because of the roar of the cannonade, and the adjutant waved his hand, indicating the location of Miloradovich. At that moment, a flying cannonball tore off his arm. Bibikov, falling from his horse, again indicated the direction with his other hand.

According to the commander of the 4th Infantry Division,

General Eugene of Württemberg

The troops of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy joined the left flank of the Semyonovsky and Preobrazhensky Guards regiments, located south of the battery. Behind them were the cavalrymen of the 2nd Corps and the approaching Cavalry and Horse Guards regiments.

At about 3 p.m., the French opened crossfire from the front and flashes of 150 guns at Raevsky's battery and launched an attack. For the attack against the 24th division, 34 cavalry regiments were concentrated. The first to attack was the 2nd Cavalry Corps under the command of Divisional General Auguste Caulaincourt (corps commander Divisional General Montbrun had been killed by this time). Caulaincourt broke through the hellish fire, bypassed the Kurgan Heights on the left and rushed to Raevsky's battery. Met from the front, flanks and rear by stubborn fire from the defenders, the cuirassiers were driven back with huge losses (Raevsky's battery received the nickname "grave of the French cavalry" from the French for these losses). General Auguste Caulaincourt, like many of his associates, found death on the slopes of the mound. Meanwhile, the troops of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, taking advantage of Caulaincourt's attack, which fettered the actions of the 24th division, broke into the battery from the front and flank. A bloody battle took place on the battery. The wounded General Likhachev was taken prisoner. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon Raevsky's battery fell.

Having received the news of the fall of Raevsky's battery, Napoleon moved to the center of the Russian army and came to the conclusion that its center, despite the retreat and contrary to the assurances of the retinue, was not shaken. After that, he refused requests to bring the guards into battle. The French attack on the center of the Russian army stopped.

As of 18:00, the Russian army was still firmly located in the Borodino position, and the French troops did not manage to achieve decisive success in any of the directions. Napoleon, who believed that "a general who does not keep fresh troops by the day following the battle, will almost always be beaten," never brought his guard into battle. Napoleon, as a rule, brought the guards into battle at the very last moment, when the victory was prepared by his other troops and when it was necessary to deliver the last decisive blow to the enemy. However, assessing the situation by the end of the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon saw no signs of victory, so he did not take the risk of bringing his last reserve into battle.

End of the battle

After the Raevsky battery was occupied by the French troops, the battle began to subside. On the left flank, Divisional General Poniatowski carried out unsuccessful attacks against the 2nd Army under the command of General Dokhturov (the commander of the 2nd Army, General Bagration, was seriously wounded by that time). In the center and on the right flank, the matter was limited to artillery fire until 7 pm. Following Kutuzov's report, they claimed that Napoleon had retreated, withdrawing troops from the captured positions. Having retreated to Gorki (where there was one more fortification), the Russians began to prepare for a new battle. However, at 12 o'clock at night, an order from Kutuzov arrived, canceling preparations for the battle scheduled for the next day. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army decided to withdraw the army beyond Mozhaisk in order to make up for human losses and better prepare for new battles. Napoleon, faced with the steadfastness of the enemy, was in a depressed and anxious mood, as evidenced by his adjutant Armand Caulaincourt (brother of the deceased general Auguste Caulaincourt):

The emperor repeated many times that he could not understand how the redoubts and positions, which were captured with such courage and which we so stubbornly defended, gave us only a small number of prisoners. He many times asked the officers who arrived with reports where the prisoners were to be taken. He even sent to the appropriate points to make sure that no other prisoners had been taken. These successes without prisoners, without trophies did not satisfy him ...

The enemy carried off the vast majority of his wounded, and we got only those prisoners of which I have already spoken, 12 guns of the redoubt ... and three or four others taken during the first attacks.

General Armand Caulaincourt

The result of the battle

Russian casualty estimates

The number of losses of the Russian army has been repeatedly revised by historians. Different sources give different numbers:

According to the 18th bulletin of the Great Army (dated September 10, 1812), 12-13 thousand were killed, 5 thousand prisoners, 40 generals were killed, wounded or captured, 60 captured guns. The total losses are estimated at approximately 40-50 thousand.

F. Segur, who was at Napoleon's headquarters, gives completely different data on trophies: from 700 to 800 prisoners and about 20 guns.

A document entitled "Description of the battle at the village of Borodino, which took place on August 26, 1812" (presumably compiled by K. F. Tol), which in many sources is called "Kutuzov's report to Alexander I" and dated August 1812, indicates 25,000 people in common losses, including 13 killed and wounded generals.

38-45 thousand people, including 23 generals. The inscription "45 thousand" is carved on the Main Monument on the Borodino field, erected in 1839, and is also indicated on the 15th wall of the gallery of military glory of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.

58 thousand killed and wounded, up to 1000 prisoners, from 13 to 15 guns. The data on losses are given here on the basis of a summary of the duty general of the 1st Army immediately after the battle, the losses of the 2nd Army were estimated by historians of the 19th century quite arbitrarily at 20 thousand. These data were no longer considered reliable at the end of the 19th century, they are not taken into account in the ESBE, which indicates the number of losses "up to 40 thousand." Modern historians believe that the report on the 1st Army also contained information about the losses of the 2nd Army, since there were no officers responsible for the reports in the 2nd Army.

42.5 thousand people - the losses of the Russian army in the book by S. P. Mikheev, published in 1911.

According to the surviving statements from the RGVIA archive, the Russian army lost 39,300 people killed, wounded and missing (21,766 in the 1st Army, 17,445 in the 2nd Army), but taking into account the fact that the data of the statements for various reasons is incomplete (does not include the loss of the militia and the Cossacks), historians usually increase this number to 44-45 thousand people. According to Troitsky, the data of the Military Registration Archive of the General Staff give the figure of 45.6 thousand people.

French casualty estimates

A significant part of the documentation of the Grand Army was lost during the retreat, so the assessment of French losses is extremely difficult. The question of the total losses of the French army remains open.

According to the 18th bulletin of the Grand Army, the French lost 2,500 killed and about 7,500 wounded, 6 generals killed (2 divisional, 4 brigade) and 7-8 wounded. The total losses are estimated at approximately 10 thousand people. In the future, these data were repeatedly questioned, and at present, none of the researchers consider them reliable.

“Description of the battle at the village of Borodino”, made on behalf of M. I. Kutuzov (presumably K. F. Tol) and dated August 1812, indicates more than 40,000 total losses, including 42 killed and wounded generals .

The most common in French historiography, the number of losses of the Napoleonic army of 30 thousand is based on the calculations of the French officer Denier, who served as an inspector at the General Staff of Napoleon, who determined the total losses of the French for 3 days of the battle of Borodino at 49 generals, 37 colonels and 28 thousand lower ranks, from of these, 6,550 were killed and 21,450 were wounded. These figures were classified by order of Marshal Berthier due to a discrepancy with the data from Napoleon's bulletin on losses of 8-10 thousand and were published for the first time in 1842. The figure cited in the literature of 30 thousand was obtained by rounding Denier's data (taking into account the fact that Denier did not take into account 1176 soldiers of the Great Army who were captured).

Later studies have shown that Denier's data are grossly underestimated. So, Denier gives the number of 269 killed officers of the Grand Army. However, in 1899, the French historian Martignen, on the basis of surviving documents, established that at least 460 officers known by surname were killed. Subsequent research increased this number to 480. Even French historians admit that "since the information given in the statement about the generals and colonels who were out of action at Borodino is inaccurate and underestimated, it can be assumed that the rest of Denier's figures are based on incomplete data."

Retired Napoleonic General Segur determined the losses of the French at Borodino at 40,000 soldiers and officers. A. Vasiliev considers Segur's assessment tendentiously overestimated, pointing out that the general wrote during the reign of the Bourbons, while not denying her some objectivity.

In Russian literature, the number of French casualties was often given as 58,478. This number is based on the false information of the defector Alexander Schmidt, who allegedly served in the office of Marshal Berthier. In the future, this figure was picked up by patriotic researchers, indicated on the Main Monument.

For modern French historiography, the traditional estimate of French losses is 30 thousand, with 9-10 thousand killed. The Russian historian A. Vasiliev points out, in particular, that the number of losses of 30 thousand is achieved by the following methods of calculation: losses in avant-garde affairs and the approximate number of sick and backward, and b) indirectly - by comparison with the Battle of Wagram, equal in number and in the approximate number of losses among the command staff, despite the fact that the total number of French losses in it, according to Vasilyev, is precisely known (33,854 people, including 42 generals and 1,820 officers; under Borodino, according to Vasiliev, 1,792 command personnel are considered to be lost, of which 49 are generals).

The losses of the generals of the parties in killed and wounded amounted to 49 generals among the French, including 8 killed: 2 divisional (Auguste Caulaincourt and Montbrun) and 6 brigade. The Russians lost 26 generals, but it should be noted that only 73 active Russian generals participated in the battle, while in the French army there were 70 generals only in the cavalry. The French brigadier general was closer to the Russian colonel than to the major general.

However, V.N. Zemtsov showed that Vasiliev's calculations are unreliable, since they are based on inaccurate data. So, according to the lists compiled by Zemtsov, “on September 5-7, 1928 officers and 49 generals were killed and wounded,” that is, the total loss of command personnel amounted to 1,977 people, and not 1,792, as Vasiliev believed. The comparison of data on the personnel of the Great Army for September 2 and 20, carried out by Vasiliev, also, according to Zemtsov, gave incorrect results, since the wounded who returned to duty after the battle were not taken into account. In addition, Vasiliev did not take into account all parts of the French army. Zemtsov himself, using a technique similar to that used by Vasiliev, estimated the French losses for September 5-7 at 38.5 thousand people. The figure used by Vasilyev for the loss of French troops at Wagram, 33,854 people, is also controversial - for example, the English researcher Chandler estimated them at 40 thousand people.

It should be noted that to the several thousand killed should be added those who died from wounds, and their number was enormous. In the Kolotsk monastery, where the main military hospital of the French army was located, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th line regiment C. Francois, 3/4 of the wounded died in the 10 days following the battle. French encyclopedias believe that among the 30 thousand victims of Borodin, 20.5 thousand died and died of wounds.

The overall result of the battle

The battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century and the bloodiest of all that came before it. According to the most conservative estimates of cumulative losses, about 6,000 people died or were injured on the field every hour, the French army lost about 25% of its composition, the Russian - about 30%. From the French side, 60 thousand cannon shots were fired, from the Russian side - 50 thousand. It is no coincidence that Napoleon called the battle of Borodino his greatest battle, although its results are more than modest for a great commander accustomed to victories.

The death toll, counting those who died of wounds, was much higher than the official number killed on the battlefield; the victims of the battle should also include the wounded, who later died. In the autumn of 1812 - in the spring of 1813, the Russians burned and buried the bodies that remained unburied on the field. According to military historian General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, a total of 58,521 dead bodies were buried and burned. Russian historians and, in particular, employees of the museum-reserve on the Borodino field, estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48-50 thousand people. According to A. Sukhanov, 49,887 dead were buried on the Borodino field and in the surrounding villages (without including French burials in the Kolotsky Monastery).

Both commanders chalked up the victory. Napoleon's point of view is expressed in his memoirs:

The battle of Moscow is my greatest battle: it is a battle of giants. The Russians had 170,000 men under arms; they had all the advantages behind them: numerical superiority in infantry, cavalry, artillery, excellent position. They were defeated! Fearless heroes, Ney, Murat, Poniatowski - that's who belonged to the glory of this battle. How many great, how many wonderful historical deeds will be noted in it! She will tell how these brave cuirassiers captured the redoubts, hacking the gunners on their guns; she will tell of the heroic self-sacrifice of Montbrun and Caulaincourt, who found their death in the height of their glory; she will tell how our gunners, open on a level field, fired against more numerous and well-fortified batteries, and about these fearless infantrymen who, at the most critical moment, when the general who commanded them wanted to encourage them, shouted to him: “Calm down, all your soldiers have decided to win today, and they will win!”

This paragraph was dictated in 1816. A year later, in 1817, Napoleon described the Battle of Borodino as follows:

With an army of 80,000, I rushed at the Russians, who consisted of 250,000, armed to the teeth and defeated them ...

Kutuzov in his report to Emperor Alexander I wrote:

The battle of the 26th was the most bloody of all those that are known in modern times. The place of the battle was completely won by us, and the enemy then retreated to the position in which he came to attack us.

Emperor Alexander I was not deceived about the actual state of affairs, but in order to support the hopes of the people for a speedy end to the war, he announced the battle of Borodino as a victory. Prince Kutuzov was promoted to field marshal general with an award of 100 thousand rubles. Barclay de Tolly received the Order of St. George of the 2nd degree, Prince Bagration - 50 thousand rubles. Fourteen generals received the Order of St. George, 3rd class. All the lower ranks who were in the battle were granted 5 rubles each.

Since then, in Russian, and after it in Soviet (except for the period of 1920-1930s) historiography, an attitude has been established towards the Battle of Borodino as an actual victory for the Russian army. In our time, a number of Russian historians also traditionally insist that the outcome of the Battle of Borodino was uncertain, and the Russian army won a "moral victory" in it.

Foreign historians, who in our time have been joined by a number of their Russian colleagues, regard Borodino as an undoubted victory for Napoleon. As a result of the battle, the French occupied some of the advanced positions and fortifications of the Russian army, while maintaining reserves, pushed the Russians back from the battlefield, and ultimately forced them to retreat and leave Moscow. At the same time, no one disputes that the Russian army retained its combat effectiveness and morale, that is, Napoleon never achieved his goal - the complete defeat of the Russian army.

The main achievement of the general battle at Borodino was that Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army, and in the objective conditions of the entire Russian campaign of 1812, the absence of a decisive victory predetermined the final defeat of Napoleon.

The battle of Borodino marked a crisis in the French strategy of a decisive general battle. During the battle, the French failed to destroy the Russian army, force Russia to capitulate and dictate peace terms. The Russian troops, on the other hand, inflicted significant damage on the enemy army and were able to save forces for the coming battles.

Memory

Borodino field

The widow of one of the generals who died in the battle founded a nunnery on the territory of the Bagration Flches, in which the charter prescribed “to offer prayers ... for Orthodox leaders and soldiers who in these places for the faith, the sovereign and the fatherland laid down their belly in battle in the summer of 1812” . On the eighth anniversary of the battle on August 26, 1820, the first temple of the monastery was consecrated. The temple was erected as a monument of military glory.

By 1839, the lands in the central part of the Borodino field were bought by Emperor Nicholas I. In 1839, at the Kurgan height, on the site of the Raevsky battery, a monument was solemnly opened, and the ashes of Bagration were reburied at its base. Opposite the Raevsky Battery, a gatehouse was built for veterans who were supposed to take care of the monument and the grave of Bagration, keep a Book of Visitors' Records, show visitors the battle plan, finds from the battlefield.

In the year of the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the battle, the gatehouse was rebuilt, 33 monuments to corps, divisions, regiments of the Russian army were installed on the territory of the Borodino field.

On the territory of the modern museum-reserve with an area of ​​110 km² there are more than 200 monuments and memorable places. Every year on the first Sunday of September on the Borodino field, more than a thousand participants recreate episodes of the Battle of Borodino during the military-historical reconstruction.

At the beginning of the 19th century, prints depicting various episodes of the Patriotic War of 1812-1814 became widespread. A significant part of them was devoted to the Battle of Borodino.

The lithograph by the artist Viktor, made after a painting by the German artist Peter von Hess, shows a wide panorama of the battle, showing numerous participants in the battle.

In the center of the composition is the moment of the wounding of General P.I. Bagration, the commander of the left flank of the Russian positions, which met the main blow of the Napoleonic troops. It happened around noon near the village of Semyonovskoye.

battle of Borodino - the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812, one of the bloodiest battles of the XIX century. It took place on August 26-27 (September 7-8, New Style) 125 km west of Moscow near the village of Borodino. In a fierce battle, the Russian army under the command of General of Infantry M. I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov and the Great Army of the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte met. About 300 thousand people participated in this battle on both sides with 1200 artillery pieces. For six hours, Russian troops fought off fierce enemy attacks. Losses were huge on both sides - more than 38 thousand Russian soldiers and 58 thousand French fell. “This day will remain an eternal monument to the courage and excellent courage of the Russian soldiers, where all the infantry, cavalry and artillery fought desperately. Everyone had a desire to die on the spot and not give in to the enemy,” M. I. Kutuzov gave such a high assessment to the Russian army. Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte later recalled: "Of all my battles, the most terrible is that I gave near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory in it, and the Russians were called invincible."

The Russian army retreated, but retained its combat capability. Having surrendered Moscow to the enemy, M. I. Kutuzov launched a "small war" with the forces of the regular army and partisan detachments. By the end of December 1812, the remnants of Napoleon's army were expelled from Russia.

The Day of the Battle of Borodino on September 8 has been celebrated since 1995 as the Day of Russia's military glory.

Peter von Hess (Peter von Hess, 1792-1871) - Bavarian court painter, battle painter. Worked in Munich. The son of the court engraver K. E. K. Hess. Member of the Academies of Arts in Munich, Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg.

At first, he painted small paintings from the life of a soldier and the common people, later he executed large multi-figure canvases from the era of 1812-1815: "The Battle of Bar-sur-Aube" (1817), "Clash of French dragoons and Austrian hussars", "Don Cossacks with prisoners French", "Crossing of the Kirghiz and Cossacks across the Rhine" (all 1819), "Defense of the bridge at Hanau" (1820), "Bivouac of the Austrian troops" (1823), "Attack of the Austrian lancers on the French van" (1829), etc.

He traveled to Vienna, Switzerland and Italy. The result of a trip to Greece in 1831 was a series of paintings representing the main episodes of the Greek struggle for independence.

In 1839, at the invitation of Nicholas I, he visited Russia, where he received an order for a series of paintings about the most important battles of 1812. Together with a connoisseur of uniforms, General L. I. Kil, he visited the battlefields and made many natural sketches. "The Battle of Borodino" is one of the canvases created in 1840-1857. and stored in the State Hermitage. (10 out of 12 paintings have been preserved). P. Hess also owns large canvases "The Battle of Leipzig" (1854), "The Battle of Austerlitz" (1860). His huge, bright, worked out in the smallest detail works were highly valued by contemporaries. They are distinguished by drama, liveliness of the composition and individual groups, expressive characteristics.