Partisans of Crimea: twice betrayed by the authorities. Partisan and underground movement
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Class hour on the topic: “Partisans and underground workers of the Crimea” Prepared by: Ibragimova A.R. Lecturer GBPOU RK "Dzhankoy Professional College" 2016
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The purpose of the lesson: To expand students' knowledge of the history of the Great Patriotic War, to show its aggressive nature, to draw students' attention to the work of organizing the partisan movement and underground organizations in the Crimea.
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It is sometimes difficult for young people who today exist in a different world - modern, pragmatic, full of loneliness, indifference and struggle for a "place in the sun" to understand how our fathers and grandfathers loved their time, how they rejoiced, despite the difficulties of pre-war life, how they fought for the Motherland, not sparing their lives.
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What do we know about the partisan front in the rear of the Nazi-occupied Crimea? People did not and could not know how long and hard this war would be. But from the first hours they knew that this was their war, the people's war. The homeland was in danger, and they went to its defense, not waiting for anyone's orders, not demanding encouragement and rewards. The partisan movement would have been impossible if the people themselves did not have readiness, determination and strength.
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Partisans are a fighting people, and a people cannot be defeated! The guerrilla movement in the Crimea could not be stopped either by mass raids by the Nazis, or blockades involving large formations of all branches of the armed forces, or continuous combing of the Crimean forests by the Nazis. The Crimean partisans had to operate in an extremely difficult situation, which was due to the geographical position of the peninsula.
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The Crimean partisans were not vulnerable: they were brave and courageous, vigilant and used flexibility during combat operations, used unexpected forms of struggle for the occupiers. They were not the only ones who waged a courageous struggle against the Nazis. During the years of occupation, about 200 underground organizations arose throughout the peninsula. The most active were the underground workers of the capital of Crimea, who created more than 15 groups and organizations. Representatives of underground groups infiltrated the enterprises of the city: a cannery, power plants, the city hospital, the depot of the station at the railway station, and the car repair plant.
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Partisans and underground fighters in Crimea The entire territory of Crimea was conditionally divided into six partisan regions: 1st region (Staro-Krymsky forests, the vicinity of Sudak and Stary Krym): Feodosia, Staro-Krymsky, Sudak and Kirov partisan detachments operated here; 2nd district (Zuysky and Karasubazar forests): Karasubazarsky, Dzhankoysky, Ichkinsky, Kolaisky, Seitlersky, Zuysky, Biyuk-Onlar detachments, as well as Krasnoarmeisky detachment No. 1 and Krasnoarmeysky detachment No. 2 operated here. 3rd district (state reserve) : Alushta, Evpatoria, Simferopol detachment No. 2, Simferopol detachment No. 3 operated here. 4th district (the region of Bakhchisarai and Yalta): Bakhchisaray, Yalta, Ak-Mechetsky, Ak-Sheikhsky detachments and the Red Army detachment No. 5 operated here. 5- th district (neighborhood of Sevastopol): the Sevastopol and Balaklava detachments operated here; 6th district (Kerch Peninsula): three detachments operated here under the general command of I. I. Pakhomov
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The commander of the central headquarters of the partisans of the Crimea, Colonel M. T. Lobov and the commissar of the Northern partisan formation N. D. Lugovoy with members of the headquarters for the analysis of the military operation. August 1942
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Number. In total, in 1941-1944, 62 partisan detachments (over 12,500 fighters), 220 underground organizations and groups (over 2,500 people) operated on the Crimean peninsula. At the end of 1943, a group of Slovak soldiers, commanded by I. Belko, went over to the side of the Soviet partisans from the Lukyanov detachment. In addition, the participants in the partisan movement in Crimea were Romanian anti-fascists - servicemen of the Romanian army who went over to the side of the partisans: in early April 1942, they deserted and joined in the Bakhchisarai detachment, five Romanian soldiers of the 2nd Romanian mountain rifle division on November 9, 1943 in the Zuya area (22 km east of Simferopol) voluntarily surrendered to the partisans of 10 Romanian soldiers, led by an officer, later they remained in the detachment on November 14, 1943 two Romanian soldiers went over to the partisans of the 4th partisan brigade, they were enlisted in the 5th detachment of the brigade
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On October 18, 1942, pilots Yakov Fadeev and Nikolai Kalmykov delivered several bags of crackers and a bag of leaflets to the Crimean partisans on October 18, 1942. The 8th separate aviation regiment of the Civil Air Fleet in 1943 committed 71 departure and transported 29 people and 3.1 tons of cargo The 9th separate aviation regiment of the Civil Air Fleet, providing the Crimean partisans, in 1943 made 100 sorties in the area of operations of the Crimean partisans, in addition, the flights were made by the 1st aviation transport division
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Results In the course of the Crimean offensive operation, the Crimean partisans provided significant assistance to the advancing Soviet troops. sabotage and operations on communications, 349 ambushes and attacks, 163 sabotage and operations on railways, 824 attacks on vehicles and convoys); blew up, derailed and burned 79 echelons and 2 armored trains (in total, 48 locomotives and 947 wagons and platforms were destroyed and put out of action; 29383 soldiers and policemen were destroyed (and another 3872 were captured); three railway stations], three power plants ], two radio stations, 25 military depots, three railway and 52 highway bridges, 112.8 km of telephone cable and 6.6 km of power lines 13 tanks, 3 armored vehicles, 211 guns, 1940 vehicles, 83 carts. 201 vehicles, 40 tractors, 2627 horses, 542 wagons, 17 guns, 250 machine guns, 254 machine guns, 5415 rifles, ammunition and other military equipment.Also, they recaptured 1019 head of cattle, 6661 sheep and 609 tons of food.Also, the Crimean partisans and underground workers were engaged in political work with the population: they published 4 newspapers (“Crimean Partisan”, “For Soviet Crimea”, “Krymskaya Pravda”, “For the Motherland”), as well as leaflets, appeals and appeals. partisans and underground fighters of Crimea published 213 newspapers and leaflets with a total circulation of more than 3 million copies. Over 3 thousand partisans and underground fighters (including 1,500 participants in the partisan movement were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, the head of the Sevastopol underground, V.D. Revyakin, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously).
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Memory The inscription on the plate: “Compounds of the Crimean partisans. North, South, East. Partisans and underground fighters fought against the German-Romanian occupiers and their accomplices from 1941 to 1944.”
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And we will repeat again tirelessly: No need for war, we do not need war. We wish everyone only a peaceful sky, And never lose loved ones, So that there is enough warm bread, And so that we will never see such a war again.
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Heavy battles, the loss of fighting friends, severe "non-Crimean" frosts, hunger - did not break the spirit of the Soviet partisans and underground fighters. Nothing prevented them, the patriots, these courageous, adamant people, from bringing their cause to the Great Victory over the invaders.
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Memory \ Commemorative sign "Partisan Hat" - on the Angarsk Pass [Obelisk of Glory to the partisans of Crimea (the city of Stary Krym, in the park on Lenin Street) - was installed in 1961. Old Crimean underground workers and partisans are buried in the square. Monument to partisans and underground workers of the Crimea (authors - sculptor N. D. Soloshchenko and architect E. V. Popov) - opened on May 9, 1978 in the city of Simferopol, on Kievskaya Street, in the Peace Park. At an altitude of 1025, a historical three-inch partisan cannon of the 1902 model was installed as a monument, from which on July 24-25, 1942, the partisans fired at the punishers. The names of the Crimean partisan formations are immortalized on a memorial plate near the tank-monument to the liberators of Simferopol in the Victory Square in Simferopol Literature and sources
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To underground guerrillas... The great \underground guerrillas of Crimea, You have gone through many difficulties: The bloody sting of death ripened, The death of people close to you. For your brave deeds, For loyalty, fight to the end, We will remember all the courage - And you will always be in our hearts! Accept gratitude, war veteran, The war that engulfed Crimea, The war that came uninvited to visit, The war that went through life, through the heart!
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On May 9, 1978, in Simferopol, on Kievskaya Street, in front of the building of the Mir cinema, a monument to partisans and underground workers of the Crimea was unveiled (authors - sculptor N. D. Soloshchenko, architect E. V. Popov). On a high pedestal is a sculptural composition depicting two patriots. One of them is wounded, but, supported by a comrade in arms, remains in the ranks. The monument symbolizes the indomitable courage of the Soviet people, shown by them in the fight against fascism, their devotion to their socialist Motherland.
Partisan movement in Crimea
Partisan and underground movement in Crimea
In the autumn of 1941, a resistance movement unfolded on the territory of Crimea, which became a response to the terror of the invaders. On October 23, by decision of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement in Crimea (TSSHPD) was formed, and A.V. was appointed commander of the partisan movement. Mokrousov. This choice was not random. During the Civil War, Mokrousov already led the Crimean partisans. S.V. became the commissioner of the TsSHPD. Martynov - Secretary of the Simferopol City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The creation of partisan detachments began. For the convenience of operations, all detachments were distributed among partisan areas. In total, five such districts were created1. On October 30, 1941, the commander of the partisan movement, Mokrousov, issued his first order, which referred to the deployment of combat activities on enemy communications.
The history of Crimea is inextricably linked with the struggle against foreign invaders, and every time the inhabitants of the peninsula showed inhuman courage, steadfastness, and heroism. The Great Patriotic War was no exception, in which the indomitable courage of the Crimeans in the fight against fascism was manifested.
The organizers of the partisan and underground struggle were the Crimean regional committee, city committees and district committees of the party, which, following the instructions of the Central Committee, did a great job of forming partisan detachments and underground groups. By the beginning of November 1941, 29 partisan detachments were created on the peninsula.
In November 1941, soldiers of those units joined the ranks of the partisans, who, covering the retreat of Soviet troops to Sevastopol, ended up in the fascist rear. These were mainly fighters and officers of the 184th Rifle and 48th Separate Cavalry Divisions, units of the Marine Corps.
From the first days of the occupation, the Crimean partisans launched active hostilities. When there were battles near Sevastopol and on the Kerch Peninsula, they provided all possible assistance to the units of the Red Army. Committing sabotage on highways and railways, attacking enemy garrisons, collecting intelligence data, brought victory closer.
During the first period of the partisan struggle, which ended with the end of the heroic and tragic defense of Sevastopol, the units of the people's avengers destroyed over 12 thousand enemy soldiers and officers.
In the summer of 1942, when the Nazis completely occupied the Crimea, the position of the partisans became much more difficult. Given the important strategic importance of the peninsula, the Nazi command concentrated large military forces here. Enemy garrisons stood in almost every settlement. Actively cooperated with the occupiers in their repeated attempts to destroy partisan detachments, local nationalist elements and other renegades. But even when the peninsula became a deep rear, the Nazis failed to extinguish the flames of the people's war. Part of the partisans, by decision of the regional party committee, was transferred to cities and villages - to help the underground. Those who remained in the forests continued subversive work on enemy communications.
Partisans at the grave of comrades who died in battle in the Upper Kokasany region. 1942
By the autumn of 1943, the number of fighters in partisan detachments had increased significantly. Villagers, underground workers, prisoners of war, liberated by patriots from concentration camps, went to the forest. In this, the third, period of the partisan movement in the Crimean forests, there were 33 detachments, united in 7 brigades. On January 15, 1944, the number of Crimean partisans was 3733 people: Russians - 1944, Crimean Tatars - 598, Ukrainians - 348, Georgians - 134, Armenians - 69.
The general management of the activities of the partisans and underground workers was carried out by the regional underground center, which from August 1943 was headed by the secretary of the Crimean Regional Party Committee P. R. Yampolsky. In November, he informed the chief of staff of the partisan movement, the first secretary of the regional party committee, V.S. goes..."
P.Ya. Yampolsky, commander of the Northern Partisans of Crimea, with a group of partisans discussing the operation plan. 1943
During this period, the partisans defeated large enemy garrisons in Zuya, in the villages of Sorokino, Tsvetochnoy, Generalskoye, Monetnoy, Golubinka. Combat operations were constantly carried out on the railways. On the night of September 9-10, 1943, sabotage groups simultaneously blew up the rails in several sections and derailed the enemy train. As a result, traffic on the railways of Crimea stopped for five days.
Winter and spring of 1944 - the period of the most active hostilities of the Crimean partisans. In total, during the war years, the patriots destroyed and captured over 33,000 enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed 79 military echelons, 2 armored trains, dozens of fuel and ammunition depots, blew up 3 railway bridges, captured a lot of trophies.
With the beginning of the Crimean offensive operation, the partisans of Crimea stepped up their actions:
The northern partisan formation operated on the roads Simferopol - Alushta and Simferopol - Karasubazar, only from April 8 to April 13 held over 50 battles.
Partisans of the 2nd detachment of the Northern formation before leaving for a combat operation. 1944
The southern formation fought on the roads Simferopol - Bakhchisarai - Sevastopol, on the southern coast of Crimea, together with the Soviet troops participated in the liberation of Yalta, Bakhchisaray.
Residents of the liberated Bakhchisaray greet partisans, 1944
The Eastern Connection operated on the highway Simferopol - Feodosia and Feodosia - Sudak, together with parts of the Soviet Army participated in the liberation of Stary Krym and other settlements.
On April 13, 1944, servicemen of the 279th Infantry Division, units of the 19th Tank Corps, partisans (17th and 19th partisan detachments of the 1st Partisan Brigade) and underground fighters liberated Simferopol.
On the same day, April 13, 1944, servicemen of the 227th Infantry Division, the 257th Separate Tank Regiment and partisans of the 3rd Brigade of the Eastern Partisan Formation liberated Stary Krym.
Also, on April 13, 1944, partisans of the 2nd brigade of the Northern partisan formation occupied the city of Karasubazar and held it until the approach of Soviet troops.
On April 15, 1944, units of the 16th Rifle Corps and the 7th Brigade of the Southern Partisan Formation (1st, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th partisan detachments) liberated Yalta. On the same day, April 15, 1944, units of the 26th motorized rifle brigade, the 19th tank corps and the 4th brigade of the Southern partisan formation liberated Alushta.
Meeting in the port of Yalta boatmen Lieutenant S. Gusev with the partisans who liberated the city. April 16, 1944
In total, in the period from November 1, 1941 to April 16, 1944, the Crimean Soviet partisans and underground fighters carried out 3226 actions against enemy troops, communications and facilities (including 252 battles, 1632 sabotage and operations on communications, 349 ambushes and attacks, 163 sabotage and operations on the railways, 824 attacks on vehicles and convoys); blew up, derailed and burned 79 echelons and 2 armored trains (in total, 48 steam locomotives and 947 wagons and platforms were destroyed and put out of action); destroyed 29383 soldiers and policemen (and another 3872 were captured); three railway stations, three power stations, two radio stations, 25 military depots, three railway and 52 highway bridges, 112.8 km of telephone cable and 6.6 km of power lines; 13 tanks, 3 armored vehicles, 211 guns, 1940 vehicles, 83 carts.
Partisans in Simeiz, 1944
In addition, they seized 201 vehicles, 40 tractors, 2627 horses, 542 wagons, 17 guns, 250 machine guns, 254 machine guns, 5415 rifles, ammunition and other military property. Also, they recaptured 1019 head of cattle, 6661 sheep and 609 tons of food.
Also, the Crimean partisans and underground fighters were engaged in political work with the population: they published 4 newspapers (“Crimean Partisan”, “For Soviet Crimea”, “Krymskaya Pravda”, “For the Motherland”), as well as leaflets, appeals and appeals. In total, during the period of occupation, partisans and underground fighters of Crimea published 213 newspapers and leaflets with a total circulation of more than 3 million copies.
Over 3 thousand partisans and underground fighters (including 1,500 participants in the partisan movement) were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, the head of the Sevastopol underground, V. D. Revyakin, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously).
1941-1945
From the memorandum of the leadership of the partisan movement in the Crimea to the Commander of the North Caucasian Front S.M. Budyonny on the combat activities of partisans from November 1, 1941 to July 1942.
(spelling and punctuation preserved)
The Crimean Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks instructed the city and district committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to recruit volunteers for partisan detachments, which, in the event of the Crimea being occupied by the Germans, should go into the forest and operate in the rear of the Nazis. Along with this, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Crimean ASSR was instructed to recruit sabotage groups to leave them in the rear of the invaders.
Shortly thereafter, Comrade Bulatov, Secretary of the Crimean All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, instructed Comrade Mokrousov to outline a scheme for the organization, disposition and combat activities of the detachments. In addition, the regional committee ordered the people's commissar of internal affairs, district and city committees of the party to procure food and uniforms, take it all into the forest and base it there. The base from which the volunteers were recruited was the destruction battalions, party and Soviet activists.
The number of partisans was determined by geographical conditions, i.e. the size of the forest area was taken, which could more or less safely shelter the partisans. It was assumed that from 5,000 to 7,500 people could accommodate and actively operate in the Crimean forests. Based on this calculation, a plan was built for the delivery of food, uniforms and weapons. It was assumed that the Germans would not hold out in the Crimea beyond May, so the delivery plan was built for six months: November-April.
Partisans must go into the forest from all regions and cities, except for the regions - Leninsky, Mayak-Salynsky and the city of Kerch, which must remain in the quarries of the Kerch Peninsula. According to the plan, the Crimean forests were divided into five regions: 1st region Eastern edge of the forest - Ortalan, Kapsikhor; 2nd district Ortalan-Kapsihor, highway Simferopol-Alushta.
3rd district highway Simferopol-Alushta, Mangush exclusively Gurzuf. 4th district Mangush-Gurzuf, Biyuk-Karalez, Mukhalatka. 5th district from this line to the western border of the forest. In the 1st district, food should be based and detachments should be placed: Feodosia, Kirovsky district, Stary Krym and Sudak.
The 2nd district is planned for the districts of Ichki, Kolai, Seitler, Dzhankoy, Biyuk-Onlar, Karasubazar, Zuya.
3rd district - two Simferopol urban detachments, Simferopol rural, Alushta, Evpatoria, Telmansky, a detachment of NKVD officers 4th district - Bakhchisarai, Krasno-Perekopsky, Larindorfsky, Yalta, Ak-Sheikhsky, Ak-Mechetsky, Kuibyshevsky.
5th district - detachments of Sevastopol, Balaklava, Freidorf and Saksky. A total of 29 units should arrive. At the end of October, the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved: Commander of the Partisan Movement of Crimea Comrade Mokrousov, Commissar Secretary of the Simferopol Civil Code of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade Martynov, Chief of Staff Major Smetanin, Chief of the First District Comrade Satsyuk, Commissar of the Secretary of the Sudak Republic of the Communist Party of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks ) comrade Osmanov, chief of staff - captain Zakharevich; the head of the second district, comrade Genova, the commissar of the secretary of the Dzhankoy RK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, t Fruslov, the chief of staff, comrade Makal; head of the third district political instructor Seversky, commissar of the secretary of the Central Republic of Kazakhstan of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Simferopol comrade Nikanorov, chief of staff comrade Seleznev;
the head of the fourth district, t Bortnikov, the commissar of the secretary of the Yalta RK VKPb) t. Selimov, the chief of staff, t. Vergasov; Comrade Krasnikov, chief of the fifth district; Comrade Sobolev, commissar; Comrade Ivanenko, chief of staff. The commanders and commissars of the detachments were approved by the city committees and district committees of the CPSU (b).
By November 1, detachments in the amount of 24 arrived in the forest and occupied the areas designated by the heads of the districts. Detachments did not arrive in the forest: Krasno-Perekopsky, Larindorfsky, Freidorfsky and Kuibyshevsky, a detachment of NKVD workers, instead of which came the commandant platoon of the headquarters of the main leadership in the amount of 20 people, staffed by prison workers. Of the comrades approved by the OK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Sobolev, Fruslov, Osmanov, Selimov, Zekirya did not appear for reasons unknown to us, in whose place they were appointed: in the 1st district - Vyalkov from the 48th cavalry division, in the Vasilenko area, in the 2nd district - regimental commissar Popov, Colonel Comrade Lobov was appointed chief of staff instead of Makal, in the 4th district - commissar Amelinov. The number in the detachments was from 100 to 150 people. Subsequently, three detachments were formed from the remnants of military units and single groups of Red Army soldiers remaining in the forest and a commander of three detachments - Gorodovikov, Kurakov, Aedinov, numbering 100-120 people in the detachment. In addition, the rest of the detachments were also replenished at the expense of groups and singles of military personnel. As a result, in November there were 27 partisan detachments with a total number of 3456 people.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the bulk were non-military. As mentioned above, the detachments did not come to the forest: Krasno-Perekopsky, Freidorfsky and Larindorfsky and a detachment of NKVD workers. On November 2, Grinberg took the Telmansky detachment to Yalta, and Krasnikov disbanded the Saki detachment, which went to Sevastopol, explaining this by the decomposition of the detachment. They fled from the forest, but then the commissar of the 1st district Osmanov, the commissar of the Seitler detachment Puzakin, the commissar of the Karasubazar detachment Kaplun returned, and the commander of the Seitler detachment Evstafiev did not return.
Part of the people left the Seitler detachment, which was soon replenished by the military. Vereshchagin was appointed commander of the detachment. In November-December, desertion assumed a threatening character. During this period, 891 people deserted, mostly Tatars. In total, up to July 1942, about 1 (200 people) deserted, mainly from the 5th, 4th, 3rd and 1st districts. The reasons for the desertion were the instability of some elements, the sharp transition of the Tatar population to the Nazis, the desire of some connect with the Red Army (Sevastopol detachment, Feodosia - commissar Yakubovsky, Kirovsky - commander Aldarov, chief of staff Panarin).
Hunger was a terrible phenomenon in the life of the partisans. As mentioned above, the delivery of food was planned for six months. In fact, more was brought in, but as a result of many reasons, a lot of food did not have time to be taken to the forest from transshipments, and it fell into the hands of the Nazis or was dismantled by the local population, and those products that were stored were also mostly looted by the Nazis. In this they were helped by traitors, mainly from the Tatars, who took part in the transportation and basing. The 5th, 4th and 3rd districts suffered the most.
The 5th district, whose bases were on the Mekenziev mountains and in the area of the village of Aytodor, lost bases in the first days, as soon as the Nazis approached there. Soon the same fate befell the 4th and 3rd districts. By January, all detachments, except Evpatoria and Ak-Mechetsky, did not have bases, they ate at the expense of wild animals of the reserve, horses and captured food from the local pro-fascist population, and sometimes received from collective farmers (village Laki). All attempts to seize food from the enemy were unsuccessful, for the reason that the transportation of troops, food and ammunition was and is now being carried out under heavy guard, often with the participation of tanks or tankettes.
There were hundreds of cases when partisans were unable to take anything from damaged cars or wagons, because groups of partisans were attacked by escort groups or groups that quickly arrived at the scene of attack from nearby garrisons. The difficulty of obtaining food in the surrounding villages was that the detachments were located surrounded by Tatar villages, and the Tatar population was hostile to the partisans and was armed by the Germans.
It was difficult to penetrate into Russian or other villages, and especially to take out food, because in all the villages there were garrisons and there were detachments of local fascists.
Sevastopol (Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD of Crimea, comrade Smirnov) knew, through Krasnikov's walkie-talkie and through a live connection, about the famine in the partisan detachments, but did not take measures, and only after Seversky wrote to comrade Oktyabrsky, then in April 1942 began to serve a small amount of food. Other areas were in a better position, but many detachments were half-starved, and they were saved by the fact that food began to be dumped there in early March.
We asked the Military Council of the Caucasian, and then the Crimean Front, to drop food to Seversky, we were promised, but this did not happen until the end of April. As a result of all this, 250 people died of starvation in three districts, and this contributed to desertion. Despite the difficulties experienced by the partisans, the encirclement by local fascists, the presence of large garrisons, and the increased security of the roads, the detachments acted actively, except for the Selikhov landing group, which trailed behind. In addition to many battles in the forest, as well as for the villages of Koush, Ortalan, Baksan and Suuk-Su, the detachments carried out 631 operations, including 124 food operations, 7984 soldiers and officers were destroyed, 787 trucks, 36 cars, small convoys (15- 20 wagons) - 31, tankettes 3, motorcycles 23, tank trucks 22, tractors 6, 2 military train echelons were blown up, 25 bridges were blown up, 400 meters of railway track were damaged, 40 km of cable were cut, fascists and various traitors were shot 441 people.
Our losses: 341 killed, 241 wounded, 110 missing. Due to the fact that the archives of the central headquarters are buried in the forest, it does not allow now to describe the combat activities of each detachment, so we are forced to confine ourselves to summary data.
For 8 months, several mergers of detachments were carried out, as well as the displacement and relocation of the command and political staff. The chief and commissar of the 1st district, Satsyuk and Vyalkov, were dismissed for inactivity, cowardice, and other misdeeds; head of the 5th district Krasnikov; commander of the Zuy detachment Litvinenko; commander and commissar of the Karasubazar detachment Timokhin and Kaplun; the commander of the Kirov detachment Aldarov was shot for corruption and desertion; the commissar of the 2nd district Popov was removed; commander of the Evpatoria detachment Kalashnikov; commander of the 1st Simferopol detachment Soldatchenko; commissar of the Seitler Detachment Puzakin; the commander of the 1st Simferopol detachment, Shchetinin, was transferred to the rank and file, and then appointed chief of staff of the 4th district. Shot by the verdict of the Revolutionary Tribunal for the murder of a wounded soldier, the murder of two lieutenants and for disarming and not accepting 15 Red Army soldiers, subsequently killed by the Romanians, into their detachment, the commander of the Kolai detachment Gubarev and commissar Shtepa.
Shot by the chief of staff of the 5th district Ivanenko, who went over to serve in the Gestapo; the head of the 2nd district, Genov, was removed by the Military Council of the Caucasian Front. The head of the 4th district, Bortnikov, was replaced by Major General Averkin; NKVD Crimean commissar Biyuk-Onlar detachment Feldman was removed. In connection with the appointment of Gorodovikov and Furik, the head of the 1st District Mokrous, Commissar Ponomarenko, was transferred to the detachment. Subsequently, movements were made in connection with the liquidation of the 4th and 5th districts, as well as in connection with the merger of detachments due to the small number of Ichkinsky with Kolaisky, Zuysky with Seitlersky. The best units should be considered:
Feodosia - commander Mokrous, commissioner Ponomarenko; Gorodovikov detachment, Dzhankoy detachment - commander Ryumshin, commissar Klevetov; Ichkinsky - Commander Chub, Commissar Bedin; Kurakov's detachment 4th Krasnoarmeisky; Alushtinsky - commander Ivanov, commissioner Eremenko; Yalta - the commander was Krivoshta, commissar Kucher; Red Army - Commander Aedinov, Commissar Sukhinenko; Bakhchisarai - Commander Macedonian, Commissioner Black; 2nd Simferopol - Commander Chussi, Commissar Tretyak; The Zuysky detachment - commander Kamensky, commissar Lugovoi is in the first place in terms of communication with the population, for intelligence and food supply, as well as the detachments of Chub and Kurakov. Of all the detachments, the 1st Krasnoarmeisky is the worst - commander Smirnov, commissar Polyansky. 4th Krasnoarmeisky - commander Nezamov, commissar Sidorov. These two detachments were formed from the Selikhov landing group.
At present, due to the abolition of the 4th and 5th districts, as well as the merger of some detachments, the number of detachments and the number of fighters is: 1st district - the head of the Chub district, Commissar Furik, detachments 4, number 517 people 1) Red Army No. 2 - commander Isaev, commissar Svinoboev, 2) Karasubazarsky - commander Zaretsky, commissar Kamansky, 3) Kirovsky - commander Pozyvaev, commissar Kryukov, 4) Feodosia - where Sudaksky is poured - commander Mokrous, commissar Ponomarenko.
2nd district - head of the district Kurakov, vrid. commissar Lugovoy, detachments 7, totaling 950 people, 1) Dzhankoy detachment, commander Shashlyk, commissar Kiselev, 2) Red Army No. 4 - commander Mitko, commissar Sidorov, 3) Red Army No. 3 - commander Baranovsky, commissar Egorov, 4) Red Army No. 1, commander Smirnov, commissar Polyansky, 5) Ichkino-Kolaisky, - commander Yuriev, commissar Bedin, 6) Zuysky - commander Kamensky, commissar Mozgov, 7) Biyuk-Onlarsky - commander Nightingale, commissar Orlov.
3rd district - head of Seversky, commissar Nikanorov, detachments 6, total number of 560 people, Simferopol No. 1 - commander Seleznev, commissar Filippov, 2) Simferopol No. 2 - commander of Chussi, commissar Tretyak, 3) Evpatoria - commander Ermakov, commissar Fartushny , 4) Alushtinsky - commander Amelinov, commissioner Eremenko, 5) Sevastopol - commander Zinchenko, commissioner Krivoshta, 6) Bakhchisarai - commander Macedonian, commissioner Cherny.
Platoon at the headquarters of the commander of 38 people, commander Fedorenko, commissioner Boyko. In total, as of July 1, 1942, there are 2125 people. The detachments are provided with food for 7-8 days. The detachments are fully equipped with rifles. There are about 200 rounds of ammunition per fighter, heavy machine guns - 8, Degtyarev - 23, machine guns -56, but not all have cartridges, company mortars -16, battalion -1, 46 mm guns - 88 2.76 mm -2, explosion . about 130 kg of substances, not everyone is provided with hand grenades, well-equipped, but not everyone has an overcoat.
Communication between the main headquarters and the districts, as well as between the headquarters of the districts and the detachments, is exceptionally lively. The headquarters of the districts have messengers with whom they send mail to neighboring districts, and if the mail is intended for the General Headquarters, from the area close to the headquarters, the mail is carried by messengers of this district. For example, a detachment has its own messengers who carry mail to the headquarters of the district and back, the messengers of the district carry mail to the neighboring district either to the leadership of the district, or to the main headquarters, if it is located in this district. Approximately - messengers of the first district, delivers mail to the second district, transfers it to the chief of communications of the district, and he transfers it to the main headquarters through the messengers of the latter who are with him.
The most difficult - communication was carried out by the 3rd, 4th, 5th districts when the headquarters moved to the 2nd district, and when the headquarters was in the third district - the same picture was with the first and second districts. Due to the fact that the roads Simferopol - Alushta, Karasubazar - Uskut are heavily guarded, communication is very difficult.
There were cases, especially in winter, when communication was broken for a month, and in the first days, without waiting for messengers from the 1st and 2nd regions, we had to allocate a special group, which with great difficulty reached these regions, losing two one man (one killed, one missing) and one wounded.
For all the time from November to July, 21 people were killed communicating with the General Headquarters, and 10 between districts. Communication with the mainland was maintained with Sevastopol via Krasnikov's walkie-talkie, liaisons from the main headquarters and the 5th district and liaisons sent by Sevastopol residents . Radio communication was established by the Military Council of the Kav. front, which sent five radio operators with two stations to the 2nd region, the first region received one radio operator in February and one in March, who came with a walkie-talkie from the steppe.
The worst was in the 3rd district. Despite our repeated requests, it was only in May that a radio operator arrived at the Zuysky detachment for Seversky, who was kept by the authorized GO for the Zuysky detachment Kharchenko for more than a month, referring to Kapalkin’s order, and only after our categorical order, the radio operator was sent to Seversky. In addition, communication is maintained by aircraft, and once a group of people arrived in the 3rd district from Sevastopol by boat.
As seen above, the main core of the partisans were volunteers. It was assumed that during the retreat of the Red Army from the Crimea, not all units would have time to cross over to the Caucasian coast and those remaining in the Crimea should settle in the forest. Therefore, even when drawing up the scheme, the question of subordination and possible misunderstandings on this basis came up, especially knowing that discipline requires, in the event of a loss of communication with the immediate superiors, the subordination of a junior in rank to a senior, there was a fear that such bosses would not be found who did not recognize chiefs approved by the regional committee, they will take it into their heads to subjugate all the military, as a result of which a jumble could result.
Therefore, the scheme and our order provided for the subordination of all the chiefs who got into the forest to the leadership of the partisans. Subsequently, in this spirit, an order was issued for the border troops and 51 armies. We learned about this already being in the forest, and even then not officially, but from the words of Major Izugenev and after Major General Averkin. Unfortunately, many commanders and commissars did not want to comply with this order, they tried to break into Sevastopol, as a result, the cadres surrendered, and only small groups managed to get to Sevastopol.
There were no cases of forcible annexation of the remnants of the units, but there were cases when the partisans, knowing that these remnants would not break through to Sevastopol, but would fall into the hands of the Nazis, disarmed those who did not want to stay in the forest. Mokrousov and Martynov themselves held a rally with Izugenev and the commander of the border regiment (I don’t remember the number) Martynenok, but neither Izugenev nor Martynenok remained. As a result, as it became known to us, after that they came to Sevastopol with a small group, consisting exclusively of the chief political staff. All the rest surrendered to the Nazis.
Before our eyes, the remnants of one regiment, retreating through the reserve, surrendered in batches. And two days before that, Mokrousov told the regiment commander that if it was impossible for him to break through to Yalta, he had to stay in the forest. To this, the regiment commander (I don’t remember his last name) replied: “The Nazis will cross this line only over my corpse.”
Despite the desire of the commanders and commissars to break through, about 1,000 people settled in the forest, including the remnants of 48 kav. divisions in the amount of 100-120 people from the Gorodovikov regiment. At the head of these remnants were Commissar Popov and Chief of Staff Lobov. General Averkin, under very mysterious circumstances, fought off these remnants on Demerdzhiyail, made his way to the headquarters of the main leadership and received command over the 4th district, and in December was killed by the Nazis in the Uzenbash area.
The partisans greeted their military comrades as relatives, providing them with all possible assistance with food, clothing and ammunition. Except for the cases in the Kolai detachment, where the detachment commander Gubarev and commissar Shtepa disarmed a group of 13 military men and expelled from the detachment, as a result of which the group died, for which Gubarev and Shtepa were shot. The command and political staff of the Red Army, who fell into the forest, received appointments instead of non-military ones. It was indicated above that the chiefs of staff, the Central Headquarters and the districts were military.
Subsequently, the military led detachments, were appointed to responsible positions in the regions. Popov, Lobov, Vyalkov, Major General Averkin, Aedinov, Seversky Chief of Staff Captain Kalugin, Lieutenant Colonel Shetinin, etc., and now most of the military are on the detachments. Relations with the military are very good, with the exception of Lobov, Popov and Selikhov. Moreover, when rumors reached us about the bad relationship between Popov and Lobov and the former head of the 2nd district, Genov, we wrote to them about it. In response, we received from Popov and Genov a refutation and confirmation of very good relations.
However, after that, the commander of the Dzhankoy detachment, Ryumshin, who died bravely in battle, wrote to us about the unhealthy relationship of this trio. When we came to the headquarters of the 2nd district in February, it turned out that this "friendly" troika was at odds, moreover, Lobov and Popov had dragged Selikhov and a number of other comrades into this squabble. Selikhov's walkie-talkie started working, and soon an order followed to dismiss Genov and appoint Selikhov, a weak-willed and mediocre person, to his place.
Martynov and I called Lobov, Popov and Genov in order to sort things out and reconcile them, but we saw that nothing would come of it. Genov was accused of incapacity, openly called a shepherd, that he did not give food to the military (on examination it turned out that the military received food equally with the partisans) and some other minor sins. If Lobov and Popov did not pursue some goal, they could help Genov in eliminating his shortcomings in military knowledge and work well.
In order to defuse this atmosphere and strengthen the leadership of the 1st district, we appointed Lobov chief of staff there, he became diplomatically ill. Selikhov's walkie-talkie started working, and three days later an order was issued by the Front Commander to leave Lobov as chief of staff of the 2nd district. Having received this order, Lobov instantly recovered.
In order to get acquainted with the political composition and identify the relationship, we gathered all of them for a meeting. Here we were met with hostility by all the commanders and political workers of the remnants of the 48th division. Most of all, they found fault with the words of Mokrousov, who said: “What are you doing with a lousy cavalry division” and said that the behavior of Popov and Lobov double-dealing borders on Trotskyism.
Moreover, the expression "lousy division" did not refer to the 48th division, and not to the existing remnants, which Lobov and Popov identified with the former division. We knew about Gorodovikov as a good commander from the stories of his fellow soldiers who were in the detachments of the 3rd district, and from the reports of Genov, so we had in mind to give him the 4th district. When this was discussed, Gorodovikov obeyed.
Here Popov came out and introduced himself as the commander of a division, which is subordinate only to him and no one can dispose of it without his knowledge. However, we did not agree with this statement and appointed Gorodovikov the head of the 4th district.
Apparently, Selikhov's walkie-talkie started working again, and on the 3rd day we received an order to create a military group, which included Gorodovikov's detachment with the subordination of this group to Selekhov. When checking the detachments, it turned out that Popov kept Kaplun, who had thrown away his party card, as commissar of the Karasubazar detachment.
When working out our order to intensify actions, he began to engage in quiet squabbles, aggravated relations between the military and non-military, had a concubine, and messed around. All this forced us to raise the question of replacing him, which happened; the Military Council appointed Buskadze in his place. After his dismissal, instead of honestly working, he was idle (report to Buskadze), gathered the offended (Kvashnev, Kasyanov, Egorov, Polyansky and others), intrigued and engaged in projecting. Having received the appointment of the commissar of the II district, he, having come to the Headquarters, began to swear obscenely to the head of the district Kurakov, the leadership of the partisan movement, wrote an order to transfer the translator Bella Trakhtenberg, Lobov's concubine, from our detachment to his disposal, wrote an order to remove the commissioners from work OO, appointed by us, and about the appointment of others in their place, including the loafer Kasyanov, and when he came to land at the landing site, he tried to forcibly put Kvashnev on the plane out of turn, threatened with a stick and scolded the deputy. Martynov, authorized by us for evacuation, Domnin (See the material sent by us to the Special Department of the Front). This open revolt of Popov outraged us, Mokrousov arrested Popov and handed him over to a military tribunal, about which he informed you by telegram on the same day.
Lobov is an elusive intrigue, if not worse. All his work is aimed at inciting and making things worse. He slandered us to the Military Council of Crimea. Front, accused us of persecuting the military, adhered to and inspired the commanders to devote more time to reconnaissance, which essentially amounted to disrupting the operation. He adhered to the tactics of keeping the detachments in a heap, while moving our headquarters, he drove Selikhov's detachments after us, contrary to our orders. On orders from the Kokasan region, a detachment of Gorodovikov and Kurakov should withdraw to Terka, and he drove this detachment and the military.
When our headquarters moved from the Kokasan region in May, Selikhov himself suggested the idea of conducting a food operation in the villages located north of Kazanly.
We have approved this plan. Instead, Selikhov drove the 2nd detachment to the Terke region, and when Mokrousov gave Selikhov a scolding for this, he said that he had received Lobov's order for this. Colonel Lobov refused this. When Selikhov fell ill, Martynov and Lobov went to him to talk about his and Buskadze's evacuation, he agreed subject to your permission, and when Lobov wrote an order for the temporary release of Selikhov due to illness, Lobov began to tell Mokrousov that the order was written incorrectly, since there was no report from Selikhov.
To Mokrousov’s remark that you said that you spoke to him, “no, I didn’t say that,” Lobov lied. This pissed off Mokrousov, and he cursed him and said in a fit of irritability: “T. Soroka, shoot Lobov." But no one shot him, and Mokrousov would not have allowed it. It must be admitted that Mokrousov acted very, very badly here.
T. Bulatov raised the question, what is our opinion if the partisan detachments are divided into two independent regions with direct subordination to the mainland. We write to the Great Land because we still do not know to whom we are subordinate. Directives were sent to us by the Military Council of the Crimean Front, the Crimean Regional Committee of the Party, the Primorskaya Army, the NKVD of Crimea, and now the Military Council of the Cavalry. front. All this stunned us, and we did not know "which god to pray"! This must be put an end to and the partisan movement must be subordinated to one leadership.
The question of separation is difficult for us to resolve. Of course, in the presence of good regular communication by radio and air with the body to which the partisans are subordinate, and the difficulties of communication between the areas separated by the Simferopol-Alushta highway, dismemberment would, perhaps, be useful, and since we have no reason to hope for this, then the abolition of the unified leadership in the Crimea may have a detrimental effect on deeds, and even if such people as Lobov and Popov end up at the head of the administration of independent regions. For these reasons, we cannot offer anything.
Prospects for replenishing people and supplying detachments Unfortunately, we began to establish contact with the population of the steppe regions only from April. Before that, it was almost impossible, since we had neither clothes nor documents with which our people could travel from the forest, and in winter it was impossible to walk hundreds of miles with an overnight stay in the field. For these reasons, we knew only by hearsay about the life and mood of the peasants.
As for the Tatar population of the mountainous regions, from the first days of the occupation of the Crimea by the fascists, the vast majority of them followed the fascists, which excluded the possibility of us doing work other than undercover. After establishing contact with the village, it was established that the overwhelming majority of the peasants were Soviet-minded, but terror had strangled them so much that people were afraid of each other and even close relatives.
Even before that, the Zuysky detachment, thanks to the energy and popularity of the commissar of the detachment, Comrade Lugovoy, had close ties with the collective farmers of the Zuysky district, especially with the village of Barabanovka, from where he drew various information and food, and subsequently almost all the inhabitants of this village went into the forest to Lugovoy . When we established contact with the steppe regions, about which see below, it turned out that the peasants were not averse to partisan and go into the forest, but fear for the families that the Nazis would destroy if their relatives went into partisans held them back.
At that time, the Nazis had not yet had time to rob the village completely, and there was food that would have been given to the partisans, but it was not possible to organize its delivery to the forest due to strong developed espionage, the lack of horses and the difficulties associated with transportation, especially through the Simferopol highway. Feodosia, heavily guarded, and passing Tatar villages. Now this situation has worsened due to increased surveillance and terror, the lack of food among the collective farmers and there is no hope for a harvest, since only seeds can produce a harvest, so the only source is the delivery of food to the Crimea from the Kuban.
Collective farmers will go to the forest with their families, which cannot be allowed. In particular, our agent came to us from the village of Besheran in July and asked whether it was possible to lead people into the forest. We said - only without families. Went to negotiate with them. How this issue will be resolved is hard to say. Our opinion boils down to the fact that there will be an influx of people into the partisan detachments, and it can be organized provided that family members are evacuated from the forest to the mainland and the supply of food is increased.
Thus, the population will also act against the fascists in the steppe. The cadres of the partisans, having survived the famine, are overwhelmingly sick and exhausted. For these reasons, people are unlikely to hold out for long, especially if Crimea is not liberated before winter. Therefore, the question arises of replacing them with new, fresh people, which in practice can be done without much difficulty. The change of people can be done by air with a landing of TB on Karabi Yayle and by sea with the approach of a boat between Otuzy-Kozy, Novyi Svet, Kapsikhor and at Semidvorye. There are no such opportunities in the Seversky district. These points have been explored, and now it is only necessary to resolve this question in practice.
Our opinion in this case boils down to the following: a) Kurakov and Chub give the order of approach for boats. b) Boats go to these points with people and food. c) On the shore they are met by armed people with packs plus those to be evacuated. d) The disembarked people and detachments lift the load on themselves and on packs and go with it to the camps.
Organize underground work in the Crimea began in April m-tse. For this, politically literate comrades with organizational abilities were selected and sent to the regions as party representatives. We decided that in order to avoid the possibility of provocations and betrayal, we should not immediately create party groups, but began with the creation of groups of Soviet patriots, and only after the comrades showed their devotion to our cause in concrete deeds, create party groups from among them ...
Organized groups launched propaganda work among the population and for this purpose they used newspapers and magazines delivered to us in the forest. The groups were given the following tasks: to carry out agitation and mass work among the population, to organize and carry out work to disrupt various kinds of enemy measures, to carry out acts of sabotage, to recruit new members, etc.
According to the data received from the district representatives, one can see a new increase in oppression and terror by the Nazis over the population. All food, livestock, poultry and clothes are taken from the population. From "voluntary" methods of confiscating the population for export to Germany, the occupiers switched to methods of undisguised violence. They give a layout for the settlement, the headman supplies the stipulated number of people for export. Intolerable conditions have been created for the population, and if they do not go to the partisan detachments, it turns out that it is because the Gestapo launched a demagogic agitation about the massacre by the partisans of anyone who appears in the forest.
And there are those who want to go to the partisans. This is in the presence of our agitation, which is not yet firmly established. We gave instructions to the district party representatives to oppose our Soviet truth to the fascist demagogy. Organize explanations to the population about the actual state of the war, about the atrocities of the invaders, about the facts of the political and economic lack of rights of the population, that the partisans are cracking down and will crack down on the occupiers and traitors of our people, and that the partisans will gladly meet everyone who wants to help them in their selfless fight. Consequently, there is a base for replenishing partisan detachments.
It is only necessary, through skillfully and energetically staged agitation, to awaken the idea among the population about the need for a merciless struggle against the invaders, by any means and under any conditions, to show the population on the concrete facts of the atrocities of the Nazis that the only way out for our people from lack of rights. Comrade Davydkin especially reports on undercover and intelligence activities.
Basically, the work consisted of: they gave intelligence data, according to which the command of the Crimean Front could fully determine the intentions of the enemy and build their operational plans. In particular, from our reports on the grouping of tank formations in the Koktebel-Feodosia-Stary Krym triangle, it could be unmistakably judged that the enemy was aiming his main blow at our left flank. So it was before the Kerch catastrophe and before the fall of the hero - Sevastopol. Unfortunately, as rumors reached us, many of our radiograms, which provided important intelligence about the enemy's preparations for an attack on Kerch, were deciphered after the fall of Kerch. So it was or not, it is necessary to check.
In March, at the request of the Military Council of the Crimean Front, we presented a list of especially distinguished partisans for an award. A total of 67 people were represented, and the Military Council did not require characteristics for those represented. So far, the show has not taken place. At the same time, all those nominated by Selikhov for the award have already been awarded.
Commander of the Crimean partisan movement Colonel (Mokrousov)
Commissioner Secretary of the Simferopol Civil Code of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Art. battalion commissar (Martynov)
The partisan movement in the Crimea (November 1941 - April 1944) is one of the brightest, tragic and in many ways little-known pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. It played a significant role in the struggle of the Soviet armed forces for this strategically important region, both during the defensive battles on its territory in 1941-1942. and during his release in 1943-1944. In fact, during the period of complete occupation of the peninsula, the partisans of the Crimea were the third front in the rear of the German-Romanian troops and, according to the military leadership of the Wehrmacht, posed a significant threat to communications.
At the same time, the partisan struggle in the Crimea was associated with a large number of victims on the part of the patriots, and repeatedly experienced difficulties that were not characteristic of the partisan movement in other regions of the Soviet Union. As a result, having been organized even before the start of the occupation, by the end of 1942 the Crimean partisan movement was reduced by almost ten times, more than three and a half thousand of its participants died in combat clashes with the enemy, and also died of starvation.
But the struggle was not curtailed, and, using many external (victories of the Soviet troops on the fronts, strengthening the role of the peninsula in the plans of the command of the Red Army and Navy, the deployment of targeted supplies from the mainland) and internal (the growth of consciousness of the masses, changes in the occupied territory, the preservation of combat cores of partisans) factors, having passed the ordeal of the winter of 1942-1943, the partisan movement in the Crimea turned around again, and as a result, actively participated in the preparation and liberation of the Crimean peninsula from enemy troops and their accomplices. Researchers divide the history of the Crimean partisan movement into three stages: 1st - from November 1941 to October 1942. During this period, the Crimean partisans provided active assistance to the besieged Sevastopol and Soviet troops who landed on the Kerch Peninsula. 2nd period - October 1942 - July 1943 - this is a period of operations deep behind enemy lines and at the same time losses, a significant reduction in the partisan movement; 3rd period - July 1943 - April 1944 - a new rise in the partisan movement, the growth of partisan structures and numbers, military and propaganda activities, which made a significant contribution to the liberation of Crimea.
Although the partisan war in the Crimea in 1941-1944. was an integral and integral part of the entire partisan movement in the occupied territory of the USSR and had common features (for example, leadership by party bodies; the principle of voluntariness in recruiting partisan formations; multinational character, etc.), however, there were also features that allowed speaking about her character. These features had a historical development, were in complex interaction and manifestation.
Geostrategic position of Crimea
The strategic importance of the Crimean peninsula, both for the USSR and for Germany, led to a particularly fierce struggle for its possession. The Soviet ground forces, in cooperation with aviation, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla, carried out four front-line operations for two years and eight months: the Crimean defensive (October - November 1941), the Sevastopol defensive (November 1941 - July 1942) , the Kerch defensive (May 1942), the Kerch-Eltigen landing (October - December 1943), and two strategic ones: the Kerch-Feodosia landing (December 1941 - January 1942) and the Crimean offensive (April - May 1944 G.) . During these operations and in the intervals between them, underground organizations and groups, detachments, regions and formations of the Crimean partisans fought against the German-Romanian invaders and collaborators from the local population on the peninsula. In the course of the above hostilities, over one and a half million people took part from the Soviet side alone (including more than 12 thousand partisans and 2,500 underground fighters), and human losses (irretrievable and sanitary) amounted to more than 820 thousand people (including about 5,000 partisans and 700 underground workers).
Military-geographical and natural-climatic features. The geographical position of the Crimea predetermined its complete isolation from the "Great Land" - the territory occupied by Soviet troops, in the event of the complete capture of the peninsula by the German-Romanian invaders. In this regard, serious problems immediately arose with the organization of communications, supplies and leadership of the partisan movement on the part of the military and party structures that were outside the Crimea.
The terrain, although heavily rugged and covered with forest, did not really represent a reliable shelter, being small in area (about 2000 sq. Km (100 - 135 km by 20 - 30 km)) and cut through by roads (which provided access to mobile units and entire military units of the occupiers in almost any corner of the mountain ranges). Along all highways, highways and at the end sections of local communications there was a significant number of settlements suitable for placing garrisons of the occupying troops and creating strongholds. Climatic conditions were especially difficult in winter and lack of drinking water in summer.
Socio-demographic structure of Crimea in the period before the occupation and during the occupation.
According to the 1939 census, the population of the Crimean ASSR was 1,126,385 people, of which about half lived in cities, half in rural areas. The national composition was distinguished by ethnic and religious diversity and included representatives of more than 70 nations and nationalities. The most numerous were: Russians and Ukrainians (up to 60%), Crimean Tatars (about 20%), Jews, Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians. Within the mountainous and foothill Crimea, which accounted for about 10% of the entire area of the peninsula, 10 out of 26 administrative districts of Kr were located. ASSR, including seven of them national Tatar: Alushta, Balaklava, Bakhchisarai, Karasubazar, Kuibyshev (Albat), Sudak and Yalta. In total, in 882 settlements and two cities of republican subordination (Simferopol and Yalta) of this zone, there were 471,343 inhabitants, including Russians and Ukrainians - 247,024 (52%) and Crimean Tatars - 145,139 (31%) people representing the main groups population. At the same time, in seven national regions, the number of Tatars reached an average of 56%.
After the eviction from the peninsula in August 1941 of the Crimean Germans (51,299 people), the partial evacuation of the population to the eastern regions of the country (more than 270 thousand people), the conscription into the Red Army and the Navy up to 93 thousand people, of which at least 40 - 45 thousand were killed and wounded in battle, and also taken out of the Crimea along with the retreating Soviet troops, the total population decreased by more than 366 thousand people (32%). Tatars lived mainly in rural areas and, not showing a desire to travel to the eastern regions of the country, remained in places of permanent residence, in connection with which the ratio of Tatars in the mountainous and foothill Crimea with other ethnic groups of the population increased and by the beginning of the occupation amounted to 63-65 %. Thus, the partisan zone, covering the mountainous forest part of the Crimea, was forced to be surrounded by settlements, most of which were predominantly inhabited by Tatars. After the beginning of the occupation, the efforts of the command of the German 11th Army and punitive authorities in the use of accomplices from the local population in the fight against partisans, of course, immediately began to acquire a Tatar orientation, as evidenced by modern research.
After the end of the civil war, a significant number of citizens of the former Russian Empire settled on the peninsula, who did not have time to leave in November 1920, together with the remnants of the Russian Army and the Black Sea Fleet, to neighboring countries and did not have sympathy for the existing system. Extremely unpopular in the Crimea, the measures to resettle the Jewish population here in the mid-1920s were aggravated by the policy of violence during the forced creation of collective farms, in resolving the national question, in relation to religion (both Christianity and Islam), the clergy, and the local intelligentsia. In general, at that time there were many dissatisfied with the Soviet regime.
National relations
Another extremely important factor that complicated the activities of the partisans was the suddenly manifested and previously unpredictable attitude of a part of the local population towards the occupiers, and this applied not only to individuals, but to entire groups of this population. In particular, Manstein in his memoirs noted the following: “The Tatars immediately took our side. They saw us as their liberators from the Bolshevik yoke, especially since we respected their religious customs. A Tatar delegation came to me, bringing fruits and beautiful handmade fabrics for the liberator of the Tatars "Adolf Effendi". Such friendly meetings took place all over the Crimea. For example, the commander of the Sudak partisan detachment E. Yusufov, himself a Crimean Tatar, reported in his report: “During the occupation of the Crimea by the German army, in particular, the Sudak region, according to intelligence in the village. Ai-Serez, Raven, Shelen, Kutlak, especially in Otuz, a special meeting was organized by the majority of the population for the Germans. The meeting was made with bouquets of grapes, fruit treats, wine, etc. This number of villages can include vil. Kapsichore..."; other leaders reported the same.
Manstein, like other German sources, depicts the case in such a way that local figures from among the Crimean Tatars took the first step towards the "liberators". However, apparently, this was preceded by a certain undercover work of supporters of the German orientation both in the Crimean Tatar environment and in exile. At the same time, it should be noted that such professional efforts of the Abwehr organs of the 11th Army and Einsatzgruppe-D turned out to be quite effective and seriously hampered the formation of the partisan movement, as they pushed a significant part of the partisans, especially residents of foothill and mountain settlements, to leave the detachments without permission.
In addition, on the other hand, unprovoked in the first days of the occupation by any unfriendly actions of partisans in relation to the local population, the spontaneous and unpunished plunder of food and property by the inhabitants of near-forest villages at the crossing points and bases of some detachments created a precedent by which the occupation authorities and their high-ranking accomplices pushed a significant part of the anti-Soviet population of the villages surrounding the partisan zone to a real robbery of the food and material bases of the other detachments, which ultimately led both the population of these villages and the partisans to the most difficult consequences.
During the organizational period, the regional committee of the CPSU (b), the NKVD and the Soviet authorities of the Crimean ASSR began to prepare the underground and the partisan movement, relying mainly on local resources, the remnants of human reserves left after several mobilizations and evacuations and the experience of old partisans - participants in the civil war. In addition, it must be taken into account that the OK of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet bodies, in addition to preparing the partisan movement and the underground, had other equally important tasks: mobilization; evacuation of the population, industry, cultural values; ensuring the participation of the population in defensive work; the formation of the people's militia, destruction battalions; organization of repair and production of military equipment; harvesting and transporting agricultural machinery, surplus food and cattle to the eastern regions of the country; organization of a network of hospitals on the basis of sanatoriums on the southern coast of Crimea, etc. . In some areas, partisan detachments were provided on a residual basis, which inevitably affected the qualitative and quantitative indicators.
Subsequently, based on the above factors, as well as due to the almost constant location of the party and economic bodies of the Crimean ASSR outside the peninsula (Caucasus, Krasnodar Territory), the emphasis in the material support of the partisans shifted to local resources (food, logistics) and union ( weapons, communications, etc.) levels. This additionally changed and, as a result, increased the role of interaction between Crimean structures and local ones - party, economic, military.
Preparation time
Unlike the border republics and regions of the western part of the USSR, which were subjected to a sudden attack, hostilities began directly in the Crimea only at the end of October 1941, thanks to which the party, Soviet bodies and the NKVD Kr. The ASSR had more than four months to assess its capabilities, the rapidly changing situation, get acquainted with the emerging experience of partisan struggle, determine the tasks ahead, create the infrastructure of the partisan movement and the underground, select and train reliable personnel for them. Although there were quite serious miscalculations in organizational terms, unlike many partisan regions of the USSR, a large-scale partisan war quickly unfolded in Crimea. The commander of the German-Romanian forces, the future Field Marshal Manstein, said best of all about its scope: “The partisans became a real threat from the moment we captured the Crimea (in October-November 1941). There can be no doubt that a very extensive partisan organization existed in the Crimea, which was created for a long time. Thirty fighter battalions... represented only a part of this organization. The bulk of the partisans were in the Yayla mountains. There were probably many thousands of partisans there from the very beginning ... The partisans tried to control our main communications. They attacked small units or single cars, and at night a single car did not dare to appear on the road. Even during the day, the partisans attacked small units and single vehicles. In the end, we had to create a whole system of peculiar convoys.
But what was the description given to the Crimean partisans by the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement at the headquarters of the Supreme High Command P.K. Ponomarenko on May 9, 1975, in a conversation with the illustrious commander of the 1st brigade of the Northern Connection of Crimean partisans, F.I. Fedorenko: “We in Moscow called you God’s martyrs ... and it was a marvel that you, adapting to the situation, despite difficulties and losses, already in the forty-first and early forty-second, that is, without buildup, conducted active military operations against the enemy and provided significant assistance to the troops defending Sevastopol, to the landings of the Red Army landing in the Crimea ... ".
Enemy actions
Namely, the professional efforts of the occupation administration (regular troops of the German 11th Army, the Romanian mountain corps, the forces of the punitive and repressive apparatus of the SD and numerous accomplices of the invaders). In the zone of action of the 11th Army, a whole system of anti-partisan measures quickly arose, which was then used throughout the German army on the Eastern Front. Well-known partisan experts C. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn believed that the fight against partisans was best organized by the 11th Army, but even this system did not eliminate the threat from partisans throughout the German occupation of Crimea.
In addition, it should be noted that large enemy military formations were almost always in the Crimea, especially at the end of 1941 - the first half of 1942, and at the end of 1943 - the beginning of 1944, which also took part in the fight against partisans; throughout the entire period of occupation, the punitive-repressive apparatus and intelligence agencies of Germany and Romania were actively operating.
Desertion.
This feature followed from the previous factors; According to modern researchers, in five partisan regions and a group of Kerch detachments, until November 15-20, 1941, detachments of 901 partisans (28% of the number of those who initially went into the forest and quarries) left without permission, which basically corresponds to the SGR data for November-December 1941 on this issue. In the report of A.V. Mokrousov to the commander of the North Caucasian Front and secretary of the Kr. OK VKP(b) dated 20.07. 1942, it was noted: “In November-December, desertion took on a threatening character: 1200 people deserted ... The reasons are instability, a sharp transition of the Tatar population to the Nazis, the desire of some to join the troops of the Red Army.” At the same time, it should be taken into account that some partisans, especially from the military, left the detachments in order to break through to Sevastopol, which at that time was incorrectly qualified by the command of the partisan movement of Crimea as desertion. Sometimes quite high-ranking partisan leaders turned out to be deserters, for example, the chief of staff of the 5th district Ivanenko, the head of the commandant platoon of the central headquarters Lukin, the chairman of the tribunal Vereshchagin, the chief of staff of the Bakhchisarai detachment Dostmambetov, the commander of the group of the 2nd Simferopol detachment Saidashev, the commissar of the Sudak detachment A.Izmailov, the commissar of Balaklavsky Detachment Betkeliev and some others .. There are known cases of leaving the locations of entire detachments. So, after the first military clash with the enemy, the Saki partisan detachment left for Sevastopol, the Telman detachment, during the days of the occupation of the Crimea by the Germans, went from the place of deployment (and blowing up their bases) to Yalta, led by Commissar Grinberg.
The difficulties of waging a guerrilla war in the Crimea and especially extreme conditions of survival, and sometimes repressive measures of the command, led to cases of desertion in the future, but it was not of a massive nature, as in the initial period.
But not only because of desertion or unauthorized actions, the partisan movement in Crimea already at the stage of formation lost more than 1000 personnel with stocks of weapons, ammunition, food and logistics, which amounted to 33% of the entire partisan movement of Crimea. The rapid breakthrough of the Perekop fortifications by the Germans led to the fact that out of 29 detachments, four did not reach their places of deployment at all (Krasnoperekopsky, Larindorfsky, Freidorfsky and a detachment of NKVD workers, from which only the headquarters commandant platoon appeared). None of the created I.G. appeared in the forest. Genov from the inhabitants of the southern coastal Crimean Tatar villages of detachments in the zone of the 2nd district. Some of the partisan leaders did not come either, in particular, the commissar of the 4th district M. Selimov, recalled at the last moment to the disposal of the regional committee.
The consequences of such a “withdrawal” were compensated by military personnel from the 51st (mostly), Primorsky armies and the Black Sea Fleet, who were surrounded and wished to join the partisans. In total, 1330 fighters were accepted, including 438 people of the commanding staff, which made it possible to replenish small detachments, strengthen the command of the regions and some detachments, and by November 17, 1941, form an additional three Red Army partisan detachments. Subsequently, several hundred military personnel fell into the forest after the battles near Feodosia and Sudak (participants of the Kerch-Feodosia and Sudak landings, respectively). Alas, the existing ideas about the breakthrough in June-July 1942. to the Crimean partisans of the defenders of Sevastopol are not documented, but there are memories of a single such case (although there were several cases of Sevastopol residents who escaped from captivity later falling into the detachments).
Even more than desertion, the damage to the partisan movement was caused by the loss of food bases by partisan detachments at the end of 1941-1942. According to Mokrousov's data, the bases were laid on the basis of feeding 5-6 thousand people for up to six months, and in some places even more (4th partisan district). Only sheep driven from the steppe regions and left in the collective farms of the foothill villages of the SNK Kr. The ASSR for the needs of the partisan movement accumulated up to 20 thousand heads, not counting pigs and cattle. The prepared stocks were supposed to ensure, during the specified period, the normal allowance of the partisan detachments and the conduct of effective military operations by them without any outside help. However, due to the irresponsible attitude of many party and Soviet leaders, insufficient control over the progress of the delivery and shelter of food and, most importantly, the absence until the last days of October of the headquarters of the partisan movement and the headquarters of the regions, as well as due to the extremely small number of bases and vehicles allocated by fighter battalions, only 60-70% of everything imported was covered (buried in the ground), and 30% remained on the surface.
However, by the beginning of 1942, even these bases were mostly lost. I.Vergasov explained this by the criminal negligence of the persons responsible for basing: “The trouble is that the selection of people who were engaged in bases by the district committees and regional branches of the NKVD was not a party one, but often treacherous. How else can one explain such facts as: the bases were located close to the villages, they had good access roads for vehicles, and the people who harvested in the bulk fled in the first days of the occupation. The defeat of the bases was facilitated by the fact that a large amount of food was not taken deep into the forest, but was concentrated on the so-called. transshipment bases near roads. In addition, everything was not so simple with the laying of bases. There were detachments that camouflaged bases exceptionally poorly and did not even prepare them, but there were also those who coped well with this task. So, a detailed analysis of the situation with the bases shows that their fate depended mainly not on how they were hidden, but on other factors. A.V. Mokrousov, who had just returned from the forest, spoke about this at a meeting of the secretariat of the Crimean OK of the CPSU (b) in July 1942: many detachments had well based their products. For example, the detachments of the 3rd district, the Sudak detachment, however, these bases were given out by traitors and plundered by the population under the protection of the Germans, and, for example, the detachments of the 2nd district did not have time to hide food in the forest and did this already during the battles with the invaders, so nevertheless, it was these units that lasted the longest without starvation. The point, apparently, is that in the Zuysky district there was no such scale of betrayal.
These circumstances led to the emergence and growth of famine, which became a real nightmare for partisan detachments. At first, people supported their existence by hunting wild animals, but they were quickly knocked out, then roots, tree bark, moss, skins and the remains of previously fallen cattle, which were dug out from under the snow, were used; the fighters cooked and ate leather posts, belts, etc.; the lack of salt was especially acute. Deaths began due to exhaustion, which by the spring of 1942 had become rampant. Until March 1942, only in the so-called "Death Camp" on the Abduga Ridge (Crimean Reserve), 53 partisans died of exhaustion.
Today, one can only roughly estimate the extent of this tragedy, the data of the reports vary significantly, but are equally striking. According to the report on the combat operations of the partisans of the Crimea for 11 months of 1942 (until December, i.e. without two months of 1941), the losses of the partisans were estimated by their command as follows: partisans lost 898 people killed, 473 missing, dead from hunger - 473 people, i.e. For every two people killed, there is one death. A similar picture emerges from the report of I. Vergasov, according to which by July more than 150 people had died in the detachments of the 4th and 5th districts. - this is also more than the detachments of these areas lost killed in battle, which were 120 people. According to archival data, only in the winter of 1942 in the detachments of the 3rd, 4th, 5th districts, up to 400 people died of starvation. . These data appear to be closer to the truth. This forced the commander of the Crimean partisan detachments, Colonel M.T. Lobov (he replaced Mokrousov in July 1942) to write in a report on the results of hostilities that “In the 3rd district, it came to a disaster. There, 362 people died of starvation, and in 11 cases there were facts of cannibalism. It should be noted that Lobov's report is the only source that speaks of such a large number of facts of cannibalism (cannibalism here should be understood as the use of parts of the corpses of those killed in battles or dead people, that is, corpse-eating), only one episode appears in the memoirs. and in archival documents there are several, but this in itself quite eloquently illustrates the terrible picture in the partisan detachments.
In March-April 1942, on the eve of the expected offensive of the Crimean Front from the Kerch Peninsula, the front command was able to support the partisans by airlifting food; the same was done from Sevastopol. Mortality was stopped, although the famine did not stop, but after the defeat of the Crimean Front in May, and especially after the fall of Sevastopol and the transfer of hostilities to the North Caucasus, when the airfields that existed in the Kuban were evacuated even further to the east, hunger broke out in partisan detachments again. Already in August 1942, mortality due to exhaustion began again, claiming dozens of lives. From then on, almost until the autumn of 1943, hunger was a constant companion of partisan life. In the terrible winter of 1942-1943. the famine also brought the entire partisan movement to the brink of disaster. In particular, in a radiogram from P. Yampolsky to V. Bulatov on February 17, it was reported: “The presence of people on February 17 is 266 people, of which 32 are in long-range reconnaissance, 20 are incapacitated. Our losses since October 25, 1942. (date of active evacuation of partisans from the forest - T.S.) - 167 people, of which: 37 in battles, sabotage -1, reconnaissance - 3, food operations - 59, starved to death -57, shot -10 ". Later, due to the growth of the partisan war and the transition of a large part of the local population of mountain and forest villages, changes in relations with volunteers from among the Tatars (some of whom went over to the side of the partisans), as well as increased supplies, the famine receded, but according to the memoirs of the partisans, satiety did not have to live.
Of course, the famine was caused both by the lack of a constant supply from the mainland, and by the relationship with the hostile population of the forest villages, and in the minds of the partisans was strongly associated with the defeat of food bases in late 1941 - early 1942, when the Crimean partisan movement lost more than 60% of food and means of logistics, which did not allow partisan areas and detachments to function without outside help.
The role of aviation
The study of archival and published documents, memoirs of partisans and aviators, materials of scientific and periodical press allow us to draw a general conclusion that Soviet aviation made a significant contribution to the development of the partisan movement in the Crimea in 1942. (when it was feasible to provide the partisans of the Crimea and establish the foundations and principles of interaction), decisive importance - in the most difficult period of the partisans' activity at the end of 1942. - the first half of 1943. (supported the Crimean partisans in the exceptionally specific conditions of their combat and daily activities) and the most important influence - during the deployment of military operations of partisan formations in the second half of 1943. and the liberation of the Crimea from the German-Romanian invaders (aviation practically contributed to the deployment of the partisan movement and was used most actively at this stage, performing the tasks of supply and combat support). In the conditions of the Crimean peninsula being behind enemy lines, from March-April 1942 to April 1944, the Crimean partisans were assisted by aviation of various groups: fronts, the Civil Air Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet. About 1000 successful sorties were carried out for the entire time, 725 tons of ammunition, food, medicines, uniforms and other cargo were delivered to the active partisan detachments. 1311 wounded and sick partisans were taken out from the partisan detachments. 545 people of the civilian population, who were hiding from the repressions of the Germans, were taken out of the rear of the enemy. 521 people of command and political staff and special groups were thrown into the active partisan detachments and the rear of the enemy. For landing aircraft, the partisans found and ordered seven landing sites in the mountainous forest part of the Crimea, but for the most part three were used. Opposition to the flights of Soviet aircraft by the enemy was ineffective and virtually ineffective, not a single aircraft was shot down by German aircraft or captured by blockers of landing sites. Aircraft losses were only in accidents of a different nature due to the influence of natural and human factors and amounted to 22 aircraft. During the entire period of interaction, the Crimean partisans, through the mediation of aviation, delivered to the command a large amount of intelligence information, and intensified combat and propaganda activities. For the partisans and residents of the Crimea, the plane became a symbol of connection with the country, an important factor in the psychological confrontation.
Given the above features, it is necessary to dwell on the results of the guerrilla war in the Crimea. In total, in 1941-1944, 80 partisan detachments (over 12,500 fighters), 202 underground organizations and groups (over 2,500 people) operated on the Crimean peninsula.
Between November 1941 and April 16, 1944, Crimean Soviet partisans killed 29,383 soldiers and policemen (and captured another 3,872); conducted 252 battles and 1632 operations (including 39 raids and shelling, 212 ambushes, 81 sabotage on railways, 770 attacks on vehicles), destroyed and disabled 48 locomotives, 947 wagons and platforms, 2 armored trains, 13 tanks, 3 armored vehicles, 211 guns, 1940 vehicles, 83 tractors, 112.8 km of telephone cable and 6,000 km of power lines; seized 201 vehicles, 40 tractors, 2627 horses, 542 carts, 17 guns, 250 machine guns, 254 machine guns, 5415 rifles, ammunition and other military property. And although modern researchers question the numbers of enemy manpower losses, nevertheless, it is necessary to note the main political and psychological result: all 923 days of occupation in Crimea, the struggle of patriots did not stop and de facto there was a legitimate Soviet power in the person of partisans.
1500 members of the partisan movement were awarded orders and medals, the head of the Sevastopol underground V.D. Revyakin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). It is important to note that the "winged partisans" were completely forgotten. On April 10, 1942, his flight - for the first time to the Crimean Reserve from Sevastopol - was made by Guards Lieutenant F.F. Gerasimov, commander of the 3rd air squadron of the 6th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. For the feat, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 14, 1942, Gerasimov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 860). So, F.F. Gerasimov was presented with an award for the first flight to the partisan forest from Sevastopol. Among the Crimean partisans, no one was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, although eight people were represented. Therefore, the high award awarded to F.F. Gerasimov, one of the first "Crimean air partisans" is unique in the partisan movement in the Crimea, and once again emphasizes the role and importance of aviation in its formation, support and deployment.
The history of the partisan movement in the Crimea is known to us today quite schematically and in a vein typical of Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War, where coverage of one side of the matter prevailed - the heroism of the participants in those events. As for a number of difficult moments in the history of the partisan movement, related, in particular, to the miscalculations of the command, the shortcomings in the organization of the partisan movement and the supply of partisans, internal contradictions in the leadership of the movement and such a phenomenon as collaborationism, they, as a rule, were not mentioned by historians and authors of memoirs for ideological reasons. Without begging for the significance of what was done earlier, we still have to state that we, a generation that did not know the war, today have an extremely poor idea of one of the key moments in our history, and numerous gaps in our knowledge are rapidly being filled with all sorts of conjectures and myths. Therefore, having considered impartially and comprehensively the features of the partisan movement in the Crimea, I would like to hope that people, realizing the past, will not stop thinking.
Sergey Tkachenko,
historian, ethnographer
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