Memoirs of a WWII veteran Kasatonov Philip Efimovich (continued). Memoirs of a WWII veteran Kasatonov Filipp Efimovich (continued) 615 Infantry Regiment

On June 22, the division was part of the 21st Army of the Volga Military District. Army from mid-June 41g. were in the process of being transferred to the border of the Dnieper River. By the beginning of the war, only the forward echelons began to unload in the area of ​​​​st. Dobrush and Novo Belitsa.

27/6/1941 occupies the line of defense along the eastern bank of the Dnieper in the Rogachev area.

By July 3, the division, consisting of 21A, occupies a line along the banks of the Dnieper in the Rogachev, Zhlobin sector, where it became part of 63SK (167, 117 and 61 sd 318 gap BM, 420 cap) commander L.G. Petrovsky. Until mid-July, the division held the defense along the Dnieper in the district. Rogachev.

In connection with the transition of Guderian's tank group to the offensive and the capture by the enemy of bridgeheads on the Dnieper, a decision was made to counterattack in the direction of Bobruisk by forces of 21A. The timing of the start of our counter-offensive was extremely well chosen. The main forces of the XXIVMK enemy crossed the Dnieper, but the infantry corps had not yet approached. Received at about 12 noon on July 12, the order to go on the offensive was for the 63rd rifle corps a complete surprise, since before that there was not only no preliminary order, but even the most general orientation on the immediate possible tasks. According to this order, the corps was to launch an offensive with the main forces from the line of the Dnieper. There was about a day left to prepare the troops for the offensive, regroup and pull up units. The situation was complicated by the fact that parts of the corps were on the defensive on a broad front.

In the current situation, L. G. Petrovsky decided to force the Dnieper on a wide front, having the battle order of the corps in one echelon. In the center, on the Rogachev-Luchin sector, the Dnieper was crossed by the 167th Rifle Division, which had the task of capturing Rogachev and subsequently advancing on Volosevichi. On the morning of July 13, with the beginning of an intensive twenty-minute artillery preparation, units of the 63rd Corps began crossing the Dnieper. Division forcing the Dnieper in two regimental sectors: 520th rifle regiment(regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Yakovlevich Nekrasov) was crossing at a blown up wooden bridge near Rogachev. The 615th Infantry Regiment (regiment commander Colonel Efim Georgievich Golobokov) aimed to divert the enemy's attention from the main direction by active actions using a smoke screen on the widest possible front. The means of crossing were improvised and boats that the regimental commanders had. The task of the 520th regiment was to capture Rogachev, the 615th regiment - to capture a bridgehead with a depth of 1.5-2 km.

A lot of rafts and driftwood have accumulated near the western bank of the Dnieper. It was decided, under the cover of artillery fire, to send a detachment to capture this forest in order to build an assault bridge for the infantry from it. The lack of crossing facilities greatly slowed down the transfer of units to the right bank. On July 14, parts of the division completely cleared Rogachev of the enemy and continued the offensive. The enemy, not having retreated in the direction of Bobruisk, conducting holding battles. On July 5 and 16, units of the 63rd Corps continued to fight their way to the west, preventing the Nazis from lingering on advantageous lines and repulsing their repeated counterattacks. Only on the western bank of the Drut River did our troops meet with the forward units of 255pd LIIIAK. This is where the offensive actually ended. The approaching units of LIIIAK stopped the further advance of 63SK, however, these infantry divisions were turned off from the fight in the direction of the main attack of 2Tgr.

In the 20th of July, 63SK made another attempt to go on the offensive against Bobruisk, but it was repulsed by the enemy. From that time until the beginning of August, Petrovsky's corps defended on the reached line a few kilometers from the Dnieper to the west of Zhlobin and Rogachev. August 6 XXXXIIIAK enemy (260 and 134pd) launched an offensive against the left-flank 232sd on both banks of the Berezina. By August 11, the enemy's 134th infantry division broke through to the Dnieper near Streshin. There was a threat that the enemy would reach the rear communications not only of 63SK but of the entire 21A Gordov. At the same time, the enemy completed preparations for an offensive in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozha. Serious danger hung over the entire 21A.

On August 12, XII and XIIIAK of the enemy launched a decisive offensive in the Gomel direction, striking west of Propoisk. The weakened units of 67SK were unable to hold back the enemy, and the 67SK front was broken through. The command of 21A was unable to assess the scale of the threat looming over the army and hoped to contain the enemy with a counterattack. To do this, on the night of August 13, 167sd was withdrawn from the front west of the Dnieper and transferred by road to the Dovsk region. On the morning of August 13, the division, supported by units of the 67th Corps, launched a counterattack. 167th Rifle Division, 696th Infantry Division, four tanks, two armored vehicles, concentrated in the Dovsk region, under the personal leadership of the commander of 21A Gordov, went on the offensive in the northeast direction, the saddle highway Dovsk, Propoisk, having the task of encircling and defeating the enemy in the Nov. Bych, Rekta, Bolotnoye, Berezovk. However, this counterattack was too late, as the neighboring 187th and 117th rifle divisions had already left their positions. The enemy struck at the open right flank of the 167th division, and she was also forced to retreat. By 22:00 on August 13, motorcycle units and armored vehicles of the enemy reached the Merkulovichi area on the Dovsk-Gomel highway.

On August 14, the enemy introduced 1kd into the breakthrough, which captured Chechersk, where the headquarters of 21A was located. Control of 21A units was finally lost. Parts remaining under the control of 67SK began to retreat to the south. By this time, the enemy had already transported three XXXXIIIAK divisions from Streshin across the Dnieper and reached communications 63 and 67SK. On August 15, units of 63SK began to leave their bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper and cross to the eastern bank. On the same day, units 267 and 112pd of the enemy united in the Buda-Koshelevo area, thereby completing the encirclement of 63 and 67SK in the area east of Zhlobin. On August 16, Lieutenant General L. G. Petrovsky decided to break out of the encirclement in the direction of Skepnya, Gubichi to join the 3rd Army. The breakthrough began on the morning of 17 August. During the breakthrough, only units of the 154th Rifle Division managed to break through. From the rest of the encircled divisions, only separate groups came out. Commander of 63SK Lieutenant General L.G. Petrovsky died during a breakthrough from the encirclement. Commander of the 167th Division, Major General V.S. Rakovsky left the encirclement in the fall of 1941. took command of the 53rd brig.

I, Philip Efimovich Kasatonov, was born on June 15, 1924 in the village of Leski, Prokhorovsky (Belenikhinsky) district, Belgorod (Kursk) region, into a poor peasant family. The war divided my life, like many Soviet people, into three periods: before war time, war and post-war period.

Youth fell on hard poor time 30s, grew up in a family with a very low income of 8 people. In order to somehow feed the family, my father, mother and two aunts were forced to go to work for railway. It was very difficult to survive during the period of widespread, sometimes forced, collectivization, during the years of crop failures, famine and poverty. From poor nutrition, diseases followed one another: night blindness, malaria, bellies swelled up. But, like all my peers, I had a desire for life, there was a desire to achieve something, to get the right profession.

In 1933 I went to school in my native village, I went late, overgrown.

In 1940 he graduated from the 7th grade with honors. In March 1941 I went to work as an apprentice in a bank. And on June 22, 1941, further plans to study were drastically changed by the war. The war that changed my fate took away the people closest to me: during the bombing, my mother, aunt and grandmother were killed.

After the defeat of the Germans near Moscow and in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army, advancing to the west, replenished its ranks with teenage volunteers along the way. In February 1943 I, among the same 18-year-old teenagers, went to the front and was enlisted in the combat crew of the 120 mm battery. mortars 465 rifle regiment 167 rifle division gunner.

During the Great Patriotic War, the 167th Infantry Division had a glorious combat path. In September 1941, the division of the first formation fought in the area of ​​​​the city of Rogachev, suffered big losses, and when exiting the environment, it was not possible to restore it. The second formation of the division began in December 1941 near the city of Sukhoi Log Sverdlovsk region, from where in April 1942 she was sent to the active 38th Army of the Voronezh Front. The 167th Rifle Division included: the 465th Rifle Regiment, the 520th Rifle Regiment, the 615th Rifle Regiment, the 576th Artillery Regiment, the 177th Anti-Tank Fighter Battalion and the 133rd Mortar Battalion. The division entered the battles on July 21, 1942 near the village of Bolshaya Vereika north of Voronezh. In January 1943, the division took part in the battles for Kastornoye.

In September 1943, for the liberation of the city of Sumy, the division received the name "Sumskaya", and for the liberation of the city of Romny, it was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. At the end of September 1943, the division crossed the Dnieper north of Kiev. For the liberation of the city of Kiev, the division received the name "Kiev".

In February 1944, the division took part in the encirclement and destruction of the Korsun-Shevchenko group of Nazis. In early August 1944, the division liberated the city of Drohobych and strove for the Carpathians. The 520th rifle regiment of the division received the name "Drogobych".

Having overcome the Carpathians, the division took part in the battles in Poland and Czechoslovakia, liberating the cities of Kosice, Nowy Targ, Bielsko Byala and Moravska Ostrava. For distinction in these battles, the division was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner. The division ended the war on Czechoslovak soil on the outskirts of the city of Prague.

There were many separate combat episodes at the front - this was daily throughout the war. I would like to dwell on especially significant ones.

1. I received my first baptism of fire in March 1943 near the city of Sumy on the defensive in the area with. Kiyanitsa, Pushkarevka during the artillery raid. German cannons and mortars "Vanyusha" incessantly bombed our battery. I was 18.5 years old. March to September 1943 as part of the battery 120 mm. mortars of the 465th rifle regiment of the 167th rifle division near the city of Sumy, in the area with. Kiyanitsy, Pushkarevki, were on the defensive. Pursuing the retreating German troops, wedged along the front, the Voronezh Front, including the 38th Army, from Belgorod and the Central Front from the Orel, formed the Kursk Bulge. The enemy sought to cut off, surround and destroy the grouping of Soviet troops located on the Kursk salient. The Germans failed to do this. In the Battle of Kursk in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka field from the south and in the area of ​​Ponyri from the north, Soviet troops won a complete victory. After the end of the Battle of Kursk in September, our division went on the offensive and liberated on September 2, 1943. Sumy, and on September 19, 1943. Romny. The division developed a further offensive towards the Dnieper River in the direction of Kiev.

2. Forcing in October 1943 of the Dnieper River. The first attempt to force was just opposite the city of Vyshgorod. A lot of soldiers died then, for many the mighty river and its banks became the last refuge. The crossing attempt failed.

After that, our division was transferred at night to the right of Kiev in the Lyutezh direction. They crossed the Dnieper early in the morning. Who was transported on what: on boards, on the slopes of wheels from cars, and our battery, along with materiel, ammunition and horses, on ferries. The enemy continuously bombed the crossing. People, equipment, horses went under water. After the successful crossing of the river by the first groups of soldiers, a pontoon bridge was built, through which they let through to the other side of the river most technology and manpower. And in the morning of the next day, the bridge was destroyed by an air raid by German bombers. The enemy went on a psychic attack, the tanks pressed us to the Dnieper. The Germans understood what it would cost them to capture the right bank of the river by Soviet troops. They strongly resisted. But with courage Soviet soldiers and officers, the Germans failed to overturn the crossing units into the river. During the battle, a warrior develops such excitement, such a powerful force, and he accomplishes a feat. A warrior has two feelings that are inextricably linked - this is love for the Motherland and hatred for the enemy. This is how heroes are born. With machine guns in their hands, both infantrymen and artillerymen, passing tanks, set fire to them from behind with grenades, and the enemy infantry cut off from the equipment was destroyed. And so held back a few onslaughts. At the same time, they even expanded the bridgehead. After capturing the bridgehead, the main attack was launched. The situation required a quick throw of our troops. The division went on the offensive against Kiev.

November 6, 1943 from the side of m. Pushcha Voditsa, Svyatoshino, Kiev was liberated. In battles, one after another, the numbers of the calculation failed. I had to perform the duties of a gunner and loader. On the outskirts of Kiev, we repulsed 13 German counterattacks per day. For crossing the river Dnieper and the liberation of Kiev, I was awarded the medal "For Courage" by order of the 465th regiment No. 038 / N of 12/20/1943. It was my first and most expensive award for fighting.

3. I would like to recall one episode of the defeat of the Korsun-Shevchenko group of Germans.

January 13, 1944 our 465th Infantry Regiment was given the task of capturing the main road behind enemy lines, which passed through the village. Tikhonovka and Tikhonov Forest, thus blocking the path of a large military group of Germans, who were going to help to break through the ring in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsk region. We secretly made our way through swamps knee-deep in water, the most impassable places, so that the enemy would not expose the plans of our command. Two days after the capture of the road by our regiment, the Germans take measures to defeat our regiment. They kick us out of the village. Tikhonovka. The regiment remains only in the forest, through which this road also went. But we continued to hold back the onslaught of the enemy, who was striving for his encircled grouping. As a result of this, our regiment, in turn, is completely surrounded in the Tikhonov forest. No power, running out of shells, mines and ammunition. The command sent planes, and everything that was missing was dropped to us by parachute. The wind carried the parachutes to the side, and part of the cargo fell to the enemy. And so it went on for 15 days, but we did not leave this road. Of course, there were very large losses in manpower and equipment. During an enemy air raid, the number of aircraft reached 100 or more, continuous artillery bombardments. Tikhonovsky forest turned into a living hell. No mines, no shells. Each fighter left one cartridge for himself in case of a German breakthrough. Our situation was on the brink of disaster.

At the scheduled hours, as it turned out after taking the "tongue", the enemy planned to squeeze the ring from all sides, but the commander of the 167th division in which we were, General Melnikov, gave the order to make a tank attack 2 hours earlier and break the ring and, thus, create exit from the environment. We have completed the task assigned to us. The Korsun-Shevchenkovsky group of Germans was defeated.

In battles in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Glinna 07/19/1944. and for the expansion of the bridgehead on the right bank of the Dniester River on 08/03/1944. near the village of Krupsko, I received the second award - the order "Glory III Art." by order of the 167th rifle division No. 064 / N of 09/21/1944. It was the boundless courage and heroism of the soldiers of the 465th regiment.

4. The battles for overcoming the Carpathian ridge remained in my memory. It happened in very difficult conditions. Height up to 2.5-3 thousand meters above sea level. The materiel was transported on horseback, and it was very difficult to make the horses, and even with a load, climb to such a height. Everything had to be dragged up by the hands of the soldiers - both materiel and ammunition. It was still necessary to dig in by the fighters themselves and install mortars. In the trenches we stood in the water. Night, rain, feet in the water, and in the morning - frost. Frozen greatcoats on the shoulders of the soldiers hung flared. Fights were fought for each hill. There were moments when 8-10 people remained in the entire battery out of 60 after the battles.

For participating in offensive battles south of the city of Sanok 09/09/1944 and in the battle for locality Plonna 09/14/1944, I was awarded the Order "Glory II Art." by order of the 1st Guards Army No. 059 / N of 10/24/1944. and was encouraged by five days of rest in a front-line rest house five kilometers from the front.

5. I remember when I was wounded, was in the medical unit, the battery commander Captain Musatov came to me every day (I was a 120 mm mortar gunner) and hurried the doctors to heal me faster, to return me to duty.

Without exaggeration, I will say that my mortar was in first place in shooting at enemy points, their serifs and destruction. Very often the chief of artillery of the regiment after the battle came from the observation post to the battery and, before the formation, announced gratitude for great help infantry, especially when taking the "tongue" and destroying firing points.

And how we crossed the borders of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Germany, liberated the cities! Residents greeted our soldiers with flowers - especially in Czechoslovakia. They arranged dances in the squares, had fun, treated the soldiers-liberators. Our stops were short, several hours.

I remember that during the liberation of the port industrial city of Moravsk Ostrava (Czechoslovakia) there were fierce battles. The enemy strongly resisted. The city stands on the Oder River, almost on the border of two states - Germany and Czechoslovakia. In order to capture this city, it was necessary to cross the Oder River twice in different places: the first time on 04/20/1945, and the second on 04/30/1945, at the time of the liberation of the city itself. During the fighting, one of the mortars of our battery failed, the load of the battle on my mortar crew increased. In addition, in my calculation, two fighters were wounded. Moreover, it was necessary to beat off the counterattacking enemy machine gunners attacking the firing positions of the battery.

In fierce battles for the capture of the city of Moravska Ostrava (Czechoslovakia) with repeated, fierce counterattacks by the enemy, I was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War II Art. by order of the 107th rifle corps No. 039 / N of 07/03/1945.

Military orders were awarded daily, and we did not always know for which military actions. And now, after 62 years, I learn information from fellow soldiers who worked at the headquarters that I was for the liberation of Moravian Ostrava awarded the order"Glory I Art."! The mistake of awarding me the command of the 107th Rifle Corps with the Order of the Patriotic War II Art. instead of the Order "Glory I Art." was that upon receipt of the material on awarding me with the order "Glory of the 1st class" from the 167th Infantry Division, the documents should have been sent to the army headquarters. But the 107th Corps was transferred from one army to another, transferred from the 4th Ukrainian Front to the Carpathian Front and redeployed from the city of Prague to the Ternopil region, the city of Borshchov. In the same period, the 167th Rifle Division was to be disbanded. And then the command of the 107th Corps decided to reward me within the framework of their authority.

That's how I didn't full cavalier Order of Glory: Although for a soldier, the awarding of this order is the highest assessment of his military feat.

Comrade Stalin, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, was thanked for the liberation of 11 main cities of Ukraine, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

For courage, steadfastness and courage shown in the fight against the Nazi invaders and in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Victory Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st class.

In 1999 awarded the Order of Ukraine "For Courage".

At the end of the war, the 167th Rifle Division returned to the town of Borshchov, Ternopil region, and was located at the military camp.

In December 1945 began the selection of soldiers for training in a military school. From a battery of 120 mm. mortars, where I served, they send two people - me and my front-line friend, Ukhaty Vladimir - to the Ryazan Automobile School for accelerated training (for 3 years under the wartime program), and a year later they are transferred to the peacetime program - 5 years. In March 1947 military personnel 1924 the year of birth fell under demobilization, and after studying for 1 year and 3 months, I agreed to it. The fatigue of the war years affected, I just wanted a peaceful life and profession.

After demobilization, he returned to his homeland in his native village of Leski, joined in civilian life. Since 1947 and up to 1993 worked in the state bank system - 46 years.

Award sheets

Transnational Political Spaces: Phenomenon and Practice

In the book, modern international practice considered through the prism of the concept of political space. It is understood as a set of rules, principles and values ​​that guide political behavior in a certain human community. In this case, we are talking about a transnational space, where the usual framework of national policy is overcome horizontally (post-Soviet, European and transatlantic space) and/or vertically (multilevel governance). Consequence...

I wholeheartedly welcome you! Igor Vasilyevich, good afternoon. Good afternoon. Let's continue. Yes. Today we will continue the topic of barrage detachments, which, according to the beliefs of our accusers, always stood behind the backs of the Red Army and, accordingly, drove them into battle, because otherwise our people for some reason did not go into battle for Stalin. Or they shot in advance, like Mikhalkov's. We didn't get there yet, we were already shot. Yes. These are the beliefs we now have. And, unfortunately, it must be said that such ideas are very common. But, as we already found out last time, reality, as always, is very different from what the whistleblowers are telling us. That is, in reality, we really did have barrage detachments, and there were several types of them, which were created at different times and had different subordination. As we remember, there were also barrage detachments at the 3rd departments, which later became Special Departments (that is, the NKVDs), there were barrage battalions and divisions created in September 1941, but which, oddly enough for our alternative gifted audience, instead of shooting their fighters in the back, they, together with these fighters, took part in battles, including here near Leningrad. And finally, there were also barrage detachments created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD. Now we, in fact, are approaching that very famous order No. 227, which was issued in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Caucasus and Stalingrad. In principle, we have such a widespread idea that the barrage detachments appeared just then. But in fact, as I said, it is not. There it was created another type of barrage detachments, that is, army. Actually, I will quote here this order, No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin, which was given on July 28, 1942. Just with regards to the barrier detachments: “The military councils of the armies and, above all, the commanders of the armies: b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrier detachments (200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters of the divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland. "Alarmists and cowards". Yes, we always have people who, let’s say, have problems understanding Russian speech, they conclude from this that ... It’s easy to blame everyone, yes. Yes. But in reality, there was precisely the idea of ​​​​stopping the fleeing units, and shooting those who sow panic. Including in front of the formation, but not so that from a machine gun and everyone, but selectively. Accordingly, on July 28, this order is issued. In pursuance of this order, on August 1, the commander of the troops of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov gives his order No. 00162 / op, in which, again, regarding the barrier detachments, the following is said: “The commanders of the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies form five barrier detachments within two days, and the commanders of 1 th and 4th tank armies - three barrage detachments of 200 people each. 5. Obstructing detachments to subordinate to the Military Councils of the armies through their special departments. Put the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments. The barrage detachments are to be equipped with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions. Provide roadblocks with vehicles. 6. Within two days, restore the barrage battalions in each rifle division, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919. Defensive battalions of divisions to be equipped with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report on execution by August 4, 1942. As we can see, these new army detachments are being formed here, in accordance with Order 227, and the detachment battalions that have existed in all divisions since September 1941 are also being restored. But since, again, this kind of measures are, by and large, they are needed during a retreat or in defense. Since our army, on the contrary, tried to counter-attack in the winter of 1942 (and in a number of places successfully), there, accordingly, the need for such measures temporarily disappeared, but now these barrage battalions are again being ordered to be restored. Well, there were also barrage detachments at the Special Departments, which showed themselves in the same Battle of Stalingrad. And here I will immediately quote the message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front dated August 14, 1942 “On the implementation of order No. 227 ...”: “In total for specified period time, 24 people were shot. So, for example, the commanders of the squads of the 414th rifle regiment, the 18th rifle division, Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, got cold feet, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by the detachment and, by order of the Special Division, they were shot in front of the ranks. I dare say, the squads remained in place, it was the commanders who abandoned their subordinates and ran to the rear. It happens, yes. Further: “A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-wounded his left hand, was convicted of a crime, for which he was put on trial by a military tribunal. On the basis of order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 people. These detachments are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns. Yes, by the way, I’ll clarify here: this is a report about the 4th tank army, which was part of the Stalingrad Front, that is, three of these detachments were formed in it. “Operational workers of special departments were appointed as heads of detachments. As of August 7, 1942, as of August 7, 1942, 363 people were detained by the indicated detachments and detachments in army sectors, of which: 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds. That is a suspicion of self-shooting. As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 to the staffing department, 73 to NKVD special camps, 27 to penal companies, 2 to medical commission , 6 people - arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people. shot in front of the line." What needs to be clarified here: it turns out that almost more than half of them were returned to their units without any repressions, 43 - not to their own department, but to the staffing department, 73 - were sent to the special camps of the NKVD, which were engaged in filtering prisoners of war, about which I already told you during one of the shows. For checking. And again, for the vast majority of them, this test will end successfully. Well, there, respectively, 27 people were sent to penal companies, 6 were arrested, 2 with suspicious wounds, they will apparently be checked to see how it was received, and 24 were shot. That is, again, instead of a brutal machine-gun execution, people were actually dealt with here and indeed some were subjected to, as they say now, repressions, but to say that these were innocent people and suffered indiscriminately, this is somehow in general ... Well, the key is - they were caught not by machine-gun fire in the back in combat positions during the battle, but detained in the rear behind the front line. In general, according to this order No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, that is, in about two months, 193 army detachments were formed, including 16 of them on the Stalingrad front and 25 on the Don (that is, this actually in the area of ​​the Battle of Stalingrad). At the same time, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, detachments along the entire Soviet-German front detained 140,755 servicemen who had fled from the front line (remember this figure - 140,000-odd thousand). Of the detainees, 3,980 people were arrested (that is, about 4,000), 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points. That is, again, it turns out that the number of people who have been subjected to any, let's say, repression, is less than 10%. The overwhelming number of detainees, moreover, those who fled from the battlefield, they were simply returned to their units so that they continued to fulfill their military duty. Again, let's go back, that is, through simple surveys, they find out who ran, who ran first, who yelled at the same time, "Let's run." Well, with the identified citizens, with the organizers - with alarmists and deserters - it is natural to have a special conversation. Well, what was shot - yes, but what you wanted, here, wartime. Now they will break through and then ten times more will die, so you must be eliminated like mad dogs. Practically it is. Because, indeed, even starting from the time ancient world and the wars of that time, the army suffers the main losses during the flight, and not during the defense. Accordingly, since the Battle of Stalingrad was taking place just at that time, we are interested in what happened on the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front during this period (from August 1 to October 15, 1942) 36,109 people were detained (that is, approximately 36 thousand), but of them: 736 people were arrested, 433 were shot, 1056 people were sent to penal companies, to penal battalions - 33 people and returned to their units and to transit points 32,933 people. That is, the proportion is about the same, even in fact there is an even greater number of those people for whom everything turned out well. Well, in general, it’s quite clear that the battles there are really very fierce, so it really happens that the nerves can’t stand it and begin to recede, but they were simply brought to their senses and returned back. In general, to put it mildly, it is strange: to destroy your own personnel against the backdrop of battles and the advancing enemy. And 15,649 people were detained along the Stalingrad Front, of which: 244 were arrested, 278 were shot, 218 were sent to penal companies, 42 were sent to penal battalions, and 14,833 people were returned to their units and transit points. That is, there is generally a percentage of repressions, somewhere around 5%. Again, here I’ll just give a few examples of how detachments acted on the Stalingrad front during this battle. For example: “On August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control, retreated to the rear in a panic. The detachment under the command of lieutenant of state security Filatov, having taken drastic measures, stopped the soldiers retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines. In another section of this division, the enemy tried to break through deep into the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy. On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in a panic. The head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense. That is, right here, it would seem, this brutal scene - that machine-gun fire was opened, but over the heads of the retreating and as a result, respectively, the soldiers of these two regiments were not shot from machine guns by their own, but were brought to their senses and returned back to their former lines of defense and the enemy was stopped. “On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The consolidated brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized withdrawal. The actions of the detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces brought order to the brigade. The brigade occupied the former lines and, on the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya. That is, here we are, by the way, not the first time we are witnessing a scene when a barrage detachment not only stops the fleeing or delays the retreating fighters and brings them to their senses, but then, together with them, enters into battle with the Germans and, accordingly, also often suffers losses . Actually, this was the case in 1941, say, near Leningrad (I quoted the documents), this was also the case near Stalingrad. Again, here, for example: “On September 13, 1942, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. The detachment of the 62nd Army, led by the head of the detachment, lieutenant of state security Khlystov, took up defenses on the outskirts of an important height. For four days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the approach of military units. Again, after two days, i.e. September 15-16: “The detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought for two days against superior enemy forces in the area of ​​​​the Stalingrad railway station ...” At the same time, although this formation itself is small, as we remember, consisting of two hundred people However, they were able not only to repel the attacks of the Germans, but also to counterattack and inflict significant losses on the enemy in manpower, and held out until the arrival of ordinary army units. At the same time, moreover, as noted in the documents, there was such an extreme situation that the detachments were used as ordinary linear units. Here, on this occasion, it is said as follows: “A number of facts have been noted when barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of formations. A significant number of detachments were sent into battle on a par with line units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were assigned for reorganization and the barrier service was not carried out. Well, further on are a few specific examples when, in this way, barrage detachments were used as ordinary units. At the same time, approximately 65-70% of the personnel suffered losses. And of course, this was not always justified. In general, in order to roughly assess the situation in which these people acted in the same Stalingrad, you can look at a number of award lists that are now posted on the Internet, since we have been running the “Feat of the People” project for several years now. And there you can see how ours, as we say "bloody gebnya", looked from this point of view. For example, senior lieutenant Vasily Filippovich Finogenov, who served as adjutant of the senior battalion, this was the name of the battalion's chief of staff at that time (this is such an army term). Here he is a senior adjutant of the 1st army detachment, born in 1918, Russian, non-partisan: “Working as a senior adjutant in 1 A.Z.O. 62 armies for the defense of Stalingrad, following the order of NPO No. 227, detained about 6,000 soldiers and commanders who were sent to their units to defend the city of Stalingrad ... return them to their units. Further in this award we read the following: “It was ordered by the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 62nd army to close the gap with a detachment, to prevent the enemy from reaching the Volga in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bplant 221. On October 16, 1942, the detachment fought, he personally, on the orders of the head of the detachment, led the battle of the 2nd company and with light machine gun fire destroyed 27 fascists. The mortar crew of the 201st mortar battalion was out of order, he organized mortar firing and did not allow the enemy to accumulate for an attack. There was a case, when bypassing the defense area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe detachment, the Germans attacked him, here he destroyed 6 Nazis with automatic fire. The man was serious. Yes. But, unfortunately, it was. Because for these exploits he was awarded the medal "For Courage", and a few months later he was wounded and died in the hospital. By the way, here again in this barrage detachment there were a number of such people who distinguished themselves at that time. Here, for example, Ivan Ilyich Andreev, a Red Army soldier, fighter of the 1st AZO of the 62nd Army, born in 1925, Russian, non-partisan. As we can see, this is 1942, respectively, he is a maximum of 17 years old, and most likely even 16: “... While serving in a barrage detachment when closing a gap in the area of ​​​​the Barrikady plant, he organized mortar firing of the 201st mortar battalion, calculation which was destroyed and thus did not allow the enemy to accumulate for an attack. Apparently, the two of them acted here just with Senior Lieutenant Finogenov. The following example, again from the same barrage detachment, Stepan Stepanovich Limarenko, political officer of the 1st AZO (army detachment), 62nd Army, born 1916, Russian, member of the CPSU (b): “In the fight against German fascism for the protection of Comrade Limarenko Stepan Stepanovich, deputy political officer of Stalingrad, performing his duties as a fighter of a detachment, under enemy fire, he detained 78 unstable Red Army soldiers who left their defensive positions and tried to retreat. Comrade Limarenko detained them and forced them to take their former lines. Just the functions of the bloody gebni are to stop the Red Army soldiers and bring them back. We read further: ... On October 16, 1942, Comrade Limarenko, together with the Red Army soldier Chernodymov V.P. detained two anti-tank rifles with crews, who, seeing German tanks, left their positions and retreated to the rear of their defense. Comrade Limarenko set up an anti-tank rifle, from which he destroyed three enemy tanks on Sculptural Street. Than the most German tanks failed to get to the Volga. Military Limarenko spoke seriously. And here is an award sheet for the Red Army soldier Chernodymov, who was with Limarenko. Born in 1921, Russian, member of the Komsomol: “Participating in the fight against German fascism to defend the city of Stalingrad, the Red Army soldier Comrade V.P. At the same time, on October 16, 1942, Comrade Chernodymov, together with political officer Comrade Limarenko, detained the calculation of two PTR rifles with rifles that German tanks saw, trying to go to the rear along Sculptural Street to our units, this calculation left their positions and went to the rear. Comrade Chernodymov personally destroyed two enemy tanks with an anti-tank rifle, the rest returned back. Here is the only thing that is not clear. What do they get there? A total of five German tanks were hit, or did they still count each one. But even if, say, three for two, it's still ... A lot. Yes. Because they used anti-tank rifles, that is, in general, this is really a feat. These are the situations. Moreover, there are many such cases described here. For example, two fighters of the 4th detachment of the 62nd Army (that was the 1st detachment, and this is the 4th), they just the next day, that is, on October 17, 1942, saved the ammunition depot, which was located on the shore The Volga, respectively, the Germans bombed it, a fire broke out there, and two fighters, instead of scrabbling, as many would have done in such a situation, they tried to save this warehouse. I will even read the award lists: “Kurbanov Tadzhedin Agalievich. Red Army soldier, fighter of the 4th detachment of the OO NKVD of the 62nd Army. Born in 1919, Lezgin, candidate of the CPSU (b). Being at the post near crossing No. 62 on October 17, 1942, the crossing was heavily bombed by enemy aircraft, as a result, shells and mines were set on fire in the ammunition depot near the crossing. Comrade Kurbanov, despite the bombing and the fact that the ammunition is burning - bursting, rushed to save them. Thanks to his courage and courage, the ammunition was saved." Accordingly, together with him he also took part in extinguishing this fire: “Obozny Nikolai Ivanovich. Red Army soldier, deputy political officer, fighter of the 4th detachment of the OO NKVD of the 62nd Army. Born in 1915, Russian, member of the CPSU(b). Being on October 17 of this year at a post near crossing 62, the crossing and the post where he stood were heavily bombed by enemy aircraft, as a result of which a warehouse with Katyusha ammunition and other shells and mines was set on fire. Comrade Obozny, despite the fact that the shells were bursting, rushed to pull them apart. Thanks to his courage and courage, the fire was extinguished, the ammunition was saved. Comrade Obozny is worthy of the medal "For Military Merit." Stunned. That is, again, as we know, our creators who make our current Russian films about the war are very fond of portraying our special officers or NKVD soldiers as well-fed cowardly creatures who can only hide behind other people's backs. As we can see, in reality, the vast majority of them acted in a completely different way. And indeed, in general, they were not only engaged in the performance of their function of restoring order, but also actually behaved, as befits real fighters. As I already said, in fact, during the Battle of Stalingrad, we observed three types of barrage detachments in action at once: detachments at the Special Departments, small, newly created army detachments and division detachments. At the same time, army detachments and division detachments, they acted closer to the front, i.e. they often went into battle and stopped mass panic on the front line, while detachments under special departments, they were already serving further in the rear, on communications, in order to again filter the contingent that was coming, well, to detain people who deserted or let's say inappropriately there are in the rear zone. Since during the Battle of Stalingrad the concepts of front and rear were already quite arbitrary, because there the Germans pressed us practically to the Volga, such a division of labor was also often not respected. For example: “On October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of ​​the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate infantry brigades. At the same time, among the leading command staff, repeated attempts were observed to abandon their units and cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. Under these conditions, to fight cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd Army created an operational group under the leadership of senior security lieutenant Ignatenko. By combining the remnants of platoons of special departments with the personnel of the 3rd army detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of restoring order, detaining deserters, cowards and alarmists who tried, under various pretexts, to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the operational group detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 privates and officers, and 15 servicemen, by order of special agencies, were shot in front of the ranks. We see the ratio, that is, 800 people were detained, 15 of them were shot before the line, but the rest were simply returned to the line and again continued to fight. Accordingly, if this bloody gebni did not exist, then what would happen - at first the commanders, and then the correspondingly unstable fighters, would try to cross to the other side of the Volga, leaving their positions, as a result could end ... From the point of view of today's civilian people, it seems it would be clear - no one wants to die, and therefore, we will retreat, there we will be alive and will be able to benefit the Motherland more. But the whole trouble is that it was necessary to bring benefit to the Motherland at the moment, standing tightly right here, and not running anywhere. Once you receive an order, you must follow it. Sometimes at the cost of your own life. In general, yes, absolutely. Because, indeed, from the point of view of common sense, you want to be away from the front line, but from the point of view of military duty, you need to follow the order that you have been given. I will give a few more examples from the Don Front. This is a memorandum dated February 17, 1943 “On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943”: “October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, separate units 138 rifle divisions, met by powerful enemy artillery and mortar fire, faltered and fled back in panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion of the 706th rifle regiment, 204th rifle division, which were in the second echelon. By the measures taken by the command and detachment battalion of the division, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the ranks, and the rest were returned to the front line. On October 16, 1942, during an enemy counterattack, a group of 30 Red Army soldiers of the 781st and 124th rifle divisions showed cowardice and began to flee the battlefield in a panic, dragging other servicemen with them. The army detachment of the 21st Army, which was located in this sector, eliminated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous situation. Actually, here what we see, again, the key words are that these 30 people, they did not just run, but at the same time, as it was rightly said, they dragged other servicemen with them. Because, unfortunately, a person, by definition, is a herd creature, as you know, we came from the wild, from social animals, and therefore, everyone runs, then ... "Everyone ran, and I ran." Yes. And therefore, naturally, it is necessary that people be found who would stop this panic and, accordingly, bring to life those who participate in such an escape. “On November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293rd Infantry Division, during the enemy’s counterattack, two mortar platoons of the 1306th Infantry Regiment, together with platoon commanders, junior lieutenants Bogatyrev and Yegorov, left the occupied line without an order from the command and in a panic, leaving weapons, began to flee from the battlefield. The platoon of submachine gunners of the army detachment, who was on this site, stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their previous lines, after which they successfully moved forward. That is, again, as we see, that two alarmists were identified and shot, but at the same time, the rest of the fighters, in general, as they say, came to their senses and then quite successfully fulfill their duty. But, unfortunately, such are the realities that, in general, are far from those ideals of humanism that are preached to us today. Since today it is believed that human life is the highest value, therefore, it is natural that a coward and a selfish person should, apparently, be inviolable. I will give one more example: “On November 20, 1942, during the enemy’s counterattack, one of the companies of the 38th Infantry Division, which was at a height, without offering resistance to the enemy, began to randomly retreat from the occupied area without an order from the command. The 83rd detachment of the 64th Army, serving as a barrier directly behind the combat formations of the units of the 38th Infantry Division, stopped the fleeing company in a panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the height, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy. “That is, as we can see, it was not necessary to shoot anyone here, just roughly speaking, people running in panic had to be stopped, brought to their senses, returned back to the same positions that they occupied, after which they were already quite successfully and steadfastly performed their military duty. I would also note that if they were returned to their positions, then it does not indicate that the Germans had already occupied these positions and they were kicking someone out of there, they simply abandoned the trenches and began to scatter, obeying some kind of, apparently, momentary impulse. We met a detachment, talked and returned back, and sat down again in their places, Well, do not succumb to momentary impulses. This, in fact, is, in general, a quite common situation, and not only during that war, but also in other conflicts, when people can simply simply move away from the fact that there, roughly speaking, panic rumors have spread that we bypassed or simply began to shoot very hard at the front line. The black sheep spoils the whole herd. It's true. Accordingly, the barrage detachments acted in this way during the Battle of Stalingrad. Well, the next such large-scale battle, when, again, our troops had to defend themselves so stubbornly, it, as you know, was the Kursk Bulge. in the summer of 1943. And accordingly, again, detachments participated in this and acted quite successfully. For example, let's say, on the very first day of this battle on the Kursk Bulge, i.e. July 5, 1943: “The 13th Army, the 2nd Battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 15th Division, led by the battalion commander, Captain Rakitsky, arbitrarily left its line and retreated in a panic to the rear of the division, where it was detained by a detachment and returned to battle. » I note: not by machine-gun fire, but by the personnel of the barrage detachment. Accordingly, further: “From July 5 to July 10, 1943, the barrage detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1,870 people. Most of them were military personnel who had lost contact with their units. In the process of filtering them, 6 deserters, 19 self-mutilators and 49 cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield were identified and arrested. The rest of the detainees (that is, almost 1,800 people) were returned to duty.” Here I have such a document as a special message from the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the 69th Army of the Voronezh Front, Colonel Stroilov, about the work of detachments from July 12 to July 17, 1943. What does he report there: “In order to fulfill the task of detaining the rank and file and command and command staff of formations and units of the army who arbitrarily left the battlefield, the Smersh Counterintelligence Department of the 69th Army on July 12, 1943 from the personnel of a separate company organized 7 detachments , 7 people each, headed by 2 operatives. These detachments were deployed in the villages of Alekseevka - Prokhodnoye, Novaya Slobodka - Samoilovka (there are a number of names here, I will not read them out). As a result of the work carried out by detachments from 12 to 17 July with. inclusive, 6956 people of ordinary and commanding staff were detained, who left the battlefield or left the encirclement of enemy troops. Further there, where all these people came from. What was done to them: “It should be noted that the number of detained servicemen, starting from July 15, has sharply decreased compared to the first days of the work of the detachments. If on July 12 2842 people were detained, and on July 13 - 1841 people, then on July 16 394 people were detained, and already on July 17 only 167 people were detained, and then those who had left the encirclement of the enemy troops. The massive retreat of the rank and file, command and command staff from the battlefield by the detachments organized by us, which began at five o'clock on July 12, 1943, was basically stopped at 16 o'clock on the same day, and subsequently completely stopped. Accordingly: “From among the detainees, 55 people were arrested, of which: suspicious of espionage - 20 people, terror - 2, traitors to the Motherland - 1, cowards and alarmists - 28, deserters - 4. The rest of the detainees were sent to their units . In view of the fact that the withdrawal of military personnel from the battlefield has been stopped, I removed the detachments, and their personnel were sent to perform their direct military duties. By the way, here we observe that these were barrage detachments, which were created just under a special department, i.e. what has been in effect since the beginning of the war. Yes, I’ll further explain here that this famous “Smersh” is mentioned here, it was just created the day before, or rather, not the day before, but a few months before that, on April 19, 1943, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD, it was again transferred to the Army and, accordingly, reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Accordingly, people from there, i.e. from Smersh, they acted like this - they stopped those who retreated in such a panic in the face of the enemy. Accordingly, here is another document, a memorandum addressed to V.S. Abakumov on the results of checking the counterintelligence units of the 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front from July 12 to 30, 1943, signed by Colonel Shirmanov: “In order to prevent possible panic and to fight cowards deserting from the battlefield, I, together with the heads of departments "Smersh" of the 13th and 70th armies in all divisions, brigades and regiments, obstacle groups and barriers were organized under the leadership of the operational staff of the armies, corps, divisions. As a result of these measures, about 1300 servicemen who were leaving the battlefield in an unorganized manner were detained in the sector of the 13th and 70th armies, among whom cowards and alarmists, deserters, self-mutilators and other anti-Soviet elements were identified. Most of the military personnel were returned in an organized manner to their positions and took part in the battles. That is, again, we see that it is practically the same as in the previous documents. Well, I'll read another note. Memorandum of the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis, dated August 13, 1943, on the work for July 1943, respectively: 4501 people, of which: arrested - 145 people, transferred to the prosecutor's office - 70 people, transferred to the bodies of the NKGB - 276 people, sent to special camps - 14 people, sent to units - 3303 people. That is, again, it turns out, however, there are still about 2/3, a little more, who were simply sent to their units. Of the indicated number, the Smersh counterintelligence bodies of only one army, where the head of the Department, Colonel Pimenov, detained: elders - 35 people, policemen - 59 people, who served in the German army - 34 people, who were in captivity - 87 people, subject to call to the spacecraft - 777 people. Of these, 4 agents of the German gendarmerie were arrested and exposed. That is, here, among other things, the process of checking our people who have been in the German occupation begins, and, accordingly, one of them could again behave, let's say, wrong. Well, many suffer because they checked those who ended up in the occupied territories. Firstly, everyone left the occupied territories, evacuated to the east, this time. Secondly, once there, you could do very different things, for example, wash the floors in the commandant's office and inform the partisans about what was happening in the commandant's office, or you could serve as a policeman in this commandant's office, walk around with weapons, arrest, shoot fellow citizens. Well, that should probably be the answer. Somehow it doesn’t fit at all, everyone is so white and fluffy, and, probably, in order to reveal this, it is necessary to carry out checks. Probably, in order to carry out checks, some of the citizens must be taken into custody and even, oh, horror! To arrest. The same thing, which is typical, is happening now. By the way, in one of our previous conversations, he just gave an example of one of the check-filtration camps and how the same elders were checked there, and how it turned out that some of them were not even released, but even hired into the ranks of the NKVD. That is, apparently, these were either our agents, or those people who showed themselves so well precisely in that capacity, as assistants to the partisans, underground fighters, that they were, in general, accordingly appreciated according to their merits. Well, those who exactly served the Germans, it was in good faith, so to speak, treating ... From the bottom of their hearts. Yes. Those became “innocent victims of illegal Stalinist repressions,” as we say. Recently, digressing a little to the side, I bought a book called, in my opinion, “Thank God, the Germans have come.” And there are memoirs of some scum named Osipov, they used to be on the Internet ... There is some kind of woman in the occupied city of Pushkin, here we had one near Leningrad ... Yes, I remember one. There is such patented scum that I don’t even know how at all ... well, these are not people ... there is some, you know, a collective mixture of Gozman and Novodvorskaya. Nothing changes. You are bastards of such a caliber that normal person , I don’t know, he won’t sit next to the field. Quiet horror ... And what do you have there, you should have regretted it, or what? But the scum went with the Germans, first to Riga, then to Berlin, and then, of course, as scum should be, ended up in the United States. Well, yes. By the way, we want to analyze this book with Egor separately. Well, returning, in fact, to our topic, since after the Kursk Bulge a radical turning point in the war took place, i.e. Since we have already begun to advance and liberate first our territory, and then the occupied countries of Europe, then, accordingly, the need for such units and subunits that are engaged in defensive service has gradually disappeared. And in the end, on October 29, 1944, an order was issued by People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 0349 “On the disbandment of individual barrage detachments”, which sounded like this: “Due to the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared. I order: 1. To disband separate barrage detachments by November 13, 1944. Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions. 2. Report the disbandment of the barrier detachments by November 20, 1944.” That is, on this, in fact, the combat path of the army detachments ended. Well, it’s clear that the same platoons that were under the Smersh organs continued to operate until the end of the war, because the functions of protecting the rear, respectively, detaining a suspicious element, etc., as if no one removed them in any normal army they in this or that structure are all the same executed. In general, summing up, behold, cruel times, terrible circumstances, they require cruel and terrible measures. An order called "Not a step back!" was known to the troops. There is a wonderful book by citizen Simonov, The Living and the Dead, which, in my opinion, shows very, very well how the servicemen felt about this order, what they thought about it and what they said. It was necessary - it was, it ceased to be necessary - and they dismissed it. By the way, on this occasion, just about what people said, I will quote one veteran, respectively, his memoirs were published somewhere in the zero years. This is a certain M.G. Abdulin, he served in the 293rd Rifle Division during the Battle of Stalingrad. And there was an interview with him, we had such a magazine “Brother”, in my opinion, and now it is still being published: “- Mansur Gizatulovich, tell us how the famous order No. 227 was adopted in the trenches? - It was a stern order. He appeared when the retreat reached the Volga. And he was a strong sobering agent - "Not a step back!" The order stopped the people. There was confidence in the neighbors on the right and on the left - they would not retreat. Although it was not easy to realize: there was a barrage detachment behind you. How did these units work? - I do not know of a case when they would shoot at the retreating. Under the "new panicle" in the first weeks after the order, the guilty fell, and someone not very guilty. I remember that I was sent from the company to observe the execution of seventeen people "for cowardice and alarmism." I had to tell my people about what I saw. Later I saw the barrage detachment under very dramatic circumstances. In the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe heights of Five Kurgans, the Germans pressed us so that we scrambled, leaving our overcoats, in some tunics. And suddenly our tanks, and behind them the skiers - a barrage detachment. Well, I think, here it is, death! A young Estonian captain approaches me. “Take,” he says, “the overcoat from the dead, you will catch a cold ...” Here is such an eyewitness account and there are quite a few such examples. But in general, no one gives examples of how to shoot from machine guns. Only Nikita Sergeyevich Mikhalkov in the cinema. More precisely, how to say, we still have our accusers, they are, as they say, like a fool with a written bag, they are still rushing with a fragment from the memoirs of the tankman Loza, who was a participant in the events when the commander ordered to hit from tank machine guns in front of the fleeing in order to stop them . But then again, at the same time, there are those who tried to brandish it, respectively, either they read the text inattentively, or simply distort it. Because the fire was not to defeat, but precisely in order to stop. Well, they don’t understand such trifles, it doesn’t matter, “everyone was killed anyway.” It really ended up that several people were killed there, but this is ... well, what to do if a unit is running and, accordingly, if these people are not stopped, then the losses will be much greater. As citizen Papanov said: "They will help you, but don't steal." That's it, you don't have to run, you have to honestly fulfill your military duty. Thank you, Igor Vasilievich. About what next time? And next time, then, continuing this topic of bloody gebni, we can consider how our penal units acted and existed: that is, penal battalions and penal companies. Fine. Looking forward to. Thank you. And that's all for today. See you again.

More than once on the website "Feat of the People" I "stumbled" on award sheets dated 1948, 1949. Award for veterans, disabled war veterans, decommissioned from the Red Army due to severe wounds, in the midst of hostilities.
And so, during the next work with the site, I came across a large selection of similar award sheets for "crippled warriors", natives of Penza and neighboring regions. Of course, I became interested in the divisions in which the Watches of Memory are held.
As a result, he found one penzyak from the 202nd division, serving in the artillery regiment, in the spring of the 42nd he was seriously wounded. There was also a fellow countryman from the 61st Infantry Division, but he served in the division of the second formation. And then I saw a document for a soldier from the 167th division. The 520th joint venture was part of it.

The 167th Rifle Division was located to the left of the Penza 61st Rifle Division.
"Testimony of a prisoner
POW Colonel Mark Ivanovich Churikov, Russian, married, commander of the 465th joint venture (167th division, 63rd division) says:
The commander of the 167th Rifle Division was Major General Rakovsky, who after the battle at Zborovo became a lieutenant general. The commander of the 63rd Corps was Major General Petrovsky, who also received the rank of Lieutenant General.
Regiments of the division: rifle 465th, 520th and 615th, 620 gap. 465 Rifle Rifle Division occupied a section of the front west of Rogachev from mid-July and covered 61 Rifle Division with its right wing.
http://voenspez.ru/index.php?topic=35504.0
On the page of the above military forum, there is a minimum of information about the 520th regiment. And nothing at all about the events of July 15, about the day when the Red Army soldier Salnikov was seriously wounded.
http://voenspez.ru/index.php?topic=13211.0
And then the OBD Memorial website became a "tip". There is a "funeral" for a soldier who died on July 15, 1941.

So, something, but cleared up. Now we know where Stepan Stepanovich Salnikov was seriously wounded. He lived a long life, in 1985 he was awarded the jubilee Order of the Patriotic War.
By the way, when I finished writing the draft of the post, I found awards for the seriously wounded from 61 SD of the first formation. I'll post it. Later.